Foreign Policy In Focus

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's demand that a "clear red line" be set on Iran is ironic in light of Israel's policy of strategic ambiguity toward its own nuclear weapons.

Three recent reports highlight the appeal (and folly) of demanding greater clarity in the case of Iran’s nuclear capabilities in the hopes that an equally obvious US/Israeli policy response can be devised. Seeking such clarity in inherently ambiguous situations has a tremendous emotional and political appeal. Decision-makers contemplating foreign policies ranging from negotiations to war instinctively strive to uncover the final bit of conclusive evidence that will demonstrate a clear opportunity or threat requiring an equally firm and compelling policy response.

However, the real-world ambiguities and uncertainties of policy and strategy rarely accommodate this understandable desire. George Tenet’s assertive claim to President George W. Bush preceding 2003 American invasion of Iraq that Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction was a ‘slam-dunk’ case did not make it necessarily so. The CIA director’s confident assertions were conclusively proven wrong. In hindsight, this false sense of certainty rested on a flimsy case of largely circumstantial evidence underpinned by the unquestioned logic that Saddam had to be guilty of developing WMD because he hadn’t proven himself innocent through total unconditional cooperation with international inspectors.

The parallels with present-day Iran are striking. The international community is essentially requiring Iran to prove the negative case that it doesn’t have a covert nuclear weapons program. As I’ve suggested elsewhere (here and here), no international inspection regime can guarantee success although a rigorous regime can be an effective deterrent to developing a nuclear weapons capability.

The most recent IAEA report does not definitively clarify the status of Iran’s nuclear program, although it largely confirms the assessment of the US intelligence community that Iran has not yet made a decision to go forward with a nuclear weapons program. For instance, the report notes that “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities…declared by Iran.” This is a clear statement that there is no concrete evidence indicating Iran is diverting its nuclear fuels for military purposes. This conclusion is consistent with repeated claims by Iranian political and religious leaders that Iran has no intent of producing nuclear weapons. Indeed the highest religious authority in Iran – a country whose identity is grounded in Shi’a Islamic theology -- has declared the pursuit of nuclear weapons a ‘big and unforgiveable sin’. Eternal damnation can be a powerful incentive for good behavior.

However, the IAEA report goes on to say in the very same summary concluding paragraph that without unrestricted cooperation with the IAEA (something no sovereign government would tolerate from an outside international body), “the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” In other words, Iran – like Saddam  – has to prove its innocence. Clearly, this latest IAEA assessment on Iran falls far short of George Tenet’s ‘slam dunk’ standard of proof for Iraq. Nonetheless, there remains sufficient ambiguity in the report’s language providing alarmists both here and in Israel with sufficient fodder to protest about the continued possibility that Iran could have a covert nuclear weapons program hidden from view of international inspectors. The likelihood is that future IAEA reports will continue to offer similarly ambiguous and qualified assessments. Thus informational clarity will continue to elude policymakers as the IAEA hedges its bets.

Of course, some policymakers will strive to compensate for this inherent ambiguity by creating a sense of policy certainty. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is only the most recent example as he pushes the international community (read the United States) to remove any uncertainty in Iranian calculations by setting a “clear red line” for military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. This demand for clarity is especially ironic given Israel’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its own nuclear weapons capabilities. Apparently, it is uncertainty and ambiguity in the case of Israel’s nuclear capabilities that has its apparent strategic advantages.

PM Netanyahu’s essential argument is that the chances of Iranian miscalculation are reduced if leaders in Tehran are convinced that overwhelming military action will be taken if certain ‘red lines’ are crossed. The problem, however, is in determining where the appropriate ‘red line’ is to be drawn. PM Netanyahu, as well as some American politicians, would seek to make the mere possession of a “nuclear-weapons capability” by Iran a red line; others suggest drawing the line before Iran has reached a suspected ‘zone of immunity’ – a point at which when military action becomes ineffective at eliminating an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, these are themselves ambiguous thresholds that defy clear definition. Is this line crossed when Iran has produced sufficient nuclear fuel for a bomb? When Iranian underground enrichment facilities are in theory capable of producing highly enriched uranium? When Iran actually produces weapons-grade fuel? When Iran has acquired the scientific knowledge needed to design a nuclear weapon; to actually produce a nuclear weapon? When Iran has successfully tested a nuclear weapon? When Iran has successfully mated a nuclear warhead to a missile capable of hitting targets in Tel Aviv, Madrid, or New York? And the list goes on. The search for clearly identifiable ‘red lines’ in Iran’s case is illusory.

