Foreign Policy In Focus

Not Just a Wife, But a Slave; Not Just a Slave, But an Advertisement

Because Naghma, whose name means melody, was not chosen by the groom, she will most likely be treated more like a family servant than a spouse — and at worst as a captive slave. Her presence may help the groom attract a more desirable second wife because the family, although poor, will have someone working for it, insulating the chosen wife from some of the hardest tasks.

Painful Payment for Afghan Debt: A Daughter, 6, Alyssa Rubin, the New York Times 

Christian Influence in Politics as Disgraced as George Bush

The cavalier militarism and the justification of torture during the Bush years, along with the strident in-group-ism of the last four decades, prodded many evangelicals to re-examine themselves and their actions. George W. Bush may have fractured the Christian coalition that elected him.

The New Evangelicals, Marcia Pally, the New York Times (December, 2011)

So Much for "the Lady"

Outside of the actions of the dictatorship, under Ne Win, Saw Maung and Than Shwe, I believe the worst thing that has happened for Burma since 1962 has been the rise of Suu Kyi, together with her receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. This award enshrined an accidental and half-hearted advocate as a national leader. It is a handicap that has hobbled the country for the last twenty years.

Aung San Suu Kyi: Burma's Robert Mugabe, Roland Watson, Dictator Watch

They've Yet to Meet the Enemy, But They Think It's Us

First, we hear that [the Department of Homeland Security] is in the process of stockpiling more than 1.6 billion rounds of hollow-point ammunition, along with 7,000 fully-automatic 5.56x45mm NATO “personal defense weapons” plus a huge stash of 30-round high-capacity magazines. Incidentally, those are also known as “assault weapons”, but are not the limited single-fire per trigger-pull semi-automatic types that we civilians are currently allowed to own. By some estimates, that’s enough firepower to fight the equivalent of a 24-year Iraq war.

Why The Heck Is DHS Buying More Than A Billion Bullets Plus Thousands Of Guns And Mine-Resistant Armored Vehicles?, Larry Bell, Forbes

At Least George W. Bush Waged War in the Open

Obama’s morally and constitutionally questionable reliance on drones puts him in the tradition of cautious Eisenhower Republicans. President Eisenhower himself preferred using the CIA to orchestrate coups, in places like Iran and Latin America, to doing nothing or sending troops. What spooks were to Ike, drones are to Obama.

Chuck Hagel nomination: Obama rebukes Bushism, Michael Lind, Salon

The Genocide Gene

World War II ended 68 years ago [but it's] as if the Germans, even the very young, to whom tales of the Nazis must feel as if extraterrestrials were at work, still shudder when they think about what their grandmothers and grandfathers were capable of. As if they were afraid that certain patterns of character and behavior could be passed on to future generations.

'Our Mothers, Our Fathers': Next-Generation WWII Atonement, Roman Leick, Spiegel Online

A prominent Burma activist takes the Nobel laureate to task.

Roland Watson, who runs Dictator Watch, is one of the most trenchant Burma and activists and observers. On October 27 he posted an article with the, uh, provocative title: "Worst person in Burma." Surely, he was referring to long-time junta leader Gen. Than Shwe, who still retains influence, or perhaps even current president Thein Sein, despite his reforms. In fact, counterintuitively enough, to Watson, the "worst person in Burma" is Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and now member of Burma's parliament. Why?

"The reason for this is that, while she isn't raping and killing people herself," writes Watson, referring to the Burmese army as well as "Rakhine madmen" who persecute and kill Rohingya Muslims in Western Burma, "she is nevertheless directly responsible for the carnage because she is the only person in Burma who has the ability to stop it, or at a minimum to reduce its scale."

By way of background for Watson's article, here's an excerpt from a previous post of mine.

In his most recent report, Burma's Semi-Freedom Scorecard, [Watson] writes: "There are clearly winners, but also losers, from the new status quo," by which he means victims of the organs of the "dictatorship’s oppression apparatus." … What makes it worse, Watson writes, is that these victims will never

… receive justice. Daw Suu and [her National League for Democracy party] made a political calculation that justice must be sacrificed, that there should not be an international investigation into the regime’s crimes against humanity, or a tribunal for them, much less the ability to bring a case to a local court.

