Foreign Policy In Focus

Who would you believe: JSOC operatives past and present or the U.S. government?

Benghazi: The Definitive Report is the title of an e-book published on February 12 by William Morrow. It's written by two editors at SOFREP.com, the unofficial special operations site: Brandon Webb -- a former Navy SEAL -- and Jack Murphy -- a former Army Ranger and Green Beret. What's unique about the report is its bipartisan appeal. Its fodder for those who would attack the State Department, the administration, and the CIA from both the right and the left. Sure enough, it's caused ripples in Washington and garnered significant attention from the mainstream media.

To sum up, Webb and Murphy allege that the  Benghazi terrorist attack, during which Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed, was mounted by Islamist militants in retaliation for attacks on them by JSOC forces. Worse, the authors claim, neither Stevens nor CIA director David Petraeus knew about the raids, which were ordered by President Obama's Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan, who was acting outside the command structure. 

Webb and Murphy also declare that Petraeus' affair with Paula Broadwell was leaked by the members of his personal protection detail in conjunction with members of the CIA who were unhappy with his emphasis on paramilitary activities over traditional espionage.

About Brennan, Murphy told Human Events:

The Senate should not confirm him as the new director of the CIA and Brennan should not continue in public life. … "I think we need to let this guy go."

Meanwhile, Eli Lake, the senior national security correspondent for the Daily Beast and Newsweek, writes:

… while the book is filled with juicy revelations that promise to shock even the most casual followers of counterintelligence gossip, government officials, including spokesmen for the National Security Council and Special Operations Command, dispute some of the key claims. … Ken McGraw, a spokesman for Special Operations Command, declined to discuss specific missions, but said “all U.S. Special Operations Forces work inside the established military chain of command,” and wouldn’t  “work in a foreign country without the knowledge and permission of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission.”

The book also claims elements of the U.S. government either allowed or ran an operation to funnel weapons collected in Libya to Syria. The authors write, “[Ambassador] Stevens likely helped consolidate as many weapons as possible after the war to safeguard them, at which point Brennan exported them overseas to start another conflict.” … but Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, says there was no program to send weapons from Libya to Syria. “This has no basis in reality and is completely made up,” he says. Hillary Clinton also denied any knowledge of this when she was asked about it by Sen. Rand Paul during last month’s hearings on the Benghazi attack.

Hmm, two spokespersons, plus Hilary Clinton during a hearing: that's all you've got, Eli? From the Human Events piece:

Because of the sensitivities involved, the authors double-source the claims in the book, he said. Many more stories were left out because there was no independent confirmation.

It all comes down to who you want to believe: the U.S. government or JSOC operatives past and present? In my case, it's more personal -- who do I want to believe: the U.S. government or my nephew? (By way of "full disclosure," as they say, Jack Murphy is my wife's sister's son.)

U.S. Special Operations forces night raids may be scaring the wits out of Afghans, but they're not the only ones freaked out. General David Petraeus professed to experience "astonishment and disappointment" when Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently called for an end to them because, aside from imperiling their lives, the raids drive Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.

In a Huffington Post article, Robert Naiman of Just Foreign Policy writes that the tactic of night raids "has been the subject of almost no public debate in the United States. Newspaper columnists aren't inveighing against the night raids. Members of Congress aren't demanding that the night raids stop." What if, he asks, "Afghans adopted a strategy of nonviolent resistance against the night raids? Could they be stopped?" Naiman explains. 

Let's suppose . . . that there were a well-organized popular movement in Afghanistan against the night raids. Let's suppose that this movement went around to respected Islamic scholars and got legal judgments that the night raids are an offense against Islam. Let's suppose that this movement prepared to defend villages where U.S. night raids are being carried out, and organized committees of unarmed women to implement this defense. And let's suppose that when a U.S. night raid began, a call would go out from the mosque, and a group of unarmed women would surround the house and say to the US soldiers: you're not coming in, and if you try, we will not move. And let's suppose that some Western NGO issued these women video cameras, as the Israeli human rights group B'tselem has issued Palestinians video cameras. And let's suppose that a group of people in the United States and Western Europe agreed that they would try to support this movement, by vigorously raising their voices in protest whenever US special forces tried to break the line of protesters. 

Nonviolent resistance is employed by thousands of Palestinians, along with sympathetic Israelis. Naiman cites the citizens of Budrus, who in 2004, used nonviolent resistance to force Israel to re-route the West Bank Barrier around its village. Do Focal Points readers think that this tactic has failed to achieve wide success in Palestine because it's an impotent act -- or because it hasn't been fully implemented? Can Gandhi's satyagraha work in Afghanistan as outlined by Naiman?  Let us know in the comments section.