Foreign Policy In Focus

Part 3 of Nawaat's interview (edited) with Rob Prince.

Nawaat: So far the topic of corruption surrounding the (Ben Ali, Trabelsi) family seems visibly dominant in the cables. Do you think we are dealing with institutional corruption that could harm the relationship between Tunisia and the West in general, at least on an economic level?

Prince: As I respond to your question…at the moment in the Tunisian interior, in Sidi Bouzid, there have been four days of protests -- what the government of Tunisia calls "riots" or "social unrest"; and now I read that similar protests have begun in Kasserine and elsewhere. The Sidi Bouzid events appears to have been a spontaneous uprising of people in the region over economic and social issues after a poor lad in his early 20s, one Mohammed Bouazizi, poured a can of gasoline on himself and then lit a match in front of the police station there. Tunisian friends relate that this is the third young Tunisian in about six months who chose to protest the grim economic and social prospects in the country by burning themselves to death. 

I cannot put into words how sad it makes me to see a photo of Mohammed Bouazizi seeming to be running down the main street of Sidi Bouzid his body nothing more than a ball of fire while [President] Zine Ben Ali parrots old and worn nonsense about non-existent economic miracles and complains that those who criticize his regime's human rights record are exaggerating.

Then there are more than 50 others, in Tunisia and in Europe, who are on hunger strikes, also protesting both the socio-economic situation in the country as well as the overall repressive atmosphere. And all this comes after what I can only call the "social uprising" in the Gafsa region centered around Redeyef in 2008, which was a "warning shot" to Ben Ali that there are deep, structural economic problems in Tunisia that need addressing.

Other than 200 people tortured and imprisoned, with a fair number of them still in jail, including the journalist Fahem Boukkadous, virtually nothing has happened since to suggest the Tunisian government takes the economic crisis serious: no development plan, a few insipid crumbs of promises of economic aid from Ben Ali's advisors, that is about it.

Combine such painful news of economic woes with its opposite: that two families -- that of the president Zine Ben Ali, and his wife, Leina Trabelsi -- are accumulating wealth at a breathtaking pace. Indeed, I read this morning that Ben Ali has squirreled away more than $5 billion in foreign bank accounts and a more sober picture of Tunisia's so-called "economic miracle" comes into perspective: a precious few are making a fortune at the expense of the multitude whose situation is deteriorating as a generalized impoverishment grows. So, the Philippines has its Marcos family, the Congo Mobutu, Saudi Arabia its royal family, and now we can add to the picture the Ben Ali-Trabelsi family clans of Tunisia! Quite an honor!

The social explosion in Sidi Bouzid reinforces the opinion of those voices in the Tunisian opposition who have argued that Zine Ben Ali's government is facing a full blown socio-economic and political crisis, one which it is questionable the government can or will survive.

Nawaat: How will the TuniLeaks -- the corruption they expose -- affect Tunisia's economic relations with "the West" (the USA, Canada and the European Union)?

Prince: Again, while the WikiLeaks documents are embarrassing -- and there's evidence that the United States embassy is aware of the scope of the corruption -- there is not much here that is not known to Tunisians or close "Tunisia watchers." Certainly the cables verify the word "on the street" and much that has been published online and in the French press. But I think the question should be somewhat rephrased to: if this corruption has gone on for so long and has been so pervasive, why has it taken until now for Europeans and the US ambassador to Tunisia to take note of it?

It appears that, despite all their talk of "transparency," foreign economic interest can and does tolerate rather substantial rates of corruption in Tunisia without much complaining. At what point has the level of corruption reached such heights that even Tunisia's Western partners have finally said "enough is enough" and "we need more caution in our economic relations with Tunisia." Well they haven't said it yet -- but it appears they will rather soon.

And here look at the relationship between the growing economic disparities of the country -- which have long existed despite the rosy propaganda, "the economic miracle mirage" – and the reality. It is the intensification of Tunisia’s social crisis which has more and more exposed the level and nature of corruption, and that the U.S. State Department has, at long last, noted all this in the released cables, is of course a positive development, one that reinforces what others have been saying for a long time. The US does so as it begins to perceive threats to its economic and security interests.Part 3 of Nawaat's interview (edited) with Rob Prince.

Nawaat: So far the topic of corruption surrounding the (Ben Ali, Trabelsi) family seems visibly dominant in the cables. Do you think we are dealing with institutional corruption that could harm the relationship between Tunisia and the West in general, at least on an economic level?

