Focal Points Blog The trees, not the forest

Entries Tagged "Arms Sales"

Cross-posted from the Arabist.

The U.S. is not so much ignoring the Arab Spring (since it cannot be ignored), but viewing it in the larger context -- i.e., our cold-hot war with the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1979 to the present. As one U.S. official told the WSJ when asked how arms sales to the U.S.'s Arab allies were being impacted by domestic unrest, the response was, "We in the military are poised to get back to normalcy," i.e., arms sales that send a clear message to Iran (ironically, when Warren G. Harding first used that word in 1920, it was followed up by a major reduction of the U.S. armed forces' strength). 

From Reuters:

The Pentagon is considering a significant sale of [4,900] Joint Direct Attack Munitions [JDAMs] made by Boeing Co, adding to other recent arms deals with the UAE. These include the sale of 500 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles about which U.S. lawmakers were notified in September.

The sale of Boeing-built "bunker-buster" bombs and other munitions to UAE, a key Gulf ally, is part of an ongoing U.S. effort to build a regional coalition to counter Iran.

The JDAMs are compatible with the UAE's strike aircraft, specifically the U.S.-made F-16s that comprise a large part (3 squadrons, around 80 aircraft) of the UAE's airforce, which sits astride Persian Gulf waters facing Iran. The U.S. airforce maintains a small logistics base in the UAE. 

The UAE, according to The National and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, was the world's "fourth-largest arms buyer" in 2009, ranking ahead of Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, particularhbly in purchases of fighter aircraft. The U.S. is the UAE's main source of arms purchases, followed by France.

While neoconservatives are increasingly blasting the Obama Administration for "green lighting" Iranian ambitions by appearing weak and indecisive, the U.S. has expanded arms sales to its Gulf allies since 2008. In 2010, a US$60 billion arms sale with Saudi Arabia went through, the largest single arms sale in U.S. history to a single country. The only stalled measure in this arena is that a US$53 million arms deal with Bahrain announced in October is now being held up pending a human rights commission's report (expected to come out on November 23). The suspension is the result of U.S. embarrassment over the fact that weapons from an earlier US$200 million arms sale might have been used against demonstrators.

In addition to these arms sales, preexisting and forthcoming contracts with the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia will see more missile defense systems heading to these states. Once the withdrawal from Iraq is completed, the U.S. will retains its important Fifth Fleet naval base in Bahrain, the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (which the UK also uses), the Indian Ocean Diego Garcia facility, and approximately 40,000 soldiers spread throughout GCC states. A planned "CIA drone base" aimed at the Horn of Africa and Yemen, but likely capable of participating in an action against Iran, is reported to be under construction somewhere in the region. 

It's no NATO, but it's got teeth. Whether it bites or not is another story.

Paul Mutter is a graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

TaiwanF-16The recent decision by the Obama Administration to sell $5.8 billion in arms to Taiwan is a bit of a head scratcher, rather like the hunter who goes into the woods with one bullet. Seeing a deer to his left and a turkey to his right, he shoots in the middle. It will annoy Taipei, irritate Beijing, stir up the China bashers in the U.S., and increase tensions in a region of the world that is already pretty tense.

So what’s the point here?

The plan would upgrade Taiwan’s 140 U.S.-made F-16 A/B jet fighters, plus supply Taipei with Blackhawk helicopters and anti-ballistic missiles. The Obama administration has more than doubled the Bush administration’s arms sales to Taiwan, and this sale would bring that figure to slightly more than $12 billion.

Taipei had asked to buy 66 new F-16 C/Ds, but the White House turned that down, annoying the Taiwanese. “These years, China is showing stronger and stronger reaction to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales,” complained Taipei’s deputy defense minister Andrew Yang, and that has turned Americans “more wary with arms sales.”

While PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing “firmly opposes the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,” China’s reaction was generally low key, certainly more so than when a similar arms sales went through in 2008. Then Beijing canceled joint military consultation with the U.S. and put capital-to-capital relations into a deep freeze for many months. After a similar arms sale in 2010, Chinese military leaders went as far as to suggest that China cash in some of American’s $1.1 trillion debt to Beijing.

