Foreign Policy In Focus

Cross-posted from Other Words.

When Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis returned from his second tour in Afghanistan, he knew that what he'd witnessed firsthand didn't match the rosy progress reports that top military officials were giving Congress.

What Davis decided to do next could be called courageous or, perhaps, idealistic. The 17-year Army veteran put his career at risk by speaking out for what he felt was right — he publicly called out his superior officers on their assessments of the war.

Specifically, Davis alleged that top commanders had misled Congress and the public. He briefed four members of Congress on his version of events and sent reports he authored, one unclassified and the other classified, to the Department of Defense Inspector General.

Then, he took the extraordinary step of bringing his story to light: He did an interview with The New York Times and authored an op-ed for the Armed Forces Journal. His unclassified report was linked to by both Rolling Stone and the Times. With all of this national coverage of Davis' report, which alleged that senior military officials have lied to Congress about conditions on the ground, you would think that Congress would be jumping at the opportunity to hold hearings. At least six members of Congress have come forward publicly supporting Davis, but no hearings have been scheduled.

It's incredible that Congress has virtually ignored Davis' allegations that it's been misled. You might expect that the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, or Intelligence Committees would jump at the chance to hold hearings on Afghanistan and ask Davis to testify. But you'd be wrong.

Why should we listen to Davis? He's a soft-spoken, unassuming soldier who was described in one evaluation as someone whose "devotion to mission accomplishment is unmatched by his peers." Davis also made the point that he is no "WikiLeaks guy part II"— he's made a concerted effort to protect classified information.

"Entering this [most recent] deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing towards self-sufficiency," Davis wrote in his op-ed. "Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on every level."

In Davis' 84-page unclassified report, he outlined the misconduct he perceived among senior officials in Afghanistan after interviewing a reported 250 soldiers — from low-ranking 19-year-old privates to division commanders. He alleged that the March 2011 congressional testimony by Gen. David Petraeus on the surge in Afghanistan ranged from "misleading" to "completely inaccurate." Petraeus is now the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Additionally, according to Davis, the "inaccurate assigning of the reason for the 2007 Iraq surge's success had profound implications for our current war in Afghanistan and doubly so for the surge forces ordered by the President in late 2009." One senior ground commander who led much of the U.S. fight in Anbar province told Davis that "75 to 80 percent of the credit" for the success in Iraq's surge lay elsewhere.

A bipartisan group of representatives sent a letter on Feb. 14 urging House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to hold hearings on Davis' allegations because they are supported by the 2011 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan. The 2011 NIE has not yet been declassified, but two members of Congress sent a letter to President Obama in February asking that he declassify it.

According to The New Yorker, which also called for the document's declassification: "[The NIE] is said to raise doubts about the authenticity and durability of the gains the military commanders believe they have made since Obama's troop surge began in 2009. The findings also raise questions about the Administration's strategy for leaving behind a stable Afghanistan."

The lawmakers' letter is on target. If taxpayers are to get a full picture of what's happening on the ground, Obama needs to declassify the National Intelligence Estimate. Additionally, whistleblowers like Davis shouldn't be dismissed once the media fanfare has died down. His allegations should be seriously considered in congressional hearings. With the cost of the Afghanistan War climbing far past the Obama administration's estimate, the public deserves to hear the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but.

Dana Liebelson is the Beth Daley Impact Fellow at the Project On Government Oversight.

On Friday March 23, 2012, Staff Sgt Robert Bales was charged with 17 counts of murder, six counts of attempted murder and six counts of assault. This is a result of what Fox News has called “the worst allegation of killing of civilians by an American in Afghanistan.” On March 11, Bales allegedly had been drinking prior to attacking two villages near his base in the Afghan villages of Balandi and Alkozai, where he murdered nine children and seven adults. He was moved first from Afghanistan to Kuwait and is currently waiting trial at the military prison in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The BBC says that Bales is seeking defense for "diminished capacity" because he doesn’t remember the crime, he had already completed three tours in Iraq, and had received brain and body injuries in previous tours. Prior to the rampage Bales had seen his friend’s leg blown off and was drinking. Other excuses cited by the Kansas City Star were that Bales had just been passed over for promotion, was experiencing stress with finances and in his marriage, and had been working at the Joint Base Lewis-McChord, known for being “the most troubled base in the military.” These rationalizations could have major implications for the military administration.   

For example, Bales shouldn’t have been enlisted for a fourth tour if he was not physically and psychologically capable, which he is clearly arguing he was not.  On top of that he had been drinking which could have increased Bales’ memory loss and is against U.S. military orders. However, if the rampage were a symptom of PTSD, then the United States is not doing enough to offer the psychological support the troops need. Providing that support is crucial to the success of overseas operations. The Huffington Post argues that the United States had no choice but to stretch what knowledgeable military it had thinly. This is understandable, but it hardly seems worth it when considering the ramifications.

