Foreign Policy In Focus

John Yoo (his former seat of power – the Robert F. Kennedy Justice Department Building – is pictured to the left; his address has since changed), a key architect of the Bush administration’s legal system practiced at Guantanamo Bay penned an article for the Wall Street Journal arguing a post facto case to justify “enhanced interrogation techniques” developed by him and his fellows for use against “enemy combatants." 

Basically, he argues, the successful operation to find and kill Osama bin Laden carried out on May 1^st could not have succeeded without the information obtained through these techniques (waterboarding, for example).

Mr. Yoo has since been joined by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld in arguing that their actions – and the whole legal system they built after 9/11 to go after al Qaeda – have been justified by the results.

Such measures are not effective techniques for obtaining intelligence, as those involved with that sort of work have testified, but the death of bin Laden has given those who favor such methods new ammunition for the fight.

In an article for The Arabist, I reported on the news that al Jazeera cameraman, Sami al-Hajj, had been held in Guantanamo Bay from 2002 to 2008 because he could help the CIA learn more about “The al-Jazeera News Network’s training program, telecommunications equipment, and newsgathering operations in Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, including the network’s acquisition of a video of UBL [Usama bin Laden] and a subsequent interview with UBL.”

Al-Hajj’s story, and the stories of many others who had nothing to do with al Qaeda (but were thrown into the legal limbo of Gitmo because they might have), is in jeopardy of being eclipsed and rationalized by bin Laden’s death.

David Sirota and Glenn Greenwald, of Salon have confronted the legal and moral ramifications of the system and its role in bin Laden’s death, and are now drawing considerable flak for their trouble.

Why does legality matter? Because as Americans, we pride ourselves on the morality and legality of our actions. The “War on Terror” is depicted as a war, yes, but is also frequently construed in existential terms and the sort of language one sees in the eponymous crime drama. Legality matters because, to lift a quote from Max Brooks’ horror novel World War Z, as Americans, “All we have are the dreams and promises that bind us together. All we have . . . all we have is what we want to be."

That’s why the morality and legality of it matters, Mr. Yoo.

Paul Mutter is a graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

(Pictured: Harvard students celebrating the killing of bin Laden.)

One week ago, some DC-area college students wondered if finals would be canceled because of Osama Bin Laden’s killing and the celebrations that ensued. Others, as I can attest, asked professors for extensions on their final exams.

Students were wondering about having to take their exams because hundreds had stayed up until the early Monday morning hours celebrating Bin Laden’s death in front of the White House. The school newspaper at American University, where I teach, quoted a student as saying, “The scene was unbelievable. People were climbing trees and singing, it was a completely unplanned gathering…. For a day we weren’t Democrats or Republicans. We were all Americans.” Others gathered on American University’s quad, singing the national anthem and chanting USA! USA! USA!

Amid the celebrations, several students in my class “Anthropology of Life in the United States” stepped back to ask about the larger significance of what they’d witnessed. “I heard students running through the hallways yelling, ‘Osama Bin Laden is dead! Turn on the news,’’” wrote one student, Hallie, in her final exam, due the day after Bin Laden’s killing. “Why are we celebrating death and violence? I read on one of my friend’s [Facebook] status, ‘Party Tuesday Night—Amurica [sic] Themed. Kill Terrorists. That is a prime example of how death and war [are] normal in the United States,” she continued. “Though the subject is more complicated than I can describe…death and violence should never be celebrated.”

A Japanese student, Sanshiroh, offered an outsider’s perspective. Referring to hundreds of billions of dollars in annual U.S. military spending, he observed, “the global military supremacy of the United States almost seems to be the national identity. As teenagers play [the warfighting video game] ‘Call of Duty,’ military casualties no longer get reported anymore, and college students gather to celebrate the death of the leader of the enemy, warmaking has definitely been normalized and become the American way of life.”

Another student, Christine, agreed, saying, “It is clear that warmaking is not a temporary state of mind for U.S. American[s]. Boys play with G.I. Joe dolls and watch movies featuring soldiers killing. War has become intertwined with notions of patriotism and the American economy itself.

“With millions of Americans shouting a raucous yelp of ‘USA! USA! USA!’ upon learning of Osama Bin Laden’s death, it is clear that our identity as a nation is tied to our military prowess,” Christine’s exam continued. Pointing to the size of the military industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned us about in his farewell address, she wrote, “massive military spending has become intertwined with the fabric of our country’s values.”

Hallie, one member of this generation that’s been at war for half her lifetime, offered a similarly broad historical perspective just a day after Bin Laden’s killing: “The United States was founded through war and has never stopped. We have been involved in at least 200 military interventions [since World War II]. With the wars today, it is clear that there is no military solution, and if we keep spending money on the wars and going into debt, our empire is going to crash…. The habit will not be broken until something major happens.

