Foreign Policy In Focus

Soon after the 2006 war with Lebanon, it became clear that Israel's Achilles heel was the fear that demoralized its population.

On Wednesday November 21, under an Egypt-brokered deal, Palestinians and Israelis agreed to end all hostilities against each other after eight days of relentless Israeli attacks on the coastal enclave. Israel also agreed to open all crossings and facilitate the movement of people and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip. But it did not accept a proposal to lift the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Over 160 Palestinians, mostly women and children, were killed and about 1,200 others were injured in over 1,500 Israeli attacks on Gaza that were carried out during the eight-day period of November 14-21. It is too early to tell whether the ceasefire will hold for very long, and if it does, whether its central provisions will be implemented. 

For those who still remember the Israeli attack on Gaza four years ago and the slaughter of Palestinian civilians and the repeated violation of ceasefire agreement by the Israelis, the current ceasefire should hold no hope, especially as we have begun to notice similar patterns of violations taking place again. Looking back  four years, to the end of ‘Cast Lead’ and since then and up to the beginning of last Israeli attack, 271 Palestinians, according to the Israeli human rights organization B’tselem, have been assassinated by Israeli air strikes, by drones, by planes, by helicopters and ZERO Israelis killed by Palestinian rockets.

Israel has already used excessive violence to disperse Palestinian civilians who gathered on the Gaza side of the border, with a few straying across into Israel, to celebrate what they thought was their new freedom now to venture close to the border. This so-called ‘no-go-area’ was decreed by Israel after its 2005 ‘disengagement’ had been a killing field where 213, including 17 children and 154 uninvolved, had lost their lives. Only in the last few days, Israeli security forces, after firing warning shots, killed one Palestinian civilian and wounded another 20 others with live ammunition. Despite this note of pessimism there are a number of fundamental differences between the situation in Gaza and Hamas fighters in Gaza in 2012 compared to 2008.

First, the change of dynamics resulting from the Arab Spring and change in Egypt. The two regional countries that the U.S. needs badly to act as interlocutors, and isolate Hamas — Turkey and Egypt — are arguably right now the closest and most important allies of Hamas. Israel is more isolated than Hamas and has fewer friends. Even the British Foreign secretary, who under normal circumstances is only good for rubber stamping whatever Israelis does, this time took a cautionary approach and did not offer any support for a ground invasion.

The fact that Israel cannot count on diplomatic support from U.S.-oriented regimes such as Mubarak of Egypt creates a new dynamic in the Middle East and puts far greater pressure on Israeli leaders to be more realistic in their approach to the peace process. This generates a better environment for a more realistic and pragmatic approach to finding a longer lasting, and more permanent peace in the Middle East.

The second difference in my assessment is Hamas’ acquisition of more sophisticated weapons dealt a serious blow to Israeli morale. These long-range missiles allowed Hezbollah in Lebanon during the 2006 Israeli war not only to secure itself against Israeli aggression, most importantly: it created a more symmetrical confrontation by taking the war into cities in the occupied territories that had been immune from any attack for a long time.

The attack on Tel Aviv soon after the first Israeli attack on Gaza in the latest war, not only was a shock to the political leadership in the Israeli government, it heralded a new chapter in the relation between the freedom fighters in Gaza and the Israeli occupying forces. These weapons turned the table of confrontation with Israel in favor of Gaza and made another Israeli victim feel bold enough, if not fully secure, to confront it with a real sting.

One does not need a complicated analysis to conclude that if the fighters in Gaza have gained access to missiles that can reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, then they must have acquired anti-tank weapons similar to those that were used by Hezbollah in 2006 with devastating consequences for the Israeli tank divisions and especially for Markova 4 tanks that the Israelis had invested so much in constructing an image of invincibility around it globally.

