Also read:
The Amilcar Notes (Part 1): Zine Ben Ali's Sorry Legacy
The Amilcar Notes (Part 2): Tunisia -- Emerging Democracy or Just a Facade?
The Amilcar Notes (Part 3): Tunisia's Forgotten Socio-Economic Crisis
The Amilcar Notes (Part 4): Tunisia -- Profoundly Islamic
The Amilcar Notes (Part 5): Election Exhilaration in Tunisia

1. The party’s over, the mansion trashed

Today, a  friend, relative of a Tunisian family in Colorado, took me for a ride in the hills above the Mediterranean just 2 kilometers north of La Marsa. On the way, we passed the residency of the French Ambassador  and nearby, one of the trashed-out mansions of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi clans, the two ruling clans that ran the country into the ground economically and politically. The gutted mansion stood on the corner of the road to Gammarth by the Mediterranean where it bisects Rue Hannibal. Down the block is a sheik looking restaurant called "Le Cafe Journal."

The mansion belonged to Imad Trabelsi, one of Leila Trabelsi’s nephews, recently sentenced to 18 years in prison by a post-Ben Ali tribunal. Among Imad’s many escapades was one where, along with his brother, he was accused of stealing a French financier’s yacht, painting it over, changing the numbers, making it his own.  One of the graffiti notes left on the wall filled with slogans against the Ben Ali years read "Dear Imad – Thanks for the wall – signed Abdel Aziz." The place was thoroughly trashed, pulverized really, as if hit by a drone missile gone astray from Pakistan! All the other Ben Ali-Trabelsi mansions – many of them, like this one built on property expropriated from the state to the two families – lie in similar ruin. Not roped off, they remain open to the public.

A person can just walk in and look around as we did. Trabelsi  did not get along well with the neighbors and didn’t seem to care. The unbridled arrogance of the nouveau riche! Trabelsi  had the neighbors pay for a retaining wall within the property to insure privacy. The mansion hosted loud and wild parties almost non-stop I was told. The neighbors complained to the police, the police came and arrested the neighbors for disturbing the party rather than the partiers for disturbing the peace. In quiet revenge, Trabelsi’s neighbors did not lift a finger to stop the popular rage against property . Not many tears were thus shed when the Trabelsis fled.

I wondered, with the French residence being so close, how close the Trabelsis were to the French diplomats who protected and defended the old order down till the end and how many Trabelsi wild soirees the French ambassador (or other French diplomats)  might have been regulars at. Did  the ambassador pass by to check out the damage, symbolic at least on some level of the damage done to French -Tunisian relations as well. Because France took something of a diplomatic hit from the Tunisian crisis.

2. General Rachid Ammar’s dilemma

Just at the time Zine el Abidine Ben Ali – whose name in Tunisia today is worth less than mud – fled Tunisia with a million Tunisians cheering him on to go in the streets of Tunis, a curious article appeared in the French press. I don’t have the citation handy but remember it clearly. It was "curious" because of its content and brevity. It alleged that the chief of the Tunisian army, General Rachid Ammar, was at a loss as to whether or not to obey Ben Ali’s orders to mow down protesters with machine guns from armored vehicles and helicopters.

General Ammar, who has slipped back into obscurity, was caught in the middle between Ben Ali and the Tunisian people. He was caught in one of those "damned if you do – damned if you don’t" moments. His crisis was being unable to discern at the time which side in the fight between Ben Ali and "the people" would come out the winner. Before January 12, 2011 when 150,000 people demonstrated against Ben Ali in Sfax in a demonstration called by the country’s union movement – the UGTT – it was not at all clear who would win – Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi (who was hated in some quarters here in Tunisia even more than the president) or the Tunisian people. Given that making the wrong decision could have cost General Ammar dearly, he needed to weigh it carefully.

3. AFRICOM’s General William Ward to the rescue

It is exactly at crisis moments like this that former President George Bush tells us, that he consulted God. Maybe General Ammar did too, but if the French press is right, Ammar also was in close contact with, the then acting head of AFRICOM, General William Ward, whom the French suggest played a key if not decisive role in influencing Ammar’s decision helping the Tunisian chief of staff understand which ways  the political winds were blowing. Apparently the United States, interestingly enough, was betting against Ben Ali. Whatever advice General Ward offered to Ammar, it was enough to help give the good man enough spine needed to refuse Ben Ali’s order to slay his own people at will.

And for that, Ammar became and remains something of a Tunisian national hero, "le centurion du people," coming only behind the immolated Mohammed Bouazzizi and the million or so demonstrators that marched on Tunis, calling on Ben Ali to make a hasty departure.

The French press revealed the details of the Ammar-Ward relationship at that sensitive moment. Let us be clear here, theirs is more than a personal connection. The contact marked a quiet watershed in U.S. Tunisian ties. The French were not pleased the Americans had gotten to Ammar before they did and so leaked the story in bits and pieces in an effort to press the French government to define itself more clearly on the Tunisian crisis. France defended Ben Ali almost up to the last second, the United States shifted gears and gambled against Ben Ali in the last two seconds, so the U.S. stuck it to France and positioned itself well to influence the flow of events in the post Ben Ali period.

4. U.S. increases its influence in Tunisia; France rushes off to insert itself in Libya

France, as nervous about losing its influence in North Africa as it is concerned about the crisis of the euro, responded by trying to regain the influence in Libya which it had lost in Tunisia by pushing NATO to take military action against Khadaffi in Libya. France placed itself to the military forefront hoping to regain in Libyan oil what it lost in Tunisian influence.

The Americans didn’t mind if France got its claws in Libya which would be a mess for a long time and therefore be more France’s problem than the U.S.’s. Besides Washington could argue this time that it was France that was too quick on the trigger taking a little pressure off what the U.S. was doing unsuccessfully in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and unofficially in Yemen, Somalia and who knows where else. In the end Tunisia would be a much easier country to "help rebuild," Libya more difficult. A U.S. foothold in Tunisia has its own strategic logic, in line perhaps with AFRICOM plans for Africa?  Not a bad deal. Some shrewd thinking there for a change? Not a lot of shrewd thinking going on in Washington for some time now, but this showed something a bit more interesting.

5. Developing the hypothesis of a new Tunisian-American relationship

These thoughts have been brewing in my mind, actually since the day I read that General Ammar was getting psychological therapy from General Ward, but I wasn’t sure what to make of it. Recent history and a couple of thoughtful articles by Tunisian political figures have given more texture to these thoughts.

Let’s look at the chain of events.

Although he gets some heat from Republican presidential hopefuls, many who probably think Tunisia is a part of the Indonesian island chain, as well as AIPAC (who else?), in an unusual turn of events, Obama himself supported Ben Ali’s removal from power, breaking with 66 years of U.S. policy of supporting dictators of every stripe from the more secular Shah of Iran to the Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia.

There were signs – today not all that difficult to read – that the U.S. was at least positioning itself for a post-Ben Ali future. For those of you who are conspiracy buffs, sorry to disappoint (again). It is not that the U.S. engineered the changes, but…more that in the Tunisan case, Washington tried jumping on a running horse rather than blowing it out of existence with bunker busters, smart bombs and torture.

