Foreign Policy In Focus

This strange animal called sequestration is certainly wreaking havoc with our customary ideological boundaries. 

If you’re an advocate, Iike I am, for revamped federal priorities that shift resources from a bloated Pentagon budget toward neglected domestic priorities, your take on this animal can’t be simple. You say cutting everything indiscriminately is a bad way to run a government (this view is nearly universal). You oppose the cuts in the domestic budget that will leave us with fewer food safety inspectors, medical researchers, Head Start teachers, and airport baggage screeners on the job. But you can reel off long lists of ways to cut waste in the Pentagon budget to the levels prescribed by sequestration, and show that these cuts will leave us completely safe.

But you also know that the whole conversation is focused on the wrong topic. It’s past time to shift this conversation away from austerity and toward investment to create jobs, as clear majorities of voters said in November was what they wanted.

Now let’s look at the Washington Post’s blogger who says he writes “from a liberal perspective,” Greg Sargent. On Wednesday he went at the Republican position on sequestration, wielding a new report from the non-partisan Congressional Research Service. The report found that the single most important cause of increased income inequality in recent years is the favored tax treatment given to capital gains and stock dividends — i.e. what the rich have used to get richer.

The Democrats, as Sargent points out, want to change this, taxing the rich and using the proceeds to replace the sequester cuts. The Republicans want to stick with sequestration and keep this favored treatment for the rich.

But all of this puts the Republicans, says Sargent, in the position of “openly conceding that the sequester will gut the military.” It’s a concession that Sargent appears to be taking at face value. Or at least not calling into question.

Gut the military? That’s what the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been saying any chance they get. Sequestration would “invite aggression,” says lingering Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It will “put the nation at greater risk of coercion,” says the Joint Chiefs Chair, Martin Dempsey. When asked at a recent congressional hearing which nation might coerce us, though, he couldn’t say.

In fact, sequestration will not “gut” our military. Our military budget has nearly doubled since 2001. Sequestration would take it back to the level it was in 2007 — when we were still fighting two wars. Adjusted for inflation, it would leave that budget higher than its Cold War average — when we had an adversary that was spending roughly what we were on its military. Now, as Michael Cohen notes in The Guardian, the closest thing to a peer adversary we have is China, and we are spending more on research and development of new weapons than the Chinese are spending on their entire military. We spend more on our military, in fact, than the next 14 countries put together.

After the longest period of war in our history, we are due for a defense downsizing. Sequestration would create a shallower downsizing than any of the previous postwar periods since World War II. We can do this, and we should. We need the money for other things.

As sequestration threatens to confuse us all, let’s be sure to stay clear on that, at least.

"There cannot be a military solution to this crisis in Mali," Emira Woods said on the PBS NewsHour. "The crisis has its roots in political and also economic processes, with people in the northern part of the country feeling completely marginalized from the rest of the country."

Woods is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. You may read the full transcript of her comments on the NewsHour's website.

VIEW THE FULL INTERVIEW HERE.

"So clearly what you had was an opportunity because of the intervention, the NATO intervention in Libya, unleashing weapons, both from Qadaffi's coffers as well as from the international community, weapons flowing from Libya, across borders of Algeria, into northern Mali, to be able to actually create a crisis, and further destabilize northern Mali," said Woods. "So I think what you have is a situation where unilateral intervention could create complications down the road, both for civilians that could be targeted in these airstrikes, as well as for further complicating a political crisis that may not be resolved militarily."

In her June 28 piece Mad, Bad, Sad: What's Really Happened to America's Soldiers at Tom Dispatch, Nan Levinson writes about "moral injury."

It’s a concept in progress, defined as the result of taking part in or witnessing something of consequence that you find wrong, something which violates your deeply held beliefs about yourself and your role in the world. For a moment, at least, you become what you never wanted to be. While the symptoms and causes may overlap with PTSD, moral injury arises from what you did or failed to do, rather than from what was done to you.  

Agreed: I've long thought that when veterans of World War II and subsequent wars that the United States has prosecuted or participated in refrain from speaking about their experiences, it's not because of what was inflicted on them. It's because of what they they did and wished they didn't, or didn't  and wish they did. The second category covers everything from acts of physical cowardice to failure to object to or report atrocities committed by their fellow soldiers.

In fact, as Levinson so astutely writes:

In trying to heal from a moral injury, people struggle to restore a sense of themselves as decent human beings, but the stumbling block for many veterans of recent US wars is that their judgment about the immorality of their actions may well be correct. 

