Foreign Policy In Focus

One of the major problems plaguing the Balkans in particular is impunity.

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

People commit crimes, and they get away with it. These are usually powerful people, like Iliya Pavlov, the head of Multigroup and Bulgaria’s wealthiest individual until a sniper took him out in 2003. If successful people break the law without paying any penalty, lots of people want to get in on the act.

In the Belgrade office of the Lawyers’ Committee on Human Rights (YUCOM), I found a pamphlet from an organization called Impunity Watch. The Netherlands-based organization has run programs on impunity with local partners in Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Burundi. And it has partnered with YUCOM and other organizations in Serbia to address the culture of impunity that has made it difficult to establish the rule of law in the post-Milosevic era. In that brief period after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the liberal standard bearer who briefly served as Serbian prime minister, the Serbian government cracked down on organized crime. But it was a short-lived commitment.

I talked with Milan Antonijevic, the director of YUCOM about the continuing human rights problems in Serbia, including the issue of impunity. “For example, let’s talk about a trial that is lasting for six years and they have all the evidence,” he told me. “I’m not talking about war crime trials. I’m talking about the burning of a mosque in Belgrade. You have police cameras on the ground; you have all the evidence. But the judiciary is the weakest link in the whole chain of protection, and that’s where the impunity is coming from.”

He continued, “On the other side, you don’t have the political will. I don’t know why we’re still speaking about political will to punish those who committed war crimes or other crimes, but unfortunately this is still happening in Serbia. We didn’t have the climate for arresting Mladic for 10 years, or Karadzic. And it’s something that’s really blocking all the trials, it’s blocking all the evidence collection, it’s blocking the prosecutor’s office. And it’s something that is unfortunately on the political side.”

Antonijevic agrees that civil society organizations have managed to achieve some successes in improving the human rights situation in Serbia. But major problems continue for Roma, sexual minorities, and others. There is still a strong link between political power and organized crime. And judges are still responding to political pressures.

With Belgrade eager to meet the benchmarks established by the European Union, Serbia will soon have to address these human rights problems more seriously. But the pressure is not only coming from Brussels. Watchdog organizations are applying pressure much closer to home. Civil society organizations like YUCOM and its partners are fighting on behalf of the powerless and the disenfranchised. The status of these social groups will ultimately determine the strength of Serbian democracy and whether, substantively rather than formally, it has fully joined Europe or not.

The Interview

When you think back to what has changed here in Serbia since 1989, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being most disappointed and 10 being least disappointed, how do you feel about the changes?

If I had to quantify it, I would say it’s in the middle. You can pass at the university with a 7, so that’s where Serbia is at the moment. If you compare it with 1989, the year of Milosevic’s rise, Serbia has really changed.

I deal with human rights. If you compare today with what was happening in Kosovo at that time, with the dismantling of Yugoslavia, with all the human rights violations that occurred, Serbia is now completely changed. Serbia changed itself. The people running Serbia also changed it a little bit. So, all parts of society really gave Serbia a push forward. We no longer have Milosevic. Some parts of his political party are now saying they want nothing to do with atrocities, nothing to do with the war crimes that happened, and nothing to do with Milosevic himself – that’s a positive sign.

We still have problems. Here in YUCOM, the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, we are dealing with torture cases. There are incidents here and there in police stations, in prisons. But this was occurring on a daily basis in 1989. Before, ethnic Albanians were in jail for political reasons, and that’s now impossible. I really can’t imagine that Serbia will ever again fall into the kind of human rights that occurred 20 years ago.

Along the same scale, how do you feel about your own life since 1989?

To be honest, I was at that time much more patriotic. I changed at the beginning of the 1990s. As a kid, we were all influenced by this nationalistic wave. At the beginning of the war, when I was a kid, only 15 years old, I drew a map of Serbia just to see where all the Serbs lived and where the borders of Serbia should be: a map of greater Serbia. We were kids, and we were under media pressure constantly to see Serbia as a separate entity. Nobody thought that when you draw a border, there are people on one side and people on the other. This is something I really can’t imagine anyone doing today. So it’s something that personally really changed for me. I’m not ashamed of those things: I was young. But it was really overwhelming for all the kids in my high school and at the beginning of university.

We were able to travel. That was one of the assets of Yugoslavia. Until the beginning of the sanctions, everything was really open. So, all kids could get some kind of exchange experience with their fellows around the world. It was common for us to travel to Austria, to Italy, to France, or further abroad. It was something that all my friends did until the age of 18. Now it’s a little bit different, and I really don’t envy kids who have never been to any other European countries because of the lack of money or the lack of visas. A whole generation became more closed, more patriotic in a negative sense. They didn’t understand the real value of being open to surrounding countries, open to all ideas. So this is something that has changed.

At that time, people were absorbing this Serbian nationalist rhetoric that the media were serving up to us. And if you were more politically active, then you would be even more on this side. My parents in the first elections voted for the candidates of the democratic forces, not for Milosevic. But most people were under the influence of this Serbianism, this belief that Serbia can be a country that stands on its own, that we are modern enough, that we can really close ourselves off.

But now, fewer people are willing to talk that way — even in the Serbian Progressive Party, the new party that emerged out of Seselj’s Radical Party. I spoke with some representatives who are now members of the parliament. A few months ago, they said to me before the elections, “There are more and more of us who are normal in our political party.” They were very sincere. Their rhetoric and their ideas don’t reflect common European values, and they know it. But they said that there are more and more people in the party that are open to the ideas of multiculturalism, of an open society, of anything that really links Serbia with its surroundings.

I’d love to hear someone from the Progressive Party say something like that. But I don’t know if they would say the same thing to me that they said to you.

It was, I think, a split second kind of thing, a moment of sincerity that I don’t expect to return. But I like to retell this story because it was a moment when somebody felt secure enough to reveal how he really feels about his political party, and the past of the party. Those are members of the parliament. As for the rest of the party…

For example, we were doing research on gender balance in the parliament, and we spoke with two recently elected MPs from the Progressive Party. But they needed consent of the party to speak with us about gender issues, which are really not a political issue in Serbia. We were not speaking about Kosovo. We were not speaking about gross human rights violations. We were speaking about gender issues with two female MPs. But they had to ask for permission for a month to speak with us. So, the party is still a bit more hierarchical, and I’m not sure that anyone can speak openly.

But where along the spectrum would you say you feel personally about how your life has changed since 1989?

Personally, there is a positive change. But at that time I was able to travel as I can now. My parents brought us everywhere and we were open to everything. During this period we could go to museums around the world, and I could really see things that I wanted to see. So, that didn’t change.

But on the level of ideas, many things improved. When you’re 14 or 15 years old and you’re under attack by the media, you don’t have the strength to question things. That changed, especially after 1989. It didn’t take long for me to really start questioning things. You look at the map you were drawing and you see that some people were really left out, that crimes took place. I’m really personally attached to this human rights work. I became interested during university and started working on these issues. I went from someone with a lawyer’s background to someone interested in protecting human rights. But I don’t know how to quantify that change. My life was at that time pretty good. We were living in pretty secure surroundings. The background of my family was pretty high. So, the quality of life has been the same, measured by context and the possibility to explore and inquire.

Well, it sounds to me, if I had to give you a number, I would say probably an 8. In some sense you’re satisfied in that your opportunities are more or less the same, because you can travel now as you traveled then. But in some sense your intellectual freedom is greater. So I would give you an 8.

Yes, thank you. You’re a professional!

And the final quantitative question: as you look into the near future for Serbia, and again it’s from 1 to 10, how optimistic are you about this situation? 1 being least optimistic and 10 being most optimistic.

Again, I think that there have been steps forward, so it is again around 7. This optimism is, I think, pretty high compared to the current situation and the economic crisis. Serbia will soon have benchmarks to meet and things that we really have to do as a society. I’m speaking about the EU negotiation process. The start of the negotiations will really give us concrete steps where we should improve and in which areas. As you know, the EU process applies to all realms of life. It will really provide opportunities. Serbia missed these opportunities, and this really has to change. And there are young people who will be leading in some of these areas. Maybe I’m a bit too optimistic, but if NGOs and civil society can change the country a little bit, then we can change things even more. I don’t see us going backwards, even though some figures appearing in our political life are bringing back some bad memories. But if they are sincere in what they are saying, then I’m pretty optimistic.

Was there a moment, either when you were in university or starting law, when you had a kind of revelation experience about the importance of human rights?

Yes, pretty soon, because I had friends who were not Serbs, and I heard their stories. I can’t say there was a revelation moment. But you have people around you, and you have your parents who are traveling to all the ex-Yugoslav countries, and you have friends all around Yugoslavia. And then you see that you will be cut off from some of your friends who are Croats, or Slovenians, or Macedonians. At that time we didn’t speak of Albanians. My father was in Kosovo working as an economist. And he spoke about his experience pretty positively because he was really welcomed in Albanian homes and what they said they would do in economic transactions they did. So when you realize that those borders will really make you distant from people you love, or where you have personal stories….

As a kid, every summer I spent in Croatia, in the city of Rovinj in Istria. This is where you mix with all nations from ex-Yugoslavia, where you mix with people who are coming from European countries, from all around the world, because it’s really a lovely city. When I was drawing that map when I was 14, I didn’t put any of this on that map. But then you are drawing a map that cuts Croatia in half, which means that your friends in Zagreb, they will be in another country. Unfortunately this realization didn’t happen in the heads of our politicians. They didn’t realize that they would lose the possibility to cooperate.

I remember the beginning of sanctions, the Yugoslav sanctions against Slovenia and Croatia, and the rhetoric about not buying Slovenian or Croatian products. By that time I was no longer under that type of influence.

Tell me a little bit about the situation for minorities today in Serbia. Apparently there is still some discrimination going on at schools, in the workplace. So what are some of the most worrisome situations?

We did research a half-year ago with high school kids who will soon be going to universities. According to the data, 85% of them witnessed discrimination against other national minorities, sexual minorities, or others. This really raises alarms that something is really wrong in this part of society and the state has to react. Because of the lack of reaction, I’m not that optimistic about the possibility of really changing the situation.

We were doing research in Vojvodina and also in southern Serbia, where you have different minorities and where Serbia would have to do a lot to overcome the discrimination there. In a multiethnic society, policy has to be done the correct way and nobody is dealing with that. We tried to influence the ministry of education to go deeper into these questions and to set up some kind of process. I know that punishing people who discriminate is not the only way, but the state really has to come up with some kind of procedure to start the process, to be active.

Were there any particular stories that came out of this research that exemplify this kind of discrimination?

Nearly all the high school kids talked about this distance toward ethnic minorities living in Serbia, such as Albanians. A large percentage of them didn’t really see the possibility of cooperating with Albanians: to talk with them, to sit together on a bench, something like that. So this is what struck us most. Only a small number of cases of discrimination are reported.

