Foreign Policy In Focus

Experts traveled to El Salvador to gain insight into how a truce between the gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 led to a marked decrease in violence.

In recent years, El Salvador, like many of its Latin American counterparts, has witnessed an explosion in violence. The contentious fighting between two of the country’s biggest gangs, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18, is largely responsible for fueling much of the carnage.

Both of these gangs trace their roots to poor neighborhoods in Los Angeles where young, marginalized Latin American immigrants clustered together to form them. When the United States started deporting convicted felons to their native countries, many MS-13 and Barrio 18 members found themselves in countries they hardly knew, including El Salvador. Driven by fear of the unknown and an instinct for survival, they gravitated to the only piece of their past that still remained—the gangs. Today, approximately 20,000 MS-13 and Barrio 18 members populate the streets of El Salvador.

Armed with an arsenal of weapons, including assault-style rifles and grenades, and saddled with a lack of economic opportunity, these gang members proceeded to slaughter each other over arbitrarily designated chunks of territory. That is until last spring, when the gang leaders met in their dungeon-like prisons and decided to enact a truce.

The results of the truce have been nothing short of miraculous. Homicides in the country have decreased by 40 percent, kidnappings have been slashed in half, and extortions have fallen by 10 percent. Hardened gang members, who at times appear to don more ink than skin, accomplished in a matter of weeks what the government failed to do in the past decade—deliver a modicum of peace to El Salvador.

Inspired by the unprecedented events in El Salvador, the Transnational Advisory Group in Support of the Peace Process in El Salvador (TAGPPES)—a coalition of experts in the fields of gang intervention, human rights, post conflict work, and economic development—traveled to the Central American country to better understand the roots of the largely unexpected peace agreement.

What the group found was that despite the strong animosity that existed between the gangs, the yearning for some sense of peaceful normality—the ability to take their kids to school without the fear of getting shot—was stronger.

The group also visited the prisons where some of the gang leaders who brokered the peace were held. The gang leaders, the coalition reported, were often troubled men who had experienced and done terrible things. Their families and friends had been vanquished by the gang war. Many of them had killed, kidnapped, and even tortured their rivals. To many onlookers, the gang leaders appeared devoid of any humanity, which is what made the peace agreement even more remarkable.

But they weren’t devoid of their humanity at all. Despite the darkness of their past and the horrid conditions of their prison cells, the gang leaders still held on to redeeming qualities that shone through their hardened exterior. They wanted a better life for their children and they wanted the opportunity to right some of their wrongs.

“I know I’ve done terrible things,” said one. “I know I’ve thrown my life away. I’m not asking for mercy. I’ll pay for my crimes. All I want is a better life for my children. That is why I agreed to the peace agreement. If I can secure a better future for them, then at least I’ll know my life was not a complete waste.”

Tupac Shakur, who coincidentally is one of the best-known “gangster” rappers, once wrote a short poem entitled, The Rose that Grew from Concrete. The poem is worth quoting at length:

Did you hear about the rose that grew / from a crack in the concrete? / Proving nature's law is wrong it / learned to walk without having feet. / Funny it seems, but by keeping its dreams, / it learned to breathe fresh air. / Long live the rose that grew from concrete / when no one else ever cared. 

If a rose can grow from concrete, then surely peace can emerge from the depths of a dark Salvadorian prison. 

Javier Rojo is the New Mexico Fellow at the institute for Policy Studies.

Cross-posted from the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

(Read part one.)

So what is the Salvador option?

“The Salvador Option” is a “terrorist mode” of mass killings that was perfected by the US to destabilize regimes that the US saw as threats to its interests. Taught at places like the School of the Americas, it is employed when other forms of political manipulation fail to produce the desired results. The option works through created and sponsored death squads, with the primary goal of committing slaughter of innocent lives. This triggers world outrage, necessitating intervention by the US under the humanitarian intervention framework. As we state in Part One, this was first applied in El Salvador, in the heyday of resistance against the military dictatorship, resulting in an estimated 75,000 deaths.  

A. To see how it works, we would like to borrow an analogy from cooking. What are the needed ingredients for this process?

I. Identify a progressive regime that resists US imperialism and hegemony and declare it ‘rogue state’ or ‘access of evil’ etc. Use any expression with a catchy title to engineer the consent of the unsuspected people; it helps if this regime is somewhat authoritarian.

II. Develop a plan and begin the preparations, putting a destabilization expert in charge, normally as ambassador or someone with diplomatic immunity.

1. This person usually begins by contacting the army searching for elements that are prepared to sell their soul and their country for few pieces of silver.