Moreover, there is also the alternative prospect that strategic clarity itself could be counterproductive -- especially if the goal is to reach a diplomatic resolution of this problem. Most analysts recognize that the minimum acceptable deal from an Iranian perspective is an agreement that will allow some level of domestic nuclear fuel enrichment by Iran in exchange for intrusive inspections that verify the non-diversion of technologies and fuels to military purposes. Such an agreement would be consistent with the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which confers on Iran (as with any signatory to the treaty) the “inalienable right…to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.”  However, permitting these activities would necessarily enhance Iranian nuclear know-how, expand Tehran’s access to advanced nuclear technologies (even if only civilian), and thus likely shorten the timeline to nuclear weaponization if that were the intent of leaders in Tehran. In this case, the strategic ‘clarity’ demanded by PM Netanyahu could well undermine the achievement of his basic strategic objectives – limiting Iran’s access to nuclear technologies in order to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state. Of course, this is exactly why the ‘red lines’ envisaged by Prime Minister Netanyahu are likely to abridge the basic rights entailed within the NPT (to which Israel is not a signatory) and thus serve to simultaneously undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution – raising an entirely different set of strategic complications and challenges for decision-makers in Washington and Tel Aviv.

Finally, the Christian Science Monitor recently echoed these calls for certainty by making an empty plea for “more information, not less…for decisions of peace and war”; by critiquing President Obama for not having a clear “red line” for military action; and by calling for the President to ‘clarify’ his position at the upcoming Democratic National Convention. As we’ve already discussed, the latest IAEA report is evidence enough that no definitive evidence in Iran’s case is likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, echoing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s desire for specific triggers for military action also has its practical downsides, as we’ve already explored. Additionally, clear ‘red lines’ now would obligate the actors – whether the international community, the United States, or Israel -- to specific actions down the road. Those ‘red lines’ made explicit now will necessarily narrow the future flexibility of the decision-makers at a time when nuance and sophistication may be required to avert a crisis. These ‘red lines’ could also limit the ability of policymakers to adopt a more favorable course of action that is not readily apparent in the present. Unfortunately, President Obama has already unwisely fallen victim to this trap by publicly dismissing the viability of a strategy of containment in his AIPAC speech earlier this year. Finally, these premature pledges to action ultimately risk the credibility of these actors should they fail to make good on these commitments whatever the subsequent justification. 

The nature of the strategic environment is one of volatility, uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity (VUCA). To be successful, policies and strategies must admit to these realities. To pretend there is certainty where there is none, to create a false sense of assurances about the present or future actions of states, or to overly simplify a complex problem is to court disaster.

Christopher J. Bolan, Ph.D., Col. (R), U.S. Army, is a Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. government.

Give Netanyahu a cubic centimeter of wiggle room, and he will carve out a square mile of new apartments beyond the Green Line.

Cross-posted from Mondoweiss.

On Tuesday evening, Shaul Mofaz, leader of the Israeli political party Kadima, convened his fellow parliamentarians and offered them his rationale for leaving the 94-seat Knesset majority they'd made possible in May when they joined PM Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud-led coalition. In doing so, he has largely sealed Kadima's fate as a political force in Israel.

According to The Jerusalem Post's Lahav Harkov, Mofaz asserted in his defense that "there are red lines I can't cross" and that "there's a difference between compromising and just paying lip service." 

Mofaz's red lines are the military service exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Palestinians. He supports a much more expansive draft program than Netanyahu. Netanyahu prefers a much more gradual course and maintaining a greater percentage of exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men. July 31 is the deadline Israel's High Court set for a reform of the Tal Law, which since 2002 has governed the current exemptions policy. If no compromise is reached, the IDF could begin drafting 18-year-olds in these demographic groups without having the civilian government set quotas for exemptions, and non-military alternative "national service" options that would primarily granted to Israeli Arabs). Only around 1/5 of ultra-Orthodox draft-eligible males currently serve in the IDF.