This incident fuels the social upheaval that has resulted from NATO and U.S. Army personnel accidentally burning several Qurans. The Taliban says Bales won’t get a fair or speedy trial. In fact the trial could be drawn out for years. They say Bales was not the only one involved in the incident. The Taliban thinks that the murders were premeditated and carried out by a group of individuals. Therefore, in their eyes the justice process is already flawed. The results of the rampage and following process are undermining U.S.-Afghan relations, Taliban peace talks are off, and Karzai has yet another reason to demand early withdrawal.

Arguably, Bales is not the only one who should be on trial right now. Military protocol and the psychological health of personnel should also be called into question.

Less than a week after the Qur’an burning incident protests have spread to Pakistan and caused at least thirty casualties. Early Monday morning nine people were killed in a suicide car bombing at Jalabad airport -- six civilians, two airport guards and one soldier -- while six others were wounded. In the city of Kunduz on Sunday Afghan demonstrators threw a grenade at a U.S. base, wounding seven American troops.

Saturday, two US advisers were shot and killed execution style while sitting at their desks in the Afghan Interior Ministry. Time magazine says a countrywide manhunt is subsequently underway. By Tuesday more than 3,000 people assembled throughout the Kabul area to protest the damaging of at least 100 Qur’ans. Seven were killed and many others were injured. Officials worry that violent protest will continue to grow and spread. CBS proposes that Americans have given the Taliban one more chance to instigate dissent. One protester in Kabul says, "When the Americans insult us to this degree, we will join the insurgents."        

The incident is only further polarizing the Americans and the Afghans. The LA Times sadly illustrated U.S. progress in the Middle East by calling the Qur’an-burning riots “one of the most sustained outbreaks of civil unrest in Afghanistan since the start of the war”! Paddy Smith says the events highlight structural issues involved in adequately training local security forces, as the U.S. and NATO have required for withdrawal in 2014. Nearly a decade into the latest war in the Middle East foreign forces continue to be plagued by a lack of cultural or linguistic understanding.

The burning of at least 15 Qur’ans incited riots on NATO’s Bagram Air Base Monday February 20^th, 2012. Two unidentified NATO personnel delivered bags of Qur’ans that were suspected of aiding Parwan detention inmates in communicating with extremist intent. Consequently they were moved from the detention facility to the base landfill for incineration. When the Qur’ans were thrown on the fire, Afghan employees frantically took them out, angrily spreading news of the folly. Mr. Shafaq showed that the inside of the Qur’ans had no evidence toward extremist collusion. Therefore, it is still uncertain why the holy books were burned so nonchalantly or why those involved in the burning were unaware of the consequence of their action. Many employees were conflicted about keeping their jobs. One Afghan man said he couldn’t work for his enemies and another feared he would be killed as a traitor. This issue will have economic repercussions for the local community as well as complicate NATO-Afghan relations on and off the base.

President Obama, Panetta and NATO commander John Allen all apologized for the misunderstanding. Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum are both criticizing the recent apologies. Gingrich says that the Afghans do not deserve an apology and that it is Karzai who should be apologizing to Americans. One Kabul demonstrator says, “We don’t care about Obama’s apology. We have to protest to be responsible to our god. They are burning our Qur’an. An apology is not enough.” The Afghan defense and interior ministers canceled his trip to Washington, but Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Kabul told CNN that everyone would remain committed to a U.S. partnership with the Afghan people. However, at present such relations are at a standstill as the U.S. embassy in Kabul is locked down, travel is suspended, foreign advisers at the Ministry are cutting back their hours and adapting the length of their contracts, while U.S. troops desperately work to reestablish trust. Furthermore, the LA Times fears that these events will result in a premature exit that doesn’t adequately address women’s rights.

It should be understood by now that such a sign of disrespect would upset Afghan employees. Cultural trainings include PowerPoints, mock villages and Afghan villager role-play, computer-based decision making trainings with several scenarios. Unfortunately the Qur’an burning event shows that augmentations in cultural training have not been enough to avoid inciting violence in an extremely delicate situation. The official solution is to have NATO personnel complete cultural sensitivity training on how to properly handle religious texts by the beginning of next month in addition to an investigation. This solution seems unlikely to be effective when one considers that personnel should have already undergone cultural trainings. Additionally, Georgetown University professor of cultural anthropology Rochelle Davis said, “it’s an impossible task to put before a U.S. soldier to recognize the Qur’an from another book. They don’t know Arabic. How are they going to recognize the Qur’an?”     

However, Davis also says that in general, Iraqis and Afghans are tired of being disrespected. For example, they don’t approve of how U.S. troops bring dogs into their homes or touch their women because these are culturally offensive actions. Shopkeeper Wali Aziz says, "They [U.S. troops] are careless with our holy things, and they are careless with our country." Davis says Iraqis feel that foreigners have dismissed their abilities to run their own country. This does not bode well for local ownership or other necessities of nation building. Furthermore, researcher Martine van Bijlert writes, "This is part of a wider struggle over what kind of society Afghanistan is becoming, over who the custodians of religious power will be and what they will use it for." The solution continues to miss the more crucial issue that foreign troops continue to offend locals thus creating reasons for them to turn against U.S. troops to support the Taliban.