Is there a process in place in the educational system to deal with discrimination? Can you deal with the problem within the educational system without having to go, for instance, to a lawyer or an NGO?

There is a process. There’s an educational inspector and an educational adviser: they’re the first line of defense when discrimination occurs. But we did trainings with them, and unfortunately they do not understand all the terms or the need to react on every occasion. It’s a nuance for them, but it means a lot for the people who are discriminated against. And there are a lot of other issues in their portfolio. They aren’t dealing only with discrimination. They are dealing with all the problems within the schooling system. They see discrimination as something that either is not occurring or that has to be tolerated because we are a society in transition and it’s not a priority during an economic crisis.

In terms of negotiating with the EU, where do you think the greatest difficulty will be to meet the EU standards on minority questions?

Discrimination will be a major issue. The Bulgarian minority is asking for a different set of rights, and nobody is reacting to that yet. For example, doing research on some of the courts in southern Serbia close to Bulgaria, we spoke about using the Bulgarian national language in court. The head of the court told us, “But nobody is using the Bulgarian language in the court. Why should we give this service?” So, they don’t see the need, even though it’s written in the law. They obey it in a certain sense. They put up signs in the court in the language of the national minority, but they don’t understand why it is needed. They don’t see the need to have translators, to have all the different mechanisms to support the identity of a national minority, so something is wrong within the system.

A lot of things have to be changed. At the level of the laws, some things have changed and there is progress, but at the level implementation, that’s what we are all pushing for. Implementation is really lacking. From that point of view, Serbia will first have to prove that all the mechanisms are in place for the protection of the rights of national minorities: on the ground and not just on paper.

Also, the Constitution should be once again checked to see whether some of the solutions can be improved and not only related to minorities. And to remind you, this is the Constitution from 2006 and yet today, only six years from its enactment, we are thinking about all the gaps in it,.

Let me ask specifically about Roma, because that often is the most challenging situation in countries in this region. Has there been any improvement? When I was here before, the discrimination against Roma was pretty severe, but that was a while ago. Has there been any improvement on the economic side, such as access to healthcare or access to housing, or on the political-legal side?

The only improvement happening now is the possibility to be registered. In Serbia, we had a large number of Roma that were out of the system. Without an ID, they have no possibility to access healthcare and other services. Where Roma do get health care, the level of quality is not as high as others are receiving. So, there is still a high level of discrimination in the healthcare system.

In the educational system, measures have been taken to make it more inclusive, to make sure that Roma are going to regular schools. We had a situation two years ago where Roma were mostly going to special schools for people with disabilities. This was being done systematically. They gave these tests to young kids who didn’t know the Serbian language, and when they failed the tests, they ended up in special schools. The law was changed. In practice, though, the Roma kids are enrolled in regular schools—because this is what the ministry of education measures—but then at some point they’re either transferred or not given substantive knowledge in order to go further in their education. There is a big dropout rate for Roma. And it’s hard to collect the data on transfers from regular schools to special schools because the ministry is not interested in doing that. They’re only interested in the numbers of Roma enrolled in first grade. There are supportive measures, such as the placement of personal assistants in the schools specially to deal with Roma. But there’s not enough money in the Serbian budget to meet the need.

Housing rights are at a really poor level. Evictions are happening. There are a large number of NGOs really trying to support people who are being evicted from different parts of Serbia—especially in Belgrade where these big highway and bridge projects are causing a large number of evictions. There is some improvement on this, but the quality of the settlements offered to Roma is very poor if they’re in Belgrade. There are also Roma who don’t have IDs registered in Belgrade. So if they are registered, for example, in Nis and they are evicted from a home in Belgrade, they will be transferred to Nis directly. Nobody is thinking about freedom of movement. Nobody is thinking about the acceptance of Roma families in other parts of Serbia. For example, after the evictions from the Belville section of Belgrade, where I think 700 families were evicted, the majority of them sent to other parts of Serbia. There was no normal housing offered to them in some of the cities. They were just transferred to cities without any further support.

In Belgrade, the last eviction was a little bit more organized. The Roma were given these so-called container settlements. The conditions there are really terrible. The containers don’t have normal heating or anything like that. It’s really not something for decent lives. The city said it wasn’t permanent, that they would offer social housing to the Roma. But the percentage of Roma receiving such housing is very low, below 1%. So, this program is not meant to solve the issue of Roma and housing.

And at the same time, the housing issue is challenging in general in Serbia because there’s been such a huge number of internally displaced and refugees and they also have been living in containers.

But the number of those camps for refugees and IDPs is now smaller. I’d have to look at the data again, but even in 2011-2012, the number is one third what it was. Every year they are closing. Social housing is provided, and it’s heading toward a solution. There are some regional donor initiatives to resolve finally the housing problems for all the people who lost their homes in ex-Yugoslavia. This program could really close the whole chapter. Hopefully the issue of the property of Serbian refugees from Croatia will also be solved.

They’ve been promising that money for a really long time.

Yes, I know. But as far as I know, the EU is willing to invest a little bit in the region. But the number of refugees and IDPs is smaller and smaller. The number in urgent need is now in the thousands in Serbia, not the hundreds of thousands as in the 1990s.

What about cases of violence against Roma, have those continued?

Yes. We have before the courts some cases concerning police torture of Roma. There’s a case in one police station where a Roma was beaten, and the reporting system completely failed. Even the structures on the municipal level that were supposed to be on the side of the victim were completely opposite. The people dealing with Roma on the municipal level wanted to persuade the victim not to report the abuse. Hopefully better contact with the police will solve some of the problems, but we will see.

And are there advocacy organizations formed by Roma, with Roma emerging as their own advocates, both in the informal sense, as in an NGO, but also in the formal sense, such as Roma lawyers and professionals?

It is emerging, but unfortunately it’s still slow. It’s the task of civil society to support smaller NGOs who would like to deal with Roma rights and are coming from Roma background. There are some active NGOs but on a really small scale. They are in Kragujevac and elsewhere around Serbia. But the strong advocates on Roma issues are not unfortunately there. For example, we had a Roma lawyer who wanted to volunteer, to dedicate some time to human rights. We tried to boost his energy to start this work and to form some kind of legal clinic for Roma rights. But it didn’t end well.

Let me ask about Vojvodina, the question of decentralization. Help me understand the issue, because I know that on the one hand accession to the EU requires acceding to certain EU rules of decentralization. The EU promotes the giving of greater authority to municipalities and regional structures. So that’s coming from the EU. Then Vojvodina itself has asked for greater authority. It wants to have its office represented in Brussels for instance. My understanding is that the EU itself has seen Vojvodina as more developed in some sense and therefore can access EU funds more quickly than other parts of Serbia. So is that something that your organization has worked on?

Where we are active now is the question of the Constitution, which I already mentioned. We see presently, after the decision of the constitutional court, that the Constitution is blocking the authorities of Vojvodina rather than opening up chances for regional structures to have some influence. It’s a bit ambitious to open the debate on the Constitution, but it is something that’s needed as soon as possible. So we opened this debate. And it’s not just a question of Vojvodina. The Constitution is blocking the progress of Serbia in other ways too

So, for instance, the Constitution would have to be changed simply for EU accession to take place.

Yes, there must be a provision allowing Serbia to enter a structure such as the EU. At the moment we don’t have such a normal procedure or an article allowing Serbia to join the EU. So, some things in this area have to be changed. Also the supremacy of international law is not defined well. Many scholars are giving a lot of examples why this constitution is far from perfect and preventing Serbian progress.

How willing is the parliament and the ruling party to reform the constitution?

The parliament is still new, elected in 2012, so we really have to open the debate again. We’ve gotten negative responses from all the political parties, even in the previous period. But it is not impossible. There must be strong advocacy for changing the constitution. And if the politicians now ruling Serbia really want to deal with the issues that they’re talking about, they will have to change the constitution.

Will a change in the constitution require a referendum?

Yes.

By what percentage? A majority?

Majority. Our constitution is a really strong one. It’s meant to last a long time, so it’s very hard to change. It would require a vast campaign on a national level – first by all the politicians in the parliament and then by referendum. Even changes to the sections on human rights need to be put to referendum. From our point, as human rights advocates, it’s really amazing that improving the standard of human rights needs a referendum.

Do you have any concerns that if there is the discussion of changing the constitution, there might be some parties or political formations that want to change it in a different direction?

I do not see it as a concern. At the moment only a few percent of Serbian parliament are speaking about lowering the level of human rights or lowering the level of democracy. So it’s not something that can change overnight without major turbulence on the political scene.

I noticed that Impunity Watch had a program here in Serbia as it did in Guatemala. What do you think are the major questions that have to be resolved before Impunity International no longer needs a program here in Serbia?

For example, let’s talk about a trial that is lasting for six years and they have all the evidence. I’m not talking about war crime trials. I’m talking about the burning of a mosque in Belgrade. You have police cameras on the ground; you have all the evidence. But the judiciary is the weakest link in the whole chain of protection, and that’s where the impunity is coming from.

On the other side, you don’t have the political will. I don’t know why we’re still speaking about political will to punish those who committed war crimes or other crimes, but unfortunately this is still happening in Serbia. We didn’t have the climate for arresting Mladic for 10 years, or Karadzic. And it’s something that’s really blocking all the trials, it’s blocking all the evidence collection, it’s blocking the prosecutor’s office. And it’s something that is unfortunately on the political side.

And this is because you still have a judicial system that’s a carryover from the previous period? You have judges that are old-fashioned in their political thinking? Are judges the problem?

The problem starts with the prosecution. A judge cannot accomplish something without decent work from the prosecutor’s office. You can’t get a sentence without all the necessary elements. So, the reason lies on both sides. It’s not just the old-fashioned judges. But judges are unfortunately listening to the politicians more than they should. It’s not just direct pressure but it’s also sensing what the political moment is. It’s very hard to prove. But if no trial emerges during a long period of time, and for several years a case that should be a priority goes nowhere, then what else can you think? It’s some kind of auto-censorship by the judges.

Judges are appointed? 

Yes, by the Serbian parliament. The High Judicial Council, as an independent body, recommends a group of candidates, and parliament chooses and appoints them.

Is there a problem with political influence through this process?

Yes, but it’s really hard to prove. Judges should be elected to full appointments. But there is still a probation period for newly appointed judges. That’s where the judges can be influenced because they fear what might happen during this probation period. There is still no solid ground for the evaluation of their work, and the criteria for their reelection is completely unclear. 

Tell me about the mosque case. The mosque here in Belgrade was burned six years ago, and you said all the evidence was collected. The culprits were…? 