There has been much talk of late of the military's efforts to “go green.” This characterization is accurate in a sense, but misleading if interpreted too broadly. The military recognizes that its dependence on massive quantities of fossil fuels imposes substantial risks, and to reduce these risks it must reduce its energy requirements. Although the military cites dependence on foreign oil and the dangers posed by continued climate change as a component of these risks, the more important issue is the logistics and costs involved in delivering fuel to distant operational centers around the world. The most obvious example of this danger is the staggering number of casualties suffered by servicemen and women during fuel shipments.

In response, the military has not only set impressive goals, but has already made significant headway in reducing its energy consumption. The Environmental and Energy Study Institute military greening Fact Sheet provides details for the Navy’s energy efficiency programs. Some of their goals include sailing the “Great Green Fleet,” a Green Strike Group run on biofuels and nuclear power by 2016; reducing non-tactical petroleum use in the commercial fleet by 50 percent by 2015; and deriving 50 percent of total energy consumption from alternative fuel sources by 2020. The fact sheet also reports that “[t]he Navy launched its first hybrid electric‐drive surface combatant, the USS Makin Island, in 2006; estimated cost savings will be $248 million over its service life.”

Despite the benefits of these clean energy programs, the House voted on July 7 to strike section 526 of a 2007 law aimed at promoting energy independence. This section prohibits federal agencies from purchasing fuels with higher lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than conventional petroleum fuels. Those who wish to repeal this section argue that it is an unnecessary constraint on operational flexibility and will damage the liquid coal industry. Those who hope to maintain the provision argue that it can serve as a tool for solidifying the military’s commitment to clean energy, and in the long run will lead to a broader spectrum of operational possibilities.

The climate activist's view

From a green economy perspective, this legislation could not be more important. The military's huge demand for energy translates into enormous market pull. By creating a market for biofuels and green technology, the military can spur further research and drive down the price of clean energy to levels that would be competitive with traditional energy sources. According to analysis presented at a congressional briefing on the Defense Department’s Deployment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, section 526 sends positive signals to the green energy sector by reassuring clean energy producers that their investments will be met with steady demand from the DoD. Such stability is critical for any burgeoning industry.

Indeed, Pew Charitable Trust cites the lack of a coherent, stable clean energy policy framework as the main cause of the United States's falling share of global clean investment. Maintaining clean energy supportive policies in the military could give green industries the toehold they need to become competitive in the U.S. market.

The military and the green economy

If the military does maintain a strong commitment to clean energy, it can play a unique role in the development of viable biofuels and other reduced carbon emissions sources. The Center for American Progress argues, “The military can test various advanced biofuels to determine the most effective blend before they are commercialized. And it can do this more easily than private businesses because it can afford to experiment without concern about a short-term profit.” With increased, stable demand, prices will drop and the industry will expand. 

Many biofuels have only dubious credentials as friends of the environment. Thankfully, the Navy reports that it will not use corn as a fuel source, nor any other fuel that would diminish the food supply. The Navy is in fact mandated to only use fuels with lifecycle costs and emissions that are lower than traditional fossil fuels.

Military investment could also help develop green technologies. Many commentators point to GPS as an example of a technology initially developed for the military that gained a second life in civilian applications. Thomas Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, recently argued that we are unlikely to anticipate the most important technological transfers, but did speculate that censors capable of detecting heat loss could be a likely candidate for one of these transformative cross-over technologies. He noted that military investment in this technology has dropped the cost of development substantially and has made it more likely that civilian applications could become economically viable.

The military: A PR agent for green?

There is another potential spillover effect that a successful military greening project could offer. The military is a nationally recognized organization with great prestige, giving its energy efficiency initiative the potential to legitimize going green and even to broaden recognition of the dangers of climate change. At a recent congressional briefing on the Defense Department’s Deployment of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Richard Kidd, deputy assistant secretary of the Army, Energy and Sustainability, argued that the military has historically led the nation toward broader acceptance of some of its most controversial social issues. Given their high level of respectability, veterans who understand the benefits of energy efficiency could change minds in their own communities and places of work. Kidd stated “When the army goes green, the nation will.” For an example of veteran climate activism already under way, take a look at Operation Free, a collection of veterans for sensible energy use. Merely having military planners discussing climate change as a legitimate concern within policy discussion certainly puts climate skeptics on shakier ground.