2. If such elements cannot be found from within the ranks of the U.S. diplomatic corps, create such an entity; call it a ‘resistance’ or ‘liberation movement’ made up of preferably those trained at a U.S. army base or training camp somewhere in the world. If that is not possible, the U.S. can usually depend upon a ready-made supply of Salafist and Wahhabi ‘freedom fighters’ willingly provided by allies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; or better yet, use the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) terrorist organization that Washington and Tel Aviv have been long training.

3. Once the appropriate arrangement is agreed upon, the process of supplying the freedom fighters with weapons, financial support, technical advisers, and clandestine operators begins. …You know what we mean.

4. To make it easier for this fabricated liberation movement to gain legitimacy, implement a tried and tested program that generates international revolution: the more abominable the crimes committed, the more likely the call to humanitarian intervention will arise.

5. To feign compassion (to make the whole thing kosher), it helps to go to that circus known as the UN to organize a Security Council resolution. Once the appropriate U.N. vote is favorably extracted, bought through either bribery, threats or some combination thereof, it is possible to reap the harvest of all this intrigue and subterfuge by dividing the country or putting a puppet in charge; the sky is the limit! The ultimate goal – a la Libya – is to produce weak or fractured states, the smaller the better – and the easier to manipulate their weak and easily corruptible governments to accept radical global corporate intervention on easy terms. Are you following the point, catching the drift?

B. Now let us see how this hypothesis works in the case of Syria.

In Part One, we stated that the destabilization and regime change in Syria has been part of US plan for the past ten years. Taking advantage of the authoritarian nature of the Assad regime, and emboldened by its ability to overthrow Khadafy in Libya, the Obama Administration turned its attention to Syria. Bringing down – or seriously weakening – Assad weakens Iran’s position in the region, undermines Hezbollah in Lebanon, puts a smile on Binjamin Netanyahu’s face and places Russia and China in a more difficult strategic position. 

In Syria’s case, the only missing ingredient was an opportunity to implement the plan. The eruption of the Arab Spring and the eruption of the ensuing social crisis in Syria provided Washington with the opportunity to turn the regional democratic upsurge to its advantage.

There are many indications that the "Free Syrian Army," currently engaged in armed struggle against the Assad government, is led not by Syrians, but by NATO-backed Libyan militants from the US State Department-listed terrorist organization, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Recently, revelations that Syrian militants are in fact being armed, trained, funded, and joined on the battlefield by Libya's Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a US State Department-listed foreign terrorist organization (listed as #27) . The Telegraph would report in November 2011 that LIFG leader Abdul Belhaj met with senior leaders of the "Free Syrian Army" on the Turkish-Syrian border. ) Belhaj and his LIFG's role is not just assisting Syrian militants but in fact leading them in NATO's armed destabilization of Syria. Belhaj pledged weapons and money (both of which he receives from NATO) as well as sending LIFG fighters to train and fight alongside Syrian militants. VoltaireNet.org would confirm. 

Saudi Arabia, which has closely coordinated with U.S. Middle East policy aims for decades, is also very much involved. It has also been confirmed that Saudi Arabia is shipping arms to foreign fighters and Syrian rebels operating out of Jordan. The Australian reports, quoting an Arab diplomat, that "Saudi military equipment is on its way to Jordan to arm the Free Syrian Army." It must be noted that Saudi Arabia in turn, receives its weapons and a significant amount of military funding from the United States.

C. The Role of  U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Ford

In January, 2011, just as the Arab Spring was expanding region-wide from its Tunisian birthplace, one Robert Stephen Ford was appointed the new US Ambassador to Syria. Ford is no ordinary diplomat. He was U.S. representative in January 2004 to the Shiite city of Najaf in Iraq. Najaf was the stronghold of the Mahdi army. A few months later he was appointed "Number Two Man" (Minister Counsellor for Political Affairs), at the US embassy in Baghdad at the outset of John Negroponte's tenure as US Ambassador to Iraq (June 2004- April 2005). Ford subsequently served under Negroponte's successor Zalmay Khalilzad prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Algeria in 2006, another highly sensitive political appointment.

Ambassador Robert S. Ford’s activities in Iraq laid the groundwork for the launching of the insurgency in Syria in March 2011, which commenced in the Southern border city of Daraa. Much of what we know about Ford’s activities has been well documented by the Canadian research center, Global Research, Ca.

