Foreign Policy In Focus

Sudan President Omar al-Bashir detains "elbow lickers" in "ghost houses."

Cross-posted from the Arabist

Last week, Sudanese security forces arrested the country’s ex-spymaster Salah Ghosh and at least a dozen other people, including high-ranking military officers, on charges of attempting a coup against President Omar al-Bashir. Little information has been made available regarding the alleged plotters, but according to AFP, state media also announced that “[t]his plot is led by some opposition party leaders.” 

The arrests came a few days after President Bashir returned from a “minor” operation in Saudi Arabia — one of the few places he can travel without fear of being turned over to the ICC to stand trial for war crimes — and oversaw the appointment of one of his main parliamentary boosters as secretary-general of the nation’s Islamic Movement organization, which Bashir and his cohorts created in 1999 after falling out with the cleric Hassan al-Turabi, who in the 1980s and 1990s led the Islamist organization that helped the current regime seize power. The new appointment was strongly criticized by al-Turabi, who is now the leader of the opposition calling for Bashir to step down, and has been described in Sudanese press commentaries as a defeat for “reformists,” since it further weds the organization to the president’s own political party, the NCP. Alex Thurston notes that the political battle at the Islamists’ national conference may not have been a precipitant for the arrest of the accused plotters and other individuals. According to Thurston, “[t]he combination of military defections and Islamist dissent (and of course there is overlap between military and Islamist ranks) poses a major problem for a regime that has relied on these constituencies as pillars of its support.”

If this was a coup by dissatisfied elements of Bashir’s military/intelligence inner circle, it bears out the worst-case scenario(s) alluded to in Reuters’ and the ICG’s November special reports on Khartoum’s precarious control over the factions the regime feels it must placate to avoid being deposed by an increasingly disappointed and impoverished populace. When students and state employees have come out into the streets this this past year to protest government austerity measures, Bashir has dismissed them as “elbow-lickers,” and his security forces have cracked down on them, reportedly spiriting dozens away to be tortured in “ghost houses.” 

As an (optimistic) accounting of the “coup” in Al Quds Al-Arabi opines that “regardless of the validity of the charge against the officers of the detainees, this confrontation may have brought the internal crisis in the system to the point of no return” because “there are even signs that the important components in the security sector in turn has withdrawn its support for the regime and sided with the reform camp.”

This would be extremely dangerous to Bashir’s rule because a significant part of the criticism leveled at Bashir from his fellow Islamists stems from the 2005 ceasefire and 2011 independence of South Sudan from the north. Since then, although Sudan and South Sudan “signed several agreements paving the way for resuming vital oil exports and creating a demilitarized zone along their contested, oil-rich border” in September 2012, South Sudan says Khartoum is delaying the implementation of the agreements because it now has “additional demands on security issues that go far beyond the scope of the 27th September agreements.”

Those “issues” are, according to the Sudan Tribune, Khartoum demanding that South Sudan oversee the disarmament of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – Army North (SPLM/A-N), which is fighting an insurgency against the Sudanese Army in several provinces bordering the new South Sudanese state, provinces which have been absolutely devastated by the ongoing conflict, in which thousands of civilians have been killed and hundreds of thousands more made refugees.

Sudan denies there is a humanitarian crisis, of course, yet still does its best to bar aid and outsiders from entering the region as it carries out military operations. Bashir’s government is not going through with the much-needed September agreement because it claims that the SPLM/A-N gets its marching orders from Juba, and there is some truth in this charge.

South Sudan says it has no control over the SPLM/A-N, and this is also partly true because even if it is a kind of “stay-behind” organization, as Khartoum charges, like all “stay-behind” organization the SPLM/A-N has its own parochial interests to consider – Khartoum having been quite clear it is willing to pay a high price in civilian lives to secure this region, one of its few remaining oil sources. Moreover, Juba has enough problems trying to disarm militias within its own borders.

Leaving the military matters aside for now, though, there are still sufficient non-South Sudan-related grievances to hound Bashir. According to Reuters:

Perhaps the biggest threat facing Bashir comes from inside his party. The movement that seized power in 1989 in a burst of religious fervor has atrophied. Younger and mid-level officials are angry that the same people have been running the country for more than two decades. Many educated officials are unhappy because Sudan’s isolation curbs their career prospects.

And, from the ICG:

The NCP is in a state of confusion, extensively fractured and with no coherent strategy for addressing multiple security, political and economic challenges. Members are deeply unhappy with the leadership, its policies and massive corruption. Discontent is rising, and local chapters are increasingly challenging decisions, as well as the party’s  general orientation. Internal divisions are spilling into the  open in the form of critical memorandums and calls for reform. Different parts of the NCP – right-wing factions in the youth movement, the parliamentary bloc, the army and the student movement – have independently sent written protests to the leadership.