Watson has no interest in dishonoring Daw Suu (as Aung San Suu Kyi is often known to Burma's people).

I do not mean to begrudge Daw Suu her due. She has suffered tremendously [and] maintained her courage and commitment throughout years of hardship and sacrifice.

But-t-t Suu Kyi

… has ignored the ethnic nationality plight for years. (She traditionally focused almost exclusively on the nation’s political prisoners.) Through doing this she turned a blind eye to what is Burma’s core social issue: Racism against the ethnic nationalities by the country’s Burman generals.

Why does Watson think Daw Suu threw the ethnic nationalities … under the bus? [He speculates.]

She didn’t know how bad the [Burmese army] was treating the ethnic groups; … she censored herself; she thinks the problems that the ethnic nationalities have are their own fault (as many Burmans believe) … or, she noticed that since the international community ignored the atrocities it was safe for her to do so as well.

What has made Watson double-down on his condemnation of Suu Kyi?

Suu Kyi is the only person with real moral authority over the Burmans, of which the Army and police are comprised, and the Rakhines. Were she to call loudly and repeatedly for the attacks [by the Burmese army and by Rakhines on Rohingya] to end … the violence would subside. (She should ask to speak on national television, and make just such an announcement. If refused permission, she should make a statement to foreign media.)

Equally importantly, the International Community would no longer be able to avoid the subject. … If she spoke out, they would also be forced to condemn the atrocities, and even to support action such as the introduction of a peacekeeping force.

Watson sums up.

History will remember Suu Kyi as the the leader of a pro-democracy movement who changed her mind and surrendered, who ignored barbaric violence, who helped split a nation, and who opened it to rapacious corporate development. This will be her real legacy. This is why she is indeed the worst person in Burma.

As you can imagine, Watson's article generated a backlash. In his "Response to Critics of 'The Worst Person in Burma'," he adds that Suu Kyi

… does not understand the process of social change. You cannot change a society from a dictatorship to a democracy through reform. There has to be a break: a revolution. One way or another, the dictators have to be deposed. Only then can you really move forward.

The jury is out on the election of Burma's long-time leading dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and members of her National League for Democracy (NLD) to Burma's parliament. Roland Watson, who runs Dictator Watch, is one of the most trenchant Burma analysts and activists. In his most recent report, Burma's Semi-Freedom Scorecard, he writes: "There are clearly winners, but also losers, from the new status quo," by which he means victims of the organs of the "dictatorship’s oppression apparatus." In other words, all those "who have been raped, assaulted, murdered, robbed, extorted, forced to labor, imprisoned, and tortured."

What makes it worse, Watson writes, is that these victims will never

… receive justice. Daw Suu and the NLD made a political calculation that justice must be sacrificed, that there should not be an international investigation into the regime’s crimes against humanity, or a tribunal for them, much less the ability to bring a case to a local court.

Watson has no interest in dishonoring Daw Suu (as Aung San Suu Kyi is often known to Burma's people).

I do not mean to begrudge Daw Suu her due. She has suffered tremendously [and] maintained her courage and commitment throughout years of hardship and sacrifice.

But-t-t …

Daw Suu had no right to decide unilaterally that the people of Burma should never have justice. While she may have received near unanimous support in 1990, and this year from the country’s Burman [ethnic group] majority, her support among the ethnic nationalities … is less.

In fact …

… she has ignored the ethnic nationality plight for years. (She traditionally focused almost exclusively on the nation’s political prisoners.) Through doing this she turned a blind eye to what is Burma’s core social issue: Racism against the ethnic nationalities by the country’s Burman generals.

Why does Watson think Daw suu threw the ethnic nationalities, from whose numbers, he explains, come the majority of victims of the junta, under the bus?

It is difficult to fathom her actions, but a number of explanations are possible, including: She didn’t know how bad the Tatmadaw was treating the ethnic groups; … she censored herself; she thinks the problems that the ethnic nationalities have are their own fault (as many Burmans believe) … or, she noticed that since the international community ignored the atrocities it was safe for her to do so as well. (Of note, the United States, her close advisor, for two decades only backed her and refused to acknowledge the regime’s war crimes.)