“We used to be a nation focused on justice,” Hallie concluded her essay, “but now we are a nation focused on controlling the world through means of violence and power. What have we come to?”

I, for one, am very thankful we didn’t cancel finals.

Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan referred to killing Osama bin Laden as "decapitating the head of the snake known as al Qaida." Bloodthirsty choice of words, especially considering that decapitation has been one of al Qaeda's preferred modes of execution, most notoriously, Daniel Pearl at the likely hands of  9/11 "mastermind" Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

In the past, when humans were beheaded as punishment, the instrument of death was usually an axe or guillotine. Leave it to members of al Qaeda to take throat cutting to extremes. Perhaps they hoped Allah would accept a victim thus butchered as a sacrificial offering.

But inviting the comparison to al Qaeda by using decapitation as an image may have been Brennan's point. It's as if he were saying: we shot him in cold blood, but at least we didn't decapitate him like al Qaeda.

Speaking of barbarism, Focal Points readers are aware that I've been questioning what seemed like the cold-blooded killing of bin Laden. Upon learning, again from Brennan, of the fear that bin Laden may have donned a suicide vest, which was theoretically possible while the SEALs swept the compound, I've withdrawn my objections on that count. 

Legal reservations, such as acting on information gained under torture (of course, those raising that objection conveniently forget that heretofore they've adhered to the conviction that information obtained during torture isn't trustworthy). More to the point is  political assassination as, at the New Yorker Jeffrey Toobin reminds us.

. . . it's worth noting that the apparently universal acclaim for the killing [of bin Laden] represents a major shift in American perceptions of such actions. Following the revelations of C.I.A. assassination plots by the Church Committee, in the nineteen-seventies, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 (later 12333), which stated, No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.

But, personally, this author is most disturbed by the celebration over a killing, the likes of which he's never witnessed in the United States. It likely surpasses public reaction to Hitler's death. As I previously wrote

How does Americans celebrating bin Laden's killing look to the rest of the world? An NBA player, of all people, has an idea.

[Chris] Douglas-Roberts [was] disturbed by the ensuing celebration. It reminded him of the response in Afghanistan -- which was also captured on television -- following 9/11. "We just looked like the Afghan people, a decade later," he said. 

Still, that doesn't absolve myself and those who share my view from taking a look in the mirror as well. At Guernica, Noam Chomsky writes:

We might ask ourselves how we would be reacting if Iraqi commandos landed at George W. Bush’s compound, assassinated him, and dumped his body in the Atlantic. . . . his crimes vastly exceed bin Laden’s.

Would we be big enough to contain the glee welling up in us?

Whether or not we're willing and able to confront our inner avenger is up to us. But, it's imperative that we refrain from celebrating for the record lest we reduce ourselves to the level of those publicly gloating over bin Laden's killing.

According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon Panetta, the U.S. never informed Pakistan about the operation to assassinate al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden because it thought the Pakistanis could “jeopardize the mission” by tipping off the target.

Maybe, and maybe not. This is, after all, the ground over which the 19^th century “Great Game” was played, the essence of which was obfuscation. What you thought you saw or knew was not necessarily what was.

The “official” story is that three CIA helicopters—one for backup—took off from Jalalabad, Afghanistan and flew almost 200 miles to Abbottabad, most of it through Pakistani airspace. Pakistan scrambled jets, but the choppers still managed to land, spend 40 minutes on the ground, and get away.

Is it possible the helicopters really did dodge Pakistani radar? During the Cold War a West German pilot flew undetected through the teeth of the Soviet air defense system and landed his plane in Red Square, so yes. Choppers are slow, but these were stealth varieties and fairly quiet. But at top speed, the Blackhawks would have needed about an hour each way, plus the 40 minutes on the ground. That is a long time to remain undetected, particularly in a town hosting three regiments of the Pakistani Army, plus the Kakul Military Academy, the country’s equivalent of West Point. Abbottabad is also 35 miles from the capital, Islamabad, and the region is ringed with anti-aircraft sites.

Still, it is possible, except there is an alternative scenario that not only avoids magical thinking about what choppers can do, but better fits the politics of the moment: that Pakistan’s Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) knew where Bin Laden was and fingered him, estimating that his death would accelerate negotiations with the Taliban. Why now? Because for the first time in this long war, U.S. and Pakistani interests coincide.

Gen. Hammad Gul, former head of the ISI, told the Financial Times on May 3 that the ISI knew where he was, but regarded him as “inactive.” Writing in the May 5 Guardian (UK), author Tariq Ali says that a “senior” ISI official told him back in 2006 that the spy organization knew where bin Laden was, but had no intention of arresting him because he was “The goose that laid the golden egg.” In short, the hunt for the al-Qaeda leader helped keep the U.S. aid spigot open.