Prince: As I respond to your question…at the moment in the Tunisian interior, in Sidi Bouzid, there have been four days of protests -- what the government of Tunisia calls "riots" or "social unrest"; and now I read that similar protests have begun in Kasserine and elsewhere. The Sidi Bouzid events appears to have been a spontaneous uprising of people in the region over economic and social issues after a poor lad in his early 20s, one Mohammed Bouazizi, poured a can of gasoline on himself and then lit a match in front of the police station there. Tunisian friends relate that this is the third young Tunisian in about six months who chose to protest the grim economic and social prospects in the country by burning themselves to death.

I cannot put into words how sad it makes me to see a photo of Mohammed Bouazizi seeming to be running down the main street of Sidi Bouzid his body nothing more than a ball of fire while [President] Zine Ben Ali parrots old and worn nonsense about non-existent economic miracles and complains that those who criticize his regime's human rights record are exaggerating. 

Then there are more than 50 others, in Tunisia and in Europe, who are on hunger strikes, also protesting both the socio-economic situation in the country as well as the overall repressive atmosphere. And all this comes after what I can only call the "social uprising" in the Gafsa region centered around Redeyef in 2008, which was a "warning shot" to Ben Ali that there are deep, structural economic problems in Tunisia that need addressing.

Other than 200 people tortured and imprisoned, with a fair number of them still in jail, including the journalist Fahem Boukkadous, virtually nothing has happened since to suggest the Tunisian government takes the economic crisis serious: no development plan, a few insipid crumbs of promises of economic aid from Ben Ali's advisors, that is about it.

Combine such painful news of economic woes with its opposite: that two families -- that of the president Zine Ben Ali, and his wife, Leina Trabelsi -- are accumulating wealth at a breathtaking pace. Indeed, I read this morning that Ben Ali has squirreled away more than $5 billion in foreign bank accounts and a more sober picture of Tunisia's so-called "economic miracle" comes into perspective: a precious few are making a fortune at the expense of the multitude whose situation is deteriorating as a generalized impoverishment grows. So, the Philippines has its Marcos family, the Congo Mobutu, Saudi Arabia its royal family, and now we can add to the picture the Ben Ali-Trabelsi family clans of Tunisia! Quite an honor! 

The social explosion in Sidi Bouzid reinforces the opinion of those voices in the Tunisian opposition who have argued that Zine Ben Ali's government is facing a full blown socio-economic and political crisis, one which it is questionable the government can or will survive.

Nawaat: How will the TuniLeaks -- the corruption they expose -- affect Tunisia's economic relations with "the West" (the USA, Canada and the European Union)?

Prince: Again, while the WikiLeaks documents are embarrassing -- and there's evidence that the United States embassy is aware of the scope of the corruption -- there is not much here that is not known to Tunisians or close "Tunisia watchers." Certainly the cables verify the word "on the street" and much that has been published online and in the French press. But I think the question should be somewhat rephrased to: if this corruption has gone on for so long and has been so pervasive, why has it taken until now for Europeans and the US ambassador to Tunisia to take note of it?

It appears that, despite all their talk of "transparency," foreign economic interest can and does tolerate rather substantial rates of corruption in Tunisia without much complaining. At what point has the level of corruption reached such heights that even Tunisia's Western partners have finally said "enough is enough" and "we need more caution in our economic relations with Tunisia." Well they haven't said it yet -- but it appears they will rather soon.

And here look at the relationship between the growing economic disparities of the country -- which have long existed despite the rosy propaganda, "the economic miracle mirage" – and the reality. It is the intensification of Tunisia’s social crisis which has more and more exposed the level and nature of corruption, and that the U.S. State Department has, at long last, noted all this in the released cables, is of course a positive development, one that reinforces what others have been saying for a long time. The US does so as it begins to perceive threats to its economic and security interests. 

Part 2 of Nawaat's interview (edited) with Rob Prince.

The Obama Administrations has few illusions about [Tunisian President] Ben Ali. Remember even what I would describe as our least eminent president, George Bush, found it necessary to make a public criticism of Ben Ali to his face not that long ago!

The problem is this: the U.S. would like to see change in Tunisia, but only that change that supports the status quo; the cables suggest that Washington no longer cares that much about Ben Ali today nor sees him as particularly effective in helping realize US strategic goals, but they are concerned with who might replace him. 