Unfortunately, the ethnic nationalities …

… now have been excluded from Parliament for the next three years, and will therefore be forced to lobby Daw Suu [and] press for their interests through her.

Watson cites a number of recent atrocities by the Tatmadaw under Thein Sein's watch such as "Burma Army troops attacked the Kachin Independence Army’s 5th Battalion with chemical weapons"  Then he writes about a case close to his heart, that of Nan Bway Poung, who, in 2002,

… was gang raped by some twenty Burma Army soldiers in Karen State. After returning home (many ethnic rape victims are murdered after they have been violated, but some are released), she announced: “I am not willing to live in this world anymore,” and committed suicide. Her final words remain an indictment of  everything that is taking place in Burma, including Thein Sein’s “reform.” …  Daw Suu does not have a right to deny Nan Bway Poung and her family justice.

The ethnic nationalities are also, he writes

… losers in the New Burma, because they allowed themselves to be out-maneuvered and out-negotiated [by] a decades-long series of divide and conquer entreaties, and were never able to create a unified military front, which with coordinated campaigns could have defeated the Tatmadaw.

Still …

… the ethnic nationalities, even without representation in Parliament, are in no way powerless. They still control armies. … they can create an effective political front, through the United Nationalities Federal Council. … an excellent forum for the different ethnic nationalities to … provide a balance to the NLD [Daw Suu's party], and to ensure that their demands are both heard and satisfied, until they are in a position to enter Parliament as well (if and when the regime ever permits it).

However, even though he's Vice President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Karen [ethnic nationality] National Union, which has a military wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, David Tharckabaw thinks that Watson paints too dark a picture. He responded to Watson's article in an email to his mailing list:

For once I find myself in profound disagreement with much of what Roland Watson writes. I have felt the path trodden of late by … the NLD to be fraught with perils. But what was the alternative? Changes in Burma were on their way, as result of western economic interests.

In reply to Watson's comment that "Daw Suu, with one sweep of her hand, decided that the correct course of action was actually to join the regime, to merge with it, and then try to change it from within," he writes:

She has not joined the regime.  She has been elected to a rubber-stamp parliament, in the hope of gradually bringing about small changes that MAY catalyse much more profound changes [perhaps in a way that is wholly unpredictable, like the butterfly flapping its wings, which sets in motion a train of events that produces a cyclone].

In response to Watsons's statement that the "Varied ethnic nationalities are also losers in the New Burma, because they allowed themselves to be out-maneuvered and out-negotiated," he writes:

I don't agree with the way some of the negotiations have been conducted. … But it is necessary to understand that the respective bargaining positions are very unequal -- not just a question of the two sides involved, but also of those waiting in the wings.

Regarding the ethnic nationalities' military might -- or lack thereof -- he writes:

The ethnic nationalities do not control "armies" [as Watson had written]. The largest are the Wa, followed by the KIA, with the KNLA next, estimated, I believe, to number about 5,000. Against them is an army of about 36,000 combat troops with ever more sophisticated equipment and inexhaustible supplies. If the ethnic forces are squeezed out of existence [by the Tatmadaw, presumably] they will be in no position to negotiate anything -- whether appropriate development, security of land tenure, safety of civilians [not to mention] removal of several million [land] mines.

Tharckabaw, however, still agrees -- nor surprisingly, considering his affiliation with the Karen National Liberation Army -- that the forces of the ethnic nationalities "should strike hard against units that violate ceasefire agreements." This way lies hope for Tharckabaw:

In Tunisia and Egypt, and to a lesser extent Libya, the army, or a substantial part of it was unwilling (perhaps for a variety of motives) to carry out mass-murder of the population. It has been my opinion, shared with others since my first trip to the border in 2001, that it is necessary to create a similar reluctance amongst the rank-and-file of the Tatmadaw.

Meanwhile, here's some of what Watson would like to see from the Thein Sein administration.

