Key Points
- The U.S. and Russia possess more nuclear weapons than they want or need.
- Deep weapons reductions from cold war peaks have been made, but even more remains to be done.
- Successful reductions require close cooperation, assistance, and transparency between the two countries.
After the attacks of September 11 and the post-attack rash of anthrax mailings, renewed attention is being paid to the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of additional states and nonstate actors. The vast majority of scenarios involving WMD proliferation invariably stems from the current insecurity characterizing the state of the Russian WMD complex, particularly its nuclear complex.
The U.S. and Russia continue to field massive offensive nuclear arsenals that the leaders of both countries acknowledge do not reflect the changed nature of their strategic relationship. The risks of accidental nuclear exchange and the possible proliferation of Russian nuclear materials, technology, and know-how pose serious threats to global security. The negotiated arms reduction process that showed such promise in the early 1990s failed to fully materialize and make continued strides in reducing the nuclear arsenals of both countries, due in part to the deteriorating U.S.-Russian relationship. Key to this blocked progress were internal disputes between the executive and legislative branches in both Washington and Moscow, which seemed to thwart repeated attempts to break the arms reduction logjam. This stagnation has left both countries with more deployed nuclear weapons than either side needs or wants. The announcements by presidents Bush and Putin that both countries will unilaterally reduce their deployed arsenals, while welcome, leave major security risks unaddressed, including the ability to rearm to cold war levels and the ultimate fate of thousands of weapons and tons of nuclear materials. Furthermore, it will be years before these deep reductions are fully implemented.
Even with their oversized stockpiles, however, the two countries have
made substantial progress in reducing deployed arsenals from their cold
war peaks. The reduction process in Russia has been greatly aided by the
innovative U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, designed to
help Moscow implement its arms control obligations. Not nearly enough
has been done, however, to complete this process or to implement steps
that would guard against the reconstruction of these arsenals, should
the global security picture radically deteriorate.
In 1990, the Soviet Union had 7,652 accountable nuclear weapons on 2,083
launchers. (The term accountable refers to attribution rules established
in the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—START I—signed
by the U.S. and Russia on July 31, 1991.) As of January 2001, Russia had
6,094 accountable weapons on 1,266 launchers. (Ukraine—the only other
former Soviet state to possess START-accountable launchers—had 56
launchers attributed with 208 warheads as of January, 2001. There are
no nuclear warheads, however, in Ukraine.) These numbers do not reflect
the full extent of Russian nuclear reductions, however, since Russia possessed
other nondeployed missile systems and thousands of other nuclear warheads
that were not reflected under the counting rules contained in the START
Treaties. Reliable estimates from nongovernmental organizations (no official
numbers have ever been provided) suggest that the Soviet Union had just
under 12,000 strategic nuclear warheads deployed (that is, mounted on
launchers) in 1990. This number has dropped, thanks in part to U.S. assistance,
to just over 5,600 actual deployed weapons by 2001.
Numbers are only part of the overall picture on reductions, however.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, nearly half of its strategic nuclear
arsenal was spread across the territory of three non-Russian republics.
Of the 7,600 accountable weapons, some 3,400 were deployed within the
borders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
This reality presented a serious challenge to the global security and
international nonproliferation regimes. An intensive legal, financial,
and technical effort by the U.S., assisted by its European allies, however,
succeeded in convincing these states to abandon their nuclear weapons.
Over the course of the 1990s, the nuclear weapons deployed in the non-Russian
republics were returned to Russia, and their associated delivery vehicles
were either returned or dismantled (an ongoing process).
Progress in Russia itself has also been remarkable, given the historic
legacy of mistrust between Moscow and Washington. With U.S. assistance,
Russia has successfully deactivated and/or dismantled 330 land- and sea-based
missiles and bombers and 17 strategic submarines as well as 306 Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) silos and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM) launchers. These missiles were previously loaded with over 1,600
nuclear weapons capable of hitting targets in the United States. The reductions
include the elimination of 116 SS-18 missiles, which formed the backbone
of the Soviet nuclear force that threatened the U.S. during the cold war,
along with 119 older SS-11, 10 SS-17, and 12 SS-19 missiles and 42 heavy
bombers. All of these reductions, along with the destruction or planned
destruction of missile silos, missile fuel, and associated weapons infrastructure,
were implemented with financial assistance from the U.S. Department of
Defense.
