FPIF Special Report
September 2004

A Secure America
in a Secure World

III. A Failed Policy

After Sept. 11, 2001, Americans began to think of national security in terms of ensuring their individual safety and protecting the American homeland. Suddenly, foreign policy and military policy became not just about the U.S. role in global affairs but about the security of Americans at home. Foreign policy has entered popular consciousness in such a way that it is no longer about distant lands and their peoples but about U.S. families, homes, communities, and workplaces. For a short time, defense policy was redefined as defending America and Americans rather than as force projection. Moreover, there remains a popular consensus—disregarded at the upper levels of the Bush administration—that international cooperation and multilateralism constitute the only viable approach to preventing and combating terrorism. In other words, most Americans know we cannot do it alone.

There exists no universally accepted definition of terrorism, nor is there a single definition shared by the U.S. government. The Bush administration’s definition of terrorism (stated in its Homeland Security Strategy) is adequate: “any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.” For the record, this means that both states and nonstate entities can be guilty of committing acts of terrorism. Also, by such a definition, the United States government and its allies have already engaged in and supported acts of terrorism.1

Although most acts of terrorism are politically motivated, political grievances do not justify terrorism. All acts of terrorism are crimes, and terrorists retain sole responsibility for their actions. If a state of war existed, many activities would also be judged as violations of the rules of war. Worldwide, the number of international terrorist attacks has declined in recent years compared to the mid-1980s, but the lethality of such attacks has increased. According to the Department of State, the annual number of international terrorist attacks peaked at 666 incidents in 1987 and had declined to 348 by 2001, declining further to 208 in 2003. But the number of significant terrorist events (as defined by the State Department) in 2003 was 175, which represents a 20-year high. Casualties resulting from international terrorist attacks during 2001 were the highest ever recorded—3,572 persons killed and 1,083 injured. (In 2003 the number of people killed was 652). The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, represented the most lethal international terrorist attack ever. Since then, significant terrorist attacks (as classified by the U.S. Department of State in its Pattern of Global Terrorism) have increased.2

Why We Shouldn’t Fight a “Global War on Terrorism”

Unfortunately, the Bush administration has sustained an emphasis on military responses to terrorism, framing the efforts as a “global war on terrorism.” This declaration of war is a mistake for two reasons.

First, it is meaningless to say we are fighting a “war on terror.” Terrorism is a particular type of political violence. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, declaring a war on terror is like declaring a war on blitzkrieg.3 It is more accurate to say that the United States is engaged in fighting a particular group of Sunni extremists. That group—al-Qaida and its sympathizers—has transformed itself into a dual identity: a cadre and a movement.4 The cadre is still mostly at large and able to communicate, plan, and mobilize support, although less easily than before Sept. 11, 2001. The movement is a geographically and politically diverse network oriented around a common set of images and rhetoric that numbers at least 18,000 according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.5

Second, many of the real successes in combating al-Qaida in the two years since Sept. 11, 2001, have come from international cooperation on intelligence and from police work and domestic investigations. War—the use of military force—has been secondary at best. In the case of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which is presented (falsely in our view) as part of the “global war on terrorism,” it has been directly counterproductive. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes, the impact on al-Qaida of the war in Iraq has been to “accelerate recruitment.”6

The Bush administration has failed to provide a compelling strategic vision that would unite Americans and the world in an effort to combat terrorism.7 It has produced a wide array of strategy papers dealing in whole or in part with terrorism, such as the National Security Strategy, the Strategy to Combat Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy, Homeland Security Strategy, Maritime Security Strategy, Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy, and Cyberspace Security Strategy. But though these strategies “identify goals, subordinate objectives and specific activities, they generally do not discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measures—elements that are desirable for evaluating progress, obtaining results, and ensuring effective oversight.”8 In a report released just prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, the General Accounting Office noted that “the federal government lacks a national strategy to guide resource investment for combating terrorism.” That assessment still applies nearly three years after the attacks, and as we discuss below, many of the Bush administration’s priorities in pursuing the “global war on terrorism” have increased, rather than decreased, our vulnerabilities.

Success and Failure

There have been some successes: improved airline and border security, a crackdown on terrorist financing, improved international cooperation in sharing intelligence, the arrest of high-level al-Qaida figures, and the disruption of planned attacks. Also, the war in Afghanistan succeeded in disorganizing the top leadership of al-Qaida and in ousting the Taliban.

But some of these successes have come at high costs, and the failures and weaknesses of the Bush approach to combating terrorism appear to overwhelm the successes. The costs of the “war on terrorism” relative to democracy and domestic civil liberties are paralleled by new alliances with repressive regimes abroad. The administration’s efforts to combat terrorism are hampered by the hypocrisy demonstrated when it shelters perpetrators of state terrorism and aids repressive regimes. Furthermore, the administration has weakened the international legal framework essential to creating a multilateral effort to combat terrorism, and it has failed to address the political contexts—failed states, repressive regimes—that enable and facilitate terrorism. Finally, the invasion and occupation of Iraq resulted in the creation of a new recruiting vehicle for al-Qaida while essential homeland security measures are shelved due to the ever-growing cost of this unnecessary and counterproductive war. The price tag so far for that misguided operation is $151 billion and rising.9 The U.S. is simply on the wrong path when it comes to reducing the threats posed by terrorists.

Six factors explain the failure of the White House’s approach:

A. Overemphasis on Military Responses

First, the Bush administration has emphasized military responses to terrorism, framing the efforts as a “war on terrorism.” And it has used legitimate concerns about terrorism to justify a massive increase in military spending that has little or nothing to do with combating terrorism. According to the Center for Defense Information, only about one-third of the increase in the Pentagon’s FY2003 budget (when compared with pