Foreign Policy In Focus

Cross-posted from the United to End Genocide Blog.

It’s time for an intervention. The brutal massacre of over 100 people, mostly women and children, in Houla, Syria last week shook the world’s conscience. Despite more than a year of atrocities, the murder of civilians in Houla has spurred the largest global outcry to date and rare unified condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. It also brought increased calls for military intervention with U.S. General Martin Dempsey warning that he had contingency plans ready and that atrocities like those in Houla made military intervention, although a last resort, all the more likely.

But the massacre in Houla should also raise the specter of another kind of intervention. The international community should have a diplomatic “intervention” with Syria’s strongest remaining ally, Russia. In the chorus of condemnation that resounded after the massacre, Russia’s voice stood out for its glaring ambiguity. Even as it joined others in condemning what happened in Houla, Russia provided Syria with political cover and quashed any hope for meaningful action.

Russia remains Syria’s main arms supplier with deliveries continuing as early as last week. It has also blocked all attempts at the United Nations (UN) Security Council to apply consequences like sanctions to Syria. Even after the Houla massacre, Russia questioned the UN monitor’s conclusions that the Assad regime was responsible, criticizing other countries for expelling Syrian diplomats, and making it clear that it would not consider further action.

The Obama administration has begun to pressure Russia, but has not done enough. The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, who is leading the charge, stated yesterday that if Russia did not join in UN Security Council action that a worst case scenario of regional escalation was likely to unfold. Today, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she was pressing her case with Russia and, when asked about military intervention, responded, “every day that goes by makes the argument for it stronger”. Yet, the tough talk is undermined by the reality that the United States itself continues to do business with the very same Russian state-owned arms company that is arming the Syrian regime.

The United States should also work with Syria’s regional neighbors. Last November, the Arab League kicked Syria out. Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have criticized Russia for blocking earlier resolutions, saying that the action was effectively giving Syria “a license to kill”. These countries need to make clear to Russia that supporting Syria is not in its regional interest. They may also be able to provide some incentives to counter Russia’s worries over lost business and influence with the fall of Syria.

Russia is not alone in its support of the Syrian regime. Iran continues to pump money and weapons into Syria and mistakenly admitted last week that it was sending its own troops in. Venezuela delivered a ship full of diesel fuel last week, undermining efforts toward building effective pressure. And China has joined Russia in blocking action in the Security Council. But, Russia has been by far the strongest voice in protecting the Syrian regime from international pressure.

The fact is that Russia continues to arm a regime that has killed more than 12,000 people, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The discovery yesterday of 13 bodies with their hands bound and gunshot wounds to the head, coupled with reports of the further shelling of Houla demonstrates that atrocities are set to continue. As they do, military options may very well become necessary as a last resort. However, first there should be an intervention with Russia.

An opportunity to engage Russia emerges tomorrow when Russian President Vladamir Putin begins a trip to France and Germany. It should be made clear to Russia that, if it truly wants to avoid any military intervention, now is the time to pull out all the diplomatic and economic stops. Russia must stop arming the Assad regime and be clear in its condemnation of the brutality occurring in places like Houla.

Condemnation without consequence is hollow. The current trajectory of atrocities and escalating regional sectarian war is in no one’s interest, not even Russia’s.

Daniel P. Sullivan is the Director of Policy and Government Relations for United to End Genocide. 

Missile defense systems against nuclear strikes are often considered "destabilizing" to the strategic balance." On May 3, Russia's RIA Novosti demonstrated this principle in action.

Russia does not exclude preemptive use of  weapons against [NATO] missile defense systems in Europe but only as a last resort, the Russian General Staff said on Thursday at a missile defense conference in Moscow.

“The placement of new strike weapons in the south and northwest of Russia against [NATO] missile defense components … is one possible way of incapacitating the European missile defense infrastructure,” Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said.

Taking into account the “destabilizing nature of the missile defense system... the decision on the pre-emptive use of available weapons will be made during an aggravation of the situation,” he said.

Exactly why missile defense is destabilizing can be difficult to grasp (at least it was for me). After all, it only seems natural for a state to seek to protect itself against nuclear attack. Besides, how can a parry be considered as aggressive as a thrust? I once endeavored to explain in a post.

Here's how it works. A state -- Russia again -- is considered vulnerable to a first, or initial, strike by the United States, during the course of which many of its surface (as opposed to those based in submarines, which are, of course, mobile) nuclear weapons would be wiped out. (This argument requires a suspension of belief that Russia would refrain from launching a counterattack on warning, that is, while the U.S. missiles were in the air, instead of waiting until they struck  -- still the only sure-fire method of verifying a nuclear attack.)

