What is the role of India in the War on Terrorism?

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FAQ Index buttonIn the vaguely defined international coalition in the "war against terrorism," India and Pakistan occupy perhaps the most uncomfortable positions. Pakistan was an ally of the United States during the cold war, and India, a significant leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, was seen as an obstacle to U.S. goals and objectives. Throughout the 1990s U.S. relations with India warmed, while they cooled with Pakistan. Prior to September 11, Pakistan, an authoritarian regime, was one of three countries to recognize the Taliban, and its intelligence services had close ties to the Taliban. India, on the other hand, was a democracy, and had ties to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

By warming up to Pakistan in the aftermath of the attacks, the U.S. has reversed the tilt toward India for which it had assiduously worked for some three years, favoring its "tactical ally" (Pakistan) over its "natural ally" (India). The Indian government appears, however, to be sacrificing its traditions of nonalignment and support for international law to rebuild an alliance with the United States.

The Indian government appears to have been quite pleased when a senior U.S. official called India the U.S.'s "natural ally" on the eve of Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee's visit to the U.S., echoing the sentimental phrase first coined by India itself. However it was disappointed that there was no specific reference to Pakastani-supported crossborder terrorism in Kashmir in the joint statement issued on November 10th following the first ever summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee. The Indian prime minister offered unsolicited and unlimited cooperation with U.S. military operations in the war against terrorism even though large numbers of Indians opposed such cooperation.

Because India does not share a border with Afghanistan, its involvement in the U.S.-directed campaign against terrorism has been marginal. The more strategic ally for the U.S. has been Pakistan, India's longtime regional rival. The Bush administration is keenly aware that achieving success in the war against terrorism without aggravating an already tense situation in South Asia, will require a delicate balancing act between the two nuclear adversaries--India and Pakistan--in the region. Secretary of State Colin Powell's October visit to South Asia illustrated the difficulties of maintaining this balance. Powell's visits to Pakistan and India coincided with an escalation of violence in Kashmir when India ended a 10-month cease-fire and stepped up its military presence and pressure on the line of control to push back Pakistani forces. India has made clear its frustration with Washington's adoption of Islamabad as its key ally in the war against terrorism.

Indian officials have repeatedly claimed that Pakistan provides military and financial support to Muslim separatists groups active in Kashmir. Many of these groups are based in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which, according to India, provides safe haven to individuals and groups fighting for Kashmir's liberation. For India, Pakistani support for militant groups active in Kashmir is "state-sponsored terrorism." Pakistan, however, views Kashmiri separatists as Islamic freedom fighters opposing India's illegitimate control in the region. The Indian government argues that President Bush's call for "global struggle against terrorism" should target Pakistan for its support of Kashmiri separatist groups. India has welcomed the U.S. and British governments' decision to freeze financial assets of Kashmiri separatist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, as a part of the broader campaign against terrorism, and continues to voice its concern about Pakistan's support for these groups.

Indian officials have also voiced concerns over the United States' decision to lift its military sanctions on Pakistan. Renewed supply of U.S. arms to Pakistan, India fears, could be used by Pakistan to mount military pressure along the "line of control" in Kashmir. On October 4th, Indian minister for Human Resource Development, Murli Manohar Joshi, expressed India's concerns over this issue in his meeting with U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill. At the same time, however, India seeks U.S. weapons to add to its recent $4 billion arms deal with Russia and $2 billion Israeli deal. Meanwhile, Pakistan's scarce foreign exchange reserves have stalled its arms purchases.

The rivalry between the two countries also will come to the fore in the hard negotiations regarding post-Taliban Afghanistan--whenever that emerges. Pakistan is keen to exclude India from the negotiations and points out that India is not among the "Six Plus Two" established in 1997 to support UN peace efforts. The forum includes six of Afghanistan's neighbors--China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--as well as Russia and China.

Pakistan is concerned about India's relationship with the Northern Alliance, as it fears it will be used as a proxy to promote India's interests in Afghanistan. India has actively supported the Alliance for the past few years, along with Iran and Russia. Although the Indian government firmly denies allegations that its army officials joined the U.S. army in aiding the Northern Alliance, its senior officials have visited the area several times. It is a safe guess that any intelligence gathered from these trips has been shared with the U.S. military following the September 11 attacks. While India's role in the present war is obviously limited, the Bush administration is keen to have a long-term military alliance with India. The Indian government, while refusing to use the term "military alliance," concedes that there are proposals on a "new strategic framework" and "expanded defense cooperation."

Sources for More Information

India: Natural and Tactical Ally
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111india.html
By Ninan Koshy

Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n28nuclear.html
By Samina Ahmed

Kashmir Conflict Profile
http://www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/kashmir.html
By John Gershman

Walk Softly and Look Ahead in Nuclear South Asia
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0110seamil.html
By Zia Mian

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