The main question to ask now is not what the compromise will look like, but "when's the next election?" Whenever it is, it will not be a good one for Kadima. 

Kadima's eleventh-hour deal with Likud back in May postponed emergency elections originally set for September 4. Polls showed that Kadima was likely to lose close to 2/3 of its Knesset seats in the September 4 contest, while Likud would gain seats. Mofaz, in seeking to avert that disaster, broke an earlier promise to never join in a coalition with Netanyahu. Kadima, not Likud, was negotiating from a position of weakness then. 

It would constitute a Herculean feat for Kadima to now dispel the scorn the Israeli right is heaping on it. The "left's" enthusiasm for Mofaz is not exactly a tangible quantity. The scorn felt in the country towards his party is rather aptly exemplified by an Israel Hayom political cartoon portraying Mofaz as a weather vane. Mofaz plainly failed to deliver -- he says he's quitting because there is no compromise on the draft and some of his party's backbenchers are yelling that he gave up too easily on it.

Kadima's withdrawal over the Tal Law is the most visible -- and risible -- issue that it's stepping out on now. Ironically, on Monday, former IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz stepped out on Kadima because it didn't go as far he wanted it to on the law -- Halutz wants universal conscription for all, starting at age 1, and Kadima was willing to accept a compromise for gradual enlistment over the next 4 years -- which again makes one wonder as to what Kadima's fate will be in the next election.

Mofaz's defection was apparently triggered by Netanyahu's dissolution of a committee that would have presented a compromise package on the draft. The Times of Israel reports:

Earlier Tuesday, Netanyahu had adopted a proposal put forward by Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon (Likud), which called for ultra-Orthodox Jews and Arabs to join the army or perform national service, such as serving in police or fire units, by ages 23 to 26. The motion also included incentives for those who enlist at a younger age.

Mofaz blasted the proposal as “disproportionate and contrary to the High Court ruling,” which stated that the burden of serving should be shared by all citizens. He also said it did not meet the principle of equality laid out by the Plesner Committee.

A full-scale draft is the preference of many members of Kadima, and it is preference of the secular-nationalist party Yisrael Beiteinu as well, whose leader, Avigdor Lieberman, is Netanyahu's Foreign Minister. 

Yisrael Beiteinu's national-secular members of Knesset (KMs) have little patience for exemptions to the Palestinian Israelis or the ultra-Orthodox, or arguments from those on the Israeli left castigating the whole exercise as political theater. Kadima, at odds with the national-religious establishment on much else, found a natural ally in Yisrael Beiteinu this time since they do not support special privileges for the ultra-Orthodox or Israeli Arabs. Lieberman's party is Likud's main ally right now, and he opposes further Tal Law extensions in favor of a full-scale national draft -- though his bill to effect this was recently voted down.

That said, it is Likud that has the most to gain from the coming deadline dance over the Tal Law, primarily because its opponents are so politically weak.

This is important to note because the law is one of the most controversial provisions of Israeli life, and one that it is easy to rally support for or against in Israeli domestic politics without having to have an uncomfortable discussion about the Occupation. As Karl Vick notes, "it leaves him [Netanyahu] weaker and more vulnerable to the passions of the factions who remain — nationalists on one hand, and religious parties on the other". 

And this is all true, but only to a certain extent. Netanyahu has to prefer the 19 votes of the national-religious bloc to Kadima's seats because those are the people he broke bread with in 2009, and there is also the matter of the settler bloc in his own party. The dissent of this bloc's leader, Moshe Felgin, over the Tal Law handling is much less threatening to Netanyahu than Lieberman's is.

