Foreign Policy In Focus

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) refers to itself as a "non-partisan institution that focuses on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons." But it's sometimes demonstrated a tendency to lean toward, if not the right, the alarmist about nuclear proliferation. As late as 2002, its "ubiquitous" president David Albright, oft quoted in print and on television, issued nuclear warnings about Iraq. In January of this year, Albright and the ISIS staff published a report titled Reality Check: Shorter and Shorter Timeframe if Iran Decides to Make Nuclear Weapons.

ISIS also endorsed the unconvincing story that Iran built an explosives chamber to test components of a nuclear weapon and carry out a simulated nuclear explosion (the Danilenko affair, if you will). Albright told Toby Warrick of the Washington Post in November of last year:

"It remains for Danilenko to explain his assistance to Iran. … At the very least, Danilenko should have known exactly why the Iranians were interested in his research and expertise. The IAEA information suggests he has provided more than he has admitted."

Investigative journalist Gareth Porter, among others, debunked that story. One can't help but wonder if the direction ISIS takes has, at times, been determined by its funding, which runs the gamut from the Ploughshares Fund to the Rockefeller Foundation to the extremely conservative Smith Richardson Foundation. Still, ISIS is quick to admit mistakes, if not always learn from them.

In his latest piece for Inter Press Service Alleged Photos of "Clean-up" at Iran's Parchin Site Lack Credibility, Gareth Porter provides an example of how a stance ISIS takes plays into hawks' hands (er, talons).

ISIS Executive Director David Albright told interviewer Scott Horton of Antiwar Radio in July 2009 that he had "gotten a tip" in September 2004 that high explosives testing at Parchin "could be used for nuclear weapons". 

ISIS then published a series of satellite photographs that the organisation said were "consistent" with facilities for such nuclear testing. 

The satellite images were then cited by Undersecretary of State John Bolton as alarming evidence of covert Iranian nuclear weapons work. … But Bolton and the IAEA had only vague suspicions rather than hard intelligence to go on.

Nevertheless:

The United States and its Western allies put strong pressure on the IAEA to get Iran to agree to a visit to Parchin.

More recently, writes Porter

News stories about satellite photographs suggesting efforts by Iran to "sanitise" [Parchin] … have added yet another layer to widely held suspicion that Iran must indeed be hiding a covert nuclear weapons programme.

But the story is suspect, in part because it is based on evidence that could only be ambiguous, at best. The claim does not reflect U.S. intelligence, and a prominent think tank that has published satellite photography related to past controversies surrounding Iran's nuclear programme has not found any photographs supporting it. 

That prominent think tank, this time demonstrating caution about drawing damning conclusions about Iran, is none other than ISIS. Porter again:

Paul Brannan, a specialist on interpretation of satellite photography for ISIS, told the New York Times that. … he could not find any photographs of sites at Parchin that suggested clean-up. He told the Times. … "There is no way to know whether or not the activity you see in a particular satellite image is cleansing or just regular work." Brannan added, "There's a lot of activity there – always." 

Perhaps ISIS is responding to increasing reluctance on the part of the Obama administration, and even many in Israel, to refrain from attacking Iran. If only we had confidence that ISIS -- and the International Atomic Agency, as well -- speak without first licking their fingers and testing the political winds.

Hold the presses -- this just in (as they say), from Haaretz:

A U.S. non-proliferation expert said on Tuesday he has identified a building at the Parchin military site in Iran suspected of containing, currently or previously, a high-explosive test chamber the UN nuclear watchdog wants to visit.

David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, said he studied commercial satellite imagery and found a building located on a relatively small and isolated compound at Parchin that fit a description in the November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency report.

On February 22, Iran's Press TV reported: "Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei says the Iranian nation has never sought and will never seek nuclear weapons. … In a Wednesday meeting in Tehran with the director and officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and nuclear scientists the Leader described the country’s nuclear and technological achievements."

Below are excerpts from the speech in which Khameini disavows nuclear weapons. (Thanks to Bernhard of Moon of Alabama for bringing this site -- the Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khomeini -- to our attention.)

Nuclear weapons are not at all beneficial to us. Moreover, from an ideological and fiqhi perspective, we consider developing nuclear weapons as unlawful. We consider using such weapons as a big sin. We also believe that keeping such weapons is futile and dangerous, and we will never go after them. They know this, but they stress the issue in order to stop our movement.