While the White House can’t get bi-partisan agreement on the budget, it brought Republicans and Democrats together on this issue. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tx) have joined hands to introduce legislation demanding that the administration sell the new F-16s to Taiwan. The Taiwan Air Modernization Act cites the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for providing defensive weapons to Taipei and resisting any effort by the PRC to forcibly reunite Taiwan with the mainland.

Cornyn thundered that the decision to upgrade rather than sell was “capitulation to Communist China” and a “slap in the face to a strong ally and a long-time friend.” In language straight out of the Cold War, a Cornyn-Menendez letter to Obama—signed by 13 Democrats and 23 Republicans—warned that a failure to sell the new fighter aircraft means “Taiwan will be dangerously exposed to Chinese military threats, aggression and provocation, which pose significant security implications for the United States.”

A similar letter, signed by 181 House members, also demanded that Washington approve the sales of new F-16s.

Tucked in amidst the “red dragon” scare rhetoric is pork: “We are deeply concerned that further delay of the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan could result in closure of the F-16 production line,” the letter argues. Lockheed Martin, maker of the aircraft, has a plant in Cornyn’s Texas, and the company employs 750 workers in Menendez’s New Jersey. The company is the largest arms manufacturer in the world and has a formidable lobbying presence in Washington.

In many ways the whole matter seems mired in the past, particularly the letter’s warning that Taiwan risked losing its “qualitative advantage in defensive arms.” Taipei has not had a “qualitative advantage” over the PRC in any category for the past two decades. Even the Taipei Times writes that “Taiwan would have at most only a few days to hold off China and get help from the outside, most likely the U.S., if they were going to stand any chance.”

According to the Pentagon, the PRC’s fighter aircraft fleet outnumbers Taiwan’s 1,680 to 388, and many of the latter’s planes are obsolete. Besides the 140 F-16 A/Bs, Taipei's forces include 1960s vintage F-5s (its day is long past), 60 aging French Mirage 2000s (vintage 1982), and 130 domestically produced, but underpowered, Indigenous Defensive Fighter, the “Ching-Kuo.”

The PRC’s fleet features Sukhoi-27 and Sukhoi-30—the latter a match for the U.S.’s premier fighter, the F-15—and China’s domestic fighter, the J-10. A J-20 stealth fighter is in the testing phase but will not be deployed until 2017. Upgrading the F-16s, or even selling Taiwan new ones, will not alter this balance.

The PRC maintains that Taiwan is part of China (and virtually no country in the world, including the U.S., disagrees) and reserves the right to use military force if Taipei tries to establish independence. But “reserves the right” is very different than ramping up the landing craft. Indeed, China has carefully lowered nationalist rhetoric around Taiwan and cross-straits ties are warmer than they were three years ago.

Current Chinese President Hu Jintao has pushed rapprochement with Taipei, but as the Financial Times points out, “his approach to Taiwan is not uncontested within the Chinese Communist Party,” and it notes that “the Party is also preparing to elect a new generation of leaders next year.” That new generation tends to be more nationalistic than the older generation.

The PRC’s armed forces mirror currents in the Communist Party, with a wing that advocates a more assertive role—at least in local waters like the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea—and a more cautious wing that wants to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.

Similar currents exist within the U.S. military establishment, although the Pentagon’s “caution” wing has recently gone silent because of all the talk about cutting military spending. Much of the recent “China threat” talk is aimed at derailing efforts to cut the huge military budget, and, to that end, generals and admirals have closed ranks behind “the dragon is coming, the dragon is coming” gang. One suspects the American hawks have counterparts among the Chinese chiefs of staff.

The arms deal will make President’s Hu’s job more difficult, although he will probably portray the F-16 upgrade as a compromise. Of course, all bets are off if Congress throws a monkey wrench into the deal and insists on new aircraft that won’t change the military balance, but will worsen an already charged diplomatic atmosphere.