Both centers and the ICG also note that Bashir is earning a reputation as a less-than-sincere Islamist among hardliners in the clerical establishment, such as those who helped organize the anti-Western protests this fall that saw the German embassy in Khartoum assaulted and gutted by fire over the film “Innocence of Muslims.” 

Bashir may believe he can dismiss the “elbow-lickers” – his security services moved quickly to cow them of stating any repeat mass demonstrations – and rely on old men like his Islamic Movement secretary-general appointee to hold the Young Turks in line, but given how he rose to power, he cannot be so dismissive of such dissenters as his former spymaster Ghosh and ex-special forces men known as the “Al Sa’ihun” who had been deployed in the conflict with the SPLA up until 2005.

And unfortunately for the two Sudans, if there is one undertaking Bashir can score points on despite the fuel shortages, “ghost houses” and arrests, it is upping the ante on the southern border.

In June, Special Envoy to Sudan Princeton Lyman displayed cautious optimism when he called the Doha Peace Talks to reach a peaceful agreement between the Sudanese government and Darfur’s rebel groups a step in the right direction. On July 14, 2011, Khartoum and some of the major rebel groups in the Northern half of Darfur, including the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and Abdul-Wahid Mohamed Nur faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), officially signed the document these talks produced. After nine years of genocidal civil war and thirty months of dialogue, the situation is still less than ideal. In spite of this, the implementation of a peace agreement will finally begin. How much of a cause for celebration this is will become clear in the weeks and months to come.

In accord with the signed agreement, local governance is being returned to the people of Darfur – even those rebel groups that denounce violent resistance and join the fold. This includes leadership postings. Former rebels will occupy positions such as the chairmanship of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), the assistant and advisor to the DRA, ministerial positions (the latter three to be held by LJM members), as well as a gubernatorial position in one of the new states being established in the region. In addition, the LJM will hold 17 of the 67 seats in the new DRA Council that will act as a parliamentary body to assist the DRA implement the peace agreement. Among those 17 positions is the Council vice-chairperson. Abdul-Aziz Adam, Commander of the Bedouins and Routes Alliance forces that signed its own agreement with the government shortly after LJM signed on to the Doha agreement, says:

This is a great opportunity to achieve the comprehensive peace in Darfur. The signing of the Doha agreement, with a great support of our people in Darfur and the international community, avails the chance for the realization of peace in the region according to the aspirations of its people…

Not all of the parties in the Darfur conflict are willing to sign on to division of authority prescribed in this agreement. Still noticeably absent are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) as well as the Nur and Minnawi factions of the SLA that continue their military struggle in the southern part of Darfur. Though provisions exist in the document that would award JEM government positions should they put down their arms, these groups argue that the agreement does not meet their needs and that the government in Khartoum cannot be negotiated with on principle. They seek to not only achieve reforms in Darfur but to instigate regime change that will finally topple the power of President Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP).

Khartoum vows to continue its fight against those groups reluctant to cooperate with what it vows is the “final document.” The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have begun bombing villages in South Darfur in an effort likely to pressure those rebel groups refusing to buckle and submit. Typical of Sudanese military-political strategy, civilians are caught directly in the crossfire.

The implementation of this peace agreement should be used as a barometer of many things. First and foremost, Khartoum now has the opportunity to prove that it can be taken at its word. Should the NCP allow the peace agreement to help the rebel groups who put down their weapons and bring stability to the people of North Darfur, it will prove to onlookers that it is seriously interested in honest cooperation and creating what Special Envoy Lyman calls an “enabling environment” for open political dialogue that is currently missing the in the region. The other groups in Darfur might consider ending their fight and coming into the fold as well. South Sudan could be encouraged to work more cooperatively with Khartoum to make progress on border disputes and oil revenue sharing.

As lofty as the upsides of cooperation are, the consequences of a disappointment are just as extreme. If the NCP allows the Doha agreement to become a meaningless piece of paper, all semblance of regional trust could be destroyed. By proving that a zebra cannot change its stripes, the rebel groups and regional players will be even more skeptical about accepting Khartoum’s olive branches in the future. Regional conflict and suffering would be sure to deepen, as would the international isolation of Bashir’s regime. As it becomes clearer that carrot and stick calculations do not faze the Sudanese government, ending the humanitarian crises it incites becomes a difficult paradox to solve. All have much to gain from making good on this step forward. All have much to lose.

Adam Cohen is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

(Pictured: South Sudan referendum registration.)

