Foreign Policy In Focus

It's All About the Spin (and I don't mean centrifuges)

Some of the reformists [in Iran] have indicated that the burden of proof of the peaceful nature of the country's nuclear program now rests with Iran, due to its past mismanaged policies and reckless statements. Thus, they favor more intrusive and comprehensive inspections. But even advocates of the status quo seem poised to accept more limited stockpiles of 20 percent enriched uranium and more flexibility in allowing inspections, in return for an end to sanctions. The latter group, led by Khamenei, is really insisting that whatever the nature of a possible agreement, the Islamic regime must be allowed to declare victory.

The Ayatollah in His Labyrinth, Abbas Milani, Foreign Policy

The Alternative Energy That's Dependent on Conventional Energy

Nuclear power, which we might mistakenly think does not rely on fossil fuels, is actually totally dependent on them. Leaving aside the uranium mining problem, nuclear power requires exacting conditions to operate safely and reliably that include diverse and reliable general and specialized supply chains, a stable electrical grid, near-certain physical security, and many other social, political, and economic conditions that directly or indirectly dependent on thermodynamically-cheap fossil fuels. … there is no indication that a safe, reliable, large-scale nuclear power based energy system would be possible without the heavy use of relatively cheap fossil fuels.

The submerged mind of Empire, Greg Mello, Forget the Rest

Will the Boston Marathon Bombing Only Isolate Us Further?

Terrorism poisons if not destroys our public spaces and the physical and psychic experiences we share with one another while in such spaces. … We must be vigilant about finding and punishing the perpetrators who terrorized Boston. But we must be equally vigilant about refusing to surrender our public places and events, for doing so is … fatal to our collective identities.

Another victim of bombings: public spaces, Thomas Schaller, the Baltimore Sun

An Advanced Degree in Atrocity

The costs of the terrorism inspired by the [Iraq] war include much more than the number, however horrifying, of lives lost. The terrorists who have been drawn to Iraq since 2003 and survived have been battle-hardened after fighting the most sophisticated military in history. … They have developed expertise in counterintelligence, gunrunning, forgery and smuggling. [We have] left behind, after seven bloody years, not only a shattered nation but also an international school for terrorists whose alumni are now spreading throughout the region.

Iraq: Where Terrorists Go to School, Jessica Stern, the New York Times

Sound Familiar?

Without [Tony] Blair’s charismatic thespianry and false hopes, without even the Shakespearean drama of Brown’s blighted leadership, an atmosphere of deathly, affectless decadence has settled over the [British] Labour Party. Populist but not very popular, Labour has become a dead mechanism animated by a blind drive: win elections. It is an election-winning machine which can barely win elections, and which has long ago forgotten why you would want to win an election in the first place. By contrast, the Tories have a feverish sense of purpose. They serve ruling class interests even when not in power by dragging the ‘centre’ ground to the right. Once in government, they impose their policy agenda at high speed, without majority or mandate, retrospectively justifying it, if they bother to justify it at all, with the kind of “debate” we saw last week. 

The Happiness of Margaret Thatcher, Mark Fisher, Verso Books Blog

Why are states allowed to implement nuclear energy without a sufficient emergency preparedness program?

In October, 2012 I wrote a post titled Attacking Iran Is Like Setting Off Nuclear Bombs on the Ground about a report released the previous month. Titled The Ayatollah's Nuclear Gamble, it's the product of an organization called Omid for Iran, along with the Hinckley Institute of Politics and the University of Utah. Omid for Iran was founded by Khosrow B. Semnani, the Iranian immigrant who became a radioactive waste disposal magnate. A controversial figure often embroiled in lawsuits, he served as president of his company Envirocare until the Department of Energy requested he step down in the wake of a bribery scandal.

Like many immigrants who make good in the United States, he draws on a reserve of rancor toward the forces in his country of origin (usually, in these cases, communist) that keep an entrepreneur like him from fulfilling his dream. You can tell by this excerpt from the executive summary of "The Ayatollah's Nuclear Gamble" that, should they attack Iran, he's less interested in blaming Israel and the United States than he is Tehran for inciting them.

The best long-term strategy would be a democratic, transparent, and accountable government in Iran. In such a scenario, political leaders would quickly understand that their people want jobs, dignity, opportunity, and political freedoms, not the false promise of nuclear weapons bought at a heavy, even existential, cost. A military strike would not only kill thousands of civilians and expose tens and possibly hundreds of thousands to highly toxic chemicals, it would also have a devastating effect on those who dream of democracy in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei has proven that he cares little for the Iranian people. It is up to us in the international community, including the Iranian-American diaspora to demonstrate that we do.

