Foreign Policy In Focus

His dalliances with the likes of Gaddafi and Assad may have soured the Arab public on a figure with whom it was disposed to be sympathetic.

When Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez passed away last week, the public in the Arab world felt as if they lost one of their own. Chavez who ruled Venezuela for 14 years did make a huge impact on the lives of ordinary Venezuelans and at the same time made very important gestures toward the Arab world and the Middle East. Ever since he assumed power, Chavez made it his life work to end poverty in his country and expand education and health care to millions of poor and underprivileged Venezuelans.

Although he supported and befriended the hated Arab dictators, he, however, was unlike them on several levels. Chavez for example was interested in reshaping the Venezuelans' society and empowering the poor classes he was born into. Before Chavez came to power, Venezuelan society was divided along racial lines where the light-skinned or white Venezuelans, known as mestizos, sat at the top of the food chain and controlled much of its wealth and resources. Meanwhile, millions of black, Indian or mixed-race Venezuelans struggled in abject poverty at the bottom in one the richest countries on earth.

For those poor classes, Latin America analyst Oliver Barrett wrote on the Foreign Policy Blog that Chavez was their modern day "Robin Hood" and "Libertador." Barrett added that Chavez used socialism as his vehicle to utilize the vast riches of the country to slash poverty levels by seventy percent, while cutting unemployment rate by half, and expanded health and education opportunities to millions of his beloved poor citizens. Chavez's accomplishments in this regard were an impressive feat that no Arab leader, dictator or not, was able to accomplish.

In that respect, moreover, Chavez looked more like the late revolutionary Egyptian leader-dictator, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who also used socialism to reshape the Egyptian society and the Arab world but failed in both endeavors. Nasser, albeit operating in a different world system, nevertheless fell victim to his own rhetoric and failed to deliver many of his lofty Pan-Arab goals. In addition, he was directly responsible for the humiliating Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. His life however was conspicuously cut short at the age of 52, Chavez at 58.

Both Nasser and Chavez dwelled on anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism rhetoric and opposing Israel where both saw the three with little delineation. This kind of rhetoric was the main engine for their popularity among the poor and disenfranchised in the Arab World. When Chavez severed the diplomatic relations with Israel in protest for its attack on Gaza in 2008, his popularity in the region skyrocketed.

Chavez's anti-Israeli pronouncements enamored him to an Arab public hungry for a charismatic leader in the mold of Nasser amid increasing marginalization, oppression and fragmentation that became the order of the day in many Arab countries especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings. Chavez therefore was that "distant" hero that reminded the Arab public of a bygone era when the Arab world led by Nasser was defiant and resisted the encroaching western influence.

But not many in the Arab World view Chavez as a hero, especially after he expressed his public support to Arab dictators Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. Chavez's support for Arab dictators came across as a contradiction for the self-styled revolutionary who spoke against "American world domination" and "imperialism" yet supported brutal and bloody Arab dictators.

It was precisely this contradiction that propelled Shireen Mriash a Dubai-based pediatrician and a writer to write on her social network page accusing Chavez of dishonesty. For Mraish it was Chavez's support for Gaddafi that made her change her perception of him: "If a man or a leader supports oppression and injustice against others, he himself, therefore, is unjust and an oppressor."

Journalist Eman El-Shenawi, an editor at Al Arabiya news channel, voiced the same sentiments in an article she wrote last week. El-Shinawi cataloged Chavez's cold and insensitive statements in support of Gaddafi and Assad which disillusioned his Arab admirers.

She explained further that while Chavez's "vehement anti-Israel stance stood strong" it was "his support for the region's dictators that millions had come out to oppose in mostly blood-soaked battles" that ended the Arab World infatuation with him.

Ali Younes is a writer and analyst based in Washington D.C. He can be reached at: aliyounes98@gmail.com and on Twitter at @clearali.

In 1982, Ronald Reagan went on a disastrous tour of Latin America. In a series of gaffes that would have embarrassed an especially out-of-touch Japanese politician, Reagan proposed a toast to ‘the people of Bolivia’ at a dinner with the president of Brazil, and opined that Guatemalan military strongman Ríos Montt, who is now facing genocide charges, was ‘totally dedicated to democracy’. After the trip, Reagan memorably told reporters that ‘I learned a lot...you’d be surprised, yes, because, you know, they're all individual countries.’