Indeed, bin Laden may have been under house arrest, which would explain the absence of trained bodyguards. By not allowing the al-Qaeda leader a private militia, the ISI forced him to rely on it for protection. And if they then dropped a dime on him, they knew he would be an easy target. As to why he was killed, not captured, neither the U.S. nor Pakistan wanted him alive, the former because of the judicial nightmare his incarceration would involve, the latter because dead men tell no tales.

As for the denials: the last thing the ISI wants is to be associated with the hit, since it could end up making the organization a target for Pakistan’s home-grown Taliban. If the ISI knew, so did the Army, though not necessarily at all levels. Did the Army turn a blind eye to the U.S. choppers? Who knows?

What we do know for certain is that there is a shift in Pakistan and the U.S. with regards to the Afghan war.

On the U.S. side, the war is going badly, and American military and intelligence agencies are openly warring with one another. In December the U.S. intelligence community released a study indicating that progress was minimal and that the 2009 surge of 30,000 troops had produced only tactical successes: “There remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency.” The Pentagon counter-attacked in late April with a report that the surge had been “a strategic defeat for the Taliban,” and that the military was making “tangible progress in some really key areas.”

It is not an analysis agreed with by our NATO allies, most of which are desperate to get their troops out of what they view as a deepening quagmire. A recent WikiLeak cable quotes Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Union, saying “No one believes in Afghanistan anymore. But we will give it 2010 to see results.” He went on to say Europe was only going along “out of deference to the United States.” Translation: NATO support is falling apart.

Recent shifts by the Administration seem to signal that the White House is backing away from the surge and looking for ways to wind down the war. The shift of Gen. David Petraeus to the CIA removes the major U.S. booster of the current counterinsurgency strategy, and moving Panetta to the Defense Department puts a savvy political infighter with strong Democratic Party credentials into the heart of Pentagon. Democrats are overwhelmingly opposed to the war but could never get a hearing from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a Republican.

The last major civilian supporter of the war is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but Gates, her main ally, will soon be gone, as will Admiral Mike Mullen, head of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. The shuffle at the top is hardly a “night of the long knives,” but the White House has essentially eliminated or sidelined those in the administration who pushed for a robust war and long-term occupation.

A surge of sanity? Well, at least some careful poll reading. According to the Associated Press, six in 10 Americans want out of the war. Among Democrats 73 percent want to be out in a year, and a USA Today/Gallup Poll found that 72 percent of Americans want Congress to address an accelerated withdrawal. With the war now costing $8 billion a month, these numbers are hardly a surprise.

Pakistan has long been frustrated with the U.S.’s reluctance to talk to the Taliban, and, from Islamabad’s perspective, the war is largely being carried out at their expense. Pakistan has suffered tens of thousands of civilian and military casualties in what most Pakistanis see as an American war, and the country is literally up in arms over the drone attacks.

The Pakistani Army has been deployed in Swat, South Waziristan, and Bajaur, and the U.S. is pressing it to invade North Waziristan. One Pakistani grumbled to the Guardian (UK), “What do they [the U.S.] want us to do? Declare war on our whole country?” For the 30 million Pashtuns in the northwest regions, the Pakistani Army is foreign in language and culture, and Islamabad knows that it will eventually be seen as an outside occupier.

A poll by the New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan’s northwest—home and refuge to many of the insurgents fighting in Afghanistan—found some 80 percent oppose the U.S. war on terror, almost nine in every 10 people oppose U.S. attacks on the Taliban, and three quarters oppose the drone attacks.

The bottom line is that Pakistan simply cannot afford to continue the war, particularly as they are still trying to dig themselves out from under last year’s massive floods.

In April, Pakistan’s top military, intelligence and political leadership decamped to Kabul to meet with the government of Harmid Karzai. The outcome of the talks is secret, but they appear to have emboldened the parties to press the U.S. to start talking. According to Ahmed Rashid, author of “Taliban” and “Descent into Chaos,” the White House is moving “the fledgling peace process forward” and will “push to broker an end to the war.” This includes dropping “its preconditions that the Taliban sever links with al-Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution before holding face-to-face talks.”

Given that in 2008 the Taliban agreed to not allow any “outside” forces in the country and pledged not to pose a danger to any other country, including those in the West, this demand has already been met. As for the constitution, since it excluded the Taliban it will have to be re-negotiated in any case.

While there appears to be a convergence of interests among the major parties, negotiations promise to be a thorny business. 

The Pentagon will resist a major troop drawdown. There is also opposition in Afghanistan, where Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara minorities are deeply suspicious of the Taliban. The Karzai government also appears split on the talks, although recent cabinet shuffles have removed some of the more anti-Pakistan leaders.

Then there is the Taliban, which is hardly a centralized organization, especially since U.S. drone attacks and night raids have effectively removed more experienced Taliban leaders, leaving younger and more radical fighters in charge. Can Taliban leader Mullah Omar deliver his troops? That is not a given.