As for the attack…

Based on the best information available as well as discussions with Iranian and Western nuclear experts, we have estimated the total number of people—scientists, workers, soldiers and support staff—at Iran’s four nuclear facilities to be between 7,000 and 11,000. … However, unlike traditional targets, the risks to civilians extend well beyond those killed from exposure to thermal and blast injuries at the nuclear sites. Tens, and quite possibly, hundreds of thousands of civilians could be exposed to highly toxic chemical plumes and, in the case of operational reactors, radioactive fallout. … Additionally, the environmental deg­radation due to the spread of airborne uranium compounds, and their entry into water, soil and the food chain would introduce long-term, chronic health risks such as a spike in cancer rates and birth defects.

Nor have Iran's leaders shown any inclination to present such an assessment.

[They] have had no interest in making the risks of their reckless nuclear policies obvious to its citizens even though the resulting economic toll—inflation, unem­ployment, and the loss of international credit—has devastated the Iranian people. The Iranian military has not provided the Iranian people with any description of potential casualties resulting from attacks on these nuclear facilities. Nor has the parliament encouraged an open assessment of the grave implications of the government’s policies for Iranian scientists, soldiers and civilians working at or living within the vicinity of Iran’s nuclear facilities. This study seeks to address this deficit.

Or, in my words …

… the attack and radiation will work its synergistic black magic in conjunction with Iran's meager disaster management and emergency preparation capabilities. … bombing Iranian nuclear facilities is like setting off nuclear weapons on the ground.

While reading "The Ayatollah's Nuclear Gamble" I couldn't help but wonder how Iran was allowed to sign the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and to become a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without instituting an effective emergency preparedness program. (Or one that at least upheld the pretense that it's possible to deal with a meltdown or attack on a nuclear-energy facility effectively.) It seems wildly irresponsible, kind of like starting a war without medical staff and hospitals.

A passage from the IAEA's website sheds some light on this.

Many Member States are currently not adequately prepared to respond to such emergency situations. Moreover, without standard procedures or common approaches, protective actions can differ between countries resulting in confusion and mistrust among the public, interfering with recovery operations and possibly leading to severe socioeconomic and political consequences.…

The Agency has a statutory function to develop standards for the protection of health and the environment and to provide on request for their application, through encouraging research and development; fostering information exchange; promoting education and training; and rendering services. Moreover, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention) place specific functions on the Agency with regard to developing appropriate radiation monitoring standards and to assisting States in developing their own preparedness arrangements for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

The IAEA's programs, as was pointed out to us by Institute for Policy Studies author Robert Alvarez, can be found on its Emergency response & preparedness page. For example: "Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Safety Requirements" (2002), "Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Safety Requirements" (2007), "Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency General Safety Guide" (20110).

In the second paragraph from the IAEA website quoted above, note that conventions (as in agreements) "place specific functions on the Agency with regard to developing appropriate radiation monitoring standards and to assisting States in developing their own preparedness arrangements for nuclear and radiological emergencies." (Emphasis added.) Developing and assisting -- but not requiring. From the 2007 report referred to above…

The IAEA’s safety standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities. The standards are binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations and on States in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA.

By all appearances, allowing member states to develop nuclear-energy programs without requiring them to meet certain standards of emergency preparedness looks as if it's a loophole designed to either allow states to develop nuclear-energy programs without delay or to aid the nuclear-energy industry (or both). It's incumbent on the United States and Israel to refrain from attacking Iran and turning that loophole into a gaping abyss of human torment.

Japanese Parliamentarian Kuniko Tanioka is not a rebel. Her assessment of Japanese policy after the Fukushima nuclear accident may not be popular with the Japanese government or nuclear industry, but she is a representative of a team formed within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to deal with the countless issues that have arisen since 3/11. The DPJ, the current ruling party, and the only party other than the Liberal Democratic Party to hold the Diet in more than 50 years, is part of a coalition government. It is subject to great pressure from the United States, Tanioka explained in a recent presentation at Institute for Policy Studies, and in charge of a system woefully unprepared to handle crises like the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

According to Tanioka, there is no legislative structure in place to deal with the long-term effects of a nuclear disaster of this scale, and Tanioka's team works to provide reports and information, and draft bills into the Diet in order to cope with all of the lingering problems and human security issues stemming from last March. This is the first time the Diet has had a probing commission for this type of disaster, and the DPJ team is under constant internal and external pressure to downplay the situation and protect the interests of nuclear power.