We were monitoring this trial for a while. There was a police officer stating that the entire burning of the mosque was filmed by police camera. But then he says that he doesn’t remember anything, because so many years have passed, everything has become blurry. He says maybe something happened, maybe not, he is not certain. So, the police are not giving substantive evidence for the trial. Many circumstances have blocked the process, and that’s why the trials have produced so little.

We also have the trial for burning the American embassy, which ended just few days ago. The sentence was one year of jail for just stealing a few things from the embassy. Even if the punishment had been more severe, I don’t think that it would change anything, because it’s only a few people from a larger number who were responsible. Those who really gave the orders, they were not caught and not brought to trial. We have simply found a victim to sacrifice and lifted the responsibility from higher authorities.

Just prior to his assassination, Djindic launched a very big anti-corruption campaign. After his assassination, that campaign continued and there was some political will behind this anti-corruption effort because of his assassination. How do you feel about that process today? Was that generally successful, in terms of breaking the power of organized crime? Have they recovered their power to a certain extent?

Those links between government and organized crime are still strong. Only a small number of cases end with a verdict. This is also one of the areas where we can speak about impunity. We’re monitoring some of the trials before the court and trying to distinguish between the indictments of major political figures and just petty corruption. We have indictments and verdicts in media, and people are judged by the general public as guilty. But it’s not proven in court. And nobody is really paying attention to this process and how it really damages the whole fight against corruption.

It’s good to have a shift in political power because it can really bring some of these things to light. I don’t like political revanchism, but if it provokes a real fight against corruption then it’s unstoppable. You can’t say it’s limited to only one political party, but it must go through all the political spheres and deal with corruption at all levels. 

I’m interested in the rise of the right wing populism, and I’m curious how you evaluate the situation here in Serbia.

Where this right wing is really strong is against minorities, especially against LGBT minority. Their support is not vast, but it still is enough to spread violence on the streets of Serbia. If they really can collect a few thousand people to be violent on the streets of the Gay Pride Parade or any other incident, then this needs to be addressed with special care.

They’re now in the Vojvodina parliament. They’re sitting in municipality assemblies around Serbia, such as Arandjelovac, Mladenovac, and so on. They’re now emerging in regular political life. It’s hard to link them with crimes. They can be linked to the church in certain cases. For example, there were some organizations using church premises in Novi Sad without paying. So, some parts of society are supporting these groups. In the 1990s, the state was always using, and misusing, these groups to spread violence. So, again, we can see that the system did not change in all respects. And this is something that is very worrisome.

Let me ask about LGBT issues, because I just saw that the Gay Pride parade has been canceled.

In 2011, the government was speaking about having the data on the groups that were planning violence during the Pride march. If you, as a state with all the powers you have, say that there are groups that are planning atrocities and violence in the street, then you have to act. You can’t just sit there with no process, no prosecutor’s office working on these issues. The only proof for us that there is such violence is the arrest of the people who planned it. Whether they committed the violence or not, it’s enough reason to start the process. If they’ve collected weapons or they have bigger plans, it’s something that the state must address. The state can use this as an excuse to cancel the event, year after year. But to demonstrate that it has the will to deal with these issues, the state has to put pressure on the groups that are planning violence and really make arrests.

Do you think that the LGBT community will go ahead with the parade anyway?

Pride Week will happen. As far as I know the whole week is not canceled: the conferences, the events all around Belgrade.

Do you see in terms of society more generally a greater acceptance of LGBT issues, even if the parade itself is canceled?

There is, I think, a certain level of softening on this topic, so the overall pressure is having an effect on society. But you will always have a small percentage of people who want to be violent on various issues, including LGBT issues. It’s not something that can be stopped completely – in any country – but the question is how organized the violence is and whether it receives support from the state. That’s what distinguishes a country developing in the right way and a country developing in the wrong way.

Belgrade, September 24, 2012

Krassimir Kanev monitors and assesses human rights for minorities in Bulgaria.

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

Bulgarian politician Ahmed Dogan was in the news this weekend after surviving a dramatic assault at a party conference in Sofia. Dogan is the controversial leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), an organization established in 1990 that has largely championed the rights of ethnic Turks and Muslims living in Bulgaria. Dogan was going to announce during this speech that he was stepping down as the head of the party.

It was not a clear-cut assassination attempt. The assailant, Oktai Enimehmedov, used a gas pistol, usually a non-lethal weapon though it could do considerable damage at point-blank range. But the pistol was loaded only with pepper spray and noisemakers. Enimehmedov, who is an ethnic Turk himself, was immediately set upon by members of the audience and security personnel, who punched and kicked him. The video of the dramatic scrum has gone viral.

It’s not entirely clear why Enimehmedov engaged in this half-attack on Dogan. He may simply have disliked the MRF leader and wanted the media limelight. This being Bulgaria, however, conspiracy theories abound. The most popular seems to be that Dogan orchestrated the whole affair, though this scenario makes little sense.

Ahmed Dogan is no stranger to controversy. He has long been criticized for his autocratic style and the many years he was on the payroll of the state security services prior to 1989. And the MRF has witnessed various fissures, most recently when former deputy chairman Kassim Dal broke with Dogan and later established his own party.

Despite these controversies, the MRF has achieved considerable successes, both as a political party and as a movement to advance the ethnic Turkish and Muslim community in Bulgaria. I spoke recently with Krassimir Kanev of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. He has worked on human rights issues in Bulgaria for more than two decades and helped write one of the first reports on the situation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in the 1980s.

“Overall, I think that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was quite positive in Bulgaria,” he told me. “They were able to both protect the human rights of the ethnic Turks, as well as to advance their welfare in the regions where they live — especially when the Movement was in government, which was for much of the past decade.”

“There were, however, also some negative developments,” he continued. “They created a political ghetto for the Turkish minority. If you’re an ethnic Turk, the expectation is that you vote for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and there has been little incentive for the other parties to work among the Turkish minority. Although some parties made some moves in that regard, it was mostly the MRF that focused on the issue.”

In addition to the rights of ethnic Turks, we talked about a current court case against 13 imams accused of promoting violence, the declining status of human rights NGOs in Bulgaria, and why Roma in Bulgaria have not replicated the success of the MRF. Below this interview, to provide a point of comparison, I have appended excerpts from an earlier discussion we had in 2007 about identity questions.

The Interview

Do you remember where you were when the Berlin Wall fell, what you were thinking, and whether you thought about its impact on life here in Bulgaria?

As with many other people in Bulgaria, it was something I sort of expected. Because I was active in the “non-formal” organizations under communism, before the Berlin Wall fell I envisaged that the political development in Bulgaria would be somewhat similar to what happened in Russia under Gorbachev. There would be more openness, more possibilities for the freedom of expression, but with certain restrictions imposed by the communist regime. In the long run I thought that communism had no future, but I thought of this perspective as long-term. And in Bulgaria, as in the other Eastern European countries, it happened quickly, this dismantling, this dissolution of the system — against the expectations of many people. At that time I was surprised, I was pleasantly surprised, but at the same time it went against my social, and personal, and advocacy strategy. So I as well as lots of people around me had to reconsider strategies in view of the circumstances.

You were here in Sofia in November 1989?

Yes, yes, I was always here in Sofia. On that day I moved to a new home, where I am still! In the evening we heard that Todor Zhivkov had been dismissed. So it was a new life and a new home, as well as something new in society.

Was there a point when you remember a clear dividing line in your life, between being non-political and being political?

That dividing line was before communism fell, certainly. I can’t think of a specific date, but it certainly happened when I was a PhD student at Sofia University. At that time, my social and political outlook was formed, and I got involved in informal politics at that time. I was sure that this was going to be my future, whether communism would last longer or fall as it did.

You did informal politics with a group of people at the university?

Yes, with a circle of people, some at the university and some outside. They were all intellectuals.

And was there anybody in your life at that time that said, “Krassimir, this is not a good idea?”

Oh, yes! My mother and father of course. They still think it’s not a good idea.

How strenuously did they try to convince you?

They were quite persistent. They thought that this was dangerous and wrong. My life should be more focused on my academic career and my family. They always thought that speaking out in public creates enemies—which is true. At that time more than now, but more or less they were always against this public activity.

At what point did human rights in the sense of monitoring and assessing the situation for minorities in Bulgaria become the focus for your work?

My involvement with minorities and with the persecution of the Turkish minority was a motivation for my initial involvement in politics. That specific period in Communist history, 1984-85 and the name-changing campaign of the Turkish minority, took place in the middle of my Ph.D. time. I was involved investigating this campaign immediately since the beginning. I published an article with several other people, an article about the campaign that was smuggled out of Bulgaria and published in the West.

I was telling Deyan Kuronov that I felt that the opposition came together around the issue of ethnic Turks and he said, “No, no, no! It was just me, Krassimir, and Dmitrina Petrova. 

In this intellectual circle of people, yes. But there were of course many other people outside this circle who were involved as well. And those were mostly Turkish intellectuals and activists. There were several other groups in society who were in one way or another involved in this issue, but we were not in touch.

I got the sense from Deyan that for the opposition as a whole, as it came together in the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and allied organizations, the issue did not become a rallying point.

No, never. The situation of minorities has never been the focus of anybody’s political work, including the opposition. There were serious debates in the opposition. In the UDF at the beginning were people with very nationalistic outlooks and approaches. That was the reason why the Movement for Rights of Freedoms at that time was not accepted in the UDF.

Was there anything that you think could’ve been done differently at that time to link democracy with the human rights of minorities?

Yes, of course, lots of things. But there was a price to be paid. It was a society heavily indoctrinated into nationalism, under Communism but also before. This nationalism and ethnocentrism is very much part of the Bulgarian national identity. It’s how people think: “We are Bulgarians because we were enslaved by the Turks, and we emancipated ourselves from Turkish rule, and therefore these are our basic enemies.” Therefore it is very difficult to make a political issue from the rights of the Turkish minority. If you try, you will lose.

That was part of the reason why the Union of Democratic Forces could not win a majority in the first elections: because the UDF was perceived (and was made to be perceived) as people who would return the names of the Turks. Within the UDF at that time were people who refrained from taking up the issue of ethnic minorities because they didn’t think they could win on this issue. So my answer would be: Yes, lots of things could have been different, if these democratic forces had been more sensitive to the rights of minorities. But on the other hand it’s not clear what influence this opposition could have had on society.

In other words, it would have been a much better opposition in terms of its agenda, but it also might have been…

Weaker politically, yes.

That’s a common dilemma.

Also now in the United States, I guess.

Yes, unfortunately. When you think back to your perspective in 1989-1990, are there any positions that you’ve had second thoughts about? Or do you feel that your perspective is pretty much the same as it was back then?

One of the things I’ve thought that I could have done better is to go through some additional form of education, either in Bulgaria or abroad. I didn’t, I was very busy. So I made do with my education under the Communist regime. I had to self-educate a lot. I did this, I think, quite successfully, but I always regret that I haven’t taken an additional Masters, or an additional Ph.D. Not because I would have been better at what I do if I had this formal education, but because other people look at these things seriously when you start talking about human rights. This issue of whether you have a law degree always comes up one way or another, for example.