It became clear soon after the 2006 war with Lebanon that the Achilles heel of the Israelis was the fear factor that demoralized its population. The fact that, in 2012 as in 2006, it was Israel who proposed the truce, clearly indicate that for the military leaders in Israel, a scared population is not the same as the dead Gazans are for Hamas – scared populations would sap the shaky morale in Israel even further, while for the freedom fighters in Gaza, innocent civilian casualties energize them to go an extra-mile to avenge.

Like the 2006 war, the underdog, Hamas, comes out of this confrontation in much more favorable status than the Zionist regime in Tel Aviv. Despite all the military shields, Hamas was able, even in the last hours of the conflict, to attack Israel. This has certainly enhanced Hamas’s prestige among Palestinians and in the Arab world, and, in a ‘zero sum gain’ relationship, any gain of prestige by Hamas by necessity implies a loss for the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas. It will be more difficult than ever to bolster the Fatah leadership on the West Bank as Hamas grows in stature.

The third outcome of this war is political recognition given to Hamas leadership by a number of Arab leaders. During the attacks several leading foreign ministers from the region visited Gaza and were received by the Hamas governing authorities, thus undermining the Israeli policy of isolating Hamas and excluding it from participation in diplomacy affecting the Palestinian people. As Richard Falk has stated:

. . . throughout this just concluded feverish effort to establish a ceasefire, Hamas was treated as if ‘a political actor’ with sovereign authority to speak on behalf of the people living in Gaza. Such a move represents a potential sea change, depending on whether there is an effort to build on the momentum achieved or a return to the futile and embittering Israeli/U.S. policy of excluding Hamas from diplomatic channels by insisting that no contact with a terrorist organization is permissible or politically acceptable.

The most important outcome of the latest attack has been the strengthening of the argument that the existence of more parity in the region would undermine the hawkish and belligerent Israeli position that so far, with the overt and covert support of the US, has not agreed to implement any treaties agreed upon in the previous negotiations and by implication would lead to a softening of such a position making a long term resolution of this conflict more likely. I hope this realization would lead to less saber rattling about attacking Iran.

Like Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas has punched a big hole in Israel’s overinflated air ego balloon sending the military leaders to the drawing board. This may be an opportune moment for the peace lovers in the region to become more active. They may be able to prevent this carnage from being repeated again. 

Ibrahim Kazerooni, originally from Iraq, is finishing a joint Ph.D. program at the Iliff School of Theology and the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies in Denver. More of his work can be found at the Imam Ibrahim Kazerooni Blog.

Former Hamas leader Meshal envisions himself replacing the aging Mahmoud Abbas as head of the Palestinian Authority.

The news that Hamas leader Khaled Meshal is resigning his leadership post is an ominous sign that Hamas is heading toward more confrontation with its Palestinian rival Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the near future.  Meshal is reported as seeking a bigger role for himself within the PLO even perhaps as its leader replacing the ageing and discredited Mahmoud Abbas.

As a leader of Gaza-based Hamas, Meshal should have been leading his organization from Gaza, which is free of Israeli control, and work to improve the lives of the people of Gaza, which his organization has been controlling since 2007. Instead Meshal has opted to place himself in the mold of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat taking comfort in hoping from this Arab capital to one day replace Arafat as a “symbol” of the Palestinian struggle against Israel albeit with very little results.

Even though Meshal lacks the personal charisma Arafat enjoyed for over 40 years, which later proved to be a disastrous trait for Palestinians leaders, he might find the regional alignment in his favor, especially in Egypt and Iran, should he decide to pursue plans to lead the PLO later on.

In order to respond to overwhelming Israeli power Palestinians need political managers skilled in statecraft and clean-handed politicians, not charismatic leaders who will inevitably turn into corrupt dictators and stay in power for decades. Neither Meshal nor Abbas can be described as clean-handed or competent.

