Foreign Policy In Focus

Just days before the Third U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue between the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the Indian Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna, in Washington, D.C., an important address was given by Robert O. Blake, a U.S. State Department official, at a meeting of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Blake stressed the unique importance of the U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship, not only to the two countries but to the world. It was noted that since these talks began in 2010, our strategic ties have led to an ever greater confluence of views on the important issues of our time. This address, the only indication thus far of the latest official thinking about this important Dialogue, was as significant for the issues it addressed as it was for those he failed to mention.

Most noteworthy was his emphasis on Afghanistan as the principal subject of the upcoming meeting. It was noted that past and continuing actions by both countries in this respect centered on economic and developmental goals, to be achieved through “strategic partnership” agreements signed by each government with Afghanistan. While both agreements include the training of Afghan forces, the American agreement (signed on May 1st, 2012) commits Kabul to allow the U.S. access and use of Afghan facilities beyond 2014 for purposes of “targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda” and for security and defense cooperation over the long-term. The security concern was once again emphasized in his closing remarks.

Thus, despite Blake’s focus on economic and scientific cooperation between India and the U.S., we see emerging a strong military and security theme, especially with regard to Afghanistan (a concern shared by the Indian Government). In his keynote address, Mr. Blake emphasizes Afghanistan’s security, as do the agreements signed by New Delhi (last year) and Washington (this year) with Afghanistan. This should not surprise us. After all, Afghanistan is a country which, in the public mind and in our daily news, is identified with the 10-year war being waged there, primarily by American military forces.

It must be stressed, however, that this emphasis goes far beyond the need to ensure Afghanistan’s stable and prosperous future. Indeed, its ramifications extend to Pakistan as well as Central Asia, and beyond that, to South and Southeast Asia. As Mr. Blake states in his concluding remarks, he feels encouraged by the progress made by the two governments towards broadening “our counter-terrorism and defense cooperation.” The economic goals, moreover, are to be achieved through cooperation and integration, not only bilaterally, but also along broad geographical lines, encompassing essentially all of Asia.

One might be tempted to question this as an overly ambitious scope on the part of an assistant secretary, until we hear Defense Secretary Panetta’s statement that the U.S. plans to increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Blake goes on to praise India’s “Look East Policy” and sees the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Myanmar in May and the signing of multiple agreements while there as an example of India “assuming a larger role in the broader Asia-Pacific.” It should be noted, however, that while the Look East Policy has included recent attempts to develop economic relations with Singapore and the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), it is a policy of long-standing, initiated in 1991, and may have little to do with the current American decision to militarize its presence in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Mr. Panetta’s announcement was almost immediately followed by a report in the Indian press that the Minister of Defense opposed India joining the U.S. “bandwagon” on the Asia-Pacific and that the U.S. ought to rethink this policy. But while some reports indicated that the Minister of Defense was in disagreement on this issue with the Indian Foreign Minister, other reports stated that Foreign Affairs Minister Krishna had told the Chinese Vice Premier at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit  that “India’s relations with China are a priority in India’s foreign policy”. This could be seen as directed to the U.S. Defense Secretary whose Asia-Pacific policy is widely thought to be aimed at China.

Mr. Panetta has also figured prominently in various Asian media because of comments about Pakistan. On June 7, while in New Delhi, he warned Islamabad that Washington is “losing patience” with the Government of Pakistan, for letting its territory be used as a safe haven for those who attack American and Afghan forces and then cross back into Pakistan. He singled out the Taliban and the Haqqani network. It is believed at the highest levels of the U.S. Government that this conduct reflects long-standing official policy by Islamabad. This is what has fueled Washington’s anger with Pakistan. On top of that, the six-month blockade of NATO’s military supply route into Afghanistan has brought American patience to a breaking point.

An important issue not raised by Mr. Blake is Iran, including the question of whether America’s friends and/or interlocutors will yield to Washington’s counsel or demand to impose sanctions on Iran or face U.S. sanctions. But there has been a reversal of this policy -- in the case of India. If so, it is unlikely that China alone would be singled out for sanctions. Both countries are critically important to the U.S. for a variety of reasons, some similar, some quite different. Clearly, Washington thought it best to clear the air ahead of the Strategic Dialogue.  