Both other insurgent groups—the Haqqani Group and Hizb-i-Islami—have indicated they are open to negotiations, but the Americans will have a hard time sitting down with the Haqqanis. The group has been implicated in the deaths of numerous U.S. and coalition forces. To leave the Haqqani Group out, however, will derail the whole process.

The U.S. would like to exclude Iran, but as Rashid points out, “No peace process in Afghanistan can succeed without Iran’s full participation.” And then there is India. Pakistan sees Indian involvement in Afghanistan as part of New Delhi’s strategy to surround Pakistan, and India accuses Pakistan of harboring terrorists who attack Indian-controlled Kashmir and launched the horrendous 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed 166 people.

Murphy’s Law suggests that things are more likely to end in chaos than reasoned diplomacy. But self-interest is a powerful motivator, and all parties, including India, stands to gain something by ending the war. India very much wants to see the 1,050-mile TAPI pipeline built, as it will carry gas from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to Fazilka, India.

A lot is at stake, and if getting the peace process going involved taking out Osama bin Laden, well, in the cynical world of the “Great Game,” to make an omelet, you have to break eggs.

Back in the Victorian era the British Army marched off singing a song:

We don’t want to fight but by jingo if we do
We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, and we’ve got the money too

But in the 21^st century most our allies’ armies don’t want to fight, ships are useless in Afghanistan, there aren’t enough men, and everyone is broke.

For 33 years the people of Afghanistan have been bombed, burned, shot, tortured and turned into refugees. For at least the moment the pieces are aligned to bring this awful war to an end. It is time to close the book on the “Great Game” and bring the troops home.

More of Conn Hallinan's work can be found at Dispatches From the Edge.

I have it on good authority that Navy SEALs put a premium on capturing targets because they're taught that information is the true prize. Then why, we continue to wonder, did one of them shoot Osama bin Laden, especially since indications are that he'd already been captured? Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan explains.

SEAL Team Six was told to accept surrender only "if he did not pose any type of threat whatsoever," and if troops "were confident of that in terms of his not having an IED [improvised explosives device] on his body, his not having some type of hidden weapon or whatever,"

But Americans weren't aware of that when they were celebrating what sounded like a cold-blooded shooting. Even here: Jubilation Erupts in Harvard Yard As Obama Tells World Osama Bin Laden is Dead. (In a side note . . . young men -- want a true test of how yoked to violence your sexuality is? Young women cheering bin Laden's killing: major turn-on or turn-off?)

How does Americans celebrating bin Laden's killing look to the rest of the world? An NBA player, of all people, has an idea.

[Chris] Douglas-Roberts [was] disturbed by the ensuing celebration. It reminded him of the response in Afghanistan -- which was also captured on television -- following 9/11. "We just looked like the Afghan people, a decade later," he said. 

As you're no doubt tired of seeing me post, a court case would have been preferable. Many claim that a trial would be a "circus." At the Independent (via Duck of Minerva via the Progressive Realist) Geoffrey Robertson writes:

I do not minimise the security issues at his trial or the danger of it ending up as a squalid circus like that of Saddam Hussein. But the notion that any form of legal process would have been too hard must be rejected. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - also alleged to be the architect of 9/11 - will shortly go on trial and had Bin Laden been captured, he should have been put in the dock alongside him, so that their shared responsibility could have been properly examined.

Failing that, Robertson adds

Bin Laden could not have been tried for 9/11 at the International Criminal Court -- its jurisdiction only came into existence nine months later. But the Security Council could have set up an ad hoc tribunal in The Hague, with international judges (including Muslim jurists), to provide a fair trial and a reasoned verdict.

This would have been the best way of de-mystifying this man, debunking his cause and de-brainwashing his followers. In the dock he would have been reduced in stature -- never more remembered as the tall, soulful figure on the mountain, but as a hateful and hate-filled old man, screaming from the dock or lying from the witness box.

At its most elemental level, legality exists to mitigate man's brutality to man. A court case would have spared us Americans (including President Obama at Ground Zero) making a brutish spectacle of themselves.

Returning to bringing bin Laden back alive, at Time's Swampland, Massimo Calabresi writes:

John Yoo, who wrote the brief [for the Bush administration] that provided legal cover for waterboarding, sleep-deprivation and other harsh interrogation methods, wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal . . . arguing that bin Laden's assassination "vindicates the Bush administration, whose intelligence architecture marked the path to bin Laden’s door." . . . Most provocatively, Yoo asserts that by killing bin Laden, rather than capturing and interrogating him, the Navy Seal team made a grave error. "Special forces using nonlethal weaponry might have taken bin Laden alive . . . [and] one of the most valuable intelligence opportunities since the beginning of the war has slipped through our hands."

It's mortifying when John Yoo gives voice to one's sentiments. But, no matter what his motivation is, when he's right, he's right.