Ford arrived in Damascus at the height of the protest movement in Egypt. He was no stranger to some of the more covert and nefarious aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Ford had been part of John Negroponte's team at the US Embassy in Baghdad (2004-2005) where he helped engineer "the Salvador Option" for Iraq. The latter consisted in supporting Iraqi death squads and paramilitary forces modeled on the experience of Central America. 

Robert S. Ford's mandate as "Number Two" (Minister Counsellor for Political Affairs) under the helm of Ambassador John Negroponte was to coordinate out of the US embassy, the covert support to death squads and paramilitary groups in Iraq with a view to fomenting sectarian violence and weakening the resistance movement.

Ford gave a touching statement of his goals in Syria in a communique from the U.S. embassy there:

As the United States’ Ambassador to Syria—a position that the Secretary of State and President are keeping me in —I will work with colleagues in Washington to support a peaceful transition for the Syrian people. We and our international partners hope to see a transition that reaches out and includes all of Syria's communities and that gives all Syrians hope for a better future. My year in Syria tells me such a transition is possible, but not when one side constantly initiates attacks against people taking shelter in their homes.

"Peaceful transition for the Syrian people"? He was pursuing a much darker agenda.

Prof. Michel Chossudovsky of Global Research describes Ford’s role more honestly:

“Since his arrival in Damascus in late January 2011 until he was recalled by Washington in October 2011, Ambassador Robert S. Ford played a central role in laying the groundwork within Syria as well as establishing contacts with opposition groups. The US embassy was subsequently closed down in February. Ford also played a role in the recruitment of Mujahideen mercenaries from neighboring Arab countries and their integration into Syrian "opposition forces". Since his departure from Damascus, Ford continues to oversee the Syria project out of the US State Department.

All indications are that Ford engaged in more cynical activities than just muted congenial diplomatic relations. In Syria he was a key player, implementing two major building blocks of the Salvador option needed for the destabilization of Syria, as he did in Iraq:

1. He used the cover of the diplomatic immunity to travel around Syria in order to connect together the groups trained by the US intelligence community. He has been pictured with US military advisers visiting hotspot sites all over Syria.

2. On a more sinister level, as in Iraq, he used his diplomatic status in Syria to distribute sophisticated communication equipment, equipment whose communications could not be decoded by the Syrian authorities (or those in other countries where the system was used). The US embassy in Damascus was the system’s communication system.

Using this new secretly coded technology, he began to openly incite the Syrian elements sympathetic to the US interest to topple the régime. Imagine what would have happened to the Syrian ambassador in Washington, had he engaged in similar activities with the Occupy movements here.

Another key figure in Syria’s 'Salvador Option' is David Petraeus. We’ll deal with his role in Part Three of this series. 

Ibrahim Kazerooni is finishing a joint Ph.D. program at the Iliff School of Theology and the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies in Denver. More of his work can be found at the Imam Ibrahim Kazerooni Blog. Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

The most significant story in Central America right now is also the most underreported. El Salvador, the tiniest country in the land belt connecting North and South America, has long suffered socioeconomic violence—first in its civil war during the 1980s, then in the period of organized crime’s rising power in the 1990s, and most recently under the mano dura years of conservative authoritarianism—largely in answer to the growing influence of transnational criminal gangs in the 2000s. But since the start of May, El Salvador’s murder rate—by some estimates, the highest in the world in 2011—has dropped by nearly 66 percent, the result of a truce between the country’s two leading gangs (or maras, as they are popularly known) that was brokered in March by religious and government representatives and deepened by gang leaders on May 2.

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its rival, MS-18, were formed on the streets of South Central Los Angeles by young refugees of the Central American wars of the 1980s and 90s. Largely comprising Honduran and Salvadoran youths, the gangs initially provided protection to Latinos excluded from Mexican gangs, and the largely African-American Bloods and Crips. The maras blossomed, growing in scope and capacity to carry out sophisticated operations. Before long, the maras appeared on the FBI’s radar and in 1996, changes in the immigration law allowed the FBI to deport tens of thousands of suspected mareros back to their native countries. Not surprisingly, back home and without ready access to formal market opportunity, they set up shop and continued their business as usual. Since then, the gangs have grown so strong that they are virtually uncontrollable in Central America, and have become worrisome threats to the security of the United States. The truce between the maras, then, comes as a welcome relief on all sides.

And the good news extends beyond declining rates of violence and symbolic “days without murder.” As the Economist reports, “The mobs have since made further concessions. On May 2nd they promised not to recruit in schools. Five days later inmates at La Esperanza, an overcrowded prison, vowed to stop extorting people using jail phones. ‘I want to ask forgiveness from society and those who gave us the chance to change,” said Dionisio Arístides, the Salvatrucha leader. “We’re human beings who aren’t just here to do evil.’”