Moreover, as American economic power weakens, it negatively affects its political influence abroad. At a time when the economic crisis has become almost worldwide, and the U.S. is involved in numerous conflicts -- open, quiet or covert -- Washington can hardly afford to alienate a rising power like India, who has  been a hesitant friend at best and whose economic relationship with the U.S. is not as healthy as the U.S. -- or India for that matter -- would like. Nor can the U.S. alienate powerful adversaries like China, who is already unhappy with the return -- in a big way -- of U.S. military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps the most important conflict of interest between Washington and Beijing may be building up in the South China Sea, where China has important economic and energy interests. With U.S. military commitments being quite extensive, and the Defense Department facing severe budget cuts, Washington can hardly afford to pick a big fight with China. It is therefore likely that the threat of sanctions against China will be quietly abandoned, now that India has been exempted. If not, we may expect the Asia-Pacific region to heat up considerably.

The drift in Indo-U.S. relations noted by many observers during President Obama’s current term may be reversed if the coming American elections change the setting in Washington. The same may be said of the Indian national elections, which could be held next year (instead of 2014) if the Prime Minister so chooses under India’s electoral system.

In recent days, there have been some interesting developments in the relationship that have caused some optimism in American circles, not entirely matched by Indian commentators. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently returned from a trip to Asia, during which she held talks with India’s Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna, on May 8th, preparatory to the 3rd U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue to be held in Washington, D.C. on June 13th.

Both parties agreed on the importance of their economic relationship, with Clinton stressing increased trade and investment, and Krishna hoping the relationship “would grow much faster and realize its enormous potential.” There was agreement also on Afghanistan, with Clinton welcoming India’s support for the “people’s efforts to build a more peaceful and prosperous future.” Among other things, India has organized a meeting of potential investors in Afghanistan from the surrounding states, to be held in June.

But beneath the diplomatic rhetoric, Clinton hinted at India’s need to open its markets to American retailers (like Walmart). Krishna in turn urged that more mobility be allowed for their IT and other specialists in the U.S. The Foreign Minister raised with Secretary Clinton India’s concern with American protectionism, a particularly troublesome intimation of which was the restrictive nature of visa applications (challenged by India at the WTO last month) that Indian professionals from the services industry are required to complete, the recent increase in visa fees to $2,000, and the high rejection rate of these applications. Instead of being reassured by the Secretary on this score, he was undoubtedly disappointed to hear that U.S. policy would persist, as would the rise in rejections.

As for the historic civil nuclear agreement signed in 2008, which raised so many hopes in both countries, all that could be claimed by the Secretary was discussions by public-private agents (of India and the U.S., respectively) on how “to move forward together.” But the Foreign Minister urged faster progress “towards contractual steps.”

Finally and most significantly, India’s continued import of Iranian oil was discussed. This is, of course, a key issue for the U.S., which believes strongly that Iran is intent on developing nuclear weapons. To deter these plans, it has declared an oil embargo on Iran, and has been imposing harsh sanctions on those who import oil from that country. But while several nations (mostly European as well as Japan) have been exempted, Washington threatens to impose sanctions on India and China after June 28th, two of the biggest importers of Iranian oil. While India agrees, in general, with Washington on the nuclear issue, and did in fact decrease its much-needed oil imports from Iran several times, Clinton was not prepared to say that India’s concessions (which New Delhi perceives as substantial) would be enough to exempt New Delhi from sanctions by the end of June. Indeed, Clinton repeatedly pressed India -- not only during the talks with Krishna, but also in several hard-hitting and unyielding public statements -- to make further cuts.