The last of the operational reactors in Japan closed earlier this month, but some government officials are already pushing to restart several reactors in northern Japan, claiming that without them there will be electricity shortages. Of course, asserts Tanioka, the industry is pressuring the government because it doesn't want Japan to prove that it can make it without reactors. This is not the main consideration, however, says Tanioka. The safety of the people and the environment should be first, and the conditions to restart must be stringent, including new standards that go beyond the engineering of the reactors, that include filtered vents, safe buildings for plant workers in case of accidents, and detailed evacuation plans for surrounding areas.

Tanioka's talk comes on the heels of a Japanese delegation to the UN asking for international assistance with the radiation that continues to emanate from Fukushima. In reactors 1 through 3, the radiation is still too high for anyone to enter, and if there were further malfunctions, there is little hope for stabilization. She cited the need for more U.S. support, and noted that the only voices speaking to the Obama administration are industry representatives.

The U.S. and Japanese nuclear industries are inseparable, as many U.S. providers are owned by Japanese firms. Until the shutdown of Tomari on May 5, Japan was one of the largest consumers of nuclear energy in the world. If Japan were to become totally nuclear-free, this would be a massive hit to the global nuclear industry. 

Tanioka wants Americans to understand several issues. First, there is a need for greater transparency and a wider scope for medical research into the effects of radiation. Even with all of the time since Chernobyl, this data is not forthcoming – blocked by a handful of experts who hold all the cards.  A wider exchange of data within the academic world would support the expansion of preventative treatments for radiation exposure, and more effective supplements and procedures for those who have already been exposed.

More importantly, both the Japanese national government in Tokyo and the Fukushima prefectural government, along with TEPCO and a host of industry scientists, insist that radiation levels near the Fukushima Daiichi plant are safe for humans. Tanioka disagrees, and spoke of  the devastating effects of nuclear accidents on citizens. Life in the affected areas has entirely lost any sense of normalcy. There have been more than 200,000 evacuees, and for them, and for those who have stayed, their lives are disrupted on a scale that is difficult to comprehend. Even simple joys, such as gardening in their now radioactive soil, are gone – the result of shoddy regulation in an industry focused only on profits, and an unhealthy dependence on this dangerous energy source.

Erin Chandler is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

At Huffington Post, Ryan Grim has written a dramatic account of how the nuclear-energy industry in the United States tried to take down the commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It seems its main beef with him was that he seeks to shut down planning for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site. Grim reports:

A feud at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where five presidentially appointed commissioners oversee the safety of the nation's nuclear power reactors, has broken out into full public view, with Chairman Gregory Jaczko's fellow commissioners assailing his character and management style, both in a letter made public earlier this month and in the resulting testimony before Congress. Republicans have begun calling for Jaczko's ouster.

What would make Jaczko's fellow commissioners turn on him?

The current fight against NRC Chairman Jaczko began with anonymous accusations that he was improperly asserting his authority to follow an administrative dictate. … The issue that most frequently provoked the commissioners under Jaczko, said [David] Lochbaum, who worked briefly for the NRC himself in 2009 and 2010, had to do with the somewhat blurry line between what are considered day-to-day operations -- the purview of the chairman -- and matters of policy -- which are supposed to be the province of the full commission. Who had what power was the animating criticism of Jaczko's decisions to [make it a priority] to study and upgrade safety at U.S. nuclear plants after the Fukushima disaster and to close out the … review of the Yucca Mountain facility. The commissioners charged that Jaczko failed to consult them fully.

Also, a lobbyist and a nuclear-energy industry consultant began seeding opinion against him with allegations that he generated a "chilled work environment" and allegations he bullied women. Grim reveals that there was no truth to the latter two, but Jaczko was forced to undergo a humiliating congressional hearing that came to naught. The Obama administration even continued to support him.

In the end, the attak on Gregory Jaczko serves as a case study of what can happen when regulatory agencies are infected by corporate interests.

"This is the ugly underbelly of large corporate lobbying," said the former staffer, who has worked with the men at the center of both controversies and is now a corporate lobbyist himself. "It really is by any means necessary."