Furthermore …

We want to say that we are not after nuclear weapons, that we do not believe nuclear weapons bring about power and that we can break the kind of power that is based on nuclear weapons. By Allah's favor, our nation will do this.

Then, on Feb. 29, the New York Times reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi:

… denied the nuclear program had a military purpose, saying Iran would be a stronger country without nuclear arms.

“We do not see any glory, pride or power in the nuclear weapons, quite the opposite,” he said, adding that on the basis of a religious decree issued by Ayatollah Khamenei, “the production possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are illegitimate, futile, harmful, dangerous and prohibited as a great sin.”

He said the existence of nearly 23,000 nuclear weapons in the world posed “the gravest threat” to sustainable international security and that as long as they existed there would always be a risk of their use and proliferation.

Khameini spoke about nuclear weapons at more length in 2011.

Iran is not after an atomic bomb, and it is even opposed to possession of chemical weapons. Even when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, we did not try to manufacture chemical weapons. Such things are not in line with the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Khameini declared that nuclear weapons "are useless except for intimidation, massacre and a false sense of security based on pre-emptive power resulting from guaranteed annihilation of everyone." Citing the atom bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he said (emphasis added):

The use of nuclear weapons resulted not only in large-scale killings and destruction, but also in indiscriminate massacre of people -- military members and civilians, young and old, men and women. And its anti-human effects went beyond political and geographic borders, even inflicting irreparable harm on future generations. Therefore, using or even threatening to use such weapons is considered a serious violation of the most basic humanitarian rules and is a clear manifestation of war crimes.

But, even though Iran doesn't seem to be developing or acquiring nuclear weapons at the moment, Khameini neglected to mention developing the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Renouncing that is obviously implied in denouncing the use of weapons. Still, theological types are as notorious as lawyers for resorting to hair-splitting legalisms as lawyers. Khameini again:

… the greatest violators of the NPT are the powers that have reneged on their obligation to dispose of nuclear weapons mentioned in Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It's tough to deny that here he has nuclear weapons states -- especially in the West: the United States, to be specific -- dead to rights. 

In an article for Foreign Affairs titled Clear and Present Safety, Micah Zenko of the Council for Foreign Affairs and Michael Cohen of the Century Foundation argue, per the subhead: "The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks."

First, from a post at the Century Foundation blog post by Cohen about the subject of his article:

And yet for a variety of reasons this singular reality of global affairs in the 21st century is pretty much not reflected in our foreign policy and national security decision-making. If you want a good explanation as to why this is -- I present to you the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, who in testifying before Congress earlier this month said this, “I can’t impress upon you that in my personal military judgment, formed over thirty-eight years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.”   

To which Cohen wrote in reaction:

Someone who holds such views would barely be qualified to teach undergrad IR no less be the highest ranking officer in the American military.

In Foreign Affairs, Zenko and Cohen wrote:

Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post–Cold War world is a treacherous place, full of great uncertainty and grave risks. … Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public’s understanding of international affairs. 

There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon.

Just a couple of reservations … like Stephen Zinker with his The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, they might have been better served by making their argument in terms somewhat less sanguine. For example, "a remarkably safe and secure place" might have read "a less dangerous place." I only mention it out of concerns for credibility with the threat hyping crowd.

More to the point, the authors write: "The United States faces no plausible existential threats." Though the authors allude to climate change, more attention could have been paid to it. As for its co-holder of the championship belt for existential threats -- nuclear weapons -- they write:

Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of nuclear attacks. Obama’s National Security Strategy claims that “… Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased.” 

If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear missiles, is … not a credible nuclear threat. … [The] threat of a nuclear device ending up in the hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early 1990s. … [And] even in Pakistan, the chances of a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally small. 

To a disarmament advocate, this seems of a piece with how, since the demise of the Cold War, much of the American public has tucked its fear of nuclear war into bed for the duration. But it's never a good idea to go to sleep on the subject of nuclear risk, no matter how terrifying it is. Not to be a nag, but all it takes is one accident, etc.

In fact, we may have dodged yet another bullet when a fire broke out on the Russian nuclear sub Yekaterinburg, which may have been loaded with nukes at the time. With nuclear weapons, thus far, the angels have been on our side. I guess they figured the c. 160 million who died in wars on earth in the 20th century was enough for a while. But all it takes is one angel to defect to Lucifer …

Still, Zenko and Cohen have performed a valuable service with their article, especially since it appears in the influential Foreign Affairs. Their conclusion is powerful:

Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than “sexier” problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks. … If the main challenges in a 99 percent world are transnational in nature and require more development, improved public health, and enhanced law enforcement, then it is crucial that the United States maintain a sharp set of nonmilitary national security tools. American foreign policy needs fewer people who can jump out of airplanes and more who can convene roundtable discussions and lead negotiations. 