• To stop attacking the ethnic groups and establish a nationwide ceasefire. …
• To irreversibly end the Myitsone Dam project [mostly of benefit to China, not an energy-starved Burma -- RW]. …
• To release all the political prisoners.
• To end the nuclear and missile programs including their cooperation with North Korea. …
• To hold a free and fair general election in 2015, if not sooner.

"This is what a real democratic transition would encompass," writes Watson. But, he cautions, "there is already great evidence that it is not the regime’s intention."

In order to open up trade with Burma, the West would love to think that the reforms of Burma's President Thein Sein are for real and won't be rolled back. As do, of course, the citizens of his own country. After all, as recently as 2011, Burma scored 1.5 out of 10 in the Corruption Perceptions Index run by Transparency International (10 is cleanest). The State Peace and Development Council -- the ruling junta -- was only dissolved in 2011 to provide it with a democratic (or less tyrannical) front, the Union Solidarity and Development Party. Nevertheless, they took a hit in the recent elections, which were comparably honest, in itself an achievement for Burma.

At Asia Times Online, Brian McCartan reports that on April 3 Aung San Suu Kyi's

… National League for Democracy (NLD) had won 43 of the 44 seats it contested, including [Suu Kyi's] constituency. … The result was a clear defeat for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and. … sent the signal that the NLD will be a force to reckon with in the 2015 general elections.

However "Thein Sein and his reform-minded allies can afford to allow Suu Kyi and the NLD the victory. The 43 seats won by the NLD amount to less than 7% of the 644 seats in parliament." His "reformist credentials have been further burnished through the legitimization provided by Suu Kyi and the NLD's participation in the polls. The real prize is the elections due in 2015, when the NLD will be able to challenge the USDP for control of parliament. … The military and the government are surely aware of their own unpopularity. They know that to win the 2015 elections they will either have to resort to vote-rigging and intimidation, which would draw the ire of the international community, or find a way to undermine support for the NLD. The alternative is to resort to military power, through a coup or other intervention in the name of national security, to secure their hold on executive and legislative power. 

Or Thein Sein could take a kinder, gentler (or less ruthless) approach:

… co-opt Suu Kyi and the NLD without giving them significant powers. There has been speculation that Suu Kyi may be offered a cabinet position, though she has said that she will decline any such offer. Even if rejected, the offer will still make the former generals appear reformist. 

As for another sticking point for the Thein Sein government, McCartan writes:

Successful peace deals with ethnic insurgents negotiated with government representatives would also go some way to gaining the support of ethnic minority voters in 2015. At the least, the deals would see former insurgent groups transform into mainstream ethnic-based political parties, which could dilute the vote for the NLD in ethnic areas. 

Still, of course …

… Suu Kyi said that her party's priorities after the election would be to push for peace in ethnic minority areas. … poverty alleviation through job creation and improving education and public health services. 

In fact …

Thein Sein's government has already gone some way on the first point by starting a peace process with most of the armed ethnic movements.

David Tharckabaw, vice president of the Karen National Union (KNUS), reports on the government's groundbreaking meeting with the KNU as representatives of the long-oppressed and brutal Karen ethnic group by the Thai border, who have been engaged in the world's longest-running insurgency since 1998. From his April 7 press release:

…7 members of the KNU Delegation, led by … General Secretary Naw Zipporah Sein, left for [Burma's capital cigty] Naypyidaw … on April 7, to meet with President U Thein Sein.

…The following 6 points were focused on in discussions at the meeting.

1. To establish … ceasefire especially in the ethnic nationality regions.

2. To guarantee life security and freedom from fear of the people.

3. To establish a state among the people to acquire confidence.

4. To stop the practice of forced labor and cash collection by various means, including demand of cash as donation and by other means.

5. To release political prisoners and resolve rehabilitation and land problems of the people.

6. To start arrangement for monitoring, analyzing and rectifying the peace process.

Agreement was reached at the meeting regarding the code of conduct for ceasefire [with] a monitoring team

Still, Tharckabaw is understandably suspicious.