“In a briefing last week for the visiting commandant of the Marine Corps,” writes Nathan Hodge at the Wall Street Journal, Japan-based Marines “said the experience of Operation Tomodachi, the Japan relief effort launched after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, could help the U.S. military respond to worst-case battle scenarios.”

"This is varsity-level stuff," Gen. [James] Amos said.

Hodge again:

Japan has become an unlikely laboratory for the U.S. to study modern warfare after the March nuclear accident created conditions like those the military could face if a terror group set off a "dirty" radiological bomb. It was the first time Marine aircraft had operated in a radiologically contaminated environment, and Lt. Col. Marsh [commander of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265], which was involved in the operation. . . told [Gen. Amos], “it's not hard to believe that we could be responding someplace involving a disaster at a nuclear power plant, dirty bombs or terrorism.”

Fukushima has focused the attention of the world on the safety of nuclear plants. As Matthew Bunn of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes:

At Monday’s opening of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ministerial meeting in Vienna on what to do about nuclear safety after Fukushima, [IAEA] Director-General Yukiya Amano laid out a sensible five-point plan for improving global nuclear safety. But Amano missed a crucial point: Disasters like Fukushima can be caused not only be accident but by terrorist action. The nuclear industry in many countries is much less prepared to cope with security incidents than with accidents.

As if the nuclear industry (at least in Japan) was even prepared to cope with an accident. Dr. Bunn again (emphasis added).

[Thus] the need to take steps to strengthen global nuclear security – protecting against both sabotage of nuclear facilities and theft of nuclear weapons or the materials to make them -- [is] particularly urgent. . . . Both al Qaeda and Chechen terrorist groups have repeatedly considered sabotaging nuclear reactors – and Fukushima provided a compelling example of the scale of terror such an attack might cause. Indeed, given the multiple layers of safety systems in place for nuclear facilities today – and the extraordinarily weak security measures in place in some countries – the chance that the next big radioactive release will happen because someone wanted to make it happen may well be bigger than the chance that it will happen purely by accident. 

Back in 2003, at the New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert wrote:

An attack on a nuclear power plant would seem to fulfill, almost perfectly, Al Qaeda's objective of using America's technology against it. In his State of the Union Message last year, President Bush announced that United States forces searching Afghan caves had indeed found diagrams of American reactors. Around the same time, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acting on information provided by the F.B.I., warned of a plot to crash a commercial aircraft into a plant. . . . As potential targets go, Indian Point [nuclear energy plant] seems almost too obvious. It is situated on the Hudson River . . . thirty-five miles from midtown Manhattan. . . . A 1982 analysis by a congressional subcommittee estimated that, under worst-case conditions, a catastrophe at one of the Indian Point reactors could result in fifty thousand fatalities and more than a hundred thousand radiation injuries. . . . By an uncomfortable coincidence, American Airlines Flight 11, just minutes before it slammed into the north tower of the World Trade Center, flew almost directly over Indian Point's twin reactor domes.

Then there’s the threat of cyberwarfare, as exemplified by the impact that the virus Stuxnet has had on Iran’s nuclear program. Still, as Seymour Hersh wrote in a New Yorker piece last November, The Online Threat, which is a cautionary tale about the dangers of allowing the intelligence communities and the military to hype cyberwarfare: “There is surprising unanimity among cyber-security experts on one issue that the immediate cyber threat does not come from traditional terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.” 

He quotes John Arquilla of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School: “Terrorist groups are. . . . not that interested in. . . . attacking our computer system.” When it comes to cyber security, their priority is to “protect their operations.” Still, Hersh warns: “As terrorist groups get better at defense, they may eventually turn to offense.”

Meanwhile, as Bunn writes

. . . attempting to separate safety and security is wrongheaded as the two are integrally linked. Better safety measures can make a facility more secure (by making it more difficult to sabotage, or keeping better control of where nuclear material is within a plant), and better security measures can make a plant safer. . . .  Ultimately, a nuclear facility cannot truly be safe unless it is also secure.

Three years ago, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) was launched in Vienna at an IAEA conference, the first organization dedicated to strengthening the “physical protection and security of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities worldwide.” After another conference in May, this time about Fukushima, WINS issued this statement, which I’ve excerpted:

Safety and security have traditionally been regulated and managed in isolation from each other. Safety management has been the responsibility of operators, engineers, safety managers and scientists, whereas security [is] frequently led by ex-military and police personnel. . . . This situation must change. The complex, interconnected nature of safety, security and emergency management requires convergence.