Kadima is setting out to make the universal draft the issue for the next election -- though if that's your only issue, why vote for the flip-flopping Kadima when you can vote for Yisrael Beiteinu, which actually has weight because of their staying in the government? Netanyahu might indeed be worried over what will happen before July 31, since he has relied so much on, perhaps sometimes without even quite realizing it, the domestic breathing room provided by his fractious partners to undertake his foreign policy program. This breathing room has helped him avoid a serious political confrontation in the Knesset over his Iran policy (this is less so with respect to the Occupation since few on any side of the political spectrum question its sustainability). 

Without that breathing room, Netanyahu really does run risks going into the next elections because an issue as divisive as the Tal Law has the potential to explode Israeli society.

But it is a slim risk for Netanyahu, who is predicted to easily win the premier-ship again in 2013. His response to the current dust-up will likely compare to how he dealt with a "settlement crisis" just as his grand coalition formed. +972's Noam Sheizaf had theorized that Likud's incentive to get the coalition formed was to head off a serious confrontation over the legality of multiple apartments in the Beit El settlement's Ulpana neighborhood: "By postponing the elections, the prime minister has bought himself some time to deal with the crisis," though Sheizaf also noted that the settlers were politically weak. 

But that weakness, Sheizaf concluded, was belied by the "political theater" that the bigger players put on. A compromise on Ulpana, was, in fact, accomplished: the apartments were physically relocated and then the government promised to undertake massively expanded construction, as it so often does when an evacuation occurs. An incident that could have prompted a wider debate of the Occupation was headed off by last-minute compromises. Gone was any talk about the peace process that some hoped Mofaz would re-introduce.

By any measure, Netanyahu won the debate -- such as it was -- over Ulpana, and he did so not by using Kadima's Knesset votes. They simply sat in his tent as his partisans worked out a solution with the furthest-right whose expansionism he sympathizes with. How that episode played out is indicative of Netanyahu's strength as a politician. Give him a cubic centimeter of wiggle room in committee, and he will carve out a square mile of new apartments beyond the Green Line because there is really no strong, organized constituency behind Kadima to match Likud's appeal.

Even as Lieberman thunders on about the universal draft, the Foreign Minister is surely mindful that had those September 4 elections been held, Likud, not his party, stood to gain the most. And for what it's worth given Mofaz's recent performance, Lieberman did announce he would not leave the coalition. It is much easier for Lieberman and Netanyahu to stay together than it is for either man to go over to the smaller national-religious parties like Shas or seek accommodation with the Labor Party. 

Harkov also reported that 3 members of Kadima formally voted to remain in the coalition, and that seven more might prefer to jump ship. Not all that many, but bear in mind that Kadima was expected to hold onto only 10, perhaps 12 seats in the September 4 election, out of the 28 it held in May when it entered the coalition.

Netanyahu may indeed be scared of the ultra-Orthodox, but he's not afraid of Kadima. A few defections on, and who at all will be afraid of Shaul Mofaz in the next general election?

Cross-posted from Mondoweiss.

The opposition party Kadima, which has the largest number of Knesset seats of any single Israeli political party, will join in a national unity government with second-seated Likud and its main partner, third-seated Yisrael Beiteinu. This creates a majority since among themselves these 3 main parties will control 70 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, and including smaller Likud coalition partners, this bloc could be up to 94 votes strong -- meaning they could easy institute new Basic Laws if they chose to do so. 

Earlier Likud-driven plans to move up Israel's 2013 elections to September 4, 2012 that had been opposed by Kadima have now been "frozen," according to Haaretz, which had actually reported yesterday that a parliamentary committee voted 12-1 in favoring of dissolving this Knesset to hold elections in September. The decision to suspend the elections apparently came overnight during inter-party talks between Kadima and Likud after that particular bill was set to go on to a further vote.

It was Likud that called for the elections, and Likud is now apparently taking the initiative to undo them, though some members of Likud deny this and lay the initiative at Mofaz's feet -- such members, it seems, hoped to trounce Kadima this fall. Is it simple politicking (the settler parties, religious and non-religious, the latter including Foreign Minister Lieberman's own Yisrael Beiteinu, that find themselves at odds with Bibi are now suddenly less important), a move to revoke special exemptions for Haredim, settlement expansion, insurance against Obama 2012, or a means of putting Israel further on a war footing with Iran? 