The White House is nervous about January elections in Taiwan, which will pit the nationalist Kuomintang Party against the more independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP’s leader, Tsai Ing-Wen, apparently had a recent falling out with Obama administration officials over the independence issue. One U.S. official told the Financial Times, “that while she [Tsai] understood the need ‘to avoid gratuitous provocations’ of China, it was ‘far from clear…that she and her advisors fully appreciate the depth of [Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations.’”

DPP leader Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s president from 2000 to 2008 pushed for formal independence and cut off formal negotiations with Beijing during his administration.

If this all seems like a terrible muddle, that’s because it is.

On one hand Washington insists on a robust military presence on China’s doorstep, and continues to supply arms to Taiwan. These are not minor matters. If there is a confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC, and it pulls in the Americans, it will pit two nuclear powers against one another.

The growth of the Chinese navy—Beijing got its first aircraft carrier this year, albeit one half the size of a U.S. flat top—is being portrayed in Washington as a threat to U.S. naval power in the Pacific and Indian oceans. But the PRC’s buildup is about protecting its oil and gas supplies—80 percent travel by sea—and recent history.

The PRC is still smarting over having to back down when the U.S. sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Straits in 1995 during a particularly tense standoff between Taipei and Beijing. The increase in China’s military spending dates from that confrontation, although Beijing’s budget is still only about one eighth of what the Americans spend.

On the other hand, the White House is leaning on the DPP not to push independence and watering down the arms package to Taipei.

Bi-polar diplomacy anyone?

It is clear that Washington and Beijing are of two minds about their relationship. Both are riding conflicting internal political currents, and over the next decade, threading a path between cooperation and competition promises to be tricky. Arms sales accomplish little more than pushing China’s nationalist button. The jobs they create in the U.S. are marginal (and the same amount spent on civilian projects produce more employment), and the tensions they create are real.

It is time to revisit the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, a piece of legislation that reflects a very different world than the one we live in now.

More of Conn Hallinan's work can be found at Dispatches From the Edge.

Arms control is an oxymoron in the U.S. Recognizing this, successive governments have managed to pursue foreign policies that export billions of dollars in weapons abroad while also debating fiercely over domestic firearms ownership.

Sometimes, these debates intersect, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty is one such occasion for intersection.

For the U.S. government, whose arms exports are largest in the world in both volume of sales and profits, to support an international arms control treaty is a bit disingenuous (that we are now bombing at least four other countries on a daily basis suggests that if anyone’s arms needs controlling, it’s our own military’s). Arms control by governments is always a bit disingenuous in any case, especially given that the other four permanent members of the Security Council are also the world’s top defense spenders and arms exporters. The U.S., the PRC, the UK, France and Russia are, in that order, the world’s top defense spenders while in arms sales, the order is as follows: the U.S., Russia, France, the UK and the PRC (Germany is actually the world’s third largest arms exporter, below Russia and above France, but is not a permanent member).

U.S. support for the treaty, presumably, has more to do with potential gains in better regulating arms sales to states like Iran, Venezuela or North Korea – or governments with suspect sympathies towards al Qaeda (Pakistan, for instance, although Pakistan remains a major recipient of U.S. weaponry).

The treaty has already been watered down by the permanent members of Security Council to remove any chance for a “supranational” regulatory authority in place of “a more general statement of obligations related to arms trade which are to be fulfilled nationally, not globally.”

According to the permanent members, “the treaty is not a disarmament treaty nor should it affect the legitimate arms trade or a state’s legitimate right to self-defense. The decision to transfer arms is an exercise in national sovereignty.”

Self-control, apparently, isn’t “an issue” for the Big Five.

The treaty, though is still garnering major opposition in the U.S. A bipartisan group of U.S. Senators is warning the Obama administration not to bargain away the U.S. Constitution’s Second Amendment, which gives U.S. citizens the right to bear arms. UN statements that the treaty will not undermine gun control in the U.S. have failed to placate anyone (the statements are derided as being “apologist”).