In terms of the focus of my work, I should have picked some topics in the beginning that were obviously serious. Some institutions in Bulgaria that were away from everybody’s eyes — children’s institutions — were revealed as horrible in the late 1990s and 2000s. We didn’t pick those issues at the beginning.

Orphanages?

There are lots of children’s institutions in Bulgaria, for orphans but also for other children, children with disabilities, delinquent children.

That’s very interesting, and I appreciate your candor about those choices that you made. But I’m also interested in any change in thinking you might have had in 22 years.

Yes probably. In human rights particularly, my thought evolved with lots of issues. At that time, for instance, I might have been more inclined to think that it might be horrible to have these institutions—children’s institutions, psychiatric institutions, other types of institutions—but they could be improved by themselves. Now I’m reluctant to tolerate any type of institution for anybody. So my thoughts in that regard evolved.

My thoughts evolved on other human rights issues. In the early 1990s we used to focus predominantly on ethnic and racial discrimination, whereas subsequently we found that other types of discrimination were also worth considering. Those issues were somewhat disregarded, like for example discrimination against sexual minorities or women or people with disabilities. I only started focusing on these issues at a later stage. Other issues became more serious over time. For example, in the early 1990s we didn’t have any refugees or migrants here. This issue became more serious over time, and we had to give some more thought to this.

When I was here in 1990, among the people I talked to, the status of NGOs was very high. Since there was so little trust in government at that time, if you were non-governmental that was a plus. I’m surprised to come back and discover when I talk to people that NGOs are not always viewed so positively.

Well, this image changed a lot – for different reasons. One is that in the 1990s the funding of NGOs was more independent, and so NGOs could be more independent. They could be seen by society as something not part of the government. Now this independence is completely compromised by NGOs associated with some forms of governmental funding that comes either directly from the government, or through some European Union program that also goes through the government. Now there’s not much sense in even saying you’re an NGO if you’re taking your money from the government, one way or another.

Then some NGOs allowed themselves to be used. But that goes also hand-in-hand with funding by the government. They lost their independent image. Still, I must say that there still are NGOs that are able to preserve their status as independent, outside monitors and evaluators of governmental policies. And I believe our organization is one such organization, but there are several other groups too. There are not many, though. On paper and in reality, maybe the amount of money that goes to the NGO sector is the same as in the 1990s, maybe even more. But if you think of really independent NGOs, now there are much fewer than there had been in the 1990s.

In the realm of human rights in particular, are there any other options other than NGOs, government, and the European Union?

There were some governmental structures, like the ombudsman. We had several independent governmental bodies such as the Commission Against Discrimination that became players in this field five or six years ago. And that made a positive change. On the other hand, we had a sharp decline in NGO activity on human rights. There are very few human rights NGOs left, compared to the 1990s.

Largely because of funding?

Yes, the shift of funding negatively affected the human rights NGO world in particular.

What about the emergence of informal movements?

There has been very little development in that regard in Bulgaria, and those groups have had no influence on public policy at all.

In terms of political parties, I’m particularly interested in the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. How would you evaluate the work of the MRF over the last 22 years? Has it made a real difference in the lives of ethnic Turks?

There were positive developments and they were probably more than the negative developments. Overall, I think that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was quite positive in Bulgaria. They were able to both protect the human rights of the ethnic Turks, as well as to advance their welfare in the regions where they live — especially when the Movement was in government, which was for much of the past decade.

There were, however, also some negative developments. They created a political ghetto for the Turkish minority. If you’re an ethnic Turk, the expectation is that you vote for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and there has been little incentive for the other parties to work among the Turkish minority. Although some parties made some moves in that regard, it was mostly the MRF that focused on the issue.

So, for instance, the current minister of culture…

He’s Turkish, yes. And the party now in government, GERB, also tries to reach out to the Turkish minority to some extent, with some success. The splinter group that emerged from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is viewed as going into prospective alliance with the party now in government. The Socialist party (BSP) had some success in the Turkish regions, but very modest. So, both GERB and the BSP have reached out to the Turkish minority.

When you look at the level of prejudice in society over the last 22 years, do you think the Movement or any other efforts have succeeded in reducing the overall level of prejudice specifically toward ethnic Turks?

Oh, yes, I think so. The very fact that ethnic Turks became visible in society reduced a lot of prejudice. The research also indicates that this has happened. There’s still a lot of prejudice, but certainly not at the level that we had in 1992-93. The fact that we now have government ministers who are ethnic Turks is quite significant. This was unthinkable in the 1990s. When the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was involved in the government in the 1990s, it had to propose a Bulgarian as a government minister because at that time it would have been unacceptable to have a Turkish government minister.

Someone told me that an important cultural indication of the change is the popularity of Turkish soap operas here.

Indeed, yes. But that was a recent thing. I think that they too contributed to better acceptance of ethnic Turks.

When I talked to people in 1990, there were some people who really thought that ethnic Turks would be a fifth column for Turkey to re-colonize Bulgaria. But I don’t have the sense that those suspicions still exist.

They do exist, but at a much lower level.

Let’s move to the Roma issue. I don’t get a sense that there really has been much improvement there, but what’s your impression?

Not at all. There’s even been a decline over the past several years with this government. With the Roma, different governmental institutions adopted different papers expressing some positive attitudes towards integration, but those were largely papers. None of them were implemented in reality. And the situation of Roma remains the same as it was in the 1990s, including the level of prejudice and discrimination toward them.

At the non-governmental level, there were some developments in the desegregation of Roma education over the past 10-12 years. But this government basically attempted to put a stop to this development. There were police investigations into these projects, harassment. The local governments in many situations obstructed any effort at the integration of Roma.

The housing situation improved somewhat for those Roma who were relatively affluent. But for others it worsened, and over the past several years there were forced evictions from several cities, which never happened in the 1990s. The access to health care worsened dramatically since the health-care reform of 2001-2002. Roma were able to benefit much more from the health-care system then than they can now. The last census indicated an increase in illiteracy and in Roma children not attending school.

There hasn’t emerged anything comparable in the Roma community to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms? Do you think that there is still a possibility of a Roma party emerging?

No, it’s impossible. Because they are very diverse. They are diverse religiously, they are diverse linguistically, they are diverse in terms of regional identity. I think that a Roma party comparable to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has no chance here.

When I ask people, “What will make a difference for the Roma community?” I get different answers, such as jobs or political power. What do you think?

There are lots of things that could make improvements in the Roma community. Measures to desegregate education, for example. Segregated education is a serious problem. This is a ghetto-type education that produces illiterate people with degrees. The housing situation can improve, and yet it doesn’t improve. In certain cases it gets worse. Most Roma in Bulgaria actually live in illegal houses. They can be evicted at any time and left on the street. Access to health care is also important. This health-care reform doesn’t work for Roma, but no one thinks of improving the way poor people are insured. And these factors — particularly education — influence employment. There’s ethnic and racial discrimination in employment, but people are also not hired because their level of education is very low.

Has there been an effort to train Roma teachers to work in schools?

There are Roma teachers, but they teach in segregated schools and that is a vicious circle.

Is there a legal basis to bring the government to court to force it to desegregate?

No, the Bulgarian justice system doesn’t work that way. You cannot expect a court to order the government to desegregate the school, as in the United States. It’s impossible here. There have been efforts to take up this issue in the courts, but all of them were so far unsuccessful.

When you talk about legal strategies, for the most part you’re talking about individual cases involving individuals, or maybe a couple of individuals?

Yes mostly. But we’re looking at these cases as a strategic issue, an issue that would affect the situation of a larger number of people. We had a case this April where the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights over a situation of forced eviction. And the legal standards it came up with must be relevant not just to this small Roma community that was affected here in Sofia, but also elsewhere in Bulgaria.

In theory, this would produce a change in the legislation. The problem, however, is that we’ve had lots of such cases that uncover incompatibilities between our legislative framework and international law. But Bulgaria doesn’t execute these judgments. It just pays compensation and doesn’t do anything to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar situation.

You can only go to the European Court if you’ve exhausted…

…all domestic remedies. Which means that very often the Court will find an incompatibility between a certain national law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. But the execution of these judgments is a serious problem.

Other than enforcement mechanisms connected to payment, there really is nothing the European institutions can do to force the Bulgarian government to change policy?

There’s a possibility to impose a fine. The European Union does this when you’re found in non-compliance with a certain EU directive. They impose certain penalties within, say, five months. After five months it becomes double, then triple, and so on. But the approach of the Council of Europe is different. They never fine a country for the execution of these judgments. 

The case you’re working on now is connected to religious minorities.

Yes, this is a very serious problem now. There’s a case now in a regional court in Pazardzhik. Thirteen Islamic imams and muftis are on trial for propagating anti-state ideology – for propagating Shari’ah law, which the government considers to be anti-state. They’re not accused of promoting violence. They just say that Shari’ah is the supreme law, which is above the laws of the state. And not all of them, only some.

The initial reason for this trial was a massive raid by the secret police back in October 2010 in areas populated mostly by Pomaks, Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. The police went to the mosques, went to peoples’ homes, went to offices, and took 33 bags of books. And this trial of 13 people came out of this action. Back in 2010, this government was in alliance with the Ataka party, and I think this was part of the reason for the raid. They wanted to display their anti-Muslim sentiment and their anti-Muslim approach. But this was also something that Ataka provoked, and the government party wanted to keep Ataka on its side.

Ataka has always been talking about Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, and things like this. But Muslims perceive this talk as a direct attack against their Muslim religious identity. When this trial started several days ago, there was a gathering in front of the court of Muslims from all those regions, and they spoke at that gathering of a new “revival process.” The name-changing campaign back in the 1980s was officially called the “revival process.”

Are there Shari’ah courts here in Bulgaria as there are in the United States, in the UK, even in Israel?

No, we abolished them in 1938.

So there’s no informal application of Shari’ah?

No.

So you are challenging the government on…?

Freedom of expression and freedom of religion. The defense argues that the peaceful expression of even fundamentalist religious beliefs should not be a matter of criminal prosecution. It would be another thing if you incite violence, but there was no such evidence of this. And the law actually doesn’t require that you incite violence as a condition for prosecution. The mere propagating of ideas that are anti-democratic without violence is a provision in the criminal code that dates back to the Communist period, when it was used to suppress the anti-Communist opposition. I think it is now being used for the first time since 1989 against these Muslims.

So actually it is going to be difficult with this law on the books to argue for the freedom of expression in this case.

This law was passed in 1968. After that we ratified the European Convention of Human Rights and other international treaties. So, it should be interpreted in the light of the standards that were established at that level.