• Actually, Ben Ali’s relations with the U.S. have long been rocky. When Republicans were in power, he fared better, but with the Democrats he has never been popular. For example, when Ben Ali came to Washington DC in the 1990s, he hoped that Bill Clinton would honor him with a state dinner. It didn’t  happen. Instead Clinton shuffled Ben Ali off to Madeline Albright. She would agree to an informal chat at the front hallway of the State Department. He went back to Tunisia empty-handed and angry.
• The first indication of  more significant shift than a simple diplomatic snub cited above came after he was re-elected President with 94% of the vote in 2008 in another rigged election. Ben Ali waited for a congratulatory telegram from Barack Obama. It never came. Some might have missed it, but Zine Ben Ali didn’t.
• Some of the WikiLeaks dealing with Tunisia made it clear that the State Department had no illusions about Ben Ali’s lack of popularity, his repressive politics and the money grabbing nature of the crudely nouveau riche Ben Ali and Trabelsi clans.
• Then there is a short blog by none other than Elliot Abrams on the Council of Foreign Affairs website, Is Tunisia Next, on Jan 7, 2011, a week before Ben Ali took flight coming close to predicting the end. Elliot Abrams who has played one of the most insidious roles in U.S. foreign policy from the days he supported the Nicaraguan Contras was now behind removing Ben Ali?
• After Ben Ali came to power both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were on the same page concerning Tunisia much more so than was  the case with Egypt where Hillary held on tight to Mubarek for as long as possible. Hillary continues to show special interest in Tunisia. A few days ago she had a column in a recent Tunisian newspaper (in French) on the status of women
• The statements of the current U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, Gordon Gray, himself a former Peace Corps Volunteer in Morocco I am told, has consistently praised the transition away from Ben Ali-ism and seems to have played a role in the emerging U.S. approach.

So from left to right, or from center to right in the U.S. government, the evidence is mounting that the U.S. was not unhappy to see Ben Ali go and when they had the opportunity, let that be known to General Ammar through the medium of AFRICOM commander William Ward. The suggestion that came with Ward’s comments – made either directly or in a more coded manner – was like manna from Heaven for Ammar. He could assume, rightly or wrongly, that the weight of the United States was behind him, helping prop up his confidence to stand down Ben Ali.

Even if the details are off here and there – I think they are quite accurate actually – an overall picture has long been coming together in my mind that the United States government, whatever else it is doing in the Middle East, supported the ousting of Ben Ali in Tunisia and within certain well-defined boundaries, supports the reform process taking place as well as the role of the Ennahdha Party as a leading force in this "new age."

6. Farhat Othman’s little political bomb: the U.S. gave "the green light" to the Tunisian revolution

An article appeared today (December 11, 2011) taking up the issue of the new U.S.-Tunisian relationship. Nawaat.org, an award winning human rights alternative website, published a piece in French by Farhat Othman, former diplomat expelled by Ben Ali for not toeing the party line in the 1990s. His piece is entitled La verite sur la revolution tunisienne en dix points (The Tunisian Revolution’s Truths Explained in 10 Points) in which he asserts that the U.S. supported Ben Ali’s overthrow, why the Tunisians took the U.S. bait, and what the nature of the evolving U.S.- Tunisian relationship could look like.

Perhaps Othman will elaborate on these points in the future, but let me say that for the moment, his is a coherent, credible explanation of the U.S. role.

Given the overall record of the United States in the region, complimenting the United States, U.S. Middle East policy in any way in Tunisia is not easy. Othman is taking a lot of heat. Othman’s reward for putting forth his ideas so far has mostly to be thoroughly trashed by readers' comments, but I think that he has come as close as anyone to explaining the hows and whys of the new U.S.-Tunisian relationship well and I’d like to see some convincing arguments against it rather than just the name calling.

What are his main points?

Othman begins by calling the uprising in Tunisia, now nearly a year old,  a "people’s coup" and gives it his full support. In so doing, Othman begins by paying homage to those who actually made the revolution: the country’s youth who paid the price with their blood and suffering. It is not particularly original but it reveals the deep respect and love that the Tunisian people as a whole feel for their youth, those that showed a courage that many older people here could not quite muster, a courage not for themselves but for the country as a whole and in so doing rekindled the wholesome fires that is a long suppressed Tunisian nationalism.

What follows however is more original and probably explains what triggered the negative responses.

Othman states unequivocally that the Tunisian revolution could not have succeeded on its own without the green light from Washington and the media coverage the protest movement here enjoyed from AlJazeera. He credits "the green light" as the key element that gave the Tunisian military the courage not to fire on demonstrators; that corresponds to what I argued above.

I would only add here, that Tunisians did not go asking kindly for permission with Washington agreeing. It was rather that, unable in any way to control the flow of events in Tunisia (or elsewhere in the region these days), the Obama Administration had, for a change, the good sense to roll with the punches so to speak and make the best of it. Had Obama not seen it in U.S. interests to help push Ben Ali aside, he could have made life much more difficult for Tunisia’s social movement.

Othman goes on to claim that Washington’s support for the changes in Tunisia are not as strange as it might seem as  "about faces – or changing of the guard" is not so unusual for "the world’s policeman" (in French: la volte face du gendarme du monde n’etait pas nouvelle). Without mentioning the specific cases, he is referring to the U.S. policy of abandoning allies when they are no longer useful. Cases like Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of Zaire come to mind' there are many more examples.

At times, U.S. global interests needs new face – a face-lift – as the old ones have become more a liability than an asset. So it was with Ben Ali. Supporting him too long backfires politically. The U.S. – or atleast Obama – understood this, Sarkozy didn’t until it was too late. (In reference to the Arab Spring, Chomsky gave a great speech in Denver and interview on Democracy Now! with Amy Goodman on this subject).

Othman’s point here is that to suggest that the United States was preparing for some kind of change like this in the Arab World. He doesn’t explain why, given his barebones synopsis but it’s not hard to put together the dots.

7. The United States rides a dark horse in the Middle East

The U.S. Middle-East policy has been in crisis for some time. No secret. Some (I’m one of them) would go further and say that it is, overall in shambles with no long-term strategy, a more and more militarized policy which just lurches from one crisis to another. No vision, no de Gaulles to save us from ourselves. It is a policy that has welded virtually every U.S. administration since World War II to Arab tyrants – secular and religious, and Israeli policies against the Palestinians and neighboring Arab people.

To that overall structural rot, long percolating, add the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The combined impact of these policies has led to a precipitous loss of U.S. prestige throughout the region. At some point…and it sure seems we’re almost there, the negative reaction that these policies have triggered boil over to the point that they threaten U.S  strategic regional interests there  (specifically oil and natural gas) unless things change. The United States has been riding dark Middle-East horses for decades; Washington is glued to them in fact with a political epoxy from which it has been unable to free itself (not that it wants to).

Among other things, the Arab Spring exposed to the bare bone the weakness of U.S. Middle-East policy. The U.S. has had strong ties for decades with leaders in so many of these countries – perhaps with the sole exception of Syria. Strong ties? Even that is an understatement – without U.S. support a good many Middle-East dictators, blessed with the label of "moderates" in Washington, could not maintain power. Washington had even made its peace with Khadaffi. Supporting the Tunisian "people’s coup" gave Washington a chance to change course just to the slightest degree and to identify with the historic movement of the Arab peoples, rather than against it…and of course slap the French in the face (it really is a very small slap actually) which pleases Washington.

8. Othman challenges the "U.S.-uses-Qatar-and-Al Jazeera to overthrow-Ben-Ali" conspiracy

In this part of the world, conspiracy theories abound. Of course we in the U.S. should talk with all the attention the 9-11 conspiracies have gotten! Actually the reason for this in the Middle East is that there are a lot of conspiracies actually taking place. William Burroughs has that wonderful line defining paranoids as simply people who have more facts than others.

That said the current conspiracy theory about the Tunisian revolution is that it was engineered by the Americans (who else?) through the Qataris and AlJazeera TV. It doesn’t hold water. Othman doesn’t think so and neither do I. His main point is simple: Othman argues rightly here that such a theory denigrates the role of the Tunisian people in their own mass effort to overthrow Ben Ali. This people’s coup was not hatched in Washington via Qatar and televised by AlJazeera, although at a critical moment AlJazeera’s reporting helped create awareness and support for the rising social movement.

It was "hatched" by a quarter of a century of Ben Ali’s repression, of his regime slavishly following IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies, of massive unemployment and neglect of the country’s interior and of a rapacious uncontrolled greed of two crude nouveau riche arrogant clans – the Ben Ali’s and the Trabelsi’s, who have gotten off quite lightly for the many crimes they have committed against the Tunisian people

9. A new alliance?

The more controversial part of Othman’s hypothesis is that he openly credits the United States for having helped enable the Tunisian changes and doesn’t really mind giving the Obama Administration credit for it. Takes a bit of courage to defend that position, and courage on Nawaat’s part to publish the piece too. The argument is simply that for a moment in time, without illusions, that the needs of Tunisian democracy coincide with developing U.S. strategy in the region. Not a marriage of love, but one of convenience.