55 U.S. Senators have publically expressed reservations about the treaty – 67 yes votes are needed in the Senate to ratify the treaty. Of that number, 10 are Democrats, which presents the Obama administration with a real problem if the treaty is going to become a law the U.S. would adhere to.

Democrat John Tester of Montana, the latest Senator to express reservations over the treaty, said that he was encouraged by the fact that “countries will maintain the exclusive authority to regulate arms within their own borders” but that a lot more needed to be done to make the treaty acceptable. Specifically, Senator Tester wants to see no that there is neither regulation of “small arms, light weapons, ammunition or related materials” nor an “international gun registry.” The provisions for small arms would make the treaty  “unenforceable,” according to Senator Tester, while the international gun registry “could impede on the privacy rights of law-abiding gun owners.”

The result? An utterly toothless arms treaty that would satisfy everyone involved – well, everyone but human rights organizations who support the treaty, which, despite being watered down, could still have a major impact on the international arms trade (to the detriment of arms dealers and defense ministries).

I guess I should say that an amended treaty would satisfy everyone who has a vested interest in keeping the well-oiled international arms trade running smoothly.

The NRA, a powerful U.S. firearms lobby, states that “Neither the United Nations, nor any other foreign influence, has the authority to meddle with the freedoms guaranteed by our Bill of Rights, endowed by our Creator, and due to all humankind.” The NRA is determined to kill the treaty altogether: “The latest attempt by the U.N. and global gun banners to eliminate our Second Amendment freedoms is to include civilian arms in the current Arms Trade Treaty.”

This particular debate is (unfortunately) being juxtaposed with a renewed debate over gun control in the U.S. because of two high-profile shootings (both by right-wing “homegrown” terrorists) in the U.S. and Norway this year. Arms control in a U.S. context tends to evoke more discussion about domestic gun ownership than, say, arms sales to repressive regimes, gun running by the U.S. government to Mexican drug cartels – or our own nuclear arsenal.

Not that the above issue aren’t being discussed – though American conservatives insist that the treaty is simply further evidence of the UN’s world governance aspirations and anti-democratic naïveté. According to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative U.S. think tank:

The treaty is still based on two fundamental and irremediable errors. First, it explicitly accepts that all states – dictatorships and democracies – have an equal right to arm themselves, and it proposes to embody this pretended right in international law.

This moralizing conveniently ignoring that the U.S. seems to recognize the right of non-democracies, such as Saudi Arabia, and, until recently, Egypt and Libya, to arm themselves, and has historically had few scruples about whether arms recipients are democratic or not, so long as they were ostensibly pro-U.S. (Iran before 1979, for instance, as well as the Nicaraguan contras, Musharraf’s Pakistan or Iraq when it was our ally of convenience in the 1980s).

The Heritage Foundation goes on to say that:

Second, it tacitly presumes that all the world’s states are well intentioned and will actually implement the treaty’s controls. But if all the world’s states were well intentioned, the treaty would not be necessary. Thus, while the treaty would do nothing to prevent states like Iran from supplying terrorists – and would actually legitimate arms sales to and from dictatorships – its ambiguous criteria would weigh heavily on the U.S. and other democracies, where activists would stigmatize any arms sale as a violation of the treaty.

Great James Madison’s ghost! Governments aren’t angels?

Once again, a lack of historical memory is present in this moralizing. The U.S. has only cared about “arms sales to and from dictatorships” when it is a matter of convenience: case and point, the “Safari Club” formed in the 1970s by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to help bankroll anti-communist movements in Africa (Morocco, France, Egypt and Iran also contributed) that the U.S. wished not to dirty is hands with direct assistance to.

The main rhetorical (and electoral) opposition is presented on Second Amendment grounds – it is rather better to argue from that position than, say, theories of mutually assured destruction, or to openly discuss one’s relationship with defense companies.

In a short, but rather telling analysis, OpenSecrets, a watchdog group of lobbyist spending in American politics, states that defense companies have “split evenly between Democrats and Republicans” in election years. Given the allergic reaction to defense spending most politicians’ exhibit when in office, it is not hard to see why they butter both sides of the bread.