For his blog for the Council on Foreign Relations, Micah Zenko decided to … Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb? The reply of one, Kyle Beardsley of Emory University, provides an instructive answer to the question of whether nuclear weapons would provide Iran with deterrence.

Given that Iran already has a strong deterrent—via its importance to hydrocarbon supplies, robust conventional forces, ability to disrupt fragile situations in Lebanon and Iraq, and Western war weariness—it is doubtful that Iran will notice much immediate advantage from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Still, never let it be said that whatever it is that drives states to nuclear weaponize is a rational process. Meanwhile, Annie Tracy Samuel of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center writes:

Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon would be a troubling and disturbing development. … However, there is reason to believe that Iran’s theoretical possession of a nuclear weapon would not profoundly alter the essence of its foreign policy [which] both before and after the 1979 revolution, has been largely pragmatic, particularly in action if not always in rhetoric. 

As a disarmament advocate I'm incapable of acceding to the idea of yet another state acquiring/developing nuclear weapons. But, while it may be impossible to prove that nonproliferation is contingent upon us disarming, we have little recourse other than to try.

As we reported recently:

The new budget for fiscal year 2013 (which begins on October 1) just released, reports Chris Schneidmiller for Global Security Newswire, calls for the

Energy Department's semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration to receive $11.5 billion [which is] $372 million less for weapons programs than it had anticipated requesting as of 2011. 

Most encouraging of all:

The administration aims to freeze development of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement complex at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, which would conduct work on materials such as plutonium employed in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. … Under the proposal, funding for the Los Alamos site … estimated to cost up to $6 … would be cut by $165 million and building would be pushed back by no less than five years.

But, as always with nuclear weapons, it's not long before the parade is rained on. At the New York Times, David Sanger and Alan Cowell report that druing a visit to Iran by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors "Tehran not only blocked access to a site" -- Parchin, to which the IAEA has previously been granted access -- "the inspectors believe could have been used for tests on how to produce a nuclear weapon … but it also refused to agree to a process for resolving questions about other 'possible military dimensions' to its nuclear program."

Of course, Iran's apparent obstinacy may not be due to it's hiding nuclear-weapons work, but because it feels singled out for the West for persecution. But perception, as they say, is everything:

Iran's refusal to deal with the inspectors' questions is likely to increase tension, at a moment of heightened sanctions and after the assassination of nuclear scientists in Iran and suspected retaliation against Israeli diplomats.

Also, Iran bridling at the IAEA's probing comes on the heels of Iran halting oil exports to Britain and France. Also reports Bloomberg, "Iranian state-run Press TV said yesterday 3,000 'new- generation' Iranian-made centrifuges were installed at its main uranium enrichment site at Natanz." Though State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that -- Bloomberg again -- "the announcement was 'hyped' for a domestic audience."

But, in addition, as Sanger and Cowell write, Iran also

… struck an increasingly bellicose tone on Tuesday, with an Iranian official warning that the country would take pre-emptive action against perceived foes if it felt its national interests were threatened.

Iran aside, the Dec. 29 fire on Russian nuclear sub Yekaterinburg, undergoing maintenance at the time, might have been more serious than previously thought. Gleb Bryanski of Reuters reports: 

At the time, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed the strategic missile submarine had been unarmed as is required for upkeep activities and that there was no danger of radiation exposure to the public.

But Russian Deputy Prime Minster Dmitry Rogozin

… noted that Soviet rules from 1986 do not mandate the unloading of weapons from submarines for small maintenance projects.

Worst-case scenario:

The prominent news magazine Vlast earlier this month reported that the blaze could have triggered … explosions in the submarine's two atomic reactors and possible detonations of 16 nuclear-armed missiles.

A telling clue that nuclear weapons might have been aboard:

The submarine traveled to the Russian navy's arms depot directly after the fire, which would not be normal for an unarmed vessel that had just been through a fire, according to the magazine.

Important as preventing nuclear proliferation is, it must always be preceded in importance by nuclear risk. Which means it's at least as incumbent on states with nuclear-weapon programs to wind theirs down as it is to keep other states from proliferating.