Palestinians, much like their Arab brethren in the Arab States have yet to produce the kind of leadership that will hold itself accountable to the people and to the law. This is perhaps one of the key differences between Israeli and Palestinians whereas Israelis were able to develop an able pool of diverse leaders who acted in the best interest of their state and citizens even before they established their state in 1948. Palestinians on the other hand were stuck with the same leaders for generations who led them from one disaster to another.

Meshal, who has been leading Hamas since the mid-nineties, might have come to see himself as a leader of all of the Palestinian people as part of larger strategy by Hamas to control the overall Palestinian leadership. This could be a plausible scenario given the deteriorating conditions within the Palestinian territories and the discredited leaders of the PA and the relentless Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

Ever since its inception in 1987, Hamas has played the spoiler in the now defunct “peace process” and as a competitor to Fatah in its quest to lead the Palestinian people in their struggle to achieve their independence and end the Israeli occupation.

Helping Meshal in his goal is the rise of Islamic leaders in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab World who he sees as his natural allies and who obviously share his ideological background.

The problem with Meshal and Hamas, however, is that they behave much like other Palestinian organizations, past and present, by being beholden to the interests of their pay masters and political allies in Iran, Qatar, Egypt and Syria. Hamas's continued control of Gaza strip and its refusal to relinquish its grip on power there is also part of a regional struggle that involved the same regional and international actors who pay money to both Hamas and the PA

Acting as pawns of other Arab states and its leaders has been the story of the Palestinian leaders even before 1948. Clan-based Palestinian leaders of the Husseini and Nashasheebi families of the 1930s and 40s were more consumed with fighting and plotting against each other than fighting off the British and the Zionists at that time.  As a result they were caught off-guard and totally unprepared militarily and politically when Zionist leaders declared their state of Israel in 1948 in what was once Palestine.

Arab states meddling and corrupting the Palestinian leaders and organizations continued even when they founded the PLO to function on their behest against each other. Hamas is no different than other more secular organizations. 

 In July of 1967 a mere month after Arabs were defeated and lost the West Bank and Gaza along with Sinai and the Golan Heights, Israeli cabinet member Yigal Allon proposed the “Allon Plan” offering the Palestinians (then under the control of Jordan)  autonomous populated areas within the West Bank and Gaza while Israel retained much of the West Bank and Jerusalem and  overall military, political and economic control

The fact that both Hamas and Fatah organizations have resigned themselves, and fighting each other at the same time, to control different semi- autonomous parts of the West Bank and Gaza while remaining under an overall Israeli military, political and economic  control -- exactly like the “Allon Plan” -- shows how shameless, irresponsible and incompetent  those leader are. Palestinians simply deserve better leaders.

Ali Younes is a writer and analyst based in Washington D.C. He can be reached at: aliyounes98@gmail.com and on Twitter at @clearali.

"Why does the Chief of Staff want to attack?" asks Uri Avnery, who morphed over the years from a member of the Israeli paramilitary Irgun to a peace activity, in a widely posted op-ed.

What? Iran? No, writes, Avnery. Because of the "catastrophic, even apocalyptic" economic consequences, Israel Defense Forces Chief of General Staff Benny Gantz "knows that he cannot have it."

It's Gaza he wants to attack. Why? How about … to "compel Hamas to become extremist again." It seems that Hamas is just not holding up its end of the bargain as an enemy. Avnery writes:

Hamas is being accepted by the international community. Their Prime Minister, Isma’il Haniyeh, is now traveling around the Arab and Muslim world, after being shut in Gaza – a kind of Strip-arrest – for four years. Now he can cross into Egypt because the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organization, has become a major player there.

Also

By joining the PLO, [Hamas chief Khaled Mash'al] is committing Hamas to the Oslo agreements and all the other official deals between Israel and the PLO. He has announced that Hamas accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. He has let it be known that Hamas would not contest the Palestinian presidency this year, so that the Fatah candidate – whoever that may be – would be elected practically unopposed and be able to negotiate with Israel.