Problems with Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
- The current U.S. intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally
threatens to prevent the cooperation needed to implement deep offensive
reductions.
- U.S. opposition to formal, negotiated agreements will make achieving
deep and lasting nuclear reductions harder to achieve.
- Not enough U.S. assistance is available for key areas of security
concerns in Russia.
It is clear, by any accounting, that the U.S. and Russia have made tremendous
progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals. As noted earlier, however,
these impressive reductions in the area of deployed weapons leave both
countries in possession of thousands of nonregulated weapons and nuclear
materials sufficient to produce tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.
Progress is desperately needed in the following areas:
Eliminating Fissile Materials from Nuclear Weapons—The two
countries are successfully implementing—despite numerous complications—an
agreement to dilute and use in nuclear reactors 500 metric tons of weapons-usable
highly enriched uranium (HEU). As of November 2001, the U.S. Enrichment
Corporation had purchased the equivalent of 137 metric tons of HEU, enough
to produce over 5,400 weapons. Although this progress is significant,
it is estimated that Russia possesses as much as 1,000 additional metric
tons of HEU, much of which may not be adequately protected against theft
or diversion.
Not one gram of the 50 tons of Russian weapons-usable plutonium declared
excess, however, has yet been eliminated or rendered less usable in weapons.
U.S. efforts to dispose of its own material are also in serious doubt
due to Bush administration concern over the cost and timeline associated
with the program. International financial support for Russian disposition
efforts has, to date, been completely inadequate to spur major disposal
of this proliferation-prone material.
Monitoring Warhead Elimination—Despite all of the progress
made in dismantling launch platforms, it is impossible to verify that
one single warhead has been eliminated as a result of the negotiated arms
reduction process. Both countries have held extensive discussions about
how monitoring might be implemented, but all efforts have run afoul of
concerns regarding the classified nature of information about nuclear
weapons. Any program to effectively control the size of nuclear arsenals
and limit their potential future magnitude and scope will require a more
comprehensive regime that includes monitoring of warhead dismantlement
and materials elimination as well as launcher destruction. Artificial
barriers to sharing information could be overcome if the decision was
made in both countries that monitoring warhead reduction was more important
than protecting the information both sides already possess. To be sure,
safeguards would need to be established, so that classified warhead information
was not lost to any third countries, but the benefits of warhead elimination
should be apparent to both states.
Downsizing the Russian Weapons Complex—During the cold war,
the Soviet Union developed the largest nuclear weapons production capability
on earth. At one point it actively employed over one million people in
ten secret cities and dozens of research facilities. The end of the superpower
nuclear arms race resulted in a dramatic decline of fortunes for the people
and places formerly engaged in the production and maintenance of this
nuclear arsenal.
Now, instead of providing for Russia’s security, these cities and
experts present a major security challenge both for Russia and for other
countries concerned about the proliferation of weapons technology and
material. Unlike the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, which has been significantly
reduced in size over the past decade, the Russian complex remains largely
unchanged in size and mission since the end of the cold war. Moreover,
it is now accepted even in Russia that the country can no longer afford
the cost of maintaining such a large nuclear weapons infrastructure. For
its part, the U.S. would like to see Russia reduce this complex both as
a way of shrinking Russia’s ability to reverse the current process
of reductions in its nuclear arsenal in order to provide greater predictability
to the future of the bilateral nuclear relationship.
Although the U.S. and other Western nations have embarked on efforts
to employ Russian scientists and redirect Russian facilities to civilian
research, these efforts have been short on cash and have not produced
enough visible successes to engender broad political support. Weapons
complex conversion should receive high-priority funding and be combined
with more innovative inducements such as debt-for-security swaps and tax
incentives for U.S. companies that utilize former Russian weapons experts
in their international ventures.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
- The U.S. and Russia should immediately follow up their unilateral
decision to reduce deployed arsenals with formal negotiations on a new
agreement to regulate both deep offensive nuclear reductions and the
future of missile defense deployment.
- U.S. assistance to Russia—for weapons elimination, nuclear material
disposition, and reducing the Russia nuclear complex—should be
greatly expanded.
The U.S. and Russia are on schedule to implement the terms of the START
I treaty by the implementation deadline of December 31, 2001. The terms
of START I, however, leave both countries with 6,000 accountable deployed
weapons and a multitude of uncounted but activated weapons. Moreover,
Russia and the U.S. have negotiated and signed the START II Treaty. This
agreement, though signed in January 1993, has not yet entered into force
for either country due to the uncertainty regarding Washington’s
interest in developing national missile defenses. The terms of the agreement
limit each country to no more than 3,500 deployed strategic warheads.