The Foreign Minister continued, nevertheless, to acknowledge Iran’s rights as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and stressed India’s full implementation of all United Nations-mandated sanctions on Iran. He thereby signaled India’s disapproval of what India views as punitive sanctions imposed on Iran by the U.S. and the West in general, which moreover do not adequately take into account India’s urgent need for increasingly expensive fuel imports (with the Rupee weakening sharply) which can be met only partially from alternate sources, due to financial, technical and other reasons. As if to underscore New Delhi’s stance, Indian exporters were holding talks with an Iranian trade delegation in one part of the capital, while Secretary Clinton was meeting with India’s Foreign Affairs Minister in another part.

It remains to be seen if the relationship will indeed be hurt, as Indians have warned, if the U.S. proceeds to impose sanctions on India because of its continued imports of Iranian oil on which the nation is so heavily dependent. Both sides hope that some of the outstanding issues can be resolved at the June 13 “strategic dialogue.” Washington may be more optimistic, given India’s greater flexibility in negotiations (especially compared to China). The pot may have been sweetened the previous week when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is in New Delhi for talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defense Minister A.K.Antony, when India is expected to sign additional arms deals. On the other hand, New Delhi may surprise Secretary Clinton this time.

The Obama administration’s attempts to punish Iran for its nuclear activities have had the unintended effect of causing strains in the US-India relationship. India, an increasingly important US partner, has proved reluctant to get on board with the campaign to isolate Tehran.

This is an unwelcome turn of events for Washington, which has gone to considerable lengths over the past decade to ingratiate itself with New Delhi. Major advances in bilateral ties occurred on President Bush’s watch, notably the signing of a 10-year defense pact and a highly controversial agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, which effectively rewarded India for developing a nuclear capability outside the framework of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2010 President Obama publicly supported India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a move which infuriated India’s mortal enemy Pakistan. 

India’s rise to prominence in US foreign policy calculations is in some ways surprising. First, the two nations have not enjoyed close relations historically. During the Cold War India was viewed as having an overly cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, with Henry Kissinger (very inaccurately) deriding the country as ‘a Soviet stooge’. Second, India has undeniably engaged in the type of behavior that has seen the likes of Syria, North Korea and Iran being labeled ‘rogue’ states. It is, for example, a declared nuclear weapons state which tested five atomic devices in 1998, and, as noted above, it is not a signatory to the NPT.

Third, it’s no secret that India has a deplorable human rights record, especially in the disputed and restive state of Jammu and Kashmir. As noted in the State Department’s 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, there were in India ‘reported extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, killings of protesters, and torture and rape by police and other security forces’. In the summer of 2010 protests in Kashmir were met with extreme violence, with more than 100 people reported killed. People can be held without charge for up to two years in Kashmir under a draconian public safety law. According to Amnesty International, an estimated 8,000 to 20,000 individuals have been detained under this law over a twenty-year period.

However, over the last ten years or so, officials in Washington have evidently determined that the perceived convergence of US-Indian strategic interests outweighs other considerations. The bilateral relationship has bloomed because the two nations face similar challenges, one of which is the ‘common threat’ of ‘international terrorism’. In India’s case, this refers to Islamist separatists, allegedly assisted by Pakistan, in Jammu and Kashmir, who have been waging war against the state for twenty years. From Washington’s perspective, then, India is on the right side of the United States’ war on terror.

The other shared challenge is the growing power of China, which looms large on India’s northern border. There is a sense among some US officials, lawmakers and foreign policy specialists, especially conservatives, that India could serve as a potential pro-US counterweight to China in Asia. To quote Republican Senator John McCain, ‘While India and the United States each continue to encourage a peaceful rise for China, we must recognize that one of the greatest factors for shaping this outcome and making it more likely is a robust U.S.-India strategic partnership’.

There is a third factor that needs to be considered here, and which relates to the point about China. India is a democracy, and is therefore viewed as a more reliable international actor than the ostensibly communist regime in Beijing. A common refrain from US officials is that India and the United States have ‘common ideals and shared values’.