But no one wants to admit that they are making policy based on the significance of particular campaign contributions. In its commentary on the Norway terror attacks, The National Review lambastes the allegedly illiberal Norwegians: “Licenses are tied to interests – farming, hunting, sports – rather than to rights.”

Of course, the only interest here is freedom, which is why the NRA rather grandly asserts that “the cornerstone of our freedom is the Second Amendment” (rather nicely sanitizes Mao Zedong’s dictum that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, doesn’t it?).

So it is not surprising that gun ownership is (ostensibly) the main bone of contention among U.S. politicians vis a vis arms control, given the history of gun ownership in the U.S. It always has been so. The Colonial Era, in which most male individuals (and some women) owned firearms for defense and hunting – both being imperatives in the westward expansion of the country – is the context in which the Second Amendment was proposed. The Founding Fathers believed an armed public was a public that would not be easily dominated by its elected officials – after all the militias played a pivotal role in the American Revolution (ironically, so did licit and illicit arms sales from the French and the Spanish, but that is rarely acknowledged).

This era is so idealized by the American right (the Minutemen and the Tea Party, to give just two examples) that gun ownership is almost always presented in the terms of the American Revolution. The Second Amendment is non-negotiable in U.S. politics.

But given the U.S.’s domestic extremists (heavily armed anti-government militias, for instance), one would see why this administration is looking favorably at a treaty that might give the government reason to exercise more arms control at home. But since the American right, from talk radio to Senators, is riding high on a wave of vitriolic extremism to all things internationalist and federalist, so this treaty is dead in the water in their view.

Although the right does have a point: the U.S. ought to practice what it preaches at home about arms control abroad. Take Mexico, for example: the U.S. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms had been secretly supplying weapons – weapons purchased with American tax dollars – to Mexican drug cartels in a misguided attempt to track their distribution and gain inside sources in the cartels. Other U.S. arms sales to Mexico have also turned up in the hands of cartels, and private sales, not being very carefully regulated, are booming as well.

The programs have since been revealed and been heavily criticized in the U.S. (by the same people who oppose the UN Treaty). The Senators’ indictment of the treaty, though, is likely to further undermine arms interdiction and gun control efforts in that region. Contradictions hardly matter when one is talking about the Second Amendment (or how the Iranians can’t be trusted to be left to their own devices – though other countries can).

The Second Amendment advocates are noticeably silent on a global Second Amendment (as that would undermine U.S. security), and for an American right so insistent about transparency (even demanding the President’s birth certificate), the possibility for greater transparency in the international arms trade is not even being mentioned.

“We’re told that in order to control the illegal trade, all states must control the legal firearms trade,” an NRA official fumed, clearly missing the fact that the two are indeed related by the way the defense industry (and defense ministries) work. The American right is quick to jump on the Founding Fathers’ statements on gun control, but equally quick to ignore Republican President Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex’s destruction of U.S. liberties.

But Eisenhower is old hat. Anti-internationalism (and anti-federalism) are the norm for the American right’s arguments against arms control of any kind, at home or abroad. The American right actually takes mutually assured destruction (which, ironically, was a term coined during the Eisenhower administration) as the rationale for blocking arms controls, from guns to nukes. A typical example of this logic comes from an anti-gun control article in The National Review. The piece, written in response to the July 2011 terror attacks in Norway, argues that things could have been different there if the victims had also been carrying around shotguns and assault rifles.

“Better a shoot-out than a massacre!” wrote one commenter on the article.

That seems to be the logic driving opposition to regulating the international arms trade. It’s hard to say who is more hypocritical here, the Obama administration, Congress, the American right, or the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The confluence of hypocrisy here will probably kill any chance this treaty has of limiting the trillion-dollar global arms trade most often paid for by those who don’t have access to arms not because of the laws conservatives rail against, but because the buyers are so often agents of greater powers.

Paul Mutter is a graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.