The military's green programs could also offer proof that green initiatives don’t hurt the economy. When the military's green programs achieve real successes in the form of jobs created, costs reduced, and lives saved, the military will have definitively demonstrated that a viable economy is not the necessary casualty of a strong policy on climate preparedness.

Maintaining the commitment

While cited frequently in DoD policy pieces, climate change and energy dependence remain secondary concerns in their strategic analysis. Military planners deal with hard choices, and will always be most concerned with the immediate, measurable consequences of their policies. While high capacity batteries and portable solar panels achieve obvious results, the cost of climate change and oil dependence cannot be easily measured, and are thus more difficult to fit neatly into strategic calculations.

So long as the military’s short-term considerations — cutting costs and increasing capabilities — translate into investments in emission reducing projects, climate activists will have something resembling an ally in the DoD. If the military’s strategic calculus changes due to a realignment of short-term considerations, we can expect to see any convergence of interests dissolve rapidly.

Some military planners have already parted ways with the logic of clean energy. Gen. Philip Breedlove, vice chief of staff of the Air Force, reports that the Air Force has nearly completed certifying its fleet to use carbon-intensive coal-to-liquid fuels. The use of these fuels is exactly what the section 526 legislation was designed to prevent. With the legislation in place, the Air Force is still unable to purchase coal-to-liquid fuels. That the Air Force moved forward with the certification process despite the legislation demonstrates that it is ready and willing to begin using these fuels as soon as legal barriers are removed.

Because military planners differ in their assessments of strategic realities, strong legislation remains necessary to maintain the military’s commitment to clean energy and energy reducing policies. The success or failure of those who wish to repeal section 526 will determine whether or not the many benefits of military greening will ever be wholly realized.

Keith Menconi is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

For decades the U.S. military has waged clandestine war on virtually every continent on the globe, but for the first time, high-ranking Special Operations Forces (SOF) officers are moving out of the shadows and into the command mainstream. Their emergence suggests the U.S. is embarking on a military sea change that will replace massive deployments, like Iraq and Afghanistan, with stealthy night raids, secret assassinations, and death-dealing drones. Its implications for civilian control of foreign policy promises to be profound.

Early this month, Vice Adm. Robert Harward—a former commander of the SEALs, the Navy’s elite SOF that recently killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden—was appointed deputy commander of Central Command, the military region that embraces the Middle East and Central Asia. Another SEAL commander, Vice Adm. Joseph Kernan, took over the number two spot in Southern Command, which covers Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Obama administration has been particularly enamored of SOFs, and according to reporters Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe of the Washington Post, is in the process of doubling the number of countries where such units are active from 60 to 120. U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman Col. Tim Nye told Nick Turse of Salon that SOFs would soon be deployed in 60 percent of the world’s nations: “We do a lot of traveling.”

Indeed they do. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOC) admits to having forces in virtually every country in the Middle East, Central Asia, as well as many in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. But true to its penchant for secrecy, SOC is reluctant to disclose every country to which its forces are deployed. “We’re obviously going to have some places where it’s not advantageous for us to list where we’re at,” Nye told Turse.

SOF forces have almost doubled in the past two decades, from some 37,000 to close to 60,000, and major increases are planned in the future. Their budget has jumped from $2.3 billion to $9.8 billion over the last 10 years

These Special Forces include the Navy’s SEALs, the Marines Special Operations teams, the Army’s Delta Force, the Air Force’s Blue Light and Air Commandos, plus Rangers and Green Berets. There is also the CIA, which runs the clandestine drone war in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

It is increasingly difficult to distinguish civilian from military operatives. Leon Panetta, former director of the CIA, is now Defense Secretary, while Afghanistan commander Gen. David Petraeus—an expert on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations—is taking over the CIA. Both have worked closely with SOF units, particularly Petraeus, who vastly increased the number of “night raids” in Iraq and Afghanistan. The raids are aimed at decapitating insurgent leadership, but have caused widespread outrage in both countries.

The raids are based on intelligence that many times comes from local warlords trying to eliminate their enemies or competition. And, since the raids are carried out under a cloak of secrecy, it is almost impossible to investigate them when things go wrong.

A recent CIA analysis of civilian casualties from the organization’s drone war in Pakistan contends that attacks since May 2010 have killed more than 600 insurgents and not a single civilian. But a report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism at City University in London found “credible evidence” that at least 45 non-combatants were killed during this period. Pakistani figures are far higher.