That is the problem…those damned reformed movements! You can never tell which way they will go and if they will, either economically or strategically go off in another direction. After all, look at those Latin Americans -- Ecuadorians, Venezualans, even Brazil, Bolivia and Chile all seeking their own path to development, snubbing the World Bank, IMF etc. An "uncontrolled" reform in Tunisia could well have consequences far beyond the little country itself, thus one must (or the State Department must) tread carefully.

The State Department seems to be probing a suitable replacement, one that will follow the broad guide lines of U.S. foreign policy (privatization and openness of the economy, support for the war on terrorism) and for Tunisia to play a role in U.S. strategic and military goals (they have merged) in the Middle East and North Africa.

It would do Tunisians, even Ben Ali (!) well to recall how many U.S. allies different American administrations have discarded…the list is long and I will only mention a few: the Diem regime in the 1960s, Noriega of Panama -- first a key U.S. ally, now rotting in a jail in Florida -- the most famous ally-turned-enemy Bin Laden, Marcos of the Philippines.

Although Habib Bourguiba bent the national will to accommodate the United States in many ways, in the end, it didn't seem to matter. He had carefully cultivated U.S. support from the outset, even during the colonial period as a wedge against the French, and did so brilliantly. I have little doubt that the presence of the Peace Corps in Tunisia (in which I participated so long ago) was a concession to the U.S. made specifically to irritate the French (which it did).

In any case, Bourguiba thought all that kowtowing to Washington would keep Tunisia safe from some kind of U.S. (and or Israeli) military action. But then there was the Israeli strike on the Palestinian headquarters in Tunis, something that was inconceivable without U.S. approval. Reagan didn't hesitate to turn on Bourguiba when he thought it necessary. It left Bourguiba extremely bitter; it also revealed how "flexible" Washington could be with allies they no longer felt useful, and that such figures are "expendable." Add to this that while it is unclear just how involved the U.S. was with the coup that unseated Bourguiba in 1987, it has to be a bit more than coincidental that Ben Ali got some of his police training in the USA.

An alternative to Ben Ali?

At a certain point reading the cables, it occurred to me: they're looking for an alternative to Ben Ali, they think "his goose is cooked" and are probing Tunisian society to find a viable alternative.

Admittedly this is just a hypothesis, and here I am sitting in Denver, high in the Rockies, speculating about Tunisia. But reading the cables over, it comes through loud and clear. How so?

• In the cables there is open admission of the overall crisis in Tunisian society, and the opposition to Ben Ali and the Trabelsi family.
• The events of Redeyef in 2008 are noted with the fear that it might just be the opening salvo of a deeper social crisis that the US should prepare for.
• There are several notes that the US "cannot do anything" until the "post Ben Ali" era opens. That relations with Ben Ali are jog jammed at present.
• But in its own way, the dinner with Sakhi and Nesrine Ben Ali Materi was not as vapid, or empty as I suggested above. It seems that the U.S. ambassador was feeling Materi out…as a possible replacement for his father-in-law. Materi impresses the ambassador that the censorship of the Tunisian media is "too much," he suggests that his media (he owns one of the country's two radio stations) is not afraid to hear critical voices. On Middle-East policy -- Israel-Palestine, Iran, Iraq -- he basically follows U.S. foreign policy to the letter. Even the comments about Nesrine are interesting. If she is "naive and clueless" perhaps she will not play the kind of nefarious role of running her husband as Leila Trabelsi has with Ben Ali! 

Did the ambassador "decide" that Sakhi Materi "should" replace his uncle Ben Ali…No, that is not how things work. I would guess the ambassador is "shopping around," getting a feel for who within Tunisia's ruling circles might cooperate with U.S. policy and if and when "the right moment" presents itself, that the U.S. would "encourage" one of a number of "candidates" for power. And of course the French, the British and a number of other foreign embassies are doing precisely the same thing. After all, the few reports we get about Ben Ali, that he has cancer, that he spends an inordinate amount of time with his grandchildren, that the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families run only the economy today (and are frantically trying to buy up, steal what they don't own, also in preparation for a change in power?) and that Zine Ben Ali is showing signs of senility not unlike Bourguiba manifested in 1986. So… the vultures are swarming.

That is what a careful reading of the WikiLeaks documents suggests. Do they scream it out loud? No…but re-read the cables and see if I am off the mark? So there is far more there than meets the eye, and I have to admit that . . . the State Department's take on what is happening in [Tunisia] is less stupid than I originally imagined.