Othman makes this argument in a classically Tunisian manner. It is not out of ignorance of the overall U.S. role in the Middle East. Tunisians, of left, right or center are not stupid. Comes with being a small country! To survive you have to be brighter than bigger and frankly not very nice neighbors – Algeria and Libya. The more I watch Tunisian foreign policy, the more I am impressed by both its cosmopolitan nature and its political pragmatism. Tunisians know Washington and Obama; they understand the parameters of power under which their situation is evolving. But they also know that their close relationship with France over decades have yielded them little to nothing.

Othman speaks of France’s claims of solidarity with Tunisia as being "no more than words, and essentially demogagic" ( “que la France dont les protestations d’amitié pour le peuple tunisien restent purement verbales et démagogiques”). He 's got French Tunisia policy pegged. So what does Tunisia have to lose by distancing itself from France and edging closer to the United States which is just acting, as any imperialist power would act, trying to enhance its strategic interests in the region and improve its image by befriending Tunisia?

This is not the line of reasoning of a Tunisian neo-conservative pandering to Washington instead of Paris. It is something far different from what I can understand, although it is a gamble for Tunisia rolling the dice with Washington, obviously.

Then what is it?

Practical choices for small countries are rather limited, at least within the framework of traditional world politics. Tunisia finds itself caught in the dilemma of many of the world’s small countries, trapped as potential pawns in the big power game to try to figure out which way the wind is blowing and what alliances to make with the world powers that might further their national interests.

10. New direction for U.S.-Tunisian relations?

So… without the U.S. green light, the Tunisian revolution could have turned to a blood bath. In recognition of the U.S. role, Tunisia opens a new page its relations with the United States, downgrading them a bit (here let’s not exaggerate too much) with Paris. On the basic premise, Othman is "on spot." Ghannouchi’s "informal" invitation to the U.S. only reinforces the validity of his views. U.S.-Tunisian approaches are being coordinated. Ghannouchi was careful not to let any issue that might sidetrack the cooperation – like adding a section of the proposed constitution to complicate the relations. He has made other gestures in the direction of damage control as well.

What is important is to understand the underlying processes taking place, if only to be able to come to grips with the reality: and the reality in this case is that somewhere along the way, the United States has decided that it will cooperate with Ennadha and that there is a new U.S.-Ennadha strategic relationship in the making. Indeed it is already made.

Othman gives the Obama Administration credit for understanding Ennadha far better than the French have. The French fear it as yet another manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism masked with a cover of European liberalism. There are some Tunisians here, by the way who feel likewise. More than the French, the Obama Administration has come to understand that Ennadha represents a genuine political force in Tunisian life. Yes, it is a mixed bag and is currently experiencing some problems winning the country’s trust, some of its own making I might add.

The new alliance builds on similar relations the United States has with Turkey. It shows a modicum of realism, a willingness to deal with a Middle East country more on its own terms, rather on terms dictated by Washington and as such, also is an admission of declining U.S. influence as Washington can no longer dictate Middle East policy. It needs to be more flexible to maintain its interests. It is the beginning of recognition in the U.S. administration of a need for a changed U.S. policy, perhaps too little too late – U.S. policy in the Middle East has done enormous damage already that will not be so easily undone.

Yes, there are many problems with this strategic alliance both from Tunisian and the United States point of view but in a region where the U.S. is drowning in bad and inhumane policies – contrast its support for Tunisian democracy with its policies towards much more strategically important Egypt  –  it is at least a glimmer of hope on an otherwise dark regional tableau.

Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

Also read:
The Amilcar Notes (Part 1): Zine Ben Ali's Sorry Legacy
The Amilcar Notes (Part 2): Tunisia -- Emerging Democracy or Just a Facade?
The Amilcar Notes (Part 3): Tunisia's Forgotten Socio-Economic Crisis
The Amilcar Notes (Part 4): Tunisia -- Profoundly Islamic

1. Remembering a History Teacher

A half century ago, I was beginning  Jamaica High School in Queens, New York, rather far from Tunisia. It was a wonderful, very academically sound public high school which produced the likes of the great evolutionary biologist Stephen J. Gould. I had a history teacher named Aaron Rose, the best teacher I ever had anywhere, anytime. It was only later that I understood how much he had influenced me, how I wanted to be a teacher and to teach like "Mr. Rose." It was from Aaron Rose, a Jewish New York City high school teacher that I was first introduced to the name of Ibn Khaldun and his work, The Muqadimmah.

Mr. Rose also gave two memorable lectures on the French Revolution that relates in its own way to the events in Tunisia. After the first one I came home excited, so excited in fact that when my father got wind of what I was saying he got a little nervous. "That French Revolution," I started, "look what they did, they got rid of the corrupt monarchy" (whatever shortcomings we Americans have, one of our better points is that we are not interested in monarchies – at least at home),  and "the people" won and got "liberte, fraternite and egalite." Wow. Cool. I’m for it. I was also 12 years old.

The next day, continuing on the French Revolution, Aaron Rose shifted gears. Having brought us up to the heights the day before. I WANTED MORE. Didn’t happen. He talked about how the revolution turned on itself, how the freedom of speech was suppressed, how the atmosphere quickly hardened and witch hunts began against anyone who spoke out who was labeled an "enemy of the revolution" and finally how so many innocent people met their deaths along with a few guilty ones.

It was crushing. He’d played a cruel trick on me, that Aaron Rose did, one day giving me hope and then stomping on it. At 12 really I had no politics, was much more interested in basketball than girls (still the case). My family was not particularly political. And here Aaron Rose for the first time kindled my interest in politics one day only to crush it the next. And maybe he WAS talking to me, because we were as close as I got to a teacher personally up until then. I liked him. He was smart, knew his subject, didn’t bullshit the students (although I do not think he was some kind of radical). He was just a fine teacher who loved his students and his subject and has long been a conscious model in my 45-year teaching career, soon to end.

In any event, seeing me steaming in my seat, Mr. Rose called on me. "Prince, you are upset." I answered something like, "Yes, you’re playing games with us, kindling hope for change one day and then snuffing it out the next. Why did you do that?"

I don’t remember his exact words but I never forgot the essence: "It’s not me who's playing games," he said, "it’s history. One can look at history honestly or choose to deny it." On the subject of the French Revolution, I am just the messenger. and it’s not that nothing changed because a lot of things changed. The monarch was corrupt and it was destroyed; France was not the same place after the revolution as it was before. Old institutions were swept away, new ones, along with a new legal system  and new modern values replaced it…and if that revolution did not solve all the problems of all the people – and it didn’t, it solved some of the problems of the old system. It’s not true that France after 1789 was in the end the France that existed before. "It is a lie," he said with some emphasis, "that the French Revolution was in vane." Its goals were just partially achieved.

Then he added the line that has stayed with me all these years and this is a quote: "In the end, a revolution simply exchanges one set of problems for another." The problems of the new world are usually quite different from those of the old system. People  know the old problems, the old system, but the "the world coming into being" is something of a mystery and the problems come fast and furiously and the new order has to learn to deal with things it never had to address before.

2. Saluting Tunisia

As much as anyone, Mr. Rose helped give me the eyes and the mind to attempt to process what I am seeing here in Tunisia. The need to be honest about the problems, but not to lose sight of the main picture and the flow of history, to appreciate from whence history flows, and even though it’s difficult to get a glimpse as to where it might be going. History is alive, organic and on the move. Attempting to capture its motion, trying to understand that moving target…well I can tell you, now that is something worth running after! As is learning how to see through the fog that often surrounds it!

Every once in a while, the fog clears for a moment at a place, a time…and right now one of the places is Tunisia and the time is the present. I had to come.