Julia A. Heath is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

"It is time for a change of mission in Afghanistan," write Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Dr. Andrew Exum, and Matthew Irvine in a policy brief for the Center for a New American Security. For those unfamiliar with CNAS, IPS Special Project Right Web describes it as:

… one of the Barack Obama administration’s key outside think tanks on national security and defense policy. … John Nagl … CNAS president, is a retired army officer who specializes in counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. The Inter Press Service described Nagl as “a poster boy for COIN enthusiasts, including influential neoconservatives."

The CNAS trio continue.

U.S. and coalition forces must shift away from  directly conducting counterinsurgency operations and toward … advising and enabling Afghan forces to take the lead in the counterinsurgency fight. … Since 2009, coalition forces have achieved significant operational successes in Afghanistan, reversing the Taliban’s momentum in many areas and greatly expanding the size and capability of the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]. … Yet these gains, achieved at significant cost in blood and treasure, must ultimately be sustained by the ANSF.

Based on interviews with field commanders in Afghanistan conducted over the past 12 months, we are not confident that most U.S. and NATO commanders have come to grips with the reality of the impending U.S. and allied transition. U.S. commanders are focused less on partnering with their Afghan allies and more on fighting the Taliban. … While there is an energetic program in place to recruit, train, organize and equip Afghan forces, there is no similarly focused and adequate program to advise these same ANSF forces in combat operations and to thus maximize their effectiveness. … Afghan military forces have not played a leading role in Afghanistan since the war began. The vast majority of military operations in Afghanistan today are conducted by U.S. forces. … Conventional Afghan security forces tend to perform only ancillary missions such as holding areas that have been cleared and partnering with coalition units to put an “Afghan face” on counterinsurgency tasks.

In other words, the coalition won't let the ANSF take off its training wheels. Repudiating, or, more accurately, shedding, counterinsurgency is a big deal for "COIN-dinistas" CNAS, Nagl, and Exum. Before we continue, here's a working definition from the Counterinsurgency Army Training Manual (2006) of counterinsurgency, one of those words that has become part of the zeitgeist without many of us understanding exactly what it entails.

A counterinsurgency campaign is … a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.

As you can see, one can be forgiven for failing to understand exactly what counterinsurgency is, both because it covers a lot of ground and because in practice its requirements keep shifting.

Meanwhile, for those COIN-dinistas who feel betrayed, Exum wrote a post at his popular blog Abu Muqawama titled Just to be clear, COIN isn't going away.

As the United States draws down in Iraq and Afghanistan, you can cut some of those ground forces … that you need for large-scale, resource-instensive [sp.] counterinsurgency. … But it is a mistake to assume the U.S. military will never fight these wars again. We've done that before, with disastrous results. Ignatius [the Washington Post columnist]:

There’s a consensus in the country that the big expeditionary ground wars of the past decade should end, and Panetta has his budget priorities right. But it would be wrong to repeat the mistake that followed the Vietnam War, when hard-learned counterinsurgency tactics were jettisoned in favor of conventional weapons for fighting quick “winnable” wars. During the COIN years, the Army and Marines learned how to adapt and fight in the most difficult environments. What a waste if those skills, acquired at such cost, were discarded and lost. 

Defense budget eventually permitting, Somalia and Yemen, here we come!

"Not everyone is outraged by the NATO airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers," I wrote at Focal Points yesterday.

In other words, Pakistani insurgents got NATO, with its helicopters and fighters, to do its work for it and attack Pakistani military forces, as well as sow yet more discord between Pakistan and the United States. 

Others celebrated the attacks too. At the Guardian, Saeed Shah and Jon Boone write that Afghans who in Kunar -- the incident occurred on its border with Mohmand, Pakistan -- "said they were delighted by the strike against the bases, saying they believed Taliban fighters were being harboured by the Pakistani army."

Though

Pakistan says there were no militants operating on its side. … Coalition and Afghan troops believe they received fire from insurgents operating from close to the Pakistani post, which is located 300 metres into Pakistani territory. A senior Afghan official told the Guardian that a combined Afghan-Nato squad had received incoming fire from 'the so-called Pakistani post", prompting them to call for air support. "The most important point here is that they were receiving fire from the direction of that post." … Afghan and coalition officials have accused Pakistan repeatedly in the past of failing to act to stop Taliban militants using its territory.

We'll give the last word to Qari Ehsanullah Ehsan, a Kunar tribal leader, who said "The people of Kunar are happy. We have been telling the Americans for a long time that the Pakistanis are bringing the Taliban to our villages."