The KNU delegation was taken to Nay Pyi Daw to meet with U Thein Sein. Going there was not on the agenda. The regime is openly and cunningly using the delegation for its own benefit.

Why the objection to meeting in the capital? It's Thein Sein's turf. Tharckabaw:

All the talks should have been in neutral venue up to the stage of achieving a durable ceasefire. Some defeatists and self-seeking opportunists among us are manipulating the agenda with the help of Egress [a Burmese civil society group], the peace brokers for business, to please their German masters.

As should be apparent from point number one, Tharckabaw and the KNU are also concerned with their brethren, the other ethnic minorities. He writes:

The next development should be ceasefire in Kachin State. Without ceasefire in Kachin State, it would be difficult for us to continue building trust with the regime.

At ATimes, McCartan points out further cause for suspicion.

… already questions are being raised about the government's most visible reformist move, the suspension of work on the Myitsone dam in Kachin State. There are growing indications that the Chinese company responsible for constructing the dam, China Power International, has quietly resumed work on the project following talks between the Myanmar and Chinese governments in early March. 

The dam is controversial because of its environmental impact. Not to mention that the power is flowing from congenitally power-starved Burma to china. As if that would slip under the radar of the minorities and Suu Kyi, as well as the rest of Burma.

Some are comparing the glimpses of freedom's daylight in Burma to F.W. De Klerk handing over South Africa to Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress. Leave us not be too hasty. The Associated Press reports:

Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has postponed a trip to central Myanmar because she could not obtain permission to hold a political gathering at a football stadium there, a party official said Thursday. … The law requires that applications be made at least seven days in advance. Ohn Kyaing [a spokesman for Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy] said the NLD asked football authorities for use of the stadium, but the football federation said Mandalay's Election Commission must first approve the request. However, the Election Commission said the NLD needed to obtain permission from the football federation first.

Whichever organization fears the wrath of the generals more:

The failure to receive Election Commission permission strikes a sour note in the reconciliation process under the reforms of the elected but military-backed government of President Thein Sein.

Meanwhile Burma activist Maung Zarni of the London School of Economics writes (not online):

Despite the unfolding hysteria and hyperbolistic characterization of Burma today as "on the verge of great transformation", I remain unpersuaded that the country is on the road towards democratization. … Those who rule the country now are the same guys who have ruled the country for the past 20 years. … Yes, people change. Belligerent generals can become "reconcilers." [But there] is no moment of political awakening in the ruling quarter.

In fact, writes Zarni

Unlike de Klerk and his Afrikana [sic] colleagues in South Africa, the same old bunch of generals and ex-generals who are in power in Naypyidaw have not modified the political system in any appreciable or significant ways. The Afrikanas decided to DISMANTLE  apartheid in South Africa … and let Mandela and his ANC comrades to run the show, in exchange for safeguards of life, liberty and property of the White minority.

Does anybody see "the generals and ex-generals doing that?" Zarni asks. By which he means:

… dismantle the military-run parliament, retire military men, ex- or in-service, from all line ministries, stop issuing unwritten orders to the judiciary, and withdraw from the civil administration from the village level -- in exchange for their ill-gotten billions, millions, and above and underground resources? Don't hold your breath.

Their plan, Zarni writes:

… through the soft-spoken President Thein Sein -- the Burmese have a term for this type of operator -- "Kyaung Chi", meaning soft cat shit which looks and feels soft, but equally stinky and potent, it attempted to turn 'that woman' [Suu Kyi, of course] into a tool to get US sanctions that block any type of World Bank/ADB and IMF 'assistance' to Burma. 

Or as Simon Roughneen reports at the Irrawaddy:

Behind the scenes, an 11-man National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) is said to be exercising real control, leaving President Thein Sein as the moderate-sounding front man attempting to launder the reputation of a cabal of military strongmen nationalists, who want Western sanctions lifted and to reduce the influence of an increasingly powerful China on their country.

Meanwhile, writes Zarni:

… it's clear without serious and genuine change, the Lady isn't going to give them a blank check. So, the regime is going to be less inclined to continue playing 'nice nice' with the Lady.

Thus the denial of the stadium permit.