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The Devil's Brew of Poverty Relief

Conn Hallinan | July 19, 2006

Editor: John Feffer, IRC

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Foreign Policy In Focus

Once a year or so, the topic of poverty climbs onto the agenda for the developed world. Poverty was a theme at last year's Group of 8 (G8) meeting, and it will likely come up again next year when the United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy sit down in Berlin to divvy up the global economy. But this past weekend in St. Petersburg, energy policy (and the Middle East) dominated the G8 discussions, and the topic of poverty barely surfaced.

The venues shift, the faces at the table change, but the hard facts about hunger and privation are not much different than they were a decade ago. In some cases the situation has gotten worse.

  • Over 90% of urban populations have no access to safe drinking water and, by next year, more than half of the world will live in cities. The slums of Mumbai have more people than the entire country of Norway.
  • One third of the world's population—2.3 billion people—have no access to toilets or latrines, a major reason for the 13 million annual deaths ascribed to water-borne diseases.
  • Almost 47% of children in Bangladesh and India are malnourished. Life expectancy in most of Africa is less than 50 years, and in those countries ravaged by AIDS, less than 40 years.
  • Hunger and malnutrition is worse in sub-Saharan Africa than it was a decade ago.

Back in 2000, the United Nations established a Millennium Development Goal to halve global poverty by 2015. The G8's enormous wealth, along with its dominance in world trade, was to play the key role in this worldwide assault on poverty and disease.

But six years into this war on poverty the goals are mired in a devil's brew of self-serving economic policies, lethargic bureaucracy, and outright disingenuousness. Only South America and the Caribbean are even approaching the Millennium targets.

The Downside of Debt Relief

Meeting last year in Gleneagles, Scotland, the G8 pledged to prioritize Africa for debt relief, accelerated aid, and increased trade. A year later, most of those initiatives are bogged down. The only part of the program running on schedule is debt relief, which looks good on paper but translates into very little on the ground. Indeed, debt forgiveness ends up benefiting the donors much of the time.

For instance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development bank cancelled more than $40 billion in debts to nineteen countries. But according to the Financial Times, while the “face value” of the debt was $40 billion, “it cost rich countries just $1.2 billion a year to write off.”

Most of the G8 increase in aid—from $80 billion in 2004 to $106.5 billion in 2005—was in debt write offs. Very little of that money went toward upgrading water systems, improving disease control, or increasing food consumption.

If debt reduction is removed from the aid packages, German aid fell 8%, and France and Britain's dipped 2%. And while U.S. foreign aid jumped 16%, if you subtract Iraq and Afghanistan, it actually declined 4%.

Debt relief is important and allows developing countries to divert interest payments toward upgrading their infrastructures. But it is also a cheap way for developed countries to fulfill their aid obligations.

When it comes to the White House and aid, what you see is not necessarily what you get. For instance, according to David Bryden of the Global AIDS Alliance, the Bush administration's 2005 pledge to “double” aid to Africa translated into only 9% in new spending, and much of that will not appear until after 2008. The rest was funding to which the Congress and the administration were already committed.

Even when aid is promised, it may never appear. In the 2002 Monterrey Consensus—named after the city in Mexico where the conference took place—the G8 pledged that each member would deliver 0.7% of its gross national product in aid. But before the ink was dry, the Bush administration argued that the pledge was simply a “guideline,” even though paragraph 42 of the Consensus binds the signers to the formula.

And if aid does materialize, it may not arrive on time. A recent study by the British-based charity, Save the Children, found that the European Commission—the world's second largest aid donor—along with key members of the G8, were consistently tardy in dispersing their assistance packages. The report blamed the delays on bureaucracy and inefficient administration.

“Delays in disbursing budget support can mean that teachers and health workers don't get paid, or that important medical supplies and school textbooks don't reach the children who need them,” Sarah Hague, Save the Children's economic adviser, told the Financial Times.

The Problem in Washington

A major roadblock to improving the lives of billions of people is the refusal of the United States to consider opening its agricultural markets, even as it insists that developing countries open theirs. This is particularly important in Africa, where 50% of a country's GNP may be in agriculture.