Those higher numbers, according to Dennis C. Blair, retired admiral and director of national intelligence from 2009 to 2010, “are widely believed [in Pakistan],” and he adds that “our reliance on high-tech strikes that pose no risk to our soldiers is bitterly resented.”

Rather than re-examining the policy of night raids and the use of armed drones, however, those tactics are being expanded to places like Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. The question is, who’s next?

Latin America is one candidate.

A recent WikiLeak release demonstrates that there was close coordination between right-wing separatist groups in eastern Bolivia—where much of that country’s natural gas reserves are located—and the U.S. Embassy. The cables indicate that the U.S. Embassy met with dissident generals, who agreed to stand aside in case of a right-wing coup against the left-leaning government of Evo Morales. The coup was thwarted, but Bolivia expelled American Ambassador Philip Goldberg over U.S. meddling in its domestic politics.

The United States has a long and sordid history of supporting Latin American coups—at times engineering them—and many in the region are tense over the recent re-establishment of the U.S. Fourth Fleet. The latter, a Cold War artifact, will patrol 30 countries in the region. Given the Obama administration’s support for the post-2009 coup government in Honduras, its ongoing hostility to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and now the WikiLeak revelations about Bolivia, the idea of appointing a “shadow warrior” the number-two leader in South Command is likely to concern governments in the region.

SOFs have become almost a parallel military. In 2002, Special Operations were given the right to create their own task forces, separate from military formations like Central and Southern Command. In 2011 they got the okay to control their budgets, training, and equipment, independent of the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. If one reaches for an historical analogy, the Praetorian Guard of Rome’s emperors comes to mind.

There is a cult-like quality about SOFs that the media and Hollywood have done much to nurture: Special Forces are tough, independent, competent, and virtually indestructible. The gushy New Yorker magazine story about SEAL Team Six, “Getting Bin Laden,” is a case in point. According to New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd, the story will be adapted into a made-for-TV movie and released just before the 2012 elections.

There is a telling moment in that story that captures the combination of bravado and arrogance that permeates SOF units. An unidentified “senior Defense Department official” told author Nicholas Schmidle that the bin Laden mission was just “one of almost two thousand missions that have been conducted over the last couple of years, night after night.” And then adds that these raids were routine, no big thing, “like mowing the lawn.”

But war is never like “mowing the lawn,” as 38 American and Afghan SOFs found out the night of August 6 when their U.S. CH-47 “Chinook” helicopter flew into a carefully laid ambush just south of the Afghan capital of Kabul.

“It was a trap that was set by a Taliban commander,” a “senior Afghan government official” told Agence France Presse. According to the official, the Taliban commander, Qari Tahir, put out a phony story that a Taliban meeting was taking place. When Army Rangers went in to attack the “meeting,” they found the Taliban dug in and waiting. Within minutes the Rangers were pinned down and forced to send for help.

The Taliban had spent several years practicing for just such an event in the Korengal Valley that borders Pakistan. According to a 2009 Washington Post story—“Taliban Surprising U.S. Forces With Improved Tactics”—the Valley is a training ground to learn how to gauge the response time for U.S. artillery, air strikes, and helicopter assaults. “They know exactly how long it takes before…they have to break contact and pull back,” a Pentagon officer told the Post.

“The Taliban knew which route the helicopter would take,” said the Afghan official, because “that is the only route, so they took position on either side of the valley on mountains and as the helicopter approached, they attacked it with rockets.” According to Wired, the insurgents apparently used an “improvised rocket-assisted rocket,” essentially a rocket-propelled grenade with a bigger warhead.

As soon as the chopper was down, the Taliban broke off the attack and vanished. According to the United States, many of those Taliban were later killed in a bombing raid, but believing what the military says these days about Afghanistan is a profound leap of faith.

SOFs are not invulnerable, nor are they a solution to the dangerous world we live in. And the qualities that make them effective—stealth and secrecy—are in fundamental conflict with a civilian-controlled armed forces, one of the cornerstones of our democracy.

As Adm. Eric Olson, former head of Special Operations, recently said at the Aspen Institute’s Security Forum, having Special Forces in 120 countries “depends on our ability to not talk about it,” and what the military most wanted was “to get back into the shadows.”

Which is precisely the problem.

Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedgeblog.wordpress.com