Bush Administration and South Asia

John Gershman, Asia-Pacific Editor, Foreign Policy In Focus

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Under a George W. Bush administration, U.S. policy toward South Asia will continue—if not accelerate—Washington’s tilt since 1998 away from Pakistan and toward India. Independent from its ongoing conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, India now has a prominent place on the U.S. foreign policy map. This is not likely to change under a Bush administration. Bush listed India, along with Russia and China, as the “big ones” that his foreign policy team will work on to get right. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh will likely remain on the sidelines of U.S. concern in the region, and Afghanistan will play an increasingly prominent role in shaping U.S. relations with the region.

Nuclear weapons will continue to be an ongoing focus of U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan. But a Bush administration that is dubious about multilateral arms control agreements is not going to pressure India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which Bush opposes). A Bush administration will likely look for assurances from India and Pakistan that both countries will refrain from weaponization of their nuclear capabilities, and increased transparency as a form of confidence building.

Although a Bush administration will likely talk about respect for the world’s largest democracy, the real emphasis will likely be on pushing for greater commercial ties with a country that has become a fast-growing export market for U.S. goods, and a key player in the transnational production of software and other high-tech products. The growing wealth and prominence of Indian-Americans in high-tech sectors will encourage this approach. Oil interests in Central Asia and the interests of U.S. energy firms in India are likely to move to center stage in U.S. foreign economic policy.

George W. Bush has close ties to the U.S. energy firm Enron, Houston’s wealthiest company and one of the largest contributors to his campaign. Kenneth Lay, the chief executive of Enron, has personally given over $100,000 to Bush’s political campaigns—more than any other individual. He is also one of the “Pioneers”—a Bush supporter who has collected at least $100,000 in direct contributions of $1,000 or less. Enron’s investments in India have been controversial. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International blamed the company for financing local police attacks on citizens protesting the construction of a natural gas plant.

But security issues in the region will become more dominated by concerns about terrorism and the increasing strength of Islamist groups, supported in part by the Taliban. This shift will accelerate the de facto tilt towards India. Bush’s likely National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, a Russia expert, is likely to be personally involved as Russia and even (to a lesser degree) China are becoming more prominent players in the poorly defined borderlands of South, Central, and East Asia.

Terrorism and Afghanistan

From 1994 to 1997 the Clinton administration quietly allowed Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to back the Taliban, seeing it as a convenient foil for Iranian influence in Central Asia. Since the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Washington’s only agenda vis-a-vis the Taliban has been to “get bin Laden.”

The focus on Osama Bin Laden will likely continue under a Bush administration. The Clinton administration and Russia are currently pushing for stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council against the Taliban regime, which controls about 95% of Afghanistan. They want to tighten the existing air embargo and to freeze Taliban assets abroad. In addition, they would ban the sale of chemicals that are used to convert opium to heroin. A unilateral arms embargo—targeting the Taliban but not their opponents in the north—is also on the agenda, although U.S. officials admit it would be difficult to enforce.

The existing sanctions have come under criticism from the UN’s office for humanitarian affairs in Afghanistan. A report from that office suggests that there is almost no support within Afghanistan for further economic sanctions, although there is some support for an arms embargo.

The U.S. is mostly concerned about the Taliban’s refusal to turn over alleged terrorist Osama Bin Laden, while Russia is concerned about Taliban support for Chechen rebels and its support of Islamic movements in Central Asia. China, usually opposed to sanctions, will likely abstain from the vote, in part because of Taliban support for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. India is concerned with Taliban support for guerrillas operating in Kashmir.

Tougher economic sanctions on the Taliban would have minimal impact on the largely isolated movement, and some UN officials argue that increasing economic sanctions will only hurt Afghani citizens. Increased sanctions would have a significant impact on Pakistan, however, which is one of the few states to recognize the Taliban government. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s leader, would have to choose between defying the U.S. and the UN to appease Islamic fundamentalists at home, or risk the destabilization of the country. Pakistan’s dilemma will be India’s gain. India has formed high-level working groups with the U.S. on Afghanistan and terrorism. India’s overall aim seems to further isolate Pakistan as a means of pressuring it to back away from Kashmir.

The expansion of unrest stretching across South and Central Asia to China will lead to some unusual alliances. For example, the U.S. has already begun informal cooperation with China, providing information on Uighur separatists. In addition to the sanctions efforts, the Clinton administration is currently working with Russia and three Central Asian states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirgyzstan) to develop a plan to hit at both bin Laden and the Taliban. Commandoes from the three Central Asian states are in training with U.S. Special Forces under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. While the main U.S. target would be bin Laden, Russia and the Central Asian states would probably also want to strike against Chechen militants and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), respectively. The IMU has launched guerrilla incursions into the three Central Asian states, while Chechens and the IMU are also working with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. This past fall the Clinton administration classified the IMU as a terrorist organization.

If, as is likely, the Bush administration continues the Clinton administration’s approach of not having an Afghan policy but a “get Bin laden” policy, the war in Afghanistan and the broader regional instability will continue.

John Gershman can be contacted at <jgershman@igc.org>.

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