Tonight I watched Tunisia invest a new president tonight on TV. I was at the home of Tunisians, descendants of the sheiks of La Marsa, relatives of Tunisian friends in Colorado. For those present watching Moncef Marzouki invested as President of the country, this was a precious moment, one that they were savoring, almost sacred. The only proper thing to do was to congratulate them which I did. They graciously acknowledged their national achievement.

It was a moment of national emotion and pride for all Tunisians. And despite the challenges, problems that lay ahead – I have written about many of them in this series – something very special has happened here as it "exchanged one set of problems  for another."

Today in Tunisia a new government was put in place. Two new presidents took their seats, one for the country overall, the other of what is called the Constituent Assembly. That assembly was the result of the first genuine election in Tunisian history.

Yes, all  election processes have their limits (as we know in the USA) but this one was done fairly. The president was not put in power by tanks, a military coup or frankly by foreign powers (who of course tried to manipulate it as is their nature), but was the result of an uprising led by the country’s youth seeking a future with dignity and commensurate with their unlimited untapped talent.

The revolution was accomplished relatively peacefully although there were casualties (les martyrs). During most of this time of crisis, people here in the Tunis region and other big cities went to work although the ministers and some corporate heads had fled keeping the country running the best they could, far different from Libya where virtually everything has fallen apart. And all this done by an over-educated, underemployed and underpaid people who were beaten down, intimidated, tortured and robbed blind by two clans of nouveau riche thugs – that is really all they were in the end – for a quarter of a century.

It is true that those who led the charge took to the streets and faced down fear – fear of arrest, of torture of being killed by Ben Ali’s assassination hit squads – are not those in the elected Constituent Assembly. As I have written elsewhere in this series, this is so not unusual and might even before for the best. There is something important about the continuation of a permanent social movement outside of government to continue as a check to those in power, to remind them of the source of their legitimacy – that it comes from the street, from mass, mostly peaceful demonstrations, de-legitimizing one government, giving birth to the conditions for another.

On this, history suggests that the Russian anarchists were right to distrust all power and to challenge it. Tunisia’s social movement remains vibrant despite going through a difficult period. This will ultimately be the real check on the corruption of power and the Tunisians have learned to use this weapon as well as – or better than – most.

This was done with an unequaled level of courage and humanity, and a sense of national solidarity, as if the Tunisian people had woken up and found each other after a long sleep, or should I say, nightmare. People broke out of their isolation, reconnected to each other, recommitted themselves to common social goals. It is frankly, something that cannot be described in words, not my words at least. It was a beautiful thing to watch, even from far away Denver from whence I long have hailed. The uprising wasn’t  about religion, it wasn’t "a left uprising," it was a "revolt of a new kind"…it was about a nation struggling with its soul and trying to find its way in the world again in a new more wholesome setting.

What happened here is nothing short of an explosion of Tunisian nationalism in all its aspects – mostly tolerant – it is not propaganda that Tunisia is a profoundly tolerant place, not just a tolerant Islamic country, it is just tolerant period. Yes there are some uglier aspects of Tunisian nationalism that have also surfaced. They are marginal, have very little actual history or base in this country and while they are making a lot of noise and headlines right now, it is unlikely in the end that their impact will amount to much. They do scare people for the moment but their very intolerance marginalizes them and will be their undoing.

That this sense of dignity is exactly what Tunisians are feeling now was reinforced today during a chance meeting with a Tunisian woman in Carthage. Her commentary on the past year got right to the point: “I never really thought of Tunisia as "my country," but since the revolution I feel a part of it and am proud.”  

A corrupt, repressive regime has been overthrown by its own people, its former leadership either forced to flee the country or in jail. A state security force of 250,000 snoops and torturers could not stop a people’s movement triggered by the immolation of a frustrated, educated, barely employed youth in Sidi Bouzid. The pictures of Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi came down overnight. There is now a Boulevard Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunis. A political party first called the Neo-Destour and then morphed into the Rassemblement Constitutionel Democratique, with its roots in the colonial period that was used by two presidents, has been dissolved and a whole region turned into turmoil with the calls for greater democracy, greater economic opportunity. And an orderly election without any violence (that I am aware of) took place, a model for other countries.

I have written a fair amount in "The Amilcar Notes" about "the new set of problems" Tunisia is facing in this series, and frankly there is more to say. I don’t think my observations are much off the mark. The country faces many challenges…all that glitters here is not gold. Much of the old system remains in place and in fact in some ways (economy, state security apparatus, administration) at least to date, not many changes at all.

But let us not at this moment forget that Tunisia today is a different place than it was a year ago, open and proud as it should be, it is a better place – it has reconnected with its own humanity. Something truly historical took place here. We can argue later – as we should – about the dimensions of the changes, or where Tunisia is or isn’t going. The significance of what happened here starting a year ago goes beyond even the Middle East. It has undermined the cynicism of so many who said it couldn’t happen here, in an overwhelmingly Arab and Moslem country run by a dictator. But it is the Tunisian changes that have created hope around the world, everywhere, including in the United States, that change is possible.

The "people’s coup" as one Tunisian observer called it, brings us back to a truth that reactionaries and conservatives throughout the world have tried to stamp out, to destroy: that it is the people who make history and not crumb-bums like Zine el Abidine Ben Ali or Hosni Mubarek. And once that process begins to take form, the "great powers" are shrunk back to their much less powerful size. Neither France nor the USA could stop the Tunisian people. And the Tunisians did it by themselves and they know it; all of them! The very people the U.S. media has denigrated, deformed their history, language and religion so out of shape that it is unrecognizable and so that people in the United States fear the words "Arab" and "Moslem"…it is precisely these people who have responded by showing the world what human decency, democracy is all about. The Tunisians are leading the way.

Yes it is a beautiful thing…with all its bumps and warts. I’m glad I lived to see it and that for three weeks I could be here, watch it, think about it, worry about it and share in the wonder. The Tunisians have started the world on a journey; they’ve taken the first step. Now it’s our turn to take the second. This is not a time for cynicism, not even mine.

Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

Also read:
The Amilcar Notes (Part 1): Zine Ben Ali's Sorry Legacy
The Amilcar Notes (Part 2): Tunisia -- Emerging Democracy or Just a Facade?

1. ENI (L’Ecole Nationale d’Ingenieurs de Tunis)

The El Manar campus of the University of Tunis stands high upon a hill far above the center of downtown Belvedere. The campus is home to some 30,000 students, among them many studying the sciences. ENIT – or L’Ecole Nationale d’Ingenieurs de Tunis – is one of Tunisia’s most prestigious institutes, producing an annual crop of about 1,000 engineers of all varieties. The students who qualify to study there are among Tunisia’s brightest and most diligent.

I visited the campus the day a jobs fair was taking place (December 7, 2011). At a time of high unemployment with the Tunisian economy bleeding jobs at an alarming rate, I asked about the job prospects for ENIT’s graduates. The response surprised me: virtually 100% of the engineers graduating from ENIT find employment and usually immediately. Rare among Tunisians these days, they will probably enjoy stable and generally well-paid jobs their whole lives.

With its highly educated work force, led by graduates of institutes like ENIT, Tunisia already possesses a human capital, a solid intellectual and technical basis for becoming the economic engine of the Magreb (North Africa), being something much more than part of a region which feeds Europe with raw materials, food and provides tourist facilities for German and Nordic tourists, and those from surrounding Arab countries. From the point of view of political economy, the question emerges: given the political changes and new openness, can Tunisia re-invent itself economically, building on the solid foundations that have already been laid

Yes, Tunisia is in the midst of a powerful socio-economic crisis, itself a part of the global crisis of neo-liberal capitalism. But looking around the Mediterranean, with the possible exception of France, which is struggling with European integration, the entire region is in dire straits. Tunisia’s neighbors are facing the same or worse crises. Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Greece, Spain, Portugal – just to name a few of the most obvious cases are all in many ways in worse condition than Tunisia. Looked at from this point of view, frankly, despite all its problems, ironically, Tunisia probably has better  prospects of pulling out of the crisis than many of the other countries in the region.