All of this week a historic referendum is taking place in which the people of Southern Sudan are casting their votes to determine whether to secede from the North, likely becoming Africa's newest independent nation. The date for this referendum was set six years ago, during the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) ending a 22-year civil war between north and south. The extraordinary voter turnout and jubilation at the polls this week reflects the desire of so many to free themselves from decades of oppression and marginalization by successive Northern-dominated regimes. After enduring a brutal war in which two million people were killed and four million more were displaced, it is clear that the people of Southern Sudan are ready to become first-class citizens of their own sovereign nation.

As a northern Sudanese living in the diaspora, I am experiencing this historic moment with mixed emotions. I feel hopeful and inspired by a people who are inching closer towards their dream of self-determination. The demands of the Southern Sudanese liberation struggle represent the Sudan many of us in the North want: a nation in which wealth and power is more equitably distributed and where everyone, regardless of ethnicity, faith, or gender is treated with respect and dignity. 

The impending secession of Southern Sudan should also serve as a wake-up call for us to recommit ourselves to the struggle for democratic change within our soon-to-be, newly drawn borders. The balkanization of African states can be devastating, because it makes them more vulnerable to neo-colonial exploitation and undermines their political sovereignty, so we must ask why it has come to this. 

The fact is, the Sudanese government failed to make unity a viable option for Southerners. Over the past six years, rather than making strides towards equitably sharing wealth and political power with the South, the Khartoum regime strengthened its grip at the expense of the majority of its citizens. The peripheral regions of Darfur and the South remain particularly neglected and underdeveloped.

A vote for secession will give the South control of about 80 percent of Sudan's current oil production of 490,000 barrels a day. This will represent a drastic shift from the 50-50 share between the Sudanese government and the Government of Southern Sudan set for the interim period, following the signing of the CPA. Meanwhile, the burden of these potential losses, are likely to be carried by those already marginalized in Northern Sudan. In the days leading up to this referendum for instance, the Sudanese government raised the price of fuel and sugar in preparation for the nearly 70 percent oil revenue losses, which are expected once the South secedes. According to economic experts, the new price increases reflect the "price of separation" from the country's south. 

These price increases have already caused suffering in the war-torn region of Darfur, where basic food items such as grains and vegetables are becoming more expensive as transportation costs rise. For the millions of Darfurians still living in the squalor of camps and dependent on food aid, an increase in fuel prices also has implications on food delivery and access to water among the displaced.

Sudan is currently sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest oil producer, behind Nigeria and Angola, providing China with 30% of the oil that fuels its factories. And yet very little of Sudan's oil profits have benefited its people. Instead, oil companies, primarily from China and Malaysia, have been providing the technology to explore the oil, while sharing the profits with the elites in power. Khartoum's regime is said to have siphoned off as much as 40% of total oil revenue, lining its own pockets through various forms of mis-pricing, instead of taking on the task of developing vast regions of the country that have been neglected for decades.

When a regime driven by greed loses its grip on power, it tends to tighten that grip before losing control. President Omar Al-Bashir's latest remarks on the eve of this referendum, demonstrate this tendency quite vividly. In the days leading up to the vote, he announced that were the South to secede, he would change the constitution in the North to impose Sharia law and ensure that Islam and Arabic are the official religion and language, respectively. He also declared that the 1.5 million Southern Sudanese living in the north would lose citizenship rights and be removed from all public service positions, thereby perpetuating the marginalization and exclusion Southern Sudanese people fought against for decades. 

The people of Sudan belong to over 597 ethnic groups and speak over 200 languages and dialects. Of those ethnic groups, approximately 60% identify as indigenous African and 40% as Arab. 70% of Sudan is Muslim, 25% follow indigenous traditions and 5% are Christian. If the South secedes, these demographics will shift, but the cultural diversity and religious pluralism of the country will remain intact. People who identify as indigenous Africans and do not speak Arabic as their first language will continue to constitute a majority in the north. And while most are Muslim, many do not adhere to the practices and interpretations of Islam put forth by the ruling elite. Forcefully imposing a mono-cultural national identity is therefore, a dangerous project, which could potentially lead to future demands for secession.

As we witness the people of Southern Sudan cast their votes on this historic occasion, it is therefore my hope that we in the north will organize ourselves, around an alternative project which recognizes our people's diversity as its strength. While the referendum represents a failure on our government's behalf to make unity a viable option, it also represents our own complicity and silence around policies that, if left unchallenged, could ultimately lead to the further fracturing of our nation. We cannot however, rely on outsiders with a variety of agendas and motives, to challenge these policies for us. It must come from within, with the support and solidarity of those who respect Sudanese sovereignty and have the best interest of all Sudanese people at heart.

Nisrin Elamin is an educator and activist living in New York City. Originally from Sudan, she is the coordinator of the Support Darfur Project which documents and supports Darfurian-led grassroots initiatives. She blogs at www.supportdarfur.org.