Focal Points Blog The trees, not the forest

Entries Tagged "Nuclear Disarmament"

As always, emphasis added.

Credibility: The Only Thing People Value More Highly Than Their Credit Rating

So why do so many smart people keep embracing an approach to Iran that is internally contradictory and has consistently failed for more than a decade? I'm not entirely sure, but I suspect it has a lot to do with maintaining credibility inside Washington. Because Iran has been demonized for so long, and absurdly cast as the Greatest National Security Threat we face, it has become largely impossible for anyone to speak openly of a different approach without becoming marginalized. Instead, you have to sound tough and hawkish even if you are in favor of negotiations, because that's the only way to be taken seriously in the funhouse world of official Washington (see under: the Armed Services Committee hearings on Chuck Hagel).

On Iran, try backscratching, not blackmail, Stephen Walt, Foreign Policy

Netanyahu's Alarmist Tachometer

So if we are looking for real “red lines,” the obvious trip-wires should be either the expulsion of IAEA inspectors or the detection of diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses – not some artificial red line drawn by a non-NPT member state.

How close is Iran to nuclear weapons?, Yousaf Butt, Reuters

Nuclear Disarmament on the Sly

… the administration continues to keep secret the current size of the stockpile, which, among other effects, forces officials such as Dr. Cook to be unnecessarily vague about the extent to which the United States continues to make progress on reducing nuclear weapons in compliance with its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [Because] the unilateral retirement of roughly 500 warheads from the stockpile since 2009 – an inventory comparable to the total stockpiles of China and Britain combined – is political dynamite (no pun intended) because conservative Cold Warriors in Congress (and elsewhere) vehemently oppose unilateral reductions of U.S. nuclear weapons.

(Still) Secret US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reduced, Hans Kristensen, FAS Strategic Security Blog

What Would the Supreme Leader Do Without the U.S.?

Reaching a lasting deal with Khamenei has never been about Iran's nuclear program but rather the political legitimacy — and thereby survival — of the Islamic regime. … Mindful of threats to his power by rival conservative and reformist factions, Khamenei has nearly always undermined efforts by any one of these groups to resolve Iran's long-standing disputes with Western powers. … Simply put, normalization of relations between Iran and the United States would deprive Khamenei and the deeply invested cohort of radical ideologues around him of a powerful justification for their arbitrary rule.

Why Iran says no, Hussein Banai, The Los Angeles Times

"A war against a name is a war in name only"

Last September, Matthew Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified to Congress that “core Al Qaeda”—the original, Arab-led group, whose surviving members, hiding mainly in Pakistan, are thought to number in the dozens or low hundreds—is at “its weakest point in the last ten years.” Yet, to explain the White House’s policy, he and many other counterterrorism analysts warn of a resilient threat posed by Al Qaeda “franchises” … Each group has a distinctive local history and a mostly local membership. None have strong ties to “core Al Qaeda,” …  A franchise is a business that typically operates under strict rules laid down by a parent corporation; to apply that label to Al Qaeda’s derivative groups today is false. … If Al Qaeda is not coherent enough to justify a formal state of war, the war should end."

Name Calling, Steve Coll, The New Yorker

In the end, what are nuclear weapons, but war writ large?

Lawrence WittnerIn 2011, people across the planet reached out to Japan in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami. Millions watched as one nation after another rose in mass revolutions across the Arab world. The Occupy movement blossomed, as citizens in cities around the globe expressed rage over the excesses of capitalism and corporate power. And Time magazine named "The Protester" its annual Person of the Year.

The world has never been smaller. Citizen movements increasingly demonstrate their limitless promise. So, think it sounds too dreamy to imagine that someday people power might transform our small world into one world -- a federal republic of the Earth?

Then read Lawrence Wittner's 2009 book, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (excerpted at Foreign Policy in Focus). And think again.

Read Tad Daley's piece in its entirety at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Tad Daley is the author of Apocalypse Never: Forging the Path to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (Rutgers University Press), just released in paperback. He is currently working on a new book about the history and future of the ancient dream that something like a world republic could serve as the solution to the problem of war.