By removing the reasons to attack it, Hamas is pulling the rug out from under Israeli calls for Cast Lead II. It's always a sad day for an army when it loses an enemy, especially one it knows it can engage without unleashing World War III.

Israeli security forces report that they have arrested at least 100 suspected members of Hamas and claim to have foiled multiple bombing and kidnapping plots. These actions would seem to indicate a severe setback for Hamas's influence in the Occupied Territories and undermine prospects for reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. With the UN vote approaching, the timing of the announcement can only help buttress the Netanyahu government's security credentials after the embarrassment of the August 18th Eilat attacks. The arrests also coincide with a major media and diplomatic campaign by the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian activists ahead of the UN vote for recognition of a Palestinian state.

The Israeli government states that it is not holding the Palestinian Authority responsible for the cells' presence in the Occupied Territories and that the IDF is "cooperating" with Ramallah to conduct further security sweeps and prepare for Palestinian demonstrations later this month. The following information has been officially released:

On Wednesday (September 7), it was released for publication that the IDF, Israel Security Agency and Israel Police prevented a major terrorist attack in Jerusalem last month.

The attack was thwarted after a terrorist had already entered Jerusalem planning to activate an explosive device on a bus or at a shopping mall in the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood [ed note: According to unnamed sources, the "explosive device" was being delivered to a suicide bomber -- Ynet reports that the alleged suicide bomber, a 20-year old male from Hebron, is now in police custody].

The attack was prevented through joint operations by the IDF, ISA and police. During those operations, members of 13 terrorist cells (around 100 terrorists) were arrested. The detained terrorists included some senior operatives.

The ISA has noted that Hamas has been trying to rehabilitate its military infrastructure in Judea and Samaria in order to carry out attacks against Israeli targets.

According to the ISA, Hamas leadership abroad (in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) has provided funding, guidance and training for the establishment of terrorist infrastructure. Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been involved as well, attempting to move weaponry into Judea and Samaria and providing funding for terrorist activities.

Questioning of detained terrorists has revealed that they were instructed to carry out a kidnapping in order to bargain for the release of prisoners [according to media reports, these capture operations constituted the cells' main operational preparations].

Some of those arrested are being linked to a bus bombing in Jerusalem this past March. Connections with Hamas cells and fundraisers in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and China have been alluded to by the IDF and Shin Bet.

Few of the arrested individuals have yet been identified, though the Israeli media report that most of those being held in custody are "repeat offenders." These arrests follow the detention of amnestied Hamas founder Sheikh Hassan Yousef (better known as the father of the Shin Bet's former Hamas double agent Mosab Hassan Yousef).

Regarding that arrest, Defense Minister Ehud Barak had this to say, which reflects the Israeli government's position on these most recent arrests:

Readiness is very high. We are determined to strike at those carrying out the attacks, to take action as much as possible to intercept the attack and we are reiterating that responsibility stems from the Gaza Strip. It is not just Islamic Jihad but also Hamas.

It looks like every player in this game is running out of options these days. 

Paul Mutter is a graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

(Pictured: Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal.)

We're honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirty-seventh in the series.

In the face of the bombshell Palestine Papers published this week by al Jazeera and the Guardian, today’s offering from WikiLeaks of a single cable examining the situation in Gaza will doubtlessly be seen as weak tea.

Still, where the Palestine Papers succeed in demonstrating Palestinian Authority weakness, the cable just WikiLeaked shows rival Hamas to be no less insecure. The 2010 Jerusalem embassy dispatch reports rumors from trusted contacts which suggest that the organization suffers from a liquidity crisis which, if true, would certainly undermine prospects for the group’s long-term popular support.

Most alarmingly, embassy contacts in Gaza reported to American diplomatic officers that

Hamas was late in paying January salaries to civil servants on its payroll, and has not yet paid those salaries in full. While Hamas salary payments are typically available on the first day of every month, employees of the de facto Hamas government did not line up at post offices or the Islamic National Bank…until February 8 when, according to contacts, Hamas paid low-level employees with salaries up to NIS 1,500 (USD 400) per month.