President Obama will himself be heading to Latin America in April for the sixth Summit of the Americas, where he will meet the leaders of other nations in the Organization of American States (OAS). While it’s improbable that he will cause as much offense as Reagan, he could still be in for an awkward weekend.

US relations with Venezuela, for example, have scarcely improved since the days when George W. Bush’s nemesis, Hugo Chávez, was calling the ex-president a ‘donkey’ and a ‘drunkard’. Earlier this year Washington chucked Livia Acosta Noguera, Venezuela’s consul-general in Miami, out of the country. No explanation was forthcoming, but there were rumors that it was related to a murky affair during Acosta’s time as a diplomat in Mexico, when, it is claimed, she engaged in discussions with students about possible cyberattacks against US interests.

Reacting to the ignominious expulsion of his representative in Miami, Chávez announced he was closing the consulate, a decision which caused some irritation in the locality, even leading to a small demonstration. This was the latest spat in what has been a fractious three years. In 2010 Chávez refused to accept President Obama’s nominee for the post of US ambassador to Caracas, Larry Palmer, whereupon Washington got its own back by revoking the visa of Venezuela’s ambassador to Washington. The two states still do not have full diplomatic relations.

The Obama administration has also decertified Venezuela three years in a row for failing to cooperate sufficiently with Washington’s anti-narcotics efforts. Even the amount of Venezuelan oil imported by the US is in decline, only accounting for about 8 percent of total US imports in 2010.

Still, despite the early optimism, it was somewhat predictable that the US-Venezuela relationship would not recover from the deep freeze of the Bush presidency. Even as a candidate, Obama had called the Venezuelan leader a ‘demagogue’ who spouted a ‘predictable yet perilous mix of anti-American rhetoric, authoritarian government, and checkbook diplomacy.’

Relations with Bolivia can’t be said to have gone smoothly either. Like Venezuela, Bolivia has repeatedly been decertified by the Obama administration for having ‘failed demonstrably’ to meet its international anti-narcotics obligations. Not until November 2011 did the two countries agree to restore full diplomatic relations, which had been suspended in 2008 when Washington and La Paz engaged in tit-for-tat expulsions of ambassadors, and Bolivian president Evo Morales sent the US Drug Enforcement Agency packing. Morales’ government continues to insist that the DEA will not be permitted to return to Bolivia.

As for Cuba, it’s effectively been business as usual. Although Obama went through with his campaign pledge to remove barriers to family travel for Cuban-Americans seeking to visit the island, Washington’s fifty year old trade embargo has not been lifted and the Caribbean nation still features on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Havana has expressed a wish to attend April’s summit in Colombia, but the likelihood is that it will not, as the US has stressed that its old adversary will only be invited if it carries out democratic reforms.

Both Cuba and Bolivia bristle at the existence of US ‘democracy promotion’ programs targeting their countries. In 2009 a contractor named Alan Gross was arrested in Cuba for his role in the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s ‘democracy promotion’ activities in the Caribbean nation. Gross had been engaged in setting up internet access in the island – in violation of Cuban law – and smuggled prohibited, state of the art components into Cuba. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison for spying.

The US president will at least be able to rely on a warm welcome from his hosts. He has spoken approvingly of Colombia, calling it ‘one of our strongest partners not only in the region but around the world.’ The administration’s foreign aid request for 2013 seeks roughly US$330 million in socio-economic and military assistance for Colombia. While this is considerably less than Bush-era aid packages for Colombia, it continues Washington’s long-standing and controversial support for Bogotá’s fight against drugs, insurgents and poverty.

The Colombian government has another reason for being well-disposed towards Obama. Last year the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) finally passed Congress, almost five years after it was signed by President Bush. Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has, like his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe, been a strong advocate of the CFTA. Although this trade pact is controversial, partly because Colombia is the world’s most dangerous country for trade unionists, Obama has argued that it represents ‘a major win for American workers and businesses.’   

Michael Walker has a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of St. Andrews.

Dressed in his customary military attire, President Chávez appeared a picture of health on Monday, ready to address anxious supporters and clarify speculations concerning his battle against cancer and his ability to lead the nation.

