Israel's True Intentions in Removing Arafat

Global Beat Syndicate, 12/04/01
R.S. Zaharna (links to online Media Guide)

There may be time left for Israel to confess to its true intentions in the Palestinian territories. The sustained and myopic focus on the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat has little to do with stopping "terrorism." What removing Arafat will do is induce a Palestinian civil war and, by extension, give Israel a pretext for re-occupying the Palestinian territories. The campaign behind this strategy has been ongoing, but it has rapidly intensified since the U.S. military action in Afghanistan. As the U.S. focuses its efforts on Osama bin Laden, Israel appears to be making parallel moves against Arafat.

The collapse of the Camp David talks in July 2000 represented the initial steps in a sustained campaign directed at isolating and removing Arafat from power. The Palestinian leader himself was reluctant to attend the talks at Camp David because he knew the mood on the Palestinian street was unfavorable to doing so. However, under intense pressure from Clinton and despite repeated American assurances that the Palestinian leader would not be held solely accountable for potential setbacks, that is exactly what happened. Arafat was personally singled out as the reason for the failure at Camp David. Only months later did American officials privy to the talks reveal that it was the Israeli delegation that stalled. However, the campaign against Arafat had already taken root and protests to the contrary fell on deaf ears.

When a new Palestinian uprising began in late September 2000, Arafat was again labeled as the instigator of the renewed violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Analogies were made that, like a faucet, Arafat could turn Palestinian violence on and off. The more Israel focused on Arafat and Palestinian "violence," the more Israel was able to obscure the brutal realities of its military occupation.

In fact, Israeli actions in early spring 2001 clearly suggest that in the name of "maintaining security," the Sharon government had several longer-term strategic purposes. First, through cordoning off the major Palestinian towns from each other and constructing a network of check points and trenches, the Israeli military was able to effectively isolate major segments of the Palestinian population from each other. The "sovereignty" of the Palestinian Authority was reduced to noncontiguous pockets of limited control.

Second, the Israeli began incursions into Palestinian-controlled territories, bulldozing land and property bordering on jointly controlled Palestinian-Israeli territory. Again, the pretext was security; Palestinian homes and territory were being used as a staging ground for attacks against Israelis. The effect, however, was that Israel created a convenient staging ground for itself should it find it necessary to launch more sustained military strikes in the future.

Third, the Israelis began a direct assault on Palestinian leaders, with the first assassinations beginning as early as November 2000. After initial American and international pressure, they subsided briefly only to be renewed with greater intensity in the late spring. In August, after extensive reports of civilian deaths, the assassinations again came under international censure. Then came September 11. The debate, like other political and ethical considerations, fell silent.

None of the Israeli tactics have reduced Palestinian "violence" or increased Israeli security. In fact, they have had the opposite effect. The tightened Israeli control around the Palestinian towns had paralyzed the Palestinian economy, creating an increasingly desperate population. The military incursions have undermined the Palestinian Authority's power to protect Palestinian land and lives, and have systematically erased the diplomatic gains from Oslo. The Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders have emboldened to a new generation of Palestinian youths who draw parallels from Israeli actions, which to the youths legitimize reciprocal retribution. The reality on the ground is that Arafat does not and cannot control Palestinian suicide bombers or attacks against Israelis. Both are the direct result of the continued Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories. So long as the Israeli occupation continues, Palestinians will persist in their efforts to end that occupation, by whatever means.

If Arafat is not able to "control the violence," why is there continued pressure for him to do so? If one looks at the campaign strategically, the end result is the same. In Israel's assassination policy of targeting Palestinian "leaders," the distinction between Palestinian "leaders" and "leadership" is strategic. Once it becomes acceptable to systematically target and assassinate Palestinian leaders associated with "terrorism"--in the name of Israeli security--the leap to targeting and assassinating the Palestinian leadership, i.e. Arafat, is not that difficult to make. In recent days, that leap has been made.

Dr. R.S. Zaharna is a Middle East expert with Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org) and is an assistant professor of public communication at American University who served as a media analyst for the Palestinian delegation to the Washington peace talks in 1991-1993.

COPYRIGHT 2001, Global Beat Syndicate

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