2. The Stats

If the prospects for ENIT graduates are promising, this is not the case for most other Tunisian youth graduating from universities. The pickings are slim and becoming slimmer with overall possibilities for Tunisian economic growth in the foreseeable future not promising. This is true throughout the Middle East and is triggered by different factors, among them the global economic slowdown and Tunisian heavy reliance on European growth to fuel their exports and tourism.

The structure of the Tunisian economy itself, essentially a periphery to a European core, adds to the tension. On the one hand Tunisia is producing mostly low and medium end products for a European market while its university graduates, some of the region’s finest, are trained for more complex economic activities for which there are no jobs in Tunisia, and so many of Tunisia’s best and brightest leave for the Gulf, for Europe or North America. And they are the lucky ones who were able to find work. This tension between a highly educated work force and the likely job possibilities is one of the key factors that triggered the revolt, the case in point being Mohammed Bouazizi, a young man with some university education, forced by circumstance to set up an unlicensed fruit stand in a town with high youth unemployment

Still, although the overall Tunisian economy is expected to shrink by 3.3% this year with many alarming corresponding indicators being produced daily in the country’s media, there are a few bright spots here and there in the date that suggests limits to the free fall and the keys to a possible recovery.

Despite the more somber statistics of anticipated overall decline, according to Le Temps (12/7/2011) the country’s export sector is actually showing positive growth signs. In 2011, a year of political turmoil for the country, still exports grew for the first 11 months by about 7.3%. Agricultural exports were in the lead, jumping 39.8% from 2010; electrical product exports grew by 22.9%. There were modest gains for textiles and leather exports of 6.4%. Add to this the fact that throughout the crisis so many Tunisians got up and got to work, working factories often with managers, ministries without ministers and given these limitations, not missing their managers all that much.

Not bad for a country experiencing a full blown political crisis that would have crippled many other countries in similar situations far more.

On the other hand the phosphate sector – a critical one – and its derivatives took a big hit, shrinking by 36% and another mainstay of the Tunisian economy, tourism, was badly hit as well. True, the 7.3% growth in exports is quite modest compared to export growth in 2009, 2010, but still a hopeful sign. Imports shrank a bit from 2010, the main imports being basic food stuffs and energy. That Tunisia should need to import basic foodstuffs – essentially grains – is ironic considering that this country has been one of Europe’s bread baskets not for centuries but for millennia.

3.  The Implications

Of course it is easy to get lost in the figures. The heart of the matter is that the Tunisian economy slowed in 2011, export growth helped slow the decline some but not enough to turn the economy around by a long shot or to reverse the continued loss of jobs.

Given the continued political instability – admittedly mild compared to what is going on in Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Libya – and the unresolved crisis of the euro, the prospects of any kind of economic jumpstart or quick recovery appear almost out of the question.

The best that can be done is to keep the economy in a holding pattern.

It is unlikely that even this modest goal can be accomplished without activating the state’s role in creating jobs and social programs. Tunisia’s economy in fact is crying out for state intervention. Without this, the social crisis threatens to deepen yet again with almost predictable consequences. The fact is that the Tunisian market by itself, for all its problems, still one of the more vibrant ones in the region, is incapable of generating enough growth to turn the situation around. Tunisia indeed is a case study of neo-liberal market oriented limitations.

Mohammed Bouazizi’s death by fire a year ago should have also marked the end of a certain kind of economic development that had run its course. To continue on the path Tunisia followed as a "model IMF student" is to repeat the economic mistakes of the path and, frankly to invite disaster. This is not so difficult to predict – it was precisely in implementing this model – the silence of any self-criticism of the IMF aside – that contributed in large measure to the socio-economic collapse in the first place.

4. No Discussion of the Failure of Neo-liberalism in Tunisia

Certainly the ENIT graduates have a key role to play in Tunisia’s future and for them, the future looks good. Yet for so many other Tunisians, working or unemployed, the future looks grim at the moment. Tunisian’s might have won the freedom of expression for which they dearly fought, but virtually no one from the political parties or in the media are talking about the economic roots of the crisis.

Triggering this crisis was massive unemployment, few job opportunities for university graduates entering the job market, the eroding overall standard of living of everyone, wage suppression and political repression, all of which are connected to the IMF/World Bank sponsored neo-liberal economic model Tunisia embraced almost immediately in full almost immediately after Ben Ali came to power in 1987.

Yet, few people are talking about the death of Tunisian neo-liberalism as if all the underlying tensions in the economy didn’t exist. Tunisia is still searching for money from wherever it can get it and on whatever terms it is offered. Wage suppression continues unabated as do strikes all over the country. Given current wage rates, the strikes and other job actions are not likely to end soon. You’d think that Tunisia’s economic collapse came from workers seeking a living wage rather than rapacious capitalists trying to steal everything in sight.

While it certainly is true that one goal for which Tunisians were fighting for overthrowing Ben Ali was freedom of speech, workers – whose critical role in Ben Ali’s demise is hardly recognized – were fighting for the right to organize and collectively bargain, for a living wage which most of them do not have. Much emphasis has been placed on Ben Ali’s efforts to stymie freedom of speech; very few people have noticed that a fundamental goal in his repressive policies was to deny wage increase requests "to keep workers in their place" in order to keep Tunisian exports competitive.

5. Wage Suppression: at the Heart of Ben Ali’s Neo-liberalism

In fact wage suppression is at the very heart and soul of Ben Ali’s "new authoritarianism." Combined with other classic structural adjustment takeaways like cutting the subsidies on food and energy, under-funding education and medical care, wage repression worked to undermine the Tunisian standard of living considerably. Yet during darker times, one rarely heard Tunisian human rights activists or the Tunisian business community complaining about wage repression.

One example of the lengths to which Ben Ali was willing to go to suppress the call for jobs and wage increases is, in 2008 in Redeyef, in the Gafsa mining region. It took the government six months to crush the movement; hundreds were arrested, many tortured, some died. When it was over no relief of any kind came through from the state. 2008 was a prelude to the events of last year.

Although slow on the uptake in the first days of the national resistance after Bouazizi’s passing, the labor movement was there when it counted and was a key factor in tipping the balance against the dictator. Twitter and Facebook were useful to tools in the effort to kick out Ben Ali. But it didn’t hurt at all that two days before he, wife and family left the country that 150,000 people called for his resignation in Sfax on January 12, in a demonstration organized by the Union General de Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT). It seems to have been quickly forgotten that on the next day, January 13, it was the UGTT that called for a nationwide general strike for January 14. As a million strong Tunisians marched on Tunis to demand their rights and call for his resignation, Ben Ali thought it the wiser to skedaddle off to Saudi Arabia with "the Mrs."

6. The Rayon Bread Factory Sit-in in Jendouba

It should come as no surprise that as soon as Ben Ali was overthrown and freedom of speech extended generally, labor actions and strikes began almost immediately and have continued until today. Virtually every sector of the Tunisian economy has had major strikes, sit-ins, and hunger strikes, from oil workers in the south, to teachers nationwide. These strikes and militant labor actions have gone on non-stop. Sit ins for jobs have gone on almost non-stop in the Gafsa region. On the Tunisian-Algerian border several hundred people gathered to block the border crossing to protest the job and social crisis. Such demonstrations are being increasingly broken up by the military who more and more find themselves breaking up strikes and demonstrations

Yesterday’s paper had a story about a sit-in at a bread factory in Jendouba, in the northwest of the country. It produces 80% of the country’s bread.

Bread is a highly politically sensitive product in Tunisia. In 1984, in response to IMF pressures to lift bread subsidies, then President Habib Bourguiba ended the subsidies causing the price of bread to double overnight. What followed were called bread riots. They were crushed by the Tunisian military. Immediately thereafter, Bourguiba re-instated the subsidies. His relations with the IMF deteriorated. There is some speculation that one of the reasons that Bourguiba was removed from power in 1986 was related to his poor IMF relations. True, it is not proven, but almost immediately after taking office, Zine Ben Ali re-established relations with the IMF and World Bank and began – quite enthusiastically to accept the structural adjustment criteria for getting loans.