This has been a triumphant return for Chávez, who departed his homeland abruptly on June 10th to receive medical attention in Cuba. Appearing frail and apologetic in a national broadcast on Thursday, the president disclosed that he had recently undergone surgery to remove cancerous cells. Following weeks of speculation, citizens were faced with the possibility that their head of state would be incapable of returning to Venezuela for several months. 

Chávez’ arrival on Monday thus came as a shock to citizens and opposition leaders alike. It seems that the president deliberately wished to surprise the nation: his plane landed at Maiquetia airport in the small hours of Monday morning in total darkness. When pictures of his recuperation in Cuba were released on Sunday, there was also no word that he was preparing to return to Caracas within a matter of hours.

There can be no question that the president was proud of his surprise return. He arrives just in time for Venezuela’s bicentennial celebrations, marking the country’s independence from Spain in 1811. For Chávez, who frequently compares his efforts for the socialist cause with Simon Bolivar’s struggles for Venezuelan independence, this return was a considerable personal triumph.

Indeed, addressing the nation from the balcony of the Miraflores presidential palace on Monday, Chávez asserted that he would win his battle for health. He thanked citizens for their support, declaring that this was “the best medicine for whatever illness.” Although he admitted that he would be unable to join the people in today’s official celebrations, he affirmed that his return to strength had begun. “I continue in charge,” he declared. 

In spite of these statements, many remain skeptical over the timeline of Chávez’ road to recovery and the extent to which he will be able to resume customary duties in the weeks ahead. Since his departure for Cuba, Chávez’ ministers have regularly insisted that the president would be capable of addressing political responsibilities from his hospital bed in Havana. Although this support might be regarded as a clear vote of confidence in Chávez’ abilities, others have seen it as an indication of the fact that there is no obvious successor. President Chávez, who has acted as head of state for 12 years and survived an attempted coup in 2002, continues to be a dominant player in Venezuelan politics.

Opposition leaders have nonetheless been quick to highlight the government’s lack of transparency in coping with the president’s illness and recovery. According to the BBC’s Sarah Grainger, over the weeks since Chávez’ departure for Cuba, officials have consistently denied rumors of cancer, often insisting instead that the president was recuperating from the removal of a pelvic abscess. For one opposition lawmaker, Alfonso Marquina, these former assertions constitute a government betrayal. Marquina informed the Associated Press that greater responsibility needed to be taken “…not only on the president’s part but by all of those high in the government to inform the Venezuelan people properly about the president’s real situation.”

Chávez’ extended stay in Cuba has already led to the postponement of a critical regional summit with Latin American and Caribbean leaders, which was scheduled to commence on Tuesday. Venezuela’s lack of affordable housing, high inflation, and recurring electricity shortages are just some of the issues which Chávez will need to meaningfully address if he intends to seek another presidential term. Nevertheless, the lack of a magnetic successor in his stead, coupled with his ingrained support among the poor, makes Chávez a fierce political competitor. If his health permits, it is still widely expected that he will run again for the presidential office in the 2012 elections.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's approach to power has been so centered on himself -- la revolución soy yo -- that it is unclear who can pick up the reins should Chávez either depart from this world or not be fit enough to seek re-election next year. Constitutionally, Venezuela does have a Vice President, Elías Jaua, and should Chávez not be able to finish his term, Jaua would become President to fill the remainder of the current term which runs through the end of 2012.

The bigger question is who can fill the immense void that Hugo Chávez's departure from the scene creates? The Foreign Minister, Nicolás Maduro, is perhaps the second best known voice of the revolution internationally but there are other actors who perform more on the domestic stage like Cilia Flores, Aristóbulo Isturiz and Diosdado Cabello, all of whom are leaders of the PSUV (the United Socialist Party of Venezuela). All three currently serve in the National Assembly and have played leading roles in Venezuelan politics during the past 12 years. Flores is the President of the National Assembly (she's also married to Nicolás Maduro). Isturiz, an academic by training and an Afro-Venezuelan, is the former Minister of Education. Cabello is a decades long Chávez confidant having served in the military with Chávez and who with Chávez participated in the failed coup against Carlos Andrés Perez in 1992. It was Cabello who regained control during the abortive 2002 coup that aimed to topple Chávez. After detaining the coup leaders, Cabello assumed the presidency briefly before restoring Chávez to power. Cabello has also served in the cabinet holding key ministries such as the Interior and Housing & Public Works. Meanwhile the youthful Jaua -- he's 42 -- in addition to being the Vice President is also the Minister of Agriculture having previously headed the land expropriation program. Returning to Maduro, he is a former bus driver with a high school degree who worked his way up the trade union movement becoming a founder of the Movimiento V República, the Fifth Republic Movement, one of the main left-wing factions that supported Chávez in his political rehabilitation back in 1998.