This is not to say that the truce between rival gangs will hold up in the long term. Many, as the Economist coverage suggests, are suspicious that the maras will be peaceful long enough to allow El Salvador’s economy recover from the damage it has suffered as the gangs duke it out for monopoly control over territory, extortion rackets, and trafficking networks. But a bigger concern lies in the worry that the gangs have grown so big and unwieldy that even if the higher ups in MS-13 and MS-18, many of whom are directing traffic from prison, genuinely endorse the peace plan, they may not be able to effectively enforce it.  

Nor is it to suggest that government security forces have given up their old ways. In some respects, the spirit of mano dura—the heavily militarized approach to combating maras under former president, Tony Saca—is alive and well. When leftist president Mauricio Funes announced earlier this year that his government intended to implement a nationwide curfew and beef up school security by calling in the military to stand guard, Insight Crime noted that these policies “appear to be part of Funes' escalation of the war against street gangs…Funes is mimicking the…strategy of his predecessors, placing ex-military officials in top security posts, some of whom are intimating that they may begin mass incarcerations of suspected gang members. These policies have more than a few critics. El Salvador's focus on incarcerating suspected gang members has placed more inmates in badly overcrowded prisons… These overcrowded prisons may have worsened crime and violence in the country.”

Nevertheless, things in El Salvador right now look markedly more hopeful than they have in decades. Any substantial reduction of violence is obviously to be embraced, as are efforts that the Funes administration has made to match iron-fist policies by extending an open hand to former criminals seeking social reintegration. Perhaps most encouragingly, gang members from opposing factions have begun to collaborate on music projects and other forms of cultural production which may have positive normative effects—both within the gangs and more broadly in Salvadoran society—and which seem like an awfully elaborate, and unlikely, PR ruse if the maras weren’t serious about giving peace a chance.

Still, any optimism on this count must be met with a heavy dose of caution.

It’s like the 1980s all over again.

During that decade, the Reagan administration – with the support of Congress – sent billions of dollars worth of unconditional military and other support to the right wing-junta in El Salvador, just as the Obama administration is today with the right-wing government in Israel.

When Salvadoran forces massacred 700 civilians in El Mozote, Congressional leaders defended the killings, saying that the U.S-backed operation was “fighting terrorists.”  Similarly, when Israel massacred over 700 civilians in the Gaza Strip early last year, Congressional leaders defended the killings for the same reason.

When Amnesty International and other groups investigated the El Mozote killings and found that it was indeed a massacre targeted at civilians by the Salvadoran army, members of Congress denounced these reputable human rights organizations as “biased.”  There was a similar reaction when Amnesty and other groups documented similar Israeli war crimes, with Congressional leaders accusing them of “bias.”

Even when the Salvadoran junta murdered international humanitarian aid workers, that right-wing government’s supporters in Washington insisted that the victims were actually allied with terrorists and that they somehow provoked their own deaths.  We’re now hearing the same rationalization regarding the attack on the humanitarian aid flotilla in the eastern Mediterranean.

The difference is that, back in the 1980s, members of Congress and the administration who were responsible for such policies were targeted with frequent protests, including sit-ins at Congressional offices and other kinds of nonviolent direct action. Unlike supporters of the El Salvador’s former right-wing government, however, today’s Congressional supporters of Israel’s right-wing government seem to be getting a free ride.

Senators Barbara Boxer, Ron Wyden, Russ Feingold, Barbara Mikulski, and Carl Levin – who led the attack against Justice Goldstone and others who documented Israeli war crimes – are still supported by many so-called “progressives” who apparently believe that, despite these senators’ attacks on basic human rights, they should still get their vote, campaign contributions, and other support. For example, here in California, Code Pink co-founder Jodie Evans and singer/songwriter Bonnie Raitt, who were active in opposition to U.S. policy in Central America during the 1980s, are major contributors to Boxer’s re-election campaign. The willingness to challenge such right-wing Congressional militarists has substantially diminished. 

The problem is less a matter of the power of AIPAC and the “pro-Israel lobby” as it is the failure of those on the left to demand a change in Obama administration policy.  Progressives must recognize that the lives of Arab civilians are as important as the lives of Central American civilians; that it is just as inexcusable for the United States to support a government that kill passengers and crew on a humanitarian flotilla in international waters as it is to kill nuns, agronomists and other civilians working in the Salvadoran countryside; and that, when it comes to international humanitarian law, the differences between the policies of Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama are not as great as we would like to think.