So you think you can get the right judgment in the case without actually getting rid of the law entirely? And just have a reinterpretation of the law? 

Yes, that’s what we’re aiming at in that case. But ultimately the law should be repealed.

But if you first have a reinterpretation, then you can use that as the basis for an argument for repeal.

Yes. 

And what do you think the prospects are for getting a good judgment in the case?

I would say 50/50. We’ve had very bad judgments affecting Muslims. I am now the representative before the European Court of Human Rights for two people who were convicted in 2010 for organizing a party along religious lines, the Muslim Democratic Union. They simply took the statute of the Christian Democratic Party, which was registered and legally operating—they even have municipal councils here and there—and changed “Christian” to “Muslim.” But that was considered by the criminal court in one area as a crime, and one of the people was sentenced to one year of imprisonment suspended for three years. The other one was fined 4,000 leva. So that case is now before the European Court of Human Rights. We formally have a provision in the criminal court, that again dates from the communist period, that punishes people for organizing a political party along religious lines.

I thought it was also in the Bulgarian constitution.

Yes, the constitution has a prohibition, but you can enforce that prohibition through different means, for example by refusing to register a political party. It is one thing to refuse to register and another thing to go after the person. By the way, in the constitution we have a prohibition of political parties organized around ethnic and religious lines, but in the criminal code we have a provision that punishes only for religiously based political parties. But that is a remnant from communism. They just haven’t introduced the ethnic provision in the criminal code.

Are there other cases similar to the one in Pazardzhik?

Oh, yes. We have now one case of a Muslim girl who was suspended from school for five days for wearing a hijab. That is also likely to go to the European Court of Human Rights, but it is still in the domestic courts.

Is there a law here that prohibits the wearing of the hijab?

No. The law that regulates education says that education should be secular. But that is interpreted apparently in different contexts. On the one hand, it’s secular. But on the other hand, nothing prohibits, for example, Orthodox priests from doing activities in the schools. But when you wear a hijab, then yes, you get suspended.

Has there been any attempt here to introduce the same kind of laws that we’ve seen in France, and elsewhere in Europe, explicitly prohibiting the hijab?

There’s a lot of talk about this. It would be difficult to introduce it here, but I would not be surprised.

What about mosque or minaret construction, like in Switzerland?

No. That actually is something quite positive here. Lots of people laughed about this amendment that was passed in Switzerland. Lots of people here thought that was totally ridiculous.

Well, that’s good.

Because we have 2,500 mosques.

That would be challenging.

To demolish their minarets.

Have any other religions come under legal challenge? Judaism, for instance?

For now it’s only Islam. From time to time Jehovah’s Witnesses get harassed at the personal level when they proselytize in peoples’ homes. They would have problems with the residents, and sometimes also with the government. And the Mormons. But other than those…

Now that Ataka is no longer in government, some people say that the age of Ataka is over — at least politically, as a party.

I very much hope so. But it’s not clear.

Do you think that the ideas of Ataka still are very strong, even if the party isn’t?

Yes. The age of Ataka is over because it shows very poorly in the public opinion polls. But this is because there are several splinter groups from Ataka that also score some results in the public opinion polls. And the combined percentages of all these would make as much as the percentage of Ataka from the last election. So the percentage of people who are prepared to support extremist nationalistic views continues to be quite high.

For instance, people who support VMRO…

Yes, they are now in alliance with Ataka and this will probably become formalized in the next elections. It is not clear what is going to happen.

And they are also talking about forming a kind of paramilitary—similar I suppose to Jobbik in Hungary. Do you think that’s an actual possibility? Do you think there are enough people who are interested?

Oh, yes. There are enough people who are interested in forming such a group, but it’s legally impossible now. I’m not sure that could be made possible by the government.

It’s legally impossible now because…

You are not allowed to maintain private armed militias.

But they might do it even though it’s illegal.

Oh, yes. They have these people, and they have their uniforms. They march from time to time. Every year they celebrate. In February they have a march here in Sofia. Some of them are in uniforms in that march.

We’ve been talking about relatively negative trends. But in terms of a future tolerant Bulgaria, or a future multicultural Bulgaria — if we can go that far — do you see any bright spots or positive trends?

Ethnic minorities have a better presence in public life and the government. Now this is accepted. Roma are heavily underrepresented, but their number is growing as a relative share of the population, so the prospects for them are becoming better. I don’t think that they will ever become influential as a single political party, but they might act through different political parties at the local level. It is now largely accepted that we have Turkish government ministers, something that was previously unthinkable. We never had them actually, not since the liberation!

Since 1878! 

Yes! That is a very positive sign. And consecutive governments have had Turkish government ministers. Even this government, which is anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim, has a Turkish government minister! So, the acceptance of the Turkish minority in the mainstream politics seems to be going well, and that is a positive sign. The migrant population, I guess, will grow too, and will have also influence. Initially probably at the local level, but at some point maybe at a national level.

Migrants from… 

We have lots of Chinese now, but we have also migrants from the other EU member states. Lots of British, for example, have settled here and bought houses on the Black Sea coast, in the mountains. We have, for example, British municipal councilors.

Really?

If they are EU citizens they are allowed to vote and be elected to municipal government.

Do they speak Bulgarian?

Some do, because they have been here for many years. Most, though, don’t study Bulgarian. They speak English and tend to communicate between themselves. But some learn, get involved in politics, and are basically well accepted by society. We have a very strong Russian community, too, on the Black Sea coast, which is growing.

The last question is about trust. I understand from talking to people, and also from an Open Society report, that there is a low level of trust in this society: trust toward the government, toward civil society, even interpersonally. And I was wondering whether that’s something you’ve also not just seen but experienced…

Oh, yes.

And what do you think is a way to build trust in society?

That has always been a problem in Bulgaria. I wouldn’t say that there has been a positive or negative trend in that area. The level of trust, interpersonal and institutional, has always been very low. Probably part of it comes from the heritage of Communism. Then there’s all these issues of organized crime, and corruption, and government involvement in corruption. This has also undermined trust in institutions. This is a very bad thing, and very un-European. It’s more American, I think, particularly with regard to trust in institutions.

The institution in which Americans have the highest trust is the military, which is very, very frightening.

Here too! But there is very little trust in anything that reminds people of a government.

Other than an anti-corruption campaign, and transparency, and an end to impunity—the usual kind of Open Society Foundation type of programs—is there anything you think can be done, at a non-governmental level, to build trust?

Trust comes with large societal reform: reducing corruption, making an inclusive government, strengthening the democratic process, and learning from the past. We’ve never re-elected a government. Every time we have an election, the party in power steps down and another party steps in. That has to do with trust too. Political parties haven’t learned from their mistakes and from the past. 

Finally, some quantitative questions. On a scale of one to 10, with one most dissatisfied, 10 most satisfied, how would you evaluate what has changed or not changed in Bulgaria from 1989 to today?

Probably between 6 and 7. So, overall it was satisfying, although the expectations were higher than the result. Maybe five years ago I would have said 7.

Same period of time, 1989 to today. Same scale, 1 to 10, most dissatisfied 1, most satisfied 10. But this time your own personal life.

Around 5, let’s say.

Finally, as you look into the next couple of years here in Bulgaria, what is your feeling about what will happen, with one being most pessimistic and 10 being most optimistic?

There’s a lot of uncertainty about what’s going to happen in Bulgaria over the next several years. That would mean perhaps I should say 5 again.

Sofia, September 28, 2012 

Interview (2007)

ON THE BALKANS

Bulgarians are the only ones proud of being Balkan, because the Balkan Mountains are here. Otherwise people are afraid of being branded Balkan.

There is a tradition here in the Balkans that we have better relations with Germany and France, and not with each other. There is a bad image of the Balkans in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Whoever can avoid calling him or herself Balkan will do their best to do so. The Serbs maybe would now accept being called Balkan, but it’s for the worst reasons: to oppose Europe, to pose Balkan against European.

There are some scholars like Maria Todorova trying to promote the view that everything bad in the Balkans is the influence of the great powers. This is more true for the Middle East and the Muslim world than for the Balkans. Very often the involvement of Europe was very positive in the Balkans.

The idea of a Balkan federation has its origins in the Ottoman Empire. It has had proponents in every Balkan country. Unfortunately, it was also promoted by the communists, and that means that it is opposed and denounced here.

ON NATION-BUILDING

There is a deep-rooted idea in Bulgarian politics of nation-building. This nation-building of Bulgaria was an attempt to establish a homogenous, ethnically-based nation on a territory that has never been homogenous. Bulgaria was more successful than some of her western neighbors, because the number of ethnic minorities here is relatively small.

There is an image here that we have lived peacefully with our minorities for centuries. This is not true. There has never been peaceful coexistence. There were lots of policies of ethnic cleansing. There were assimilation attempts. For Bulgarians, particularly after the fall of communism, there was some pride that “we managed to keep the peace in Bulgaria.” Because of this, you would hear from some that interethnic relations are harmonious. But it was because there was no ethnic conflict of the magnitude of former Yugoslavia. But this also serves as a deterrent in terms of how far it can go.

People here say, “We are not against the Turks, we are only against their political party.” Or they say, “We have nothing against them personally, but why do they build mosques?” The relationships with the Muslims in Bulgaria are probably not that problematic. They can be sorted out one way or another. This country has the highest share of Muslims in Europe on a per-capita basis. In some Western countries, the attitude toward Muslims is based on the assumption that they are not civilized, that they violate the rights of women. There is less of that here, because a Bulgarian would not value gender equality as much as a French or a Dutch would.

ON ETHNIC MINORITIES

For some minorities in Bulgaria, the situation got better, of course. For all the smaller minorities, except the Macedonians, it got better: for Jews, Armenians, Vlachs. They were able to freely express their identity. Their schools were opened. For instance two Armenian schools opened, one in Plovdiv, one in Sofia. There’s one Jewish school in Sofia. The Karakachani registered their associations and opened an out-of-school center for studying their language.

The situation of the Turkish minority generally improved with the restoration of their right to their names. They started to study their mother tongue in public schools. Their political participation has always been strong at the local and national level, and it is improving.

For the Roma, though, I couldn’t say that there has been any improvement, except that they were able to assert their identity. They could register their associations. They could publish their Roma newspapers. But many elements of their life worsened, such as their exclusion from society. They were always excluded from society, but this process of ghettoization increased, particularly after 1990-1, particularly after they lost jobs. There is now a parallel life outside of Bulgarian society. No one pays attention to this parallel society. Mainstream society is interested in guarding itself from Roma society. Neither are the police interested in what happens in the ghetto.