All of the above all possible -- and as such, Bibi wins in 2012.

With Likud, the immediate effort is all about taking advantage of a beaten opposition; now only Labor and the smaller parties -- Palestinian citizens of Israel, far-left and ultra-religious -- remain, a most fractious and heavily outnumbered coalition. Bibi may just be the most politically insulated Prime Minister in Israeli history at this moment: "king of Israeli politics," Haaretz just called him, grudgingly that he is, after all, "Israel's number one politician, no doubt -- by a mile."

And for Kadima, it is about surviving to the next election. The move represents a significant departure in Kadima's rhetoric, to say the least. At the end of March, following Tzipi Livni's loss to Shaul Mofaz, the new head of the party told Haaretz he'd never join a government with Likud (h/t Max Blumenthal):

Yossi Veter: Would you consider joining a government should that situation arise?

Shaul Mofaz: No, Kadima under my leadership will remain in the opposition. The current government represents all that is wrong with Israel, I believe. Why should we join it? We will be a responsible opposition. Anything Netanyahu does for the benefit of Israel’s future will find our support. I want to restore an ethic of nonpartisan patriotism to Israel. I want to represent something new, like we had in the past.

But Kadima, born out of a schism within Likud in 2005, has few options otherwise if it wants to hold onto the seats it won in 2009. Elizabeth Tsurkov, from +972, and Barak Ravid of Haaretz:

In any current poll, Kadima's power is projected to diminish by almost 2/3. Kadima wants to keep this unrepresentative Knesset in power.
— Elizabeth Tsurkov (@Elizrael) May 8, 2012

Reason for agreement: Mofaz was panicked by the elections, Ehud Barak also panicked and Bibi wanted to kill Labor and Yair Lapid
— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) May 8, 2012

And Gregg Carlstrom at Al Jazeera:

Yet another Israel poll: Likud gets 31 seats in early elex, Labor 17, Yisrael Beiteinu 13, Atid 12, Kadima down to 10. bit.ly/JrS7r2
— Gregg Carlstrom (@glcarlstrom) May 3, 2012

Likud has found a way to have its cake -- humbling Kadima -- and eat it too with this deal because now, that cake is Kadima. One wonders what resurrected legislation from 2010 and 2011 on loyalty oaths, BDS, administrative detention, NGO funding, settlement subsidies or judicial appointments to the High Court will make a comeback. What foreign observers are most concerned about, of course, is not Kadima's electoral woes, or how this all means the national service exemption "Tal Law" will be amended or annulled (a measure both Kadima and Yisrael Beiteinu back), but what this unity government portends for a possible conflict with Iran. Barbara Slavin of Al-Monitor asks:

mofaz opposes #israel war on #iran; what did bibi promise him?
— Barbara Slavin (@barbaraslavin1) May 8, 2012

At the moment, we know Mofaz has been promised two explicit, and one implicit, bargains. Mofaz will become a deputy prime minister in the new government, but will be a "minister without portfolio" "in charge of the process with the Palestinians." These offices are his explicit rewards. His implicit reward, as noted above, is getting to avoid a general election for at least one more year that his party was likely to suffer in. 

Finally, for Likud there is a big immediate benefit regarding the settlements, suggests Noam Shezaif (though he notes this might only be a temporary victory for Bibi):

The final push for the new agreement was probably yesterday’s High Court ruling on the evacuation of the Ulpana neighborhood in the settlement of Beit El, built on private Palestinian land. With elections around the corner, this would have become for Netanyahu a public showdown with either the settlers or with the court – and possibly both. By postponing the elections, the prime minister has bought himself some time to deal with the crisis.

As for the foreign front, I think that Bibi has decided to hedge his bets for now on Iran by offering the bruised Kadima a way forward to survive another year in a way that insulates him from American pressure and possible domestic confrontations over his focus on Iran. Yousef Munayyer put it succinctly:

@blakehounshell its more about obama than Iran, even when its about Iran, its about Obama
— Yousef Munayyer (@YousefMunayyer) May 8, 2012

Now Netanyahu won't have to tone down his rhetoric on Iran, which he has used to successfully dodge the question on settlements as well as (reducing) sanctions and criticizing P5+1 diplomacy. Or, perhaps far, far more importantly for his fellow Likudniks' purposes, concern himself with any further weak Western protests over West Bank settlement expansion. At the risk of beating a dead horse -- this coalition formation shows we can also say goodbye to any foreseeable future negotiations with Ramallah. 