New START Closer to Breaking Out of the Blocks

The ratification vote for New START is finally at hand today or tomorrow and the Obama administration may have finally garnered enough supporters. The Los Angeles Times reports:

Aides to Senate supporters of the treaty said that of the nine Republican members they need, they have four committed supporters: Sen. Richard Lugar (IN), Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and Sen. George Voinovich (R-OH). Scott Brown of Massachusetts announced Monday he would also vote to ratify.

They considered as likely or possible votes are Sen. Bob Corker (TN), Johnny Isakson (GA), and Lisa Murkowski (AL). Sen. Bob Bennett (UT) Sen. Saxby Chambliss (GA) Thad Cochran (MS) are considered maybes.

Once again, though, we feel a responsibility to point out what New START isn't: a true disarmament treaty. In a recent commentary for the Western States Legal Foundation (despite its name, an anti-nuclear group), Andrew Lichterman sums up this perspective as well as anyone:

The principal purported benefits of new START, given that it requires only marginal arms reductions over seven years, mainly fall into two areas: resumption of on-the-ground verification measures, and re-establishment of a negotiating framework for future arms reductions. The concessions extracted by the weapons establishment in anticipation of ratification, in contrast, will have immediate and tangible effects, beginning with increases in weapons budgets and accelerated construction of new nuclear weapons facilities. These increased commitments of resources are intended to sustain a nuclear arsenal of civilization destroying size for decades to come, and will further entrench interests that constitute long-term structural impediments to disarmament. 

One would think that the START deal, with a treaty constituting at best very small arms reductions coming at the cost of material and policy measures that are explicitly designed to push any irreversible commitment to disarmament off many years into the future, would spark considerable debate within the U.S. -- arms control and disarmament community.  With the struggle over treaty ratification in its final stages, however, most U.S. arms control and disarmament organizations have obediently lined up behind the Obama administration, parroting its talking points and saying little or nothing about the budget increases and policy promises provided to the nuclear weapons establishment.  

The last sentence is what, in part, Lichterman means by the subtitle of his paper "The START Treaty and Disarmament." It reads: "a Dilemma in Search of a Debate." More on that:

For months now, what little public discussion there is in the United States about arms control and disarmament has been dominated by treaty negotiations between the Obama administration and a formidable adversary. . . . The adversary is not Russia (those negotiations concluded last spring); it is the U.S. military-industrial complex and its representatives in the United States Senate. 

To this observer the saddest irony may be that the Republicans who are finally agreeing to vote to ratify may not have needed the $86 billion which the Obama administration has indicated that it will designate for the nuclear-weapons industry. The Republican senator to which the money was directed to win their votes, led by Jon Kyl and Mitch McConnell, remain unmoved.

 

Recently, Dr. Christopher Ford of the Hudson Institute wrote a post, the title of which expressing a conflict, hitherto unnoticed by most: Disarmament Versus Nonproliferation. It begins:

For those who are believers in what I call the "credibility thesis" -- that is, the idea that a lack of progress in demonstrating disarmament "credibility" is the main "missing ingredient" that has helped ensure that the post-Cold War world has seen so little progress in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- this must have been a disheartening year. To hear its adherents tell the story over the years, bringing great numbers of countries together in a strong united front against proliferation only awaited a long-overdue commitment by the nuclear weapons states, and above all, the United States, to move more rapidly to abolish nuclear weapons. [It doesn't look much like we're turning too much of a corner as a result of our disarmament-friendly rhetoric. 

I responded in a post titled Are Nonproliferation and Disarmam, which beginsent, Once Joined at the Hip, Headed for Divorce?

In the words of the old Sammy Cahn and Jimmy Van Heusen song, as made famous by Frank Sinatra, nonproliferation and disarmament, like love and marriage, "go together like a horse and carriage." Nonproliferation -- preventing states that don't currently possess nuclear weapons -- works in tandem with disarmament -- states with nuclear weapons divesting themselves of same. "You can't have one without the other." Right?

After all -- continuing with the musical metaphor -- that's how the refrain goes in that old strain of a treaty, the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Let's all sing the sixth stanza (aka, article) together: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (Actually, it would probably require a good rapper to do it justice.)