None of these political actors are really popular on the level that Chávez is with the lower strata of Venezuelan society, many of whom genuinely worship Chávez. However with the Chávez regime very much a throwback to the political tradition of caudillismo that was prevalent in many, but not all, LATAM countries in the 19th and through the mid-20th century, Chávez simply never the prepared the groundwork for a successor. On more than one occasion, Chávez envisioned staying at the helm through 2025 or even 2031. Should Chávez not be able to continue in power, filling the vacuum should strenuously test the PSUV.

Beyond those mentioned above, there are others who might seek to fill Chávez's shoes. Among these is the well-known former Vice President and the leading ideologue of the PSUV José Vicente Rangel. Rangel's main drawback is that he is in his mid 80s though he remains quite active. Another aspirant might be the dashing, charismatic and fiery Tareck el Aissami, who serves as Minister of the Interior and Justice. He is of Syrian descent but he's just 36 and not immune to controversy. Still el Aissami has worked his up way the ladders of chavismo rather quickly first running the youth movement of the party while still a university student. That earned him an appointment as the Deputy Director of the Identification and Immigration Directorate which handles the national identity card essential to virtually all legal and financial transactions which in turn led to his appointment as Vice Minister for Public Security. Perhaps the most formidable candidate is Energy and Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez Carreño who has been an important player in the PSUV party hierarchy for over a decade and who also, perhaps more importantly, happens to run PDVSA, the state oil company. By virtue of these posts he is well known abroad and his controlling position at the head of the still vast Venezuelan energy sector provides Ramírez Carreño an important platform that others lack. He comes with a fiefdom that remains a cash cow. Still the wild card is Adán Chávez, the President's older brother who is currently the Governor of the state of Barinas.

It is quite possible that Chávez keeps it in the family and uses his "dedazo" to anoint his older sibling as his successor, a rare event in the annals of Latin American history. Dynastic regimes have arisen in Nicaragua and in Paraguay and most recently Cuba but even there Raúl Castro is preparing Cuba for a Castro-less future.  The Venezuelan press seems to think, or perhaps better put, seems to hope that the heavyweight contender to lead a post-Chávez Venezuela is Rafael Ramírez Carreño. Perhaps tellingly however, the ones in Havana with Chávez are his brother, Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro and Henry Rangel Silva, the Armed Forces Chief.

In the interim, it seems that Venezuela will be governed from Havana. In remarks to a Colombian radio network on June 30th, Vice President Jaua indicated that Venezuelan policy makers and jurists were relying on an interpretation of the Venezuelan Constitution that permits the president to exercise his duties as head of state from abroad for a three-month period, which could then be extended for another three months. It is increasingly unlikely, however, that Chávez will return to Caracas in time for the country's bicentennial on July 5. So much for the best laid schemes of mice and autocrats.

Charles Lemos writes on politics, international affairs and economics. He has a degree in history from Stanford University and a degree in International Finance from the University of California. He spent a decade on Wall Street working for Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs as an equity analyst. He currently blogs at MyDD.

Cross-posted from the Tumblr site Peru Elections 2011.

With less than a week to go before Sunday’s vote, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega, presented a report to the Peruvian government purporting to document Venezuelan government support for the campaign of presidential contender Ollanta Humala. According to Noriega, “We have a very sensitive source in Venezuela who says that Humala receives money, possibly from the Venezuelan Embassy in Lima, where cash is sent by military plane from La Paz (Bolivia), and from there across the border that is controlled by military attaches of the Venezuelan embassy in Lima.” In an interview with Univision, Noriega claims that “sources” in Venezuela have told him that Venezuelan military officers delivered cash for the campaign, but that he won’t release the report or the names of his sources so as to not put them in jeopardy. A high-level Peruvian government official told Univision that the report provided no proof of the allegations. 

That Noriega sees Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as a threatening enemy is no secret. (Assistant Secretary from 2003 to 2005, Noriega was replaced by a career diplomat in large part for having driven U.S.-Venezuelan relations to the breaking point.) Yet somehow, despite his obvious enmity for Chávez, Noriega claims to have internal sources that have provided him with this information. Also highly questionable is his timing, which certainly appears to be intended to give Humala’s opponent, Keiko Fujimori, a boost before Sunday’s vote. Ironically, Noriega was given an award by the government of former President Alejandro Toledo for his work (then as a top aide to then-U.S. Senator Jesse Helms) for his efforts to bring an end to the Fujimori dictatorship of the 1990s. (Now that he is working to put another Fujimori back in the presidential palace, he should have the decency to return the award.) 

Such meddling in the electoral politics of Latin American countries was commonplace during previous administrations, though it sometimes backfired. In 2002, Evo Morales came very close to winning the presidency (which he then assumed in 2006) after statements against him by the U.S. Ambassador, Manual Rocha, caused his popularity to jump significantly. To its credit, since assuming office, the Obama administration has refrained from public interventions in electoral politics. According to a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The United States supports the democratic process, including elections that are free, fair, and transparent, and looks forward to learning the outcome of Peru’s presidential race. The Peruvian people will choose the next president of Peru. Regardless of who is elected, the United States looks forward to continuing its strong bilateral relationship with Peru.”

Behind the scenes, however, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Rose Likins, is evidently playing a very different role. As reported in a previous blog, she has openly expressed support for Keiko Fujimori’s candidacy in private meetings, including with a group of human rights activists where she actually attempted to defend Keiko Fujimori’s human rights credentials. According to journalist Gustavo Gorriti, “The U.S. Embassy strongly opposes Humala’s candidacy.” Like Noriega, Ambassador Likins no doubt fears another progressive government in South America joining the ranks of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela – all countries more willing to stand up to entrenched economic interests and the United States.

It is certainly true that Peruvian President Alan Garcia is now one the few consistent U.S. allies in the region. If Keiko Fujimori wins the elections on Sunday, it would be logical to assume that she would continue to play that role. However, it would be a mistake for the U.S. government to simply put Humala in the Chávez box. As reported previously – and despite Noriega’s claims to the contrary – Humala has sought to distance himself from Chávez, presenting himself instead as a more moderate candidate in the mold of the highly popular Lula in Brazil. Moreover, during the second round Humala has broadened his political support to include a range of progressive and moderate Peruvians. In short, if Humala were to win Sunday’s elections, it would behoove the U.S. government to reach out and try to work with him, rather than ending up in yet another situation of tense bilateral relations.

As is often the case in Washington, the official memory is short-lived. In the 1990s, the U.S. government was a key international actor in responding to human rights violations and the steady dismantling of democratic institutions in Peru. Developments there were seen as a direct threat to the democratic advances across the region and hence a threat to the U.S. government’s interest in promoting stable, democratic governments. Since then the U.S. voice has largely subsided. But a return to Fujimorismo in Peru would necessitate far more attention from the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration. Whoever wins Sunday’s vote, the U.S. government should be vigilant with regards to issues related to democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Peru and should work with its Latin American neighbors to ensure that the hard-fought gains of the last decade are not rolled back.

Finally, U.S. officials should not overlook the fact that a significant percentage of the population supports Humala – particularly in the southern and central parts of the country – which underscores the need address the countries’ real and deep inequities. While Peru has had impressive economic growth over the last decade, the levels of inequality have only improved slightly. Clearly, far too many Peruvians continue to suffer from extreme poverty, lack of opportunities for meaningful employment and a poor quality of life overall.  If measures are not taken to address these issues – measures that go beyond food handouts – then the problems that Peru faces today will continue to grow larger, including social conflict and violence. Rejecting Humala as the “Chávez candidate” may be politically expedient for some, but negates the important role he has played in bringing the issue of inequality and poverty into the political debate.