On the Obama angle, Maariv's Ben Caspit reported earlier this week, when elections were still on, that Netanyahu had based his call for early election off of an AIPAC consensus that Obama would win reelection in 2012 (and thus, feel capable of standing up to the Prime Minister). He hardly needed AIPAC to tell him the President's ahead in the polls, but Caspit's effort to portrait Bibi's mindset is illuminating:

The surprising announcement of early primaries in Likud by the party leadership fell out of the blue, [and] came three days after a quiet meeting held with AIPAC officials, who after conducting a review of U.S. polling data, advised Netanyahu that Obama would be the next president. Bibi knows he cannot campaign for reelection himself with Obama in office for a second term. This is a dangerous gamble. [But] there is great mistrust between the American President and the Israeli Prime Minister, and Netanyahu may try to do to Obama what he did during Clinton's first term, and Obama [may try to do] to Yitzhak Shamir what George H. W. Bush did in 1992.

When referring to Clinton, the author means Netanyahu's efforts to handicap the Oslo Accords. With Shamir, he means to say that Bibi seeks to avoid any chance of there being repeat of the "one lonely little guy" speech Bush gave when he refused to cave in to Shamir on delinking loan guarantees from a halt to settlement expansion. Netanyahu would rather not fight that fight and give his opponents at home openings against him, even though he's almost certain to win such a fight both at home and abroad. As such, it may be that these comparisons (severely) overestimates Obama's will to criticize the Israeli government and (slightly) overdoes Bibi's sense of insecurity since Congress will simply not allow such scenarios to come into being. 

This said, the Prime Minister would rather not have to fight such a fight when the U.S.-Israeli "special relationship" gives him so much room to maneuver in the region, no matter how much he dislikes Obama. So he is playing it safe; no elections to risk losing a seat in the Knesset or having to face an irate White House. If he's concluded Obama will win, he intends to set the tone for the President's final term by building his coalition ahead of the actual Romney-Obama faceoff. He puts himself above the fray, and greater unity at home will translate into greater assertiveness abroad. It keeps the rhetoric red hot. 

So, then, here is the $64,000, deal-or-no deal question: where does this leave newcomer Mofaz in Bibi's kitchen cabinet? Are the scales tipped in favor of war with Mofaz's addition to the coalition? 

Not for now, at least. Mofaz opposes an attack on Iran as of this writing. And it is not clear what Mofaz's complicity, if it were to come, would achieve for the most gung-ho boosters of an attack. The most outspoken opponents have, in any case, mainly been former national security officials, and in a way, Bibi has even preempted them with this unity government (not that some kind of reaching across the aisle seemed to be in the cards; most who've worn the uniform have kept quiet) -- though what this means in practice has yet to be tested with respect to Iran. Again, the kitchen cabinet -- this "Octet" -- is reportedly still divided over an attack. It's tempting to see a possible reorganization of the "Octet" as a prelude to a 2012 war with Iran because it ensures Barak stays on as Defense Minister and, as Larry Derfner notes, Bibi has "cleared his calendar," and Barak earlier said this month the government had to separate Iran from "the elections" and it has done just that. At the same time, further settlement building, the revival of undemocratic legislation, even Cast Lead II seem just as, if not more, likely worst-case outcomes for 2012-3 (unless, you know, I'm dead wrong, and Mofaz, the man who would beat Bibi and never, ever, ever join a coalition does an about-face on Iran and it's bombs away).

But even if he does not defect over Iran to the hawk, one does wonder what Mofaz is going to look forward in 2013 when elections will take place -- although since they're apparently going to get to do some election law rewriting, that question may be answered by Kadima itself! But what was promised, indeed, for the man who swore upon his election this spring that he would "replace" Netanyahu? And was a compromise on Iran policy staked out in these arrangements? 