Yet many maintain that Article VI does not, in fact, commit nuclear-weapons states to a long-term divestment of those weapons. Christopher Ford of the Hudson Institute outlined this position as well as anybody in a Nonproliferation Review article that he wrote shortly after he left the Bush administration as its lead negotiator on the NPT. Negotiations toward that end in themselves, he wrote, are sufficient for a state to be in compliance with Article VI. 

Chris Ford responded to my article with A Nonproliferation and Disarmament Colloquy on his website New Paradigms Forum:

Russ Wellen is a thoughtful and attentive reader, and his view of the inseparability of nonproliferation and disarmament is widely shared. To make sure my position is understood, however, let me make three clarifications.

First, just for the record, let me make clear that my position on Article VI of the NPT is that while the text of that article clearly requires that we try in good faith to bring about disarmament through negotiations, it does not impose any concrete disarmament obligations (e.g., that such negotiations actually succeed, or that any unilateral steps be taken). During the negotiation of the NPT, repeated attempts were made to insert just such concrete requirements into the Treaty, but they all failed to win adoption. One might bemoan this, of course, but one cannot deny it.

There is today a widespread political expectation that the nuclear weapons states need to do more on disarmament, but it is a mistake to read this as a legal requirement. I do not defend disarmament inaction, and indeed there has not been disarmament inaction. (The United States, for instance, has so far decommissioned four weapons out of every five it had at the end of the Cold War, and we even run our civilian nuclear power plants partly on uranium downblended from Soviet nuclear weapons.) My point about Article VI was merely that we confuse the issue by pretending that this is a legal and not simply a policy challenge. It is understandably tempting for disarmament advocates to deploy the argumentative weight of "legal" obligations in support of their agenda, but this isn't very good lawyering.

Second, I'd caution the reader not to be too dismissive of President Obama's nuclear weapons infrastructure modernization plan, which Russ contemptuously describes as "an ingenious force multiplier for our hypocrisy." I am not -- shall we say -- the most practiced or comfortable defender of the Obama Administration's agenda, but it bears emphasis that if there is a feasible road toward a global nuclear "zero," our travel down that path needs to include sensible nuclear weapons stewardship during the period prior to abolition.  And even according to the optimists, this might be quite a while. (As Obama noted in his Prague speech in April 2009, abolition is not likely to take place in his lifetime -- and he's not an old geezer, either.)  Until then, we have a responsibility not to be foolish in weapons management.

For so long as we retain nuclear weapons and rely to any extent upon them for strategic deterrence, for instance, we need to make sure such devices remain safe and reliable. Unless Russ wants us to resume underground nuclear testing -- and to a great extent even then -- this will entail maintaining quite a robust and well-funded weapons laboratory infrastructure for years to come. Having a weapons complex capable of producing new weapons should the threat environment "go south," as the saying goes, is also important to disarmament progress, for such productive capacity will allow us to reduce stockpile numbers by shifting from strategic "hedging" based upon warheads-in-being -- on the shelf, as it were, in our reserve stockpile -- to hedging based merely upon potential warheads. (This process is already underway, as we pointed out during the Bush Administration, and which Obama officials emphasize frequently today.) In fact, a failure to fund the laboratory infrastructure needed for these various purposes might well impede U.S. reductions, not to mention ratification of future treaties.

It's certainly somewhat counterintuitive that U.S. weapons complex modernization is a key to moving forward more quickly and sustainably on disarmament -- but it is true nonetheless. This is why so many "hawks" and "doves" in the U.S. policy community tend to support Obama's modernization plans, with the former being distinguished merely by concern that the president's plan provides insufficient funding. The idea of modernization -- which has its origins in President Clinton's support for the U.S. weapons labs in the name of "stockpile stewardship" and in connection with negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- is well-nigh a bipartisan consensus in mainstream political Washington.

Third, and for present purposes most importantly, let me stress that I actually do not think disarmament and nonproliferation are unrelated. It's just that precisely how they are related is extremely important.