The U.S. government heavily subsidizes crops like corn, soy, cotton, and wheat, so that U.S. wheat sells for 46% below production cost, with corn at 20% below cost. If Brazil or South Korea were to try to do the same thing with steel, they would be accused of “dumping” on the international market.

The G8 members of the European Union (EU) argue that if developing countries remove their tariffs, they will be overwhelmed with cheap U.S. produce, which will drive their farmers out of business, encourage uneven regional development, and do very little to aid the poor.

Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a case in point. Mexican fruit and vegetable exports increased 50% under NAFTA, enriching big landowners in the country's north. But U.S.-subsidized corn is swamping small farmers in the south. Some two million farmers have left the land, and 18 million subsist on less than two dollars a day, accelerating rural poverty and helping to fuel the growth of immigration.

Mexican wheat production has fallen 50%, and U.S. imports now account for 99% of Mexico's soybeans, 80% of its rice, 30% of its chicken, beef, and pork, and 33% of its beans. When Mexican cattle growers switched from sorghum to cheaper U.S. corn, they put the local sorghum industry out of business.

While the United States demands the removal of foreign barriers, it maintains tariffs on sugar and cotton, two crops that are, coincidentally, central to the key electoral battleground states of Florida and Texas.

According to the Financial Times, “new research suggests that the very poorest of the least developed countries (LDCs) could make big gains in exports and growth if the United States followed the EU and opened its markets to LDC.”

Free trade has been a disaster for most the developing world. In Latin America, where until recently the free trade “Washington Consensus” held sway, growth from 1987 to 2002 averaged 1.5%. To put a dent in poverty, Latin America requires a growth rate of at least 4% or more.

The EU is also part of the problem. While it has been critical of U.S. intransigence on tariffs, the EU has kept out a number of LDC exports over health issues, and it subsidizes its farmers as well. In all, the developed world hands out nearly $1 billion in farm subsidies each day.

Reforming Food Aid

Food aid policy in the United States, for which the total 2005 budget was $1.6 billion, is largely dictated by an “iron triangle” of agribusiness, shipping magnates, and charity foundations. Studies demonstrate that the most efficient way to deliver aid is to purchase food locally rather than buy and ship it from the donor country.

But Washington insists that food aid must come from the United States, be shipped on U.S. carriers, and distributed by agencies like CARE and Catholic Relief Services. As a result, 60 cents out of every aid dollar goes to middlemen for transport, storage, and distribution.

Four companies and their subsidiaries, led by agri-giants Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill, sell more than half the food used by the Agency for International Development. Five big shipping companies dominate the transport side of the equation. And relief agencies, like CARE and Catholic Relief Services, generate up to half their budgets by selling some of the aid food.

Oxfam has long lobbied for putting cash directly into the hands of local farmers rather than handing it out to agricultural and transport corporations, but most U.S. aid groups support the current system and so has the U.S. Congress. CARE, however, recently broke ranks and endorsed the Oxfam initiative.

The recent G8 meeting largely tabled the issue for this year, but the problem is not going to go away. Poverty is an affliction of the underdeveloped world, but the solutions to it lie in altering the policies of the developed world.

Conn Hallinan is a foreign policy analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and a lecturer in journalism at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

 

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Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a project of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). Copyright © 2009, Institute for Policy Studies.

Recommended citation:
Conn Hallinan, "The Devil's Brew of Poverty Relief" (Silver City, NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 19, 2006).

Web location:
http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3374

Production Information:
Author(s): Conn Hallinan
Editor(s): John Feffer, IRC
Production: Chellee Chase-Saiz, IRC

Latest Comments & Conversation Area
Editor's Note: FPIF.org editors read and approve each comment. Comments are checked for content only; spelling and grammar errors are not corrected and comments that include vulgar language or libelous content are rejected.
 
Name John Rivera Date: Jul 21, 2006
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) would like to request that a correction be posted to your article "The Devil's Brew of Poverty Relief," posted July 19 on the Foreign Policy in Focus website.

In your article you state: "And relief agencies, like CARE and Catholic Relief Services, generate half their budgets by selling some of the food aid." This statement is incorrect and we ask that a correction notice be posted on the website.