ON ROMA

The ghettoization of Roma life has increased. More Roma entered the ghetto. Some of the ghettos got larger – in Sofia and several of the big cities. People are coming from villages outside Sofia because the employment opportunities are better or at least they can try to find some work – in garbage collection and so forth. With the increased size of the ghettos has come all the consequences. The education became more segregated. And discrimination is quite severe in almost every sphere of social life, such as housing and health care. The latter particularly worsened after the introduction of the current health care reform because it is based on insurance. Before 1999, it was free health care. It was the socialist model. You go to the hospital and get the care for free. Now you have to pay. And in addition to that you have to pay a consumer tax. The Roma are not able to pay. So their access to health care has worsened dramatically.

The situation with employment has improved a little bit with the employment boom over the past several years. There are also possibilities to travel abroad, especially from the beginning of this year, to other EU member states. Many Roma were on social assistance in the 1990s. Since May, the government cut social assistance for everyone, but mostly for Roma. On January 1, the first 18 months of temporary social assistance expires. Perhaps 40,000 Roma will remain on the street. Because of the economic boom, the assumption of the government is that everyone will find employment. But that’s not true, particularly in the countryside. Anyway, the access to social assistance is conditioned on whether the person actually sought employment. If they were able to find a job, they would have found it.

With the economic boom, the price of property went up. The government started targeting Roma neighborhoods for demolition. Last year, in one Roma neighborhood in Sofia, very close to the center, all the 200 inhabitants were supposed to be removed without compensation and just left on the street. At the last moment, four members of the European parliament wrote a letter to the mayor of Sofia and he stopped the demolition. Otherwise, the courts approved that the Roma were occupying the flats illegally. But 70 percent of Roma occupy their houses illegally. They usually can only build illegally.

Since 2005, the general perception of Roma has worsened. The racist Ataka party entered the parliament in 2005. It’s not just Ataka. Their language has also been picked up by other parties as well.

ON MACEDONIANS

The Macedonians are another group whose situation has not improved since 1990. It’s not like under communism when the dominant ideology was that everyone is Bulgarian. After 1990, minorities could publically express themselves. For the Macedonians, however, their political party was prohibited several times. They went to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, which decided in 2005 that this was a violation of freedom of association. After this decision, the Macedonian party tried to register. Twice it was turned down, the last time on August 23rd. They and the Pomaks are the only peoples whose self-expression and self-identity are not recognized by the government. The opinion of the Council of Europe advisory committee on national minorities issued last year described the situation in Bulgaria quite fairly and singled out these two minorities for mention.

No one seriously fears separatism since the Macedonians are such a small group. But this is the tradition in Bulgaria, to view Macedonia as a Bulgarian land. After the liberation from the Ottoman Empire, there was a gradual process of accession of lands that were at that time outside of Bulgaria. Then came all the wars fought to bring Macedonia under the Bulgarian government. This was the major reason why Bulgaria joined with Germany during World War II, because Germany offered Macedonia to Bulgaria. There was a period of ten years after the communists took over when the government recognized Macedonian identity. There was this dream of a Balkan federation. Bulgaria’s Dimitrov and Yugoslavia’s Tito made a formal agreement. Macedonia was supposed to be a constitutive member of this federation. But this federation failed. For a short time, Bulgaria tolerated this identity. Since Zhivkov came to power, the communist government became gradually more nationalistic and denounced Macedonian identity. But now everyone in politics considers the recognition of Macedonian identity a communist policy!

In formal relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia, there were very few agreements before 1999. Bulgaria initially refused to recognize Macedonia because the treaty was proposed in both Macedonian and Bulgarian languages. The formula in 1999 was that the Macedonian language would not be mentioned. Instead, the treaty would be concluded “in the official languages as provided for by the respective constitutions.” This situation gradually improved through mutual relations. There were a lot of factors involved. One of them was the Macedonian fear that this issue would block integration into Europe. Macedonia also has a problem with Greece and it didn’t want to create a problem with Bulgaria, too.

Macedonia sponsored a Macedonian cultural center in Bulgaria. Two years ago, they employed a Bulgarian national. He was an ethnic Macedonian, with a clear Macedonian identity that he wasn’t afraid to show. The Bulgarian government wanted this person removed. So Macedonia eventually removed him and appointed someone from Macedonia itself.

ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The European commission took a very schizophrenic approach to Bulgaria’s accession. Every report contained a comprehensive list of human rights problems and some of them were quite significant – torture, the situation in prisons, Roma integration, the situation of the mentally disabled. But then, in the end, the commission would say, “Nevertheless, Bulgaria fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria.” The Bulgarian government would just simulate taking some measures. But only those measures that were part of the EU Acquis were effectively taken – the adoption of an anti-discrimination law, the adoption of the data protection law. But on the desegregation of Roma education, the commission simply mentioned that education was too segregated. There were several policy papers from the Bulgarian Ministry of Education. The ministry followed up with several programs that were never fulfilled. It was just paperwork. Bulgaria took small amounts of money from the EU to improve the situation here and there. But it was on a haphazard basis and sometimes based on the political interests of particular politicians. On paper, there are plans and policy documents for the integration of Roma education. But in practice nothing happened, not one Roma child was integrated. Yes, there are several desegregation programs going on, but they are non-governmental, sponsored by the Roma education fund, the World Bank and Soros.

There was a Roma survey on education in May 2005. Roma were asked to evaluate the ongoing desegregation projects and the prospects of desegregation. Only four percent said that they would prefer their children to be in school only with other Roma children. The rest wanted their kids to go to schools with all other kids. The Roma are very much more open about being integrated with Bulgarians. It’s the Bulgarian attitudes that are the problem.

There is usually high support for European integration. Some Bulgarians would say that accession means joining a club of rich people, that it increases the prospects for better social welfare. There isn’t much understanding of a political or human rights agenda. For some ethnic minorities, the perspective is different. You hear from some Roma leaders that they would like to be part of a larger community of nations, that “we would feel more equal in that community.” Also from ethnic Macedonians, they would rely on the influence of the EU to bring their minority situation up to EU standards. But there is no public support for their position. Even in civil society, our organization is perhaps the only one with Macedonians as members.

There have not been many Bulgarians in the past who have promoted ethnic tolerance. There is a feeling of historical deprivation and this feeling is promoted in the culture. We don’t have figures like Martin Luther King, Jr. We don’t have anyone who has promoted tolerance with the Turks. One popular figure of the Bulgarian enlightment, Vassil Levski, had one sentence in his writings about the future Bulgarian republic that all the nations in Bulgaria would live together in peace. On the other hand, he created an organization in Bulgaria to fight against the Turks. Everyone in the Balkans has such contradictory traditions.

ON AMERICANIZATION

The dominant idea of America is the melting pot. It has had some bad influences here in Bulgaria. Because America is a melting pot, and everyone who goes there speaks American, therefore we should assimilate our minorities and make them speak Bulgarian and make them disappear. This is the view promoted by nationalistic circles. On one hand they hate Americans. On the other hand, they give this example of how everyone speaks English, becomes American, and renounces their previous identity. There is no understanding of Americans as a people who assert their ethnic identity. Hip-hop is popular but there is no understanding that this is an expression of a particular culture.

The Roma continue to be marginalized in Bulgaria.

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

Much has changed in Eastern Europe over 22 years. But one group that has seen relatively little improvement in its fortunes over this period has been the Roma. Unemployment levels among Roma remain high. Access to decent education, health care, and other social services is limited. Representation in politics and business is minimal. And discrimination remains pervasive.

In interviews and casual conversations in the four southeastern European countries I visited this fall, I heard the same stereotypes about Roma repeated over and over again. And many of the people who trafficked in these stereotypes were highly educated, the people who are expected “to know better.”

Maria Metodieva was, until recently, in charge of Roma issues at the Open Society Institute in Sofia, Bulgaria. She confirmed for me this most depressing fact. “We’ve done research on the type of people who are more likely to be discriminatory,” she said. “The most educated people, in terms of higher education, discriminate the most. This is ridiculous. Once you have a good education, it means that you’ve been studying in a mixed environment, and you know much more about diversity and cultural pluralism.”

But alas, there isn’t as much cultural pluralism in Bulgaria as one might hope. The effort to desegregate schools and ensure that Roma and non-Roma mix in the classrooms has encountered pushback. Economically, Roma continue to be marginalized, often living in crowded conditions in poor neighborhoods in cities like Plovdiv. Some successful Roma, borrowing a page from African-American history, “pass” as non-Roma if they can get away with it, which does little to upend common stereotypes. And even very successful Roma who openly proclaim their heritage, like TV anchorwoman Violeta Draganova, have experienced the same, maddening discrimination that their less famous brothers and sisters face.

Here’s another depressing fact. The OSI program has been quite successful in placing Roma interns in businesses in Bulgaria. But that success has been almost entirely in multinational businesses, Maria Metodieva reports, not with Bulgarian businesses. Roma don’t just face a glass ceiling – they face glass walls.

Europe is currently more than halfway through the Decade of Roma Inclusion.  There have been conferences and studies and documentaries and political lobbying. And millions of Euros have been allocated to closing the gap between Roma and the rest of Europe. There have been some notable achievements, particularly in terms of the greater visibility of Roma issues. But it’s easy to get discouraged when you come face to face with persistent discrimination. On the other hand, the modern civil rights movement in the United States was at it for more than two decades before achieving the Voting Rights Act in 1965, and the election of an African-American president more than four decades later still doesn’t mean that racism has been flushed out of the American system.

But many Roma, as they struggle against injustice and attempt to build a truly multiethnic democracy, keep their eyes on the prize. Maria Metodieva talked with me about OSI’s programs on Roma and what has worked and hasn’t worked in terms of policy approaches. She now works at the Trust for Social Achievement, which focuses on education, jobs, and capacity-building for marginalized communities in Bulgaria. 

The Interview

How would you evaluate the change in the situation for Roma between 1989 and today, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being most disappointed and 10 least disappointed?

3, which is quite close to 1. Unfortunately after the changes, the living conditions for Roma deteriorated. And Roma became more marginalized compared to the period of the socialist regime.

How do you feel about your own personal situation over the same period and along the same spectrum?

Considering the fact that I was very young in 1989, I would say 6.

Looking into the near future, 1-2 years, how do you feel about the prospects for Bulgarian society, with 1 being most pessimistic, 10 most optimistic?

Considering the political context and the economic situation, I would give a 3 again, because I think that one or two years is too short a time for any significant change in regard to economic or political stability.

Please tell me a little bit about the Roma-related programs here at the Bulgarian office of Open Society.

I’m managing a bunch of projects that range from small-scale to really large-scale. They are mainly on issues related to the Decade of Roma Inclusion, the initiative led by George Soros and the World Bank. The priorities we work on are health, employment, and housing. We also do some work on education, mostly through the provision of scholarships to Roma studying medicine. Most of our projects are research. We try to assist in the adequate formulation of evidence-based policies by the government at a national, regional and local level.

