Focal Points Blog The trees, not the forest

Entries Tagged "human rights"

A kinder, gentler drone?In a recent Op-Ed published in the New York Times titled, Drones for Human Rights, the authors argue the usefulness of unmanned aerial drones as tools of surveillance for humanitarian purposes. They suggest that if humanitarian organizations could spy on “evil”, they should. In particular, the authors promote the use of drones over Syria to capture the Assad regime’s brutality toward the Syrian people.

The suggestion that drones be used as tools of humanitarianism is well-intended, yet highly impractical. Though it is significantly important for the world to see what is happening inside Syria, resources and efforts can be better placed elsewhere than flying drones over that country, such as working steadfastly at having the opposing sides agree to a cease fire and to negotiate a resolution to the conflict before an all-out conflagration into civil war; it is the only tangible way forward, especially since Assad is highly unlikely to voluntarily step down.

Never mind that violating Syrian airspace is a violation of sovereignty under international law, the Syrian government’s forces, backed by Russian military hardware, would not sit idly by while drones hover and buzz over Homs or Damascus, monitoring the Assad government’s crackdown on the Syrian people. The Syrian regime is equipped with a hefty air defence system, consisting of Russian-made S300 surface-to-air missiles, widely seen as one of the most efficient anti-aircraft missile systems currently fielded. This effectively renders the use of larger drones to be futile as they would most likely be brought down. The Assad forces are also equipped with Russian MiG-29 fighter jets which can easily intercept any non-stealth drone in Syrian airspace.

Further, as mentioned above, the use of drones over Syria would break one of the basic tenets of international law by violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. Such a violation of another country’s airspace by a foreign entity would require the approval of that country’s government (such is the case in Iraq and Pakistan) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which includes veto-wielding permanent members, Russia and China, who have considerable interests in the stability of Syria and the Assad regime in particular. This has been demonstrated through their recent veto of a UNSC resolution condemning the Syrian government’s actions, for which they feared the language of the resolution would permit foreign military intervention if necessary.

Assad is Russia's chief ally in the Middle East, and Syria is home to the only Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union. Russian arms manufacturers also have lucrative arms deals with Assad that they would like to see through. These reasons would likely propel the Russians to veto any resolution authorizing the use of drones over Syria, unless perhaps if it is clearly stipulated in any UNSC resolution that the drones’ sole purpose is to monitor and record the onslaught on the Syrian streets.

China’s interest in Syria mostly rests in its interest in Syrian oil. In the eyes of Beijing, human rights can take a back seat to Syria’s oil exports, especially since China’s National Petroleum Corporation is in a joint-venture partnership with Syria’s national oil company.

Additional questions arise when considering the difficulty in distinguishing between humanitarian drones flown by non-governmental human rights organizations and those flown by the Pentagon. How would the ordinary Syrian on the street be able to distinguish between a drone that has been predominantly used as a weapon of war in places such as Pakistan and Somalia and a drone used entirely for surveillance purposes and which intends no harm?

One can also argue that the use of drones for surveillance would erode basic civil liberties; however, this argument can be morally circumvented in the event of a humanitarian crisis where innocent civilians are being harmed and brutalized. Nonetheless, this argument does merit attention.

Also, who is to say that if the United States (or NGOs funded by the United States) uses drones over countries like Syria, that countries such as China would not reciprocate and use drones over the airspace of US allies? What would the U.S. reaction be? Is the United States ready for that type of reciprocity?

The idea of drones as surveillance tools that would capture images of the horrific scenes on the streets of Syria is one that merits further thought and discussion. However, as it stands, the above noted obstacles would prevent the use of drones over Syria.

Smaller, radio-controlled drones, operated by local handlers would be more efficient as they do not attract as much attention as their larger counterparts; however, as the authors of the New York Times Op-Ed note, local handlers could be put at risk in this scenario. Another option is to use stealth-drones, such as the American RQ-170 Sentinel. This drone could be useful in humanitarian-centric scenarios due to its invisibility and ability to loiter above a specific area at high-altitude. However, its reliability is put into question given that one of these drones recently went down in Iran in December 2011.

With the above in mind, it is quite evident that there are serious obstacles preventing humanitarian drones from taking to the skies to spy on “evil”. It is also clear that there have been too many fatalities over the past year in Syria. History has taught us that it is usually political will, not insufficient information, which has been the barrier to intervening in defence of human rights. Drones would only be able to record the humanitarian crisis for the world to see, while the power to put an end to the violence rests with Assad, the Syrian opposition, and ultimately, the people of Syria.

Navid Hassibi is a PhD student in political science (University of Antwerp) and a Canadian civil servant. The views expressed here are solely his own.

Timoney Time in Bahrain

John Timoney, former police chief of Philadelphia and Miami.Cross-posted from the Arabist.

I missed this, but it turns out that in addition to a bevy of lobbying – much of it centered on English-language media management – before and after demonstrations peaked, Bahrain’s government was also quick to tap American expertise in containing public demonstrations following the release of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report:

… [the news that] the former police chief of Philadelphia and Miami, John Timoney, has been recruited by Bahrain’s Interior Ministry to advise the Bahrainis on policing strategies, will come as no comfort to those in the opposition hoping that the next American intervention would be more constructive. They may be particularly sceptical considering his policing style was so notorious it came to be dubbed Timoney’s ‘Miami Model’ by Jeremy Scahill, a journalist who covered the chief’s heavy-handed policing of protests around the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in 2000 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas summit meeting in Miami in 2003. Timoney’s militarized crowd control strategy involved ‘the heavy use of concussion grenades, pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets and baton charges to disperse protesters.’

Timoney has a reputation as a turn-around police chief from his work in the US, but his handling of these demonstrations has made him controversial. Another controversial cop, John Yates of the UK (who gained notoriety during the News of the World voicemail hacking scandal), is also working with the Interior Ministry now. Given the charges of torture presented against Bahraini police, I imagine everyone in these circles is keeping the case of Ian Henderson in mind, a former British colonial officer who led Bahrain’s secret police for 32 years and gained the sobriquet “Butcher of Bahrain” because of the security apparatus’s use of torture against dissidents during that time.

Security ties such as this are by no means uncommon in the region, though the focus is usually focused on counterterrorism rather than public demonstrations. The Monitor Group, a Massachusetts-based lobbying firm, helped Muatassim al-Qadhafi train and staff his proposed National Security Council before the Libya uprising curtailed its creation. The New York Times reported last May that Erik Prince, former Blackwater chief, was building up a mercenary army in the UAE on the Crown Prince’s dirham.

Israel and the US often share counterterrorism techniques and trainings. The US has been involved in past Bahraini police trainings, as have trainers from the UK: “British police have helped to train their counterparts in Bahrain, Libya, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” The Independent reported. The Saudi National Guard, which was deployed in force to Bahrain last spring, also received UK training. Military and intelligence training for security forces is also common – Iraq, of course, is the most notable Middle Eastern example of such a (multinational) effort, but the US has also funded and trained Lebanese, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and West Bank Palestinian security forces.

Although Washington places great emphasis on the place of ethical conduct in these courses, ethics don’t mean much when the police in question are not held accountable to civil society and operate as a state within a state. WikiLeaks shows that the FBI had trained members of the notorious State Security Investigations in Egypt.

Elham Fakhro and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen note that while “recruiting John Yates and John Timoney to re-train Bahrain’s security services may play well in London and Washington,” it “leaves unresolved the structural exclusion of large numbers of Bahraini citizens from an organisation many perceive as exclusionary and deeply-partial.”

Blogger and Bahrain watcher Justin Gengler is a bit more forthright in his criticism:

Bahrain is covering all of its bases. If you are going to bring in a expert trainer in police brutality [Timoney] then you are definitely going to want someone [Yates] specialized in illegal wire-tapping and police surveillance as well, not to mention someone who recognizes the need to withhold a page or two (or 11,000) of evidence for reasons of political expediency.

Paul Mutter is a Fellow at Truthout and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

Bahrain future?Cross-posted from the Arabist.

A US$53 million arms sale, put on hold in November pending an investigation by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry into Bahraini security forces’ human rights violations, is being pushed forward by the Obama Administration in defiance of Congressional opposition and criticism from human rights observers. In the meantime, a new arms sale is going through, which the US State Department claims has nothing to do with the original one. The Cable reports that the new deal was going to be done “without any formal notification to the public,” and that the State Department told Congress that it has “gone above and beyond what is legally or customarily required” to address critics’ human rights complaints.

At the same time, the Kingdom of Bahrain is denying entry to observers from the US-based Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First organizations, which have been sharply critical of how security forces and the judiciary have behaved towards demonstrators.

I think the logic behind the Obama Administration's approach works (in theory) as follows: a trickle of aid coming at the same time the government is reportedly taking investigators' reports into consideration will compel the royal family to do more to democratize the country in exchange for more aid.

If the royal family changes its mind about those observers, I'll start entertaining more optimistic thoughts about the efficacy of this "behind the scenes diplomacy." Why? Because if they were being let in, it would demonstrate that the US is actually accomplishing a conditional aid policy that is pushing the government to fully implement the recommendations in the Commission's report. I often turn to the concept of "uncivil society" to discuss entrenched interests in countries experiencing democratic protests, and it's clear that the US is going to have to offer tastier carrots, and brandish much heavier sticks, if it is truly committed to democratization in Bahrain (and Egypt). 

Granted, if these observers' entry became permissible (and it's not an impossibility), it could just as easily be read as a decision by the government to chaperone these people around to mute further criticism -- something their PR firms back in the US have already been working very hard at (the Kingdom of Bahrain has retained the US lobbying group Qorvis for US$40,000 a month since 2010, with a particular emphasis on English-language media management).

Nothing signals "our priorities" like using a legal backdoor to funnel arms to a key Arab ally in the face of human rights criticism, and this holds true along the coastlines of both American littorals, the Mediterranean and the Gulf. How we respond to growing pressure on NGOs in Egypt will address the dichotomies facing Egyptians willing to work with Western NGO. The resumption of arms sales to Bahrain, alongside the lockout of these groups, offers a much more concrete lesson of what Bahrainis can expect in the coming months. 

At least when Moscow decides to send a message about a Mideast naval base, it sends that message clearly.  

Paul Mutter is a Fellow at Truthout and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

Page Previous 1 • 2