The process you describe in the article, in which NGOs like CARE or CRS sell some of their food aid to generate cash for development programs, is called monetization. According to our figures, monetization accounted for between 7% and 12% of our operating revenues between FY2004 and FY2006, a far cry from half our budget.

In Barrett and Maxwell's "Food Aid After Fifty Years," a comprehensive and critical study of food aid practices, the authors analyze monetization by the percentages of non-emergency food aid converted by NGOs. These figures do not include total U.S. food aid -- they exclude commodities supplied by the World Food Program and emergency shipments, which account for an increasing percentage of U.S. food aid. In their review of the data, CRS and CARE had monetization revenues in 2000-2001 that were 10% and 13.4% of total revenues, respectively.

Perhaps you were misled by the graph on page 101 of Barrett and Maxwell, which showed a monetization rate of 70 percent. This rate accounts for volume, not value, and refers to the percentage of non-emergency food aid under Title II that was sold, not to agencies' operating budgets. In addition, the figures used in this graph exclude emergency food aid, which now accounts for as much as 75% of U.S. Title II food aid.

On the issue of purchasing food locally, we agree that the practice is sometimes more "efficient," particularly in a food crisis where there are delays or breaks in the pipeline. CRS and CARE have been inaccurately portrayed in several news accounts as being opposed to the use of cash-based food aid to make local purchases, allegedly because it benefits our financial bottom line as members of the "Iron Triangle" (Barrett and Maxwell's sobriquet, picked up by you). In fact, CRS has made several large cash purchases in recent years, particularly to address food shortages in Niger, Zambia and Malawi. We purchase food locally when it is feasible and appropriate.

But there are other considerations we must take into account that often make importing food a better option. These considerations include:

1) Whether there are adequate stocks of appropriate food to be delivered to the victims of emergencies. In much of the developing world, such stocks are not available locally.

2) The local purchase of commodities for emergency food aid may drive up the local price. It may force people who were not food insecure to either cut their consumption due to the price rise, or to become recipients of food aid themselves.

3) The issue of quality control. The U.S. has standards in place, but many developing countries either don't have the same standards or don't enforce them. For example, sacks of beans will often contain stones to increase weight and volume.

4) The law of unintended consequences. Large purchases can skew local markets. If there are large purchases in one year, this can establish expectations for the next planting season. If the purchases aren't repeated, there could be an oversupply of crops leading to a subsequent drop in prices. This would likely reduce farmers' income and create more poor people.

From the beginnings of Title II Food Aid in the 1950s, CRS has been one of the largest non-governmental partners in the management of the U.S. Government's food aid programs. We have distributed millions of metric tons of U.S. commodities overseas for the past 50 years, including over 500,000 metric tons in FY2004. Through these efforts CRS has helped millions of people in the developing world fend off hunger, malnutrition, and starvation.

CRS' sole motivation is helping the poorest of the poor, and suggestions that we are motivated by self-interest are unfair and wrong. I invite you to become more familiar with the complex issue of how we use food aid, as well as with our work in 99 countries around the world.

Sincerely,
John Rivera
Senior Writer
Catholic Relief Services
209 W. Fayette St.
Baltimore, MD 21201
410-951-7399
jrivera@crs.org

Name Tristan Anderson Date: Jul 27, 2006
US food AID is often used as part of US foriegn policy. To accomplish this goal the US government partners with huge mega charities. These groups make the majority of their money from the US government and have the preservation of the status quo at the top of their agenda. On the topic of buying food locally The CRS post above does not endorse this idea only says that they have done it at times. The reasons given for opposing it include raising food prices and expectations that are subsequently unmet. In countries where the majority of people are farmers, rising food prices can be benificial to the majority. This is the case in most areas with famines. Giving poor farmers money one year and none the next is far batter than the "You don't want to get their hopes up" view. The main reason that buying food locally is better than food imports is economic. Food is eaten and then gone and people can become hungry again. When money is added to an economy it has an affect of moving around the economy and creating about ten times as much. That is, the money goes to a farmer who then buys clothes and the taylor buys some other goods and services and so on. This benifits the economy of the country facing disaster but cuts US corporations out of the loop. The US highly subsidises major crops (agricultural commodities) then dumps them on poor countries any way it can. This often includes (or is solely) genetically modified foods even if the recipient countries oppose genetic engineering.