The Jenbouba sit-in at the bread factory was broken up by the Tunisian army on the day that bread supplied to local bakeries was about to run out. One sees in this incident the role that the military is going to be called on to play – to break strikes. It was a curious sit-in as it was not the bakers in the factory who organized it but sugar workers who shared the facility with them and whose economic grievances had not been addressed. The sugar workers rightly felt that by blocking the bread factory it would draw attention to their plight and it did so they blocked the entrances and exits so that supplies could not enter and bread shipments could not leave.

In the end, the newly formed Tunisian government can deal with labor’s demands only in a few ways: they can improve the condition, acknowledging decades of wage suppression and deteriorating social programs, or as in Jendouba they can crush such movements, which seems to be the chosen option. Despite the fact that low wages were one of the main causes of the uprising, the financial markets and much of Tunisia’s business community is set on keeping wage levels unchanged. Now a few days short of the one year anniversary of Mohammed Bouazizi’s immolation, the socio-economic crisis in Tunisia has hardly been addressed. This cannot bode well for the future.

Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

Also read The Amilcar Notes (Part 1): Zine Ben Ali's Sorry Legacy.

Have "les jours de gloire" arrived in Tunisia and we just didn’t know it?

From the point of view of public relations, Rachid Ghannouchi’s unofficial trip to the United States appears to have been modestly successful. Ghannouchi opposed putting criticisms of Israel in the Tunisian constitution which appeared on some of the legislative drafts. Both Congress and AIPAC – it’s hard to distinguish between the two these days – breathed a sigh of relief. Whatever his inner thoughts on the subject, good relations with the United States trumped pushing Tunisian support for the Palestinians (which is pervasive) too far at the moment. Call it principle or a tactical decision, or simply the fact that Ghannouchi has too much on his plate back home, he moved on to other subjects quite quickly.

Ghannouchi promised a Tunisian coalition government in which the two secular parties with whom his Ennahda Party is in coalition would be respected, again calming the waters. Sounded good to Washington ears. This reassurance came after one of his spokespeople called Ennahda’s October 23 election victory the beginning of "the 6^th caliphate" – suggesting that Tunisia is heading in a much more religious fundamentalist direction. That gem came from Hamadi Jbeli, Ennadha Party chair and a possible choice to become Tunisia’s prime minister during a speech in Sousse just after the October 23 national elections here for a constituent assembly.

How much money he was able to raise in Washington, if any, I don’t know, but if Tunisia hopes to continue to play the United States off against France, as it has with considerable acumen since the 1940s – with the possible exception of the Ben Ali years –  Ghannouchi’s performance was both necessary and within the traditional framework of U.S.-Tunisian relations. If he and his party don’t make too many dumb mistakes, it is pretty clear that the Obama Administration is willing to work with them.

Both Hillary Clinton and the current U.S Ambassador to Tunisia, Gordon Gray, have said as much. This support will give Ghannouchi important diplomatic legitimacy and room to maneuver both in Tunisia and the Arab World at large. But he’s got to keep a lid on his less moderate elements within his party. It is becoming evident that while Ghannouchi’s statements are generally moderate that Ennahda includes some elements that are less moderate. There seems to be something of a divide between a number of Ennahda’s more cosmopolitan and moderate Islamic intellectuals that can talk  inclusion, women’s rights and respect for freedom of speech on the one hand, and the more fundamentalist elements at the party’s base who talk Shar'ia on the other. This seeming dichotomy is nothing new by the way; it has marked Ennahda’s style of work for the past thirty years.

Ghannouchi talked a good game in Washington. Does he and Ennahda have the moxy and the political acumen to finesse what is already a difficult transition from the Ben Ali years to…whatever. Will he be able to use his political capital to bring the Tunisian people together, or will he divide them further? To build unity and keep his foreign allies happy Ennahda will need to show more flexibility. This is not just to please investors and his own business class, which is waiting and watching, but to keep the country moving together in one direction without reverting to the methods of the old system.

True, some of the news reports of the some of the proposed themes for the new constitution are encouraging. There are commitments on paper at least to write eliminating the death penalty into the new document, to preserving existing woman’s rights in the country – and even of extending them, enshrining free speech rights, etc. In a bid to stop the continued collapse of tourism, Ennahda is committed to let European tourists continue to have their nude beaches (to which Tunisians, however will be prohibited).

Combine that with a new openness towards demonstrations – including a big one shaping up today at the Tunisian Parliament in Bardo – and Tunisia certainly appears a different place than it was a year ago when Mohammed Bouazizi lit the match that ended his and ignited the Arab Spring.

What has changed?

Doubtless some things have changed…

A tyrant – (actually two, gotta throw in the "Mrs." here) – "un salaud" as the Tunisians now refer to Ben Ali, having both outlived his usefulness to foreign interests and oppressed his own people, was deposed. The Tunisian social movement that unseated Ben Ali gave birth to a regional uprising, the Arab Spring, the Second Arab Revolt, what have you. The Tunisian people are proud of both as well they should be. The big prize that has been won, and now is cherished, is freedom of speech.  Yes, freedom is in the air. "Sweet Freedom" as the song goes.

Oh yes, and the election held here for a constituent assembly to write a new constitution unfolded without violence, bringing into power a block of three parties. The biggest winner was Ennahda, which portrays itself as the bearer of a moderate Islamic approach, willing to find common ground with secularists compatible with Western values. It takes much inspiration from Turkish Islamic politics which talks democracy while arresting dissident journalists. In the past, Ennahda has made efforts to separate itself and its image from the more fundamentalist Salafist elements. Ennahda’s two coalition partners are the more secular Congress pour la Republique, or CPR, and Ettakotal. But without a doubt Ennahda is the stronger of the three and able to exert its will over them, which it does.

Warning signs…Is it all frosting with no cake?

Still, it all sounds a bit too rosy. Maybe not yet Nirvana, but Nirvana is just a few steps away, around the corner perhaps? (My mother’s wisdom comes to mind; most things that sound too good to be true…are just that.)

Are Tunisians experiencing only "the frills" of social change or "the real thing"? Is this Tunisia’s version of France 1789, Eastern Europe 1989 now being repeated in Tunisia in 2011? Did the revolution end when Zine Ben Ali and his dear and tender wife Leila stepped on the airplane to Saudi Arabia on Jan 17, 2011? Is the revolution still in an early stage, hardly off the ground and quite fragile all in all? Or is it, as some already fear, a kind of political spring cleaning in which the house remains essentially the same minus a few cobwebs and bad odors? Is it too early to tell?

Well, there’s a lot of frosting on this Tunisian cake…but the cake itself needs some work, a lot of work. Tunisians might have their hard-earned freedom of speech, but little else.

The biggest problem that Ennahda – and all of Tunisia – faces, is its slowness to address the country’s socio-economic crisis which has only deepened in the past year despite Ben Ali’s welcomed departure. It was this crisis – the high unemployment, especially among youth, decades of repressed wages and of course the pervasive repression that triggered the national uprising that deposed Ben Ali. How much patience will the Tunisian people show the current government before they explode once again?

Nero might have fiddled while Rome burned. Tunisians are arguing over the relevance of the niqab (full veil) and whether male and female university students should be separated (come on now!) while the economy bleeds jobs. While Ennahda dithers over pressure from more Islamic fundamentalists to its right on cultural questions, Tunisia is unraveling on several fronts:

The economy is in trouble, the legitimacy of the new government fragile and once outside of Tunis, the security of the state quite unstable. Rather than addressing these more pressing issues, the country has been side-tracked into magnifying the country’s religious-secular divide.

Truth is there is no economic program at the moment. 

The seriousness of the economic crisis was addressed today (December 6, 2011) head on in a major article in the lemagreb.tn (business newspaper written in Arabic) by none other than the head of Tunisia’s Central Bank Governor Mustapha Kamel Nabli. Concerned with the deteriorating political situation and political tensions developing in parliament, he paints a dire picture of Tunisia’s economy.