Last week two young men committed suicide in the Tunisian town of Sidibouzid. One lit himself on fire in front of the town hall; the other climbed a lamp post and reaching out to a high voltage wire in front of a crowd of hundreds who were protesting the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the country. Prior to that, Nawaat, a Tunisian opposition website, solicited Rob Prince's perspectives on the consequences of the WikiLeaks Tunisia cables for the US-Tunisia relationship, and how Tunisians can use the leaks to push for a real change. Part 1, edited, follows.

From what I can tell, it is not the New York Times that has revealed anything about the US-Tunisia relationship, it has been the Guardian of London and El Pais of Spain. This is curious. What to make of it? An attempt to embarrass the US in its N. Africa policy? Perhaps…there is a certain competition for Algerian natural gas between Spain and the U.S., there are voices in UK, especially at the Guardian that have been critical of U.S. Middle-East and North Africa policy since September 11, 2001. How do such things play into the release of the documents. Dunno, but it would be a bit foolish to think that some strategic considerations (if only to embarrass the U.S.) are not at play.

I have now read the Tunisian cables – the ones you have provided at Nawaat – through, three times.

There are certain themes which stand out, others which appear to be omitted. My first impression, which I have written and spoken about is that there was less there than meets the eye, ie, that they were not so interesting except for a few details here and there, that pretty much everything in the cables was certainly common knowledge to most Tunisians, and to those who, for various reasons, follow developments in Tunisia closely.

• Most just gossip, ie, that Nesrine Ben Ali El Materi is "naive and clueless"
• or that her husband Mohammed Sakia El Materi feeds his pet tiger in Hammamet four chickens a day (but are the chickens organic?)
• or that Imed and Moaz Trabelsi are addicted to stealing yachts from French bankers and painting them over, the way that mafia's here in the USA steal and dissemble cars, etc, etc. 

Juicy reading perhaps, but less than meets the eye at first glance until such remarks are put in context. Even the more substantial stuff, was, with a few exceptions (the shopping list the Tunisian military would like get as U.S. aid), "not new":

• the general state of the country
• the corruption of the economic sector that seems to know no bounds of those closest to the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families in economic matters
• the intensified levels of repression against journalists and social movements (students, trade unions) that has reached epidemic proportions
• the impact of the social uprising in Redeyef in 2008. 

We could have found out about all of this -- and most of us did -- elsewhere.…the ambassador would have done better reading Le Monde, Liberation orNawaat to be honest. 

After first reading the documents, a distinct sense was that the embassy, in reality, does not know that much about Tunisia. It has little feeling or understanding for what is going on "on the ground"; while aware of the growing discontent and social movement there seems to be little or no contact or even interest in speaking to people outside of narrow government circles.

And for its part, it appears that the government of Tunisia -- GOT -- (like many others) is not particularly forthcoming to American authorities, as if to hide as much as possible. In these cables, GOT gives the American embassy as little as is possible. Embassy contacts with independent voices are severely restricted. But what surprises me is the willingness of State Department reps to accept these limitations! The Tunisian authorities seem to know how to play U.S. paranoia about Islamic fundamentalism, overstate "the Iranian threat"…i.e., giving the State Department what they want to hear to elicit aid and modern weaponry.

Now the suggestion that all is not well in the US-Tunisian relationship is, I would argue, very serious stuff. More on this below.

All that is not "new," but it does have some substantiate many things that both Tunisians and others have thought about what is going on in the country:

• that the place is corrupt today almost beyond belief
• that the human rights abuses are getting worse -- the torture, the forced detention, the atmosphere of fear that permeates the countries beyond the hotels and beaches of Sousse
• that the "economic miracle" is something less than that
• Or put another way, that the U.S. State Department has become aware of the many-sided crisis which has been percolating in Tunisia for a long time, and which has these past few years exploded into a general crisis of society, so much so that not even the U.S. State Department -- which has known about it all along -- can any longer avoid. The cat is out of the bag. The cables substantiate this. 

And something else is going reading between the lines, a kind of dangerous dance that on some level the two sides are both aware of: it is as if the State Department is probing Ben Ali: are you still useful to us, they seem to be asking. And he is responding, "Why yes, of course." Tunisian authorities are somewhat defensive, nervous one would say and while the US ambassadors are not particularly rude, they are actually "diplomatic," they have made mild criticisms to Ben Ali himself, to the Tunisian foreign secretary. And the cables themselves make the situation clear: all is not well in the relationship.