I would be the first to argue, for instance, that disarmament and nonproliferation are indeed linked in one specific sense: in that a failure to stop the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities would destroy whatever hope there may otherwise have been for nuclear disarmament. It is inconceivable that anyone would (or should) take disarmament seriously if the international community cannot demonstrate its ability to stop nuclear weaponry from spreading. (If we cannot stop today's hemorrhaging, there's no point in worrying about tomorrow's recovery program.) So "linkage," at least in this sense, is quite real: unchecked proliferation is a showstopper for complete disarmament.

I am more skeptical, however, about linkage in the other direction: the oft-expressed idea that our failure to contain proliferation is due to a failure to demonstrate more of a commitment to rapid disarmament -- and that if such a commitment were to appear, we would finally be able to bring today's proliferation challenges under control. This variety of linkage may have been plausible at some point, but it doesn't seem to be supported by the evidence, despite earnest U.S. (and other) efforts to operationalize it. Despite the vast reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals since the end of the Cold War, and despite the recent Nobel Prize-winning U.S. enthusiasm for disarmament, the proliferation situation is worsening, not improving.

I worry about Russ' lack of concern over disarmament's inability to discourage proliferation. He says this failure is "immaterial." I find this hard to credit, however, because as I have noted, if proliferation cannot be stopped, one can be quite sure that we will never see the complete disarmament for which Russ so earnestly hopes.

Perhaps Russ means to suggest that the United States should abandon nuclear weapons even if other states continue to acquire them, but I think that position would be difficult to defend -- especially over the longer term, when we cannot ensure that we will continue to enjoy today's pronounced superiority in conventional arms. At any rate, such a position would speak only to the issue of whether and to what degree we should engage in unilateral reductions: by definition, to speak of such a world would entail the abandonment of ambitions for nuclear weapons abolition.

Alternatively, perhaps Russ means that disarmament's failure to support nonproliferation is "immaterial" in the sense that there may be some way to stop proliferation by other means, even though continuing disarmament has no effect upon proliferation dynamics. I certainly hope that there is some such way, for we shall need it.

Russ Wellen responds:

As usual, Chris, with his experience with U.S. nuclear weapons policy and his knowledge of its history, provides me with material to which I'd never before been exposed. For example, he writes (emphasis added):

It's certainly somewhat counterintuitive that U.S. weapons complex modernization is a key to moving forward more quickly and sustainably on disarmament -- but it is true nonetheless. [And before that] Having a weapons complex capable of producing new weapons should the threat environment go south, as the saying goes, is also important to disarmament progress, for such productive capacity will allow us to reduce stockpile numbers by shifting from strategic hedging based upon warheads-in-being on the shelf, as it were, in our reserve stockpile to hedging based merely upon potential warheads. . . .  In fact, a failure to fund the laboratory infrastructure needed for these various purposes might well impede U.S. reductions, not to mention ratification of future treaties.

It hadn't occurred to me that funding the laboratory infrastructure and maintaining productive capacity might be critical steps to "hedging based merely upon potential warheads." Though the outcome would be a disarmament milestone, personally I'm constitutionally incapable of supporting the process, but concede it might work. Another example:

I would be the first to argue, for instance, that disarmament and nonproliferation are indeed linked in one specific sense: in that a failure to stop the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities would destroy whatever hope there may otherwise have been for nuclear disarmament. It is inconceivable that anyone would (or should) take disarmament seriously if the international community cannot demonstrate its ability to stop nuclear weaponry from spreading. . . . unchecked proliferation is a showstopper for complete disarmament.

Most who prefer nonproliferation as the lead dog to disarmament instead of disarmament itself tend to ignore the elemental concerns -- "It's just not fair" -- of states that aspire to develop nuclear-weapons programs. The unstated assumption seems to be: "We're rational and you're not." Chris, however, acknowledges the concerns of other states (presumably including the nuclear-aspirational). But he holds that among them is: "It is inconceivable that anyone would (or should) take disarmament seriously if the international community cannot demonstrate its ability to stop nuclear weaponry from spreading."

In the future, I will need to account for these ideas in order to continue to make the case for disarmament Again, thanks for bringing them to our attention, Chris.