Among the more disturbing aspects:

• Some 120 foreign companies have left Tunisia since the beginning of the year, many moving to Morocco where the political climate is more stable.
• It is expected that this year the Tunisian economy will shrink by 3.3%.
• The number of unemployed has grown by more than 50% since the beginning of the year (from approximately 500,000 to 800,000; every month the numbers of those joining the unemployed jumps by more than 10,000 with no end in sight).
• The poverty rate has jumped in the same period from 13-18.6%.
• While Tunisia’s private health clinics do a booming business doing cosmetic surgery on the boobs, faces, buttocks and who knows! how many other body parts of French women for rock bottom prices, Tunisia’s public health system is in shambles.
• Doctors report spikes in patients who are victims of crime and violence of all kinds – against women, against the elderly.
• In the worst hit areas of the country, the interior (west) and the south, literally nothing has changed. No private or public investment. Nada. Youth unemployment in these parts of the country is still going through the roof; that white anger which stared down Ben Ali’s security police and burnt down rural police stations has not cooled.

Ca commence mal…mais ce n’est pas encore trop tard

During the election campaign anger was enflamed in Islamic circles over a cartoon movie that portrayed God as an old man. The movie had actually played in Tunisia prior to that and while perhaps Moslem fundamentalists were not happy and criticized the film in their media, this time it was something different. Virtually the whole election campaign fixated around the film. The goal posts shifted dramatically from how the country might emerge from its socio-economic crisis to the question of defending or defaming the film.

Shifting the dialogue to these religious questions probably benefited Ennahda’s election possibilities as it shifted the emphasis on the basic qualities of Tunisian citizenship to a more religious basis (on which it has not up until now been based). In so doing the "new dialogue" mostly over religion and religiosity discredited the less religious Moslems, vilified the more secular elements and created a more fearful environment that continues up until the present. Ennahda bears some of responsibility for widening the secular-religious gap in Tunisia.

Ennahda has emerged as the more powerful political force in the country. It is a party that emanates from an Islamic social movement. It has existed for thirty years and has gone through many trials, tests of fire and has sacrificed much. It is a hardened (in the good sense of the term) political party with a genuine mass base as the recent election demonstrated. The two more secular parties that make up the power triangle, CPR and Ettakotal, are really not political parties in the same sense. Scraped together to participate in the election, they have little experience and a much narrower social base. Their leaders are acknowledged personalities in Tunisian life, but at least up until now they have been rather unimpressive. Marzouki seems glued to becoming Tunisia’s president at all costs and Ben Jaafar, at least so far, has not inspired much confidence even from his supporters, some of whom are already splitting off from the movement. Neither has offered anything substantial to address the socio-economic crisis to date.

As for Ennahda, they are now in power but still acting as if they were still the opposition, agitating for their positions rather than showing a concern for the whole of the country that they govern. Political power requires a certain magnanimity, which at the moment, all Ghannouchi’s good words aside, seems somewhat lacking. Admittedly after thirty years of repression it is difficult to change gears, but that is what appears necessary to hold the country together and move forward to address the problems at hand.

Further, since the elections, while claiming to work in coalition and consensus, there are signs that Ennahda is using the current situation to concentrate as much p0wer as possible in its own hands at the expense of its coalition allies and in so doing undermining Tunisian democracy. In the name of weakening the presidency given Ben Ali’s excesses they are attempting to concentrate similar powers in the position of the prime minister, giving that position something approaching unlimited control over the political process. At the same time, if the current trend continues the position of president of the republic (which Ben Ali and Bourguiba held) become little more than ceremonial posts. A needed balance  of power is lost to what appears to be plain and simply a not particularly subtle power grab. Needless to say, the prime minister will be an Ennahda appointee.

There are also fears that the transitional government might seek to extend its mandate beyond its mandate of one year by stalling promised elections. There is a long history of promised but postponed elections in the Middle East that have undermined democratic processes. Such maneuvers were common in the Ben Ali era. Finally some of the key Ennahda appointments do not sit well. The fact that Ennahda has appointed the husband of Ghannouchi’s daughter as foreign minister, a man with no foreign policy experience to speak of, reminds Tunisians of the nepotism in the Ben Ali era. In a country whose political posture has long been based upon a clever, if not shrewd regional and international foreign policy, this rubs many people the wrong way.

It is not too late to close the gap, to build the confidence necessary to pursue a national agenda. These cultural questions need to be laid aside, a change in course that addresses the socio-economic crisis emphasized. And it needs to be done soon, before the gap is too great, the trust is broken and the good will Ennahda has earned through its anti-Ben Ali struggles is dissipated and the coalition collapses which it could.

In the last days, violence has broken out between pro and anti-nijab supporters at the University of Tunis taking tensions to a new level. Today a dean was beaten and an assistant administrator sent to the hospital after being beaten by Salafist (Islamic fundamentalist radicals) elements. As a result of what has been weeks of intimidation and lack of any government intervention the university closed its doors until security could be re-assured. While Ennahda claims uninvolvement, on a day that rocks were thrown at the more secular camp of demonstrators, several of their members of parliament were identified in the Salafist crowd widening the gap that much further. While Ennahda talks unity, most of the signs are that it is engaged in a power grab at which it could win the battle but lose the war, the war being over the future of Tunisia. Ca commence mal. It’s one thing to "talk the talk" of national unity, ah…but walking the walk, that appears to be a bit harder.

Keeping the social movement alive, the same one that overthrew Ben Ali and that said "no" to the first to post Ben Ali governments – and forced the government to concede – is needed now more than ever. And they are still there pushing Tunisia, once again, out of the darkness and towards the light, the nation’s conscience.

All the more important as the country once again seems headed for uncharted and darker waters. It’s not too late, but the clock is ticking and the younger generation in Le Kef, Kasserine, Gafsa and Sidi Bouzid are watching. Their demonstrations have a somewhat different tone than those of Tunis.

Postscript: Just after this was written, Ennahda relented to massive demonstrations and widespread anger to what has been perceived as power grabbing and it re-opened negotiations with other parties concerning the redistribution of power during this transition period. I don't think in the long run that it will change a thing, but it has reduced tensions here some. these folks (Ennahda) are in it for the long run. The U.S. has made its peace with them for the most part.

Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.

Introduction

Rachid Ghannouchi is returning to Tunisia after a brief tour of Washington DC. The leader of the Ennahdha Party, the moderate Islamic party that won 41% of the vote in the country’s first open election in its history, Ghannouchi probably went to the U.S. for two reasons – to calm Congressional fears in Washington that Ennahdha is little more than Al Qaeda with a makeup job, and to solicit investment possibilities. From the press reports coming out of the U.S. that I am reading here in Tunisia, it seemed his visit was successful from the public relations view point at least.

Le Bandit

45 years ago when I lived in Tunisia as a Peace Corps volunteer and staff member, it was rare that people would talk about politics or openly criticize the government. "How’s your family? How’s your health? What do you think of the weather" and other non- subjects were the focus of conversation. But the country is living in another political age today. Less than a year after Ben Ali fled the country with as much of the nation’s treasury he could carry on his plane, the country, finally liberated from fear, seems to talk nothing but politics. It  is on nearly everyone’s mind…and tongue.

What has been most striking is the utter contempt that has been expressed to me – now a week in Tunisia – towards the country’s deposed president  Zine Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi. Ben Ali is known to have had two favorite hobbies during his presidency: playing with his grandson and torturing people. A few examples of how his former countrymen evaluate his 25 years in power will suffice. An elderly man at a train station engages me in conversation without my soliciting the exchange. Refusing to stoop to even mentioning Ben Ali’s name, he speaks of the country getting rid of "le bandit." A cab driver, an admirer of the country’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, speaks of Ben Ali in harsher terms, calling him a fascist, un salaud’ (that translates in English to something approaching a scumbag).