One source reported overhearing an employee at Hamas’s Ministry of the Interior

complain on the phone that his salary was late and he would only receive a portion of it. The employee further complained that this was at least the third month he had received only a “portion.”

If true, Hamas has a problem on its hands. The group reportedly employees some 34,000 workers on a payroll that pays out roughly $16 million in monthly salaries, on top of the $9 million allotted for other operational costs. One source confided to embassy personnel that Hamas only collects between $3.5 and $4 million a month in levied taxes and other fees and thus relies heavily on outside assistance to make up the difference.

For instance, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX employee salaries at Hamas’s “Ministry of Education”—except those receiving salaries from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah are covered by Qatari donations.

Recently, however, Israeli and Egyptian crackdowns on entry and exit to the Strip compromised Hamas’s ability to capitalize on foreign largesse. Contacts reported that tighter Egyptian restrictions were especially deleterious to the organization’s checking account,

Including increased interference with smuggling operations. Gaza contacts note that Egypt has also cracked down on travel of Hamas officials outside Gaza by restricting their access through the Rafah crossing. In particular, Egypt reportedly no longer tolerates “Hamas VIP bags,” a reference to suitcases of cash transported across the Rafah border into Gaza.  

But the cable notes also that while all of the American embassy’s contacts inside Gaza reported Hamas’ financial troubles, they “interpret the nature and depth of the problem differently.” One contact speculated that Hamas indeed possessed enough money to cover all of its various expenses at the moment, but was “protecting its fiscal position by holding back on payments. ” Another asserted that Hamas has plenty of cash on hand, but instead of honoring the payment schedules of its employees, chooses to invest it in real estate accumulation in Gaza. The source provided intelligence that Hamas was offering “bids on properties…well above market prices,” and speculated that “purchasing real estate is a sustainable investment for Hamas, a money laundering scheme, and/or part of a strategy to strengthen its financial position (or physical presence) in Gaza as a bulwark against future events.”

At the same time, Hamas was reported to have been not only cutting costs but also accelerating its efforts at rent-seeking.

According to multiple contacts, municipalities in Gaza are stepping up the collection of electricity and water bills. Hamas-run ministries also charge fees for various services, like the issuance of official documents. The first-time “registration” fee for a car is USD 12,000…Gazans must also pay an annual fee to renew their car or motorcycle. New traffic signs are being installed, and traffic laws are being aggressively enforced by the police. For an infraction, according to a Gazan contact, police typically confiscate a driver’s license or car documents and require the driver to retrieve his documents at a police station, where he will likely pay a penalty fee.

If the reports are to be believed, some cases are outright predatory:

In one anecdotal account…a man who used his van to transport children to school was confronted by Hamas authorities and instructed to register his van as a school bus, and then pay requisite taxes.

The attack on education isn’t relegated solely to making transportation difficult. “Another contact said that Hamas now demands private school to pay taxes based on tuition fees, and threatens to shut down schools for non-compliance.” Purported school taxing would be of a piece with other reports that increased taxes and fees were also being levied against local businesses.

The fact that Hamas is unable, or unwilling, to pay salaries, combined with its practice of increased taxes and random fees cannot have positively contributed to the party’s already sagging popularity in Gaza. Despite claims that the Gazan economy is improving, Hamas’s favorable ratings currently remain at less than half of what they were five years ago when they assumed power of the territory, numbers that dropped precipitously in 2010. This is surely in large part due to the organization’s difficulties staking out political positions on the continuum between rhetoric and responsibility since 2006. And needless to say, worsening humanitarian conditions on account of the Israeli blockade haven’t helped. But until Hamas learns that candy and greeting cards are no replacement for basic attempts at effective governance—especially as the wealth of a new political elite within the organization grows—the party’s goal of securing its political future through ballots, not bullets, will remain elusive.