What Bibi intends to do with the time and the Knesset majority he has bought himself through 2013 remains to be seen. West Bank settlement expansion, "court packing," sanctions on the PA, bombing Iran, perhaps even further punitive measures in Gaza? All are on firmer ground as of this week, "the putsch against war" notwithstanding.

Indeed, thanks to Kadima's actions, "the putsch against war" may constitute the only serious challenge to Bibi's politics right now, and that is cause for concern over the Iranian question (hopefully, the generals will not be swayed by Bibi's efforts to influence the services with political appointees). The initiative on Iran, the settlements, the "peace process," the national service debate and even the chance to pass new Basic Laws will stay with him for at least a year.

It's good to be the king.

"We can almost speak in shorthand. … We share common experiences and have a perspective and underpinning which is similar."

Thus does Michael Barbaro quote Mitt Romney in a New York Times article titled A Friendship Dating to 1976 Resonates in 2012. Of whom does Romney speak? Another Mormon deacon? Bain & Company founder Bill Bain? Barbaro explains.

… in 1976, the lives of Mitt Romney and Benjamin Netanyahu intersected, briefly but indelibly, in the 16th-floor offices of the Boston Consulting Group [headed by Bill Bain before he founded Bain & Company], where both had been recruited as corporate advisers. … That shared experience decades ago led to a warm friendship, little known to outsiders, that is now rich with political intrigue. 

Not to mention controversy (emphasis added).

Mr. Romney has suggested that he would not make any significant policy decisions about Israel without consulting Mr. Netanyahu. … In a telling exchange during a debate in December, Mr. Romney criticized Mr. Gingrich for making a disparaging remark about Palestinians, declaring: “Before I made a statement of that nature, I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say: 'Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?'"

That even gives pause to Martin Indyk (one-time U.S. ambassador to Israel), no shrinking violet on Israel, who said "Mr. Romney's statement implied that he would 'subcontract Middle East policy to Israel.'"

Barbaro on the bromance's blossoming:

Mr. Romney, never known for his lack of self-confidence, still recalls the sense of envy he felt watching Mr. Netanyahu effortlessly hold court during the firm's Monday morning meetings, when consultants presented their work and fielded questions from their colleagues. The sessions were renowned for their sometimes grueling interrogations.

"He was a strong personality with a distinct point of view," Mr. Romney said. "I aspired to the same kind of perspective."

Once they both switched to politics:

The men reconnected shortly after 2003 when Mr. Romney became the governor of Massachusetts. Mr. Netanyahu paid him a visit, eager to swap tales of government life [and] regaled Mr. Romney with stories of how, in the tradition of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, he had challenged unionized workers over control of their pensions, reduced taxes and privatized formerly government-run industries, reducing the role of government in private enterprise.

That both men are products of the same rapacious business environment is telling. On the other hand, that two such odd ducks -- Romney wrapped as tight as a drum; Netanyahu in the grips of his obsession with attacking Iran -- were able to find each other and become fast friends would be called heartwarming were the source of the heat anywhere but hell.

Leaders of states are less often voted out of office for initiating a war gone wrong than for exhibiting good sense and drawing the brakes on the war-fever express when called for. Or that's the assumption on which Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is no doubt operating. But if, as influential Yediot columnist Nahum Barnea has written, "all his life he's dreamed of being Churchill," Netanyahu either forgets that Winston Churchill wasn't re-elected prime minister in 1945 or envisions himself, if out of office, retaining the same influence that Churchill did.

As for other personal consequences, Netanyahu is no doubt aware that the attacks Churchill called for on Germany, such as the "area" bombing that resulted in atrocities like Dresden and Hamburg, never resulted in him standing in the docket at Nuremberg. In present times, he may further be emboldened by the United States invasion and occupation of Iraq. Except for a few scattered charges by courts overseas (though they seem to be gaining momentum), George W. Bush and Dick Cheney have yet to be tried for war crimes. Not only do they remain free men, they're still accorded respect in many quarters.

No matter what happens after an attack on Iran, Netanyahu knows that he will still be accorded the same respect in the same quarters, at least in the United States.