Russia's retaliatory force would be further diminished if much of it was destroyed while in the air by U.S. missile defense. (This requires a suspension of belief that the day when missile defense is that effective will ever come). The crux of this theory is that since Russia knows that under this arrangement it's going to lose missiles both on the ground and in the air it's motivated to build more to compensate. (Why Russian missile defense isn't considered destabilizing to America's “deterrent” is a question seldom, if ever, raised.)

More from the RIA Novosti article:

“By 2018-2020 – that is the third and fourth phases of the deployment of the Euro-missile defense in Europe – the continent should have enough [NATO] anti-missile defense to be able to intercept part of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles,” Patrushev said at an international conference on Euro-missile defense in Moscow.

At the Christian Science Monitor, Yousaff Butt backed this up.

The problem with European missile defense is that while it’s designed to counter Iran, the faster interceptors due to come online in 2018 will also be able to engage Russian warheads, upsetting this all-important perception of parity.

Though what Butt probably meant by "designed to counter Iran" was in the highly unlikely event that Iran develops missiles that could reach Europe, not to mention the nuclear weapons that would be affixed to them as warheads. Meanwhile RIA Novosti reported that NATO's Deputy General Secretary Alexander Vershbow said:

"In fact, we have no desire at all to disturb global strategic stability," told the conference. "Quite the contrary: NATO missile defense will be capable of intercepting only a small number of relatively unsophisticated ballistic missiles. It does not have the capability to neutralize Russian deterrence."

Ivan Oelrich explained in the January/February issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (behind a pay wall)

Almost all independent US analysts—that is, those outside the government and the defense industry—are deeply skeptical of the feasibility of missile defenses, especially against a technically sophisticated country like Russia. To these skeptics, therefore, Russia’s position seems frustratingly irrational: Russia is letting the potential for mutually beneficial arrangements be undermined by the USA’s politically motivated pursuit of a system that will never work.

But Patrushev said:

“Our experts say other targets, which could require serious missile defense against it, do not really exist.”

The United States and NATO may act like Russia is being a drama queen about missile defense, but it knows very well that the system will never be used against Iran. Even if that were its intention, it would be years before it's necessary to defend Europe against Iran -- years of NATO missile-defense deployment acting as a burr in Russia's saddle as well as an ongoing obstacle to disarmament. Not only is missile defense destabilizing, it's an endless fund of misinformation between the United States and Russia.

I just finished reading Timothy Snyder's instant classic Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (Basic Books, 2010) in which he chronicles the suffering of countries that were alternately occupied by Russia and Germany: Poland, the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkan states. In the course of looking art World War II through this prism, he dispenses much little-known history.

For instance, along with the POW camps, where Soviet prisoners were sometimes held in open, "The Germans shot, on a conservative estimate, half a million Soviet prisoners of war. By way of starvation or mistreatment during transit, they killed almost 2.6 million more. All in all, perhaps 3.1 million Soviet prisoners of war were killed."

In fact

The German prisoner-of-war camps in the East were far deadlier than the German concentration camps. Indeed, the existing concentration camps changed their character upon contact with prisoners of war. Dachau … became … killing facilities. …  At Auschwitz in early September 1941, hundreds of Soviet prisoners were gassed with hydrogen cyanide, a pesticide (trade name Zyklon B) that had been used previously the fumigate the barracks of the Polish prisoners in the camp. Later, about a million Jews would be asphyxiated by Zyklon B at Auschwitz. 

(Pictured: Mistral warship, two of which France sold to Russia.) 

Russia is set to increase its defense spending by 60 percent, from $42 billion in 2010 to $66.3 billion by 2013. This news is several months old, but the recent remarks of Russian President Dimitry Medvedev, coupled with the completion of an arms deal for two French warships, with the possibility of two more to follow, has drawn attention to Russia’s military modernization program. By itself, the deal with France has drawn considerable notice, as it is the first time a NATO member has sold such sophisticated weaponry directly to Russia. France has defended its decision in purely economic terms, and as an opportunity to improve relations between NATO and Russia. However, other NATO members, most notably the United States, have been skeptical of what they see as a potentially dangerous reversion to Cold War-style militarism by the Kremlin.

Russia is intent to embark on a vigorous modernization program aimed at several areas. In particular, officials have enunciated the need to modernize an aging navy, as well as place ‘special emphasis’ on aerospace defense and the need to keep pace with other modern air forces. Indeed, these areas are likely to receive the majority of new defense funds. Along with the recently completed purchase of two French Mistral class helicopter carriers-amphibious assault ships, the increased defense budget will include allocations for three Talwar class frigates, three Improved Kilo class submarines as well as several advanced Yasen and Borei class submarines. In addition to the increased focus on naval modernization, Russia plans to direct significant funds towards reinforcing its air force. This will include significant additions of Su-family fighter aircraft, MiG-29K Fulcrum-D carrier-based fighters as well as Su-34 Flanker fighter-bombers.