We have some interesting action projects. One of them is a project we call Bridging Roma and Private Business in Bulgaria. We place qualified and highly motivated Roma in internships in multinational and national companies in Bulgaria. The hidden objective of this program is to place the interns in permanent employment. This appears to be the most successful Roma initiative.

We have some other projects that are large-scale and related to research. We try to identify the position of Roma in the labor market. We try to follow trends in terms of social distance toward Roma in mainstream society. 

You said the placement of interns in multinational companies was successful. Can you give some examples?

We have a girl named Desi. She’s a lawyer by vocation. She applied to the program. We placed her at TNT, a logistics company. She was placed as an intern to the general manager of the company here in Bulgaria. This was three years ago. After the three months, she was offered a year-long contract. Then she was retrained to take another position in lower management in the company. Now she is still working for TNT. I believe that her life changed. Actually she’s one of the best practices, if we can use that phrase, because she managed to change the stereotypes and the attitudes of her colleagues. She was Roma in an environment that is completely Bulgarian, without any other ethnic minority representatives. Now she feels very comfortable within the company.

We had another example of Bozhidar, who was interested in alternative energy resources. We placed him in an electricity supply company here in Bulgaria, EVN, a Bulgarian-Austrian company. He worked there for a year and a half. Nowadays he is paid partly by EVN to do a master’s degree in the United States. I think these are the two of the most successful that we’ve had in this program. In general, we have a really good success rate for interns that were placed and are still working.

But your evaluation of the situation for Roma was 3, which suggests that there remain significant challenges. Can you tell me about the most significant challenges that your programs face?

Negative attitudes and discrimination. Affirmative action, something that’s quite popular in the United States, this is not something that would happen or be acceptable in Bulgaria. It wouldn’t work. The bridging project actually is a kind of affirmative action program, but it works only with multinational companies, not with the Bulgaria companies. This is another sign that something is really wrong. So, the first challenge is the hostile environment.

We have also witnessed the rise of far-right-oriented political parties, which have had huge support from Bulgarian citizens, and that’s why they have managed to enter the Bulgarian parliament. So, this is another thing that has been a great challenge to our programs.

Otherwise, I’d say that it’s mostly human resources that is lacking on behalf of the Roma community: people who are willing to work and be dedicated to the cause of improving the life of Roma in Bulgaria. This lack of human resources is connected to the lack of education, the lack of access to quality education.

Some people have told me that there’s been some improvement over the last five or six years in terms of attitudes about Roma, in part because of the success of some Roma in Bulgarian society. Others have told me that there has been movement backward. I talked to someone about a program with Bulgarian journalists. The only thing they were able to able to achieve was the change in the descriptive word, from Gypsy to Roma, but the actual attitude of people didn’t change. What do you think, has there been some improvement or movement backward?

I’ll give you an example. You see me now. If I go to New York, do you think that anyone would turn to me and call me a Gypsy?

No.

I have a son. He’s four years old. Two weeks ago, we were traveling with my husband to visit his parents in the village. On the way back, we stopped at a gas station. The gas station has a playground. So my son, said, “Mommy, can I go and play a bit at the playground.” And I said, “Of course, you can.” There were a few kids, ages 6 to 9. When my son approached, they said, “Go away, you dirty Gypsy.” This is the situation now in this country.

I interviewed the Roma journalist Violeta Draganova and she told me a very similar story involving a swimming pool. She also said she likes to go to Brussels, because people there think she’s Spanish and she doesn’t have to deal with negative stereotypes. At an individual level, the discrimination continues. Do you see any indications of improvement at the larger, societal level? 

Unfortunately, no. Because there are some preconditions that have to be taken into consideration. Some factors impede the acceptance of Roma as equal citizens of Bulgaria. First of all, the government, even though it recognizes there is a problem with Roma, doesn’t speak aloud about it. They think that if they speak publicly they won’t win the next elections. The other problem is the media. Even though it uses politically correct terminology, the media still publishes articles with content that is abusive. The media is the main channel that transmits the messages of negative attitudes about Roma in Bulgaria.

Right now, we have this interesting reality TV format called Big Brother. We have a young Roma singer, an artist who’s invited to take part in that program. She’s been very active on mainstream issues, as active as any other participant. But at the same time there are these comments on the online forums and by the other participants on the show that she’s Roma and therefore she’s stupid. Or that she’s not good enough to be on this Big Brother reality show. This is the common opinion of the average Bulgarian.

In addition to that, we’ve done research on the type of people who are more likely to be discriminatory. The most educated people, in terms of higher education, discriminate the most. This is ridiculous. Once you have a good education, it means that you’ve been studying in a mixed environment and you know much more about diversity and cultural pluralism. The illiterate, not having even primary education, are not supposed to know much about these things. This is an interesting phenomenon that has to be researched to identify the reasons.

There is a similar reality show in Serbia in which celebrities live with ordinary families. And they had a show in which a famous person lived with a Roma family. The negative reactions were similar to those in Bulgaria. On the other hand, however, there was a whole set of positive reactions, like “I never saw how Roma lived before” and “It was interesting to see a Serb that we know interacting in a positive way with Roma.” Are such positive responses possible here in Bulgaria?

Yes, but on a very personal level. The mass attitudes are influenced by stereotypes. But if you follow individual cases, then you see the possibility for change in this type of attitude.

I’ll give you another example. A colleague of ours recently left our office. She went to work for a multinational company. When we interviewed her for the position here, she was clearly informed that it was a Roma-related program. And she was honestly interested in the program. Then suddenly during the implementation of the program, she became so frustrated with the beneficiaries of the project. In a way she revealed her stereotypes of the Roma, that Roma are not good.

So, on the one hand, there’s a real interest on behalf of different representatives of society to learn more and to hear more about the Roma community. On the other hand, many people are raised with the notion that Roma are bad, are illiterate. At some point these people try to prove these stereotype for themselves.

The Movements for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was supposed to deal with not just the rights and freedoms of the ethnic Turkish community, but of all ethnic communes. Do you think that MRF has represented Roma issues over the last 20 years? We’ve also seen the development of some Roma parties, like EuroRoma. Can any of those parties serve the same kind of function that MRF has served for the ethnic Turkish population?

I think that this particular political movement has not been openly serving this function for the Roma community, but still this issue is on their agenda, and they use it for their own profit. We’ve had local mayors and actual Roma representatives involved in local municipalities and authorities around the country from this particular party. Basically, there is a dialogue between Roma community leaders and the MRF.

On the second question, Roma political parties, there have been many attempts. The politically correct answer is that due to the diversity of the Roma communities in Bulgaria, it is difficult to find and identify a compromise that unites them politically. Bulgaria is a unique example, not found anywhere in Europe or in Central-Europe Europe, where Roma cannot work together. Roma leaders can’t do anything together. And it’s not because they’re diverse. It’s because their agenda is completely different. There are also large levels of corruption among the Roma leaders. But this is not the politically correct answer.

Ataka has become a more powerful political force. Do you think that this is just temporary, the result of the economic conditions in Bulgaria? Or are you more pessimistic?

The influence of Ataka and the passion it has generated are vanishing. It’s not the kind of factor today that it was four years ago. I don’t think they have any chances for the next parliamentary elections. There are private interests behind Ataka. If anyone dares to disclose information about the founding resources, it would be very interesting.

Why do you think that Ataka’s popularity has declined?

Because the current government GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) is no longer interested in Ataka as a partner. This might change for the next elections. Obviously, Ataka has lost a part of its audience because of the internal challenges facing the party in terms of governing, corruption, and everything else. This is part of the reason why I believe that Ataka is losing support.

If GERB tries to make a coalition for the next election, it won’t be with Ataka. But it may form a coalition with that other crazy man, Yane Yanev, from RZS  (Order, Law and Justice). It’s another small formation. But the government uses Yanev to shut the mouth of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) with corruption scandals. I have to be honest. We are witnessing a very interesting and challenging political life after the changes in 1989. Not that I’m not familiar with what happened before that. I’ve read historical books. It seemed quite boring during the time of Todor Zhivkov.

The Chinese have a curse: may you live in interesting times.

Obviously, we are cursed!

The ruling party is not, you mentioned, interested in working in coalition with Ataka. Do you think that GERB has absorbed some of Ataka’s message and made its right-wing populism into a more politically acceptable form in Bulgaria?

I can’t say that. At the same time, we have a high-ranking official, the vice prime minister responsible for the Decade of Roma Inclusion who is also the minister of interior. At a public forum, he dares to say that the major target group of his ministry are Roma. They are the most marginalized and criminalized people in the country, and he’s obliged to undertake appropriate measures to reduce the rate of Roma perpetrating crimes. So, it’s part of the government’s rhetoric. But I don’t think that they’re as oriented toward the kind of discrimination that Ataka was proclaiming during the elections.

The EU has put some funds into Roma issues. Have they made a difference?

It’s too soon to tell. We became a member of the EU just recently, in 2007. Five years is not sufficient time for achieving any success. In addition to that, there is a lack of capacity and human resources in the government to absorb funds related to Roma. Increasing the capacity of the government to implement this kind of policy would be the best-case scenario.

At the same time, there is a lack of decision about whether the government will implement targeted policies for Roma or whether they will implement mainstream policies funded by the EU. This hesitancy and lack of understanding has led to a total confusion around spending money. They spend without a clear vision about the final product or the beneficiaries.

Are there programs in the region directed at Roma, or with Roma or by Roma, that you can point to and say, this is a great program, this is something that can serve as an important model?

I think that what works best is a mainstream policy that has an impact on socially vulnerable or challenged people. I’ve seen an example of social housing in Spain that has worked well both for Roma and for socially vulnerable groups. For me, this project would work anywhere because it is a mainstream program and it won’t lose support from Roma or mainstream society.

I’ll give you another example. We had a Roma-targeted policy funded by EU funds in Burgas here in Bulgaria. The municipality applied for the funds and the project was approved. The main goal of the project was the construction of social housing for Roma. But suddenly, the local community in Burgas opposed this construction and forced the mayor to withdraw from the project. So, basically, Roma-related projects won’t work in Bulgaria.

When I worked with the American Friends Service Committee, I worked on an exchange that brought American civil rights leaders to this region to meet with Roma. During these meetings, three different approaches came out: a civil rights approach by Roma that was more confrontational, a community development approach, and a top-down approach with EU and government funding. Which approach do you think is best?

There has to be a mixture of all these approaches. Therefore, we are trying to convince the government that an integrated approach is needed to solve the problems of Roma. There has to be a dual process. On the one side there are Roma. On the other side, there are ethnic Bulgarians and other ethnic minorities. At some point, these two groups have to meet somewhere. The problem is that neither of the groups is moving. We are at some kind of a dead end. And we have to find another way to make these groups move forward toward each other.

