Japan is confronting a formidable dilemma: whether or not to support the nuclear deal concluded between the United States and India on July 20, 2007. Japan’s decision could risk discrediting its carefully accumulated nonproliferation and disarmament credentials. The decision could also affect its national identity.
India has never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), both of which Japan values as cornerstones of the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. Japan is particularly disturbed that the U.S.-India agreement does not include any specific countermeasure in the case of India’s nuclear weapons testing.
And yet, despite being the only country to experience nuclear devastation, Japan has been extremely cautious in expressing its attitude toward the nuclear deal. It has merely repeated that it will “fully examine and carefully consider the effects on the nonproliferation regime.” In other words, Tokyo has been wise enough to avoid further controversy but not strong enough to maintain its stance as a champion of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
Indeed, former Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to India suggests that Tokyo is ready to support the agreement. Although Abe cautiously avoided mentioning the deal explicitly, the two countries agreed in their joint statement that nuclear energy is safe and important for sustainable development. The leaders from the two countries also agreed to enhance further economic cooperation. That Abe was accompanied by influential industrialists in major nuclear industry sectors suggests that Japan intends to expand nuclear cooperation.
After the defeat of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the recent elections and Abe’s subsequent resignation, the Japanese Cabinet was again reshuffled. Under the new prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, the Japanese government has not signaled any changes in its policy toward the U.S-India nuclear deal. So far, this issue has not been adequately debated between the ruling and opposition parties in Japan.
India’s pressure on Japan to support the deal has been vocal from the beginning. Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Japan last year, as well as external affairs minister Mukherjee’s visit this March, proves India’s eagerness to get Japan’s consent. The United States, too, is eager to win Japanese approval for the pact. Whenever the relevant U.S. and Japanese governmental officials meet, they discuss further cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, which has included support for the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy in interested countries.
Despite this pressure, it is in Japan’s interest – and the world’s interest – to treat the U.S.-India nuclear deal with a degree of skepticism.
A Changing Position?
Japan was particularly critical of India after the nuclear tests of 1998. It not only condemned the test but also imposed sanctions against India. Japan also sponsored the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation and issued a historical report that framed the nuclear tests in South Asia as an attack on the NPT.
In the NPT forums, Japan always reiterates the importance of the universality of the regime among like-minded countries. If Japan joins the United States in accepting an exception to this universality, the NPT will soon be full of many other exceptions, including disarmament obligations that could lead the treaty to becoming a titular statement at best. Japan must find a way to prevent the nonproliferation regime from being further weakened.
At the same time, India is an emerging economic power. So, it is natural for Japan to enhance its ties with New Delhi, particularly during 2007, the year of “Japan-India Friendship.” By tightening its relationship with New Delhi, Tokyo implicitly is warning China, a strong regional rival to both India and Japan. In his book Toward a Beautiful Nation, former Prime Minister Abe foretold that “it will not be surprising if in 10 years’ time, Japan-India relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China relations.”
However, the issue Japan is now confronting is deeper than “friendship.” Japan is the staunchest nonproliferation regime advocate. If Japan supports this deal at the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the rest of the undecided members could easily follow suit.
Japan’s Options
Sooner or later, Japan needs to express its attitude more explicitly. Japan’s commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation should be preserved even if it causes short-term friction between Japan and India as well as the United States. In the long run, a commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament remains the most important element of Japan’s national identity and interest. At a time when confidence in the NPT regime is at an all-time low, Japan’s heightened scrutiny of the U.S.-India nuclear deal would give the regime a much-needed shot in the arm.
If India is allowed access to the global civil nuclear market remaining outside the NPT regime, this could reduce the incentives for non-nuclear weapon states inside the NPT regime to remain non-nuclear. But India is not likely to join the NPT in the foreseeable future. As such, Japan might decide to support this exception in the NSG as the next best political option.
Such a decision would be a mistake. Instead, Japan should use its economic leverage to pressure India to sign and ratify the CTBT. For almost a decade, Japan has submitted a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly urging the early entry into force of the treaty. Only three countries voted against the disarmament resolution Japan submitted last year: the United States, India, and North Korea. Japan can use the carrot of the nuclear deal and the stick of reduced economic cooperation to push India to at least abstain in the resolution.
If the US- India nuclear agreement unambiguously stated that the United States can terminate and cease the deal should India conduct a nuclear weapons test, and if the agreement clearly required all of India’s nuclear facilities to be placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, former Prime Minister Abe might have been able to express his clearer support of the agreement during his August visit to India. In fact, Abe commented in an interview that the agreement between India and the IAEA should respond to the concerns of Japan and the international community.
Japan will continuously enhance its efforts for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in every aspect including promoting the early entry into force of the CTBT and strengthening IAEA safeguards as well as international export controls. Japan can never escape from its responsibility as a champion of nuclear disarmament. Only by making hard decisions, as in the case of the U.S.-India deal, can Japan maintain this worthy identity.
Masako Toki is Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). The views expressed in this article are purely personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization she belongs.