It comes as no surprise that Russia should embark on a large-scale overhaul of its military, much of which still relies on Soviet-era equipment and methods. In particular, Russian military performance in the 2008 war with Georgia, continued conflict in Chechnya and the failure to keep pace with NATO, have helped sustain the drive to increase defense spending. However, of concern is the potential of modernization coupled with a reversion to out and out hard-power balancing. In his recent address to the Federal Assembly, President Medvedev, warned that failure to reach agreement with NATO over a European missile defense system may induce another arms race.

This seems particularly salient given Russia’s intent to use its increased budget to bolster its submarine fleet, in particular, by acquiring additional Borei and Yasen class submarines. The Borei class ballistic missile submarine is designed to enhance Russian second-strike capability, thereby ensuring nuclear deterrence. The Borei class sub is designed “to stay submerged for extended periods and launch long-range missiles in case of nuclear war.” The Yasen class attack submarine is designed to neutralize enemy maritime assets, particularly enemy ballistic missile submarines. Moreover, it is likely that these assets will be presented to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, placing them in ideal positions should conflict ensue with Europe. Based on these planned acquisitions, it seems clear that Russia continues to focus on the perceived threat emanating from NATO, and although relations have warmed between the two, Russia still believes a strategic hedge is in its best interest.

However, questions remain over exactly how the Russian government plans to pay for such a significant increase in defense spending, particularly given Russia’s economic situation and a rising need to address a shrinking population. Indeed, in his recent speech, Medvedev made clear that a major goal was initiating programs aimed at boosting the Russian population. Balancing defense spending with necessary social programs will likely prove to be difficult in an uncertain financial climate.

Despite arduous financial constraints, weapons sales are likely to help significantly offset the costs of modernization. After a several year hiatus, it appears that China is ready to resume buying high-end Russian weapons systems and aircraft. Sales of the fourth-plus generation fighter, the Su-35 along with military transport planes and air refueling tankers, as well as anti-aircraft systems will net a huge windfall for the Russian defense industry. Indeed, China’s modernization program, thoroughly reliant on imported Russian weapons technology, may help Russia fund its own modernization program. 

Having seen its military forces struggle in several low-level conflicts and amid concerns over losing even more ground to NATO military power, Russia is set to engage in a large-scale military overhaul. Although relations have warmed significantly between Russia and the West in the past two decades, and despite very serious efforts to reach out to and include Russia in global governance, some even arguing for Russia’s admittance into NATO, it seems that shaking off a Cold War outlook remains difficult.

Greg Chaffin is an Intern/Research Assistant with Foreign Policy in Focus. 

We're honored to have Michael Busch dissecting the latest WikiLeaks document dump for Focal Points. This is the thirteenth in the series.

Leaked cables from the US embassy in Bangkok shed light on the extent to which the United States and Russia were willing to go to win their diplomatic tug-of-war for alleged arms trafficker Viktor Bout.

In one dispatch dated February 2009, Ambassador Eric John reveals forthrightly that since “Bout's arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago [March 2008], moving towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our bilateral agenda here.” The matter was so sensitive, in fact, that “President Bush raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok.”

John notes that while extradition proceedings had been progressing smoothly, if slowly, evidence had surfaced to suggest Russian tampering with the case.

There have been disturbing indications that Bout's xxxxxxxxxx and Russian supporters have been using money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of xxxxxxxxxx that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-to-government submarine deal.

Suspicions of corruption and perjury drove the ambassador to raise these concerns directly with Thailand’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. 

Despite assurances from Bangkok that every effort would be made to ensure fair legal proceedings in the extradition process, a Thai court ruled against Washington’s request six months later. A determined John fired off another cable two days later, laying out “a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process.” Underscoring the argument that securing Bout’s extradition was a matter of priority for American interests, John urged pulling out all the stops.

Beyond his embassy’s own efforts to voice displeasure at the ruling with top Thai authorities, John requested that

Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S. commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources around the world.

But John doesn’t stop there. He also suggests that President Barack Obama personally call the prime minister and have

a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement on Bout would have had significant effect here.

 The ambassador also floats the idea that it may be a good to explore     

the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne the bloody results of Bout's activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the verdict and whether any affected government would be willing to ask for his extradition. 

At the end of the day, however, John notes that Thailand should not exclusively consume efforts at putting Bout behind bars. The affair, the ambassador notes, “is at heart a U.S.-Russian matter.” In the event that the so-called “Lord of War” were to walk, John recommends that the State Department

make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout's activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout… At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so.

Whatever action was eventually taken in the Bout affair, it worked. In early October, Thailand’s Criminal Court handed down a ruling that paved the way for his extradition to the United States. A month later, Bout was being held on American soil. As WikiLeaks documents continue dripping into the public record, we’ll hopefully be treated to more cables offering a blow-by-blow account of the lengths to which Washington went to secure sole authority over the Merchant of Death.