These cuts, if implemented, would be deeper than they appear, since the
treaty eliminates the somewhat-misleading counting rules contained in
START I and would result in actual deployed arsenals on both sides to
no more than 3,500 weapons.
But with the joint decisions announced at the November 2001 summit between
presidents Bush and Putin, START II was bypassed. Instead of seeking verifiable
reductions through a treaty arrangement—which would also limit the
types and numbers of deployed weapons—the two leaders have decided
for now to announce unilateral cuts. President Bush announced that the
U.S. would reduce its arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the
end of the decade, and President Putin announced his intention to make
similar, but unspecified, reductions.
The loss of the START II treaty and Helsinki summit provisions is unfortunate
for several reasons, not the least of which is that START II banned the
deployment of land-based missiles with multiple warheads. These missiles
are considered very destabilizing, since they pose attractive targets
to a would-be attacker. Banning such weapons would also help limit the
potential future growth of arsenals, should political circumstances change
radically. Moreover, the Helsinki statement pledged both sides to work
toward agreement on monitoring warhead elimination and to discuss controlling
tactical nuclear weapons. It is not yet known if the announcements of
November 2001 will be codified in a treaty (preferred by Russia, resisted
by the U.S.) and implemented under any meaningful system of verification.
Although President Putin did not make a specific announcement of what
reductions would be made in the Russian nuclear arsenal, below is a summary
of the types of reductions that can be expected based on the rapidly aging
nature of the Russian strategic arsenal. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that if international circumstances worsen, Russia could deploy
an arsenal of almost 4,000 weapons, some four times larger than envisioned
under the cuts described below.
ICBMs—Russia currently deploys 738 ICBMs of 5 different types.
Due to aging, all but one of these systems—the SS-27 Topol-M—will
be retired from service by the end of the decade. This means that Russia
needs to eliminate over 700 currently deployed ICBMs by 2010. The number
of new missiles Russia will deploy, and the number of warheads mounted
on those missiles, will depend on the overall relationship between the
U.S. and Russia. Russia currently lacks the resources to carry out this
elimination mission on its own, and the CTR program has plans to assist
with the elimination of missiles, missile fuel, and silos—provided
the program is funded and the cuts are required by the terms of arms reduction
agreements. CTR also intends to assist Russia in retiring additional nondeployed
missiles. Overall CTR plans would result in the elimination of 1,473 ICBMs
by the year 2007 (including systems already retired).
SLBMs—Russia now has 284 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
deployed on 17 submarines. Given the poor condition of the Russian Navy,
few of these missiles are on station and ready to launch at any given
time. Moreover, the pace of retiring submarine-launched missiles is accelerating,
and Russia is likely to only possess 116 missiles on 7 submarines by the
end of the decade. Elimination of submarines is another important activity
of the CTR program; one that is now entering a contract elimination phase
where U.S. monies are being expended to hire Russian companies to destroy
submarines and missile launch tubes. CTR efforts could result in the elimination
of 41 submarines and 661 missiles, if the program is funded and implemented
as planned.
Bombers—This component of the Russian nuclear triad is the
most likely to remain stable over the course of the next 10 years. By
extending the service lives of current aircraft, Russia is likely to deploy
some 80 strategic bombers throughout the coming decade.
If the U.S-Russian strategic relationship stabilizes and an agreement
can be reached on the future of missile defenses, Russia’s nuclear
arsenal could dip to as low as 1,000 weapons by the end of 2010. This
would allow the U.S. to pursue deep cuts of its own. It is unlikely, however,
that Washington’s current position on missile defenses, the ABM Treaty,
or negotiated arms control will create the environment needed for these
reductions to materialize. Instead, Russia could end up deploying three
times as many strategic warheads, with all of the associated risks for
strategic stability that accompany such an expansion. This is especially
worrisome given the state of the Russian early warning radar system and
the country’s overall security situation.
Jon Brook Wolfsthal is an associate with the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he works on issues related to Russian nuclear security and proliferation threats in North Korea. He is the coeditor of Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, Jon served in the office of nonproliferation and national security in the U.S. Department of Energy during the Clinton administration.