No doubt the system of repression that existed under Ben Ali is at the root of this pervasive contempt for the former president. With a state security force of 250,000 given a free hand and encouraged to torture, intimidate and break the spirit of anyone questioning his authority, Ben Ali ruled with an iron hand. He himself was trained for the job in the U.S. (Baltimore) and France. No one of the many people I have spoken to has one good word to say about him. Yet despite being aware of Ben Ali’s record, five American presidents – Reagan, Bush 1, Clinton, Bush 2, and until the last moment Barack Obama – supported the dictator as a "moderate" and important ally in Washington’s "war on terrorism."

This past Wednesday a Tunisian court found Abdullah Khallal and Mohamed Ali Ganzoui  – the former a Minister of the Interior under Ben Ali – guilty of having promoted and practiced torture and government blackmail . The specific case involved the torture of 17 former Tunisian military officers unjustly accused of plotting a military coup against Ben Ali; they were arrested, savagely tortured and imprisoned. The two were sentence to – five years in prison – minus time served. The court also ruled that the accused pay considerable but undefined restitution payments to the victims.

A very light sentence given the extent of the repression used against the Tunisian people during the Ben Ali years! Consider only a part of the data relating to Ben Ali’s attempt to suppress the Islamic Ennahdha Party; it gives a suggestion of the scope of the repression. According to several sources,  over the course of the Ben Ali years, some 30,000 supporters of Ennahdha would serve prison terms, another 30,000 would be placed under "administrative detention" forced to report twice or thrice daily to the police. 20,000 were purged from jobs, 4,000 went into exile, 105 were assassinated with another 30 having simply "disappeared."

It is as if Ben Ali were competing for something akin to an anti-Nobel prize and he is right up there in the running with the worst of them: the Guatemalan dictators, Pinochet, Mobutu and that great cast of right wing dictators the United States has supported – whether it be in defense of the war on Communism or the war against terrorism – for decades.

The case of Abed Moneen Ben Chabaane, an Ennahdha activist, illustrated the nature of Ben Ali’s repressive machine as well as any. Arrested, imprisoned and tortured because of his work as an organizer for the Islamic university student organization, Ben Chabane is one of the more fortunate ones. He survived. Many of his friends and comrades in arms did not.

From Amilcar to Le Cram

To this day, the  Arish Ben Chabaane clan to which Moneen belongs has properties "from Amilcar to Le Cram" – two suburbs north of Tunis. There they prospered for several hundred years, raising crops and engaged in dairy farming. Interviewed yesterday in Amilcar, Moneen told how at harvest time, he would watch his grandfather slaughter a cow and distribute to meat to the needy people of the district.  The family would also give away milk to the poor rather than sell it because they thought that the right, Islamic thing to do. While still influential family to this day, their family farming business took a hit in the 1950s, just after independence, when then President Bourguiba put an end to their dairy activities on the pretext that foreign tourists would be offended by the sight of the Ben Chabanne cows and sheep.

Whatever influence the family clan possessed was not enough to save Ben Chabaane from Ben Ali’s jails. On September 10, 1992 – the day of the prophet Mohammed’s birthday, le mouled  –  at a café in Sidi Bou Said on the Ave de la President Habib Bourguiba, Ben Chabaane was sitting drinking coffee and chatting with a group of friends.  In short order several police cars pulled up, surrounded the place and arrested him. He would spend the next month and 29 days in a jail cell at the Ministry of Interior in Tunis and the next 11 years in Ben Ali’s prisons.

Ennahdha’s Election Victory: in Part a Sympathy Vote

It has been acknowledged that the victory that Ennahdha won in Tunisia’s October 23 elections for the Constituent Assembly was, for many Tunisians, a result of a sympathy vote for the party that was easily the target of Ben Ali’s most vicious and sustained repression. There was also a deep desire among those who went to the polls to "return to normalcy." After Ben Ali’s hasty exit from Tunisia with as much of the country’s national treasure as he could haul away, it was a network of political prisoners – hardened and disciplined by their time behind bars – in concert with their families, which provided Ennahdha with the organizational backbone for its re-emergence and stunning victory at the polls.

Was Ennahdha exaggerating the hardships it had endured, or “playing the victim”? From what can be gleaned from various sources here in Tunisia, Ennahdha’s suffering under Ben Ali was not at all overstated. The former dictator conducted nothing short of a campaign of annihilation against the party. He personally oversaw much of the worst repression personally. Ben Ali was obsessed with Ennahdha and went to all necessary extremes to crush it. That it survived and now is flourishing can only be explained by its connection to and sympathy from broad sectors of the country’s population.

The repression took many forms – arbitrary arrest, exacting signed confessions through torture, disappearances of political activists and critics, threatening and intimidating the families and friends of political prisoners, purging Ennahdha supporters from jobs – all the now familiar and well-worn methods of dictators everywhere. That either the United States or France were unaware of the scope and brutality of the repression is not credible. Whatever Nicolas Sarkozy or Barak Obama might now be saying, praising Tunisia’s role in starting the Arab Spring, these leaders and their governments did not lift a finger to press Ben Ali when it might have helped. They spoke of him as a "moderate" and praised his role in supporting them in their war on terrorism. Their current praise of Tunisian democracy rings hollow.

Torture With a Cat

During the nearly two months spent in the basement of the Ministry of the Interior in 1992 Ben Chebaane was repeatedly tortured. A young university student in his early 20s he was the subject of Abu Ghraib-like tortures, eerily resembling those inflicted upon Iraqis by the U.S. military occupation forces a decade or so later. He described several.

Besides repeated beatings I will only describe one of the more common forms. Among the more demented creative forms of humiliation to which political prisoners were subjected involved a cat. First forced to strip nude in front of fellow prisoners and guards, a prisoner had to then put on a pair of baggy pants the bottoms of which were tied closed at his ankles. Then the cat placed in his baggy pants and while there beaten with a stick. Programmed to panic, in its panic and inability to escape, the cat would scratch and tear at a prisoner’s stomach and scrotum.

Repeatedly and savagely beaten, himself, Ben Chebaane was forced to sign a confession that he had a bomb-making factory in his home, although the ingredients were never found. Instead the authorities confiscated a bag of sand and a bottle of cough medicine  – material from which it is rather difficult to make bombs.

The bomb-making scenario was key to the prosecution, and to convincing the press and the international media that Ben Chabaane and his colleagues were not being arrested for their political views, but because they were terrorists. This was especially important as at the time, the European Commission was already putting pressure on Ben Ali for him to set free the imprisoned Islamists, whom the Europeans understood, had nothing to do with radical Islamic extremism. But Ben Ali would have none of this. Raising the specter of an Islamic radical movement like that which had emerged in Algeria, he was able to fend off the pressure and continue what was a merciless crackdown of the Islamic movement in Tunisia.

The extent of the torture was such that Ben Chabaane admits he would have signed anything put before him. "If I was told to sign a document that I would kill my father, I would have signed it."

Transferred to Tunis’ main prison (since demolished), he had to wait another four years before he was finally brought to trial. Charged with having explosives in his possession, he denied his guilt. But the judge waved Ben Chabaane’s signed confession before his face and, he sentenced him to 11 years in prison. Having already served four of them waiting for trial, he spent the next seven being transferred from one prison to another throughout Tunisia – seven in all. Most of them were far from Tunis and his extended family.

All that because he was an open supporter and political activist for Ennahda. He had committed no crime, to act of violence against persons or property. "That is not our way," he told me.

In prison, the humiliation only continued. While life for anyone in a Tunisian prison is not easy, for Ennadha supporters it was that much harder. They were denied many privileges permitted others, the right to read newspapers, watch TV. Reading the Koran was banned as was any manifestation of prayer. It’s the kind of treatment that breaks the soul and spirit of many – which is exactly what it is meant to do. But many of those who survived the mental and physical torture became hardened political activists and would take the survival and organizational skills honed in Tunisia’s prisons out into society at large once released.

Call it the school of hard knocks! … Very hard knocks.

Rob Prince is a Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver's Korbel School of International Studies and publisher of the Colorado Progressive Jewish News.