Unfortunately to make groups move, we have not only to secure funding, public support, and adequate government with an adequate message. We also have to talk to people on the community level, people who live together with Roma and Bulgarians as well as Roma who live only among Roma. Everyone feels comfortable in their own situation, and they don’t want to change it.

A recent sentence for members of a death squad represents a step backward for Peru on human rights. 

Cross-posted from WOLA.

On July 20, the Peruvian Supreme Court emitted a highly controversial sentence in a case involving the members of the Colina Group death squad. 

According to human rights defenders and the victims in the relevant cases, the sentence is a major step backward in Peru’s tortured quest for truth and justice in cases of egregious human rights violations. WOLA has long supported the efforts of the Peruvian human rights community and the victims of human rights violations seeking truth and justice, and strongly condemns this setback to overcoming impunity in Peru.
 
The sentence refers to three crimes committed by the notorious Colina Group, a military unit responsible for a series of human rights violations between 1991 and 1992: the 1991 massacre of Barrios Altos in which 15 people, including an eight-year-old child, were murdered and four others gravely wounded, and the forced disappearance in 1992 of journalist Pedro Yauri and of nine peasant leaders from the community of Santa.
 
The verdict not only reduces the sentences of renowned criminals, including former security chief Vladimiro Montesinos, but also turns on its head established jurisprudence of previous Supreme Court decisions, decisions by Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal, and rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
 
The Minister of Justice, Juan Jiménez Mayor (recently named Prime Minister), criticized the sentence as “shameful.” Eduardo Vega, Peru’s Ombudsman, stated that the verdict represented a “serious setback” in Peru’s efforts to achieve accountability for grave human rights violations and called for its rectification. President Ollanta Humala also noted his surprise at the verdict. Human rights groups have criticized the sentence and have stated that they will pursue actions domestically and internationally to challenge it.
 
Background
The initial investigation into the Barrios Altos massacre was closed in 1995 after the Fujimori government passed two amnesty laws that granted impunityto state agents accused of human rights violations during the internal armed conflict (1980-1995). The victims and their legal representatives took the case to the Inter-American system, and in 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights emitted a verdict in the case, determining the responsibility of the Peruvian State for the massacre and ordering the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible. The same verdict determined that the 1995 amnesty laws violated international law and lacked legal standing.
 
As a result, the Barrios Altos case was reopened. The case is a complex one, involving 15 fatal victims and 31 defendants; later the cases of Pedro Yauri and Santa were incorporated into the legal proceedings as part of a “mega-trial” against the Colina Group members. However, the process was plagued by delays. The investigation lasted five years before the public trial started in 2005; then, due to a number of factors, but especially the delay tactics of the defendants’ lawyers, the public trial lasted another five years. Finally, in October 2010, a sentence was emitted finding 19 of the 31 members of the Colina Group responsible for the crimes. The most severe sentences, the maximum of 25 years, were reserved for the intellectual authors of the crime—Vladimiro Montesinos, the de facto head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), Gen. (r) Julio Salazar Monroe, actual head of the SIN, and Gen. (r) Nicolás Hermoza Ríos, former army chief, and Gen. (r) Juan Rivero Lazo, former head of Army Intelligence—as well as for the chief operational heads of the Colina Group, former Army Major Santiago Martin Rivas and Carlos Pichilingue. The ruling was appealed by the defendants.
 
The Controversial Ruling
The Supreme Court announced its sentence in the case on July 20, 2012. The most controversial measures include a reduction in the sentences for virtually all those convicted, including Montesinos and Hermoza Ríos, which Supreme Court justice Javier Villa Stein, who presided over the court that emitted the ruling, said was in “compensation” for the lengthy legal process. But rights advocates say that the most questionable measures are related to a number of legal arguments that overturn the original sentence’s determination that the Barrios Altos massacre and the forced disappearances of Pedro Yauri and the peasants of Santa constituted crimes against humanity; that these crimes were committed by an organized apparatus of the State that constituted an unlawful association created for the purpose of committing criminal acts; and that Montesinos, Hermoza Ríos, Rivero Lazo and Salazar Monroe were responsible as autores mediatos of the crime—the same legal concept used to prosecute Alberto Fujimori for the Barrios Altos massacre, the La Cantuta murders, and two kidnappings. Of special concern, say human rights advocates, the sentence states that the Barrios Altos massacre does not constitute a crime against humanity. Although the sentence acknowledges that the crimes committed by the Colina Group were part of official State policy, it also states that this policy was not directed against the civilian population but rather against terrorists.
 
Reactions
Human rights groups have challenged each of these arguments point by point. The systematic nature of the Colina Group’s crimes was documented by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and has been recognized in sentences emitted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Barrios Altos case as well as in the case of La Cantuta. The sentence emitted by the Special Criminal Court for the Fujimori case, which was ratified in December 2009 by the Supreme Court, recognized Barrios Altos and La Cantuta as crimes against humanity not only because they were directed at civilians but because they were part of official State policy, they were the result of a planned operation, and they occurred in a context of systematic violations of human rights. Additionally, the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal recognized in 2005 that the crimes committed by the Colina Group—including the Barrios Altos massacre—constituted “crimes against humanity.”
 
The Supreme Court sentence has been sharply and widely criticized. The Vice Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Daniel Figallo, presented a recourse of amparo before the Constitutional Tribunal, the only legal remedy available within Peru to challenge a verdict of the Supreme Court. Several Parliamentarians have said that they would present a constitutional challenge against the Supreme Court judges who emitted the sentence. Diverse civil society groups, from labor organizations to human rights groups, criticized the sentence on a variety of grounds and said that they would petition the Inter-American Court to nullify the sentence.
 
Gloria Cano, head lawyer for APRODEH, one of the organizations representing the victims in the criminal proceedings, sharply questioned the ruling for its legalistic sophisms and its clear intent to favor not only those convicted in this legal process, but ultimately former president Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, who was convicted in 2009 and sentenced to 25 years in prison for the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases. In this regard, Carlos Rivera, head lawyer for the Instituto de Defensa Legal, another NGO representing the victims in this case, stated: “The Villa Stein court has provided a magnificent political tool [to Alberto Fujimori] to challenge his guilty verdict.”
 
As WOLA has noted in the past, international law prevents pardons for crimes against humanity. By removing the status of “crime against humanity” in the Barrios Altos massacre, the Villa Stein sentence could provide new arguments for Fujimori’s supporters to propose if not a challenge to his guilty verdict, then a pardon for Fujimori. However, it is important to note that according to Peruvian law, those sentenced for the crime of aggravated kidnapping, as is the case for former President Fujimori, cannot receive a pardon.
 
Also of concern has been the attitude assumed by Supreme Court Justice Javier Villa Stein, widely seen as the architect of the sentence. In the wake of the wave of criticisms against the Barrios Altos-Yauri-Santa sentence, Villa Stein assumed a combative tone, accusing Minister of Justice Jiménez Mayor of “stoking the fire” and being a “polarizing figure” for his comments criticizing the verdict. He stated that he would welcome a challenge to his sentence before the Inter-American Court, which rights advocates have said they will pursue. Most shockingly, Villa Stein mocked human rights groups, saying they should not continue to “whine” (“lloriquear”) about the sentence.
 
It is important to note that previously, APRODEH sought to have Villa Stein recused from this and other legal processes involving human rights cases due to his political positions. According to APRODEH, with regard to the Chavín de Huántar case, another highly controversial legal process involving the accusation against Montesinos and others for carrying out at least one extrajudicial execution in the aftermath of the hostage rescue operation in the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in 1997, Villa Stein asserted that NGOs defending victims in human rights cases were motivated by a desire to undermine the prestige of the Peruvian Armed Forces. The Constitutional Tribunal rejected APRODEH’s petition, saying that Villa Stein had a right to emit his personal political views and that these would not prejudice the legal proceedings. However, in the wake of the sentence, as well as Villa Stein’s dismissive comments, broad sectors of civil society are calling for his removal as a Supreme Court justice.
 
Justice on Trial
The victims of political violence in Peru have fought long and hard to overcome diverse forms of institutionalized impunity, including two amnesty laws that prevented them from knowing the fate of their missing loved ones and seeing those responsible for these crimes prosecuted and punished. After the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its 2003 report recommending the criminal prosecution of several cases of grave human rights violations, special bodies were set up in the Public Ministry and the Judiciary to investigate and prosecute these crimes and facilitate the rights of the victims to truth and justice. A number of important sentences, including the Fujimori verdict, were emitted staring in 2005. In recent years, however, human rights organizations in Peru have denounced a number of obstacles that have emerged that have undermined these special human rights courts and the broader process of justice for victims of state-sponsored human rights violations in Peru. The Villa Stein sentence is one more factor contributing to new forms of impunity in Peru today.

Jo-Marie Burt is an Associate Professor at George Mason University and Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

Cross-posted from Progressive Avenues.

Whenever a lawyer or historian describes how a particular action “violates international law” many people stop listening or reading further. It is a bit alienating to hear the words “this action constitutes a violation of international law” time and time again – and especially at the end of a debate when a speaker has no other arguments available. The statement is inevitably followed by: “…and it is a war crime and it denies people their human rights.” A plethora of international law violations are perpetrated by every major power in the world each day, and thus, the empty invocation of international law does nothing but reinforce our own sense of impotence and helplessness in the face of international lawlessness.

The United States, alone, and on a daily basis violates every principle of international law ever envisioned: unprovoked wars of aggression; unmanned drone attacks; tortures and renditions; assassinations of our alleged “enemies”; sales of nuclear weapons; destabilization of unfriendly governments; creating the largest prison population in the world – the list is virtually endless.

Obviously one would wish that there existed a body of international law that could put an end to these abuses, but such laws exist in theory, not in practice. Each time a legal scholar points out the particular treaties being ignored by the superpowers (and everyone else) the only appropriate response is “so what!” or “they always say that.” If there is no enforcement mechanism to prevent the violations, and no military force with the power to intervene on behalf of those victimized by the violations, what possible good does it do to invoke principles of “truth and justice” that border on fantasy?

The assumption is that by invoking human rights principles, legal scholars hope to reinforce the importance of and need for such a body of law. Yet, in reality, the invocation means nothing at the present time, and goes nowhere. In the real world, it would be nice to focus on suggestions that are enforceable, and have some potential to prevent the atrocities taking place around the globe. Scholars who invoke international law principles would do well to add to their analysis, some form of action or conduct at the present time that might prevent such violations from happening. Alternatively, praying for rain sounds as effective and rational as citing international legal principles to a lawless president, and his ruthless military. 

Marti Hiken, former Associate Director of the Institute for Public Accuracy and former chair of the National Lawyers Guild Military Law Task Force, is the director of Progressive Avenues. Luke Hiken is an attorney who has engaged in the practice of criminal, military, immigration, and appellate law.