The huge charities become complicit, weather they mean to or not, with US foriegn policy, gaint subsidised corporate farms, genetic engineering corporations, and shipping companies. When they do not question this model but only make excuses it occurs to me that they may have interests other than starving people's at heart.

Tristan Anderson Action For Local/Global Justice trismegatus@riseup.net

Name Conn Hallinan Date: Jul 28, 2006
Dear Mr. Rivera:

The figure "half their budgets" was taken from a New York Times "poverty memo" article authored by Celia W. Dugger, Oct. 12, 2005 entitled "African Food for Africa's Starving is Roadblocked in Congress." It does draw on Barrett's work. I quote the following two paragraphs from the article:

"Members of Congress often applaud the benefits of food aid for American farmers, but that is not how it really works, as Christopher R. Barrett, a Cornell University economist and co-author of "Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role," noted "It's the middlemen who enjoy most of the gains," he said, "not the farmers."

Mr. Barrett's research has established a third side to the triangle of interests with a deep stake in the status quo: nonprofit aid organizations. He and his co-author, Daniel Maxwell, found that at least seven of them, including Catholic Relief Services and CARE itself, depended on food aid for a quarter to half their budgets in 2001. Those groups distribute food in poor countries. But what is less well known is that they have also become grain traders, selling substantial amounts of the donated food on local markets in poor countries to generate tens of millions of dollars for their antipoverty programs."

I originally put the words "up to half their budgets" but the "up to" was left out. I do apologize for the elimination of those two words, and I am at a loss to explain why they did not go into the final version. However, Barrett and Maxwell, as well as the New York Times, stand by the figures of from 25 percent to 50 percent, which seem to be considerably more than the ones you present.

I am puzzled by your response to the local purchasing issue. You write that you agree that the practice is sometimes more "efficient," and go on to suggest that you do not follow the policy and do make local purchases. But you then present a list of reasons why you oppose local purchasing (all of which have been challenged by Oxfam). The column said you support the policy; it did not delve into your specific practices in any given situation. Is CRS on record being opposed to the current U.S. policy discouraging the purchase of local food? (If such purchases might make things worse, of course one would not pursue them). Your letter says you are not opposed to "cash-based" food purchases and do them on occasion. So are you in agreement with Oxfam and CARE in their opposition to current U.S. policy? I might also point out that local, cash-based purchases put the money where it is needed, as opposed to the bank accounts of Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland.

One final word on this: You use the term "monetization," a rather opaque term for describing the selling of food aid to raise money. I think most people would be quite surprised—maybe even shocked—to find out that food destined for starving people was being sold to generate funds for other programs. Taxpayers might even approve of this practice, but a term like: "monetization" is not likely to alert them to its existence.

Nowhere in my column did I suggest that CRS or any other aid agency was motivated by "self-interest," although the current policies do allow them to generate funds through selling foodstuffs. The column was quite clear that the problem lies with the policies of the developed world, not the relief agencies. That said, could relief be delivered more efficiently and effectively? I would argue yes. Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill are in the aid business because it fits their bottom line. The same goes for the shipping companies. These companies are profiting off of human misery, a misery, I might point out, whose origins lie in the long history of colonial exploitation and manipulation. Africa was not a basket case until the slave trade and colonialization turned it into one. People in the developed world are still making a buck off it, which was the point of my column.

Conn Hallinan

Name kumar Date: Feb 13, 2007
conn
any charity is a money making business, either by an authority or by bueraocrat. so as you said middle man eats more. haliburtan like companies grow like that. fortunate this time that you did not get any quote from religion. those who barks even just don't do anything. anybody can speak and gain applauses. your anger and righteous cunning indigantion is also a money making business sitting at the comfort of luxury. There are millions of poor you can't make big difference there. but you can make it one kids life in africa or asia or even new orleans or mississippi. so that first. sponser at least one kid's expense from US itself first. then speak big. there are people who silently do it what ever they can and see changes in one famlies life. bark bark bark
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