Nonetheless, cracks have begun to appear in the bilateral relationship, not least over Iran. The government of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has found itself in an increasingly awkward position as Washington, the UK and other European nations have sought to tighten the screws on the regime in Tehran. Washington’s efforts to convince other nations to reduce or shut off imports of Iranian oil have met with success in some countries, but have been rebuffed by India, which has boldly declared that it has no intention of cutting the quantity of oil it imports from Iran. India relies on Iran for about 12% of its oil, and it is Tehran’s second-biggest customer in this regard, after China. According to a report in the Financial Times, ‘The US believes India will be the only major Asian buyer of Iranian crude to maintain its imports in the first half of this year’.

India’s refusal to play ball when it comes to Iran has raised eyebrows among senior figures in the US foreign policy establishment. For instance, Nicholas Burns, who served in the State Department during George W. Bush’s presidency, recently wrote an op-ed criticizing New Delhi, in which he accused the Indian government of ‘actively impeding the construction of the strategic relationship it says it wants with the United States’.

Other recent events have also served to strain the India-US relationship. As Burns observed in his op-ed, India has been ‘stonewalling’ on implementation of the civil nuclear agreement signed by Bush. Furthermore, the Obama administration was irked by the Indian government’s decision in 2011 not to shortlist US defense giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin for a highly lucrative contract to supply the Indian air force with 126 new warplanes. (The eventual awarding of the contract to the French company Rafale did not go down well in the UK, either.)

It remains to be seen if the dispute over Iranian oil will result in a ‘back to the future’ scenario in US-India relations. The tensions that are developing between the two countries do, however, clearly demonstrate that Washington’s strategy of putting the squeeze on Tehran is having an unwelcome ripple effect. There could well be further repercussions elsewhere in the world.

Michael Walker has a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. 

"Every now and again, one reads an editorial that stops the reader in his tracks," writes John Daly at Oil Price. He's referring to a story titled "War Inevitable To Tackle Indian Water Aggression" on Pakistan’s Urdu-language widely read daily newspaper Nawa-e Waqt, which "bluntly commented on India's Kashmiri water polices and Islamabad's failure up to now to stop New Delhi's efforts to construct hydroelectric dams in Kashmir."

First some background  on the tug of the war over the Indus, a prime water source for Pakistan. Almost 2,000 miles long, its wellspring is in the Tibetan plateau, which incorporates the Himalayas. The Indus runs through Kashmir (and Jammu) and flows south through Pakistan to Karachi where it empties into the Arabian Sea. But the dams that India builds across rivers feeding into the Indus not only decrease the share of water for Pakistan but can be used to deprive Pakistan of even more water in the event of war.

To address this issue, in 1960 India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty, which gave India control of the main rivers of the Punjab, and Pakistan control of the Indus. Recently, though, wrote Tufail Ahmad for the Henry Jackson Society in 2009, "Concern is growing in Pakistan that India is controlling the water flow of rivers that flow from India into Pakistan, especially the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers that pass through India’s Jammu & Kashmir state."

Pakistani commentators, pressure groups and religious leaders think that India is controlling the river waters to strangulate Pakistani agriculture, which could affect Pakistani exports and increase its dependency on food imports. Pakistani commentators fear future war with India may break out over water disputes.

This is hardly the first time that Pakistan voices have called for war over water issues. Ahmad writes about how in

… early 2008, an editorial in the [Pakistani] newspaper Roznama Ausaf accused India of planning a "Water Bomb" strategy to strangle Pakistan economically. The article quoted the officials of the IBWC pressure group [Pakistan's Indus Basin Water Council] as saying that India wants to achieve through a "water bomb" what it could not achieve through the three wars waged over the past six decades.

He then sheds light on the meaning of the phrase "water bomb."

Noting that India is planning "50 dams to raid the waters of the rivers" flowing into Pakistan, the IBWC warned: "If this is not foiled, Pakistan will face the worst famine and economic disaster."

Daly quotes the Nawa-e Waqt editorial on how to counter the water bomb.

India should be forcibly prevented from constructing these dams. If it fails to constrain itself, we should not hesitate in launching nuclear war because there is no solution except this.

That, too, is an old refrain in Pakistan. Ahmad again.

In May 2009, [IBWC Chairman Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan] Dahir described "India's water terrorism as a bigger threat than Talibani terrorism," and then added: "The day is not far when circumstances like those in Somalia, Ethiopia and Chad will emerge inside Pakistan... India has readied a weapon for use against Pakistan that is more dangerous and destructive than an atomic bomb." …  [A] convener of the Pakistani chapter of the Kashmiri secessionist organizations’ alliance, Syed Yousaf Naseem stated. … "Unless this issue is resolved, the Damocles' sword of a nuclear clash will remain hanging over the region." 

The rhetoric is as flamboyant as it is incendiary -- and irresponsible to the power of ten megatons. In a 2007 paper for the Physicians for Social Responsibility titled An Assessment of the Extent of Projected Global Famine Resulting From Limited, Regional Nuclear War, Ira Helfand, MD, writes that nuclear war in the region would result in "a total global death toll in the range of one billion from starvation alone."

An atmospheric scientist from the University of Colorado in Boulder, Brian Toon helped Carl Sagan put nuclear winter on the map. Colorado Arts & Sciences magazine reports:

In 2006, Toon helped lead two studies that found that even a small-scale nuclear war—one involving 100 15-kiloton explosions—could slaughter as many people as were killed during World War II and disrupt the world’s climate (and food production) for a decade. … Pakistan and India have the capacity to detonate 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs.

Daly wonders aloud if "there any way out before the missiles fly?" Ahmad wrote, "There is a realization in Pakistan that the 1960 Indus Water Treaty that establishes legal framework for use of river waters has been to the advantage of India." But Daly writes:

The 1960 Indus Water Treaty. … is considered one of the world's most successful trans-boundary water treaties, as it addresses specific water allocation issues and provides unique design requirements for run-of-the-river dams … All foreign governments interested in avoiding further military conflict in South Asia should impress upon both New Delhi and Islamabad the ongoing value of their 51 year-old water agreement and urge them to resolve their conflicts within its framework.

India has always been considered a soft state and it is time we shed this image.

Writing at Truthout, J. Sri Raman is quoting senior BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party --sort of India's Likkud)  leader Yashwant Sinha, who also says (emphasis added), "India should reserve the right of surgical strikes and hot pursuit against Pakistan irrespective of the consequences."

Sinha is speaking about the U.S. attack on the bin Laden compound. (Never mind the consequences, such as, shortly afterwards, the twin bomb attacks  on the Frontier Constabulary in Shabqadar, Charsadda, Pakistan that killed 80.) As Raman writes:

One of the very first questions raised in India by the [SEAL attack] was whether this was or was not an example for this country to emulate. "Yes," said India's extreme right and the security "experts" that give its rhetoric some respectability. They continue their campaign for a similar operation or series of operations from New Delhi to eliminate sources of anti-India terrorism seen to be harbored on Pakistani soil.

Of course

The demand is not entirely new.  [For example, the] question that the Bush-ordered aggression on Iraq . . . provoked was: should not India, too, support "pre-emptive" strikes against terrorist targets in Pakistan and the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir?

Raman also cites

. . . a pro-covert-action propagandist as saying, "If a Pakistan-based terrorist group carries out strikes against civilians in Mumbai ... India must be able to assassinate its leaders and their financiers."

For his part, Raman adds

Don't the words sound eerily like someone speaking from the White House in early May?

But no one throws down the gauntlet with as much of a vengeance as Indian national security advisor Bharat Karnad, who Raman quotes.

Does the ... government, encouraged by the successful action to finish off Osama, have the guts, gumption, but mostly the will, to rethink its ... attitude, when it comes to doing what any self-respecting country would do when under terrorist threat - bump off those responsible in a major way for terrorist strikes within India?

After a grievous wound like the Mumbai attack, India would be better advised to concentrate more on making sure it never happens again than worrying about vengeance. Especially because, to terrorists, punishment is of zero value as a deterrent.

Meanwhile, as India pumps up the volume on calls for revenge and as the TTP (Pakistan's Tehrik-i-Taliban) demonstrate more stealth and skill in its  attacks within Pakistan, what's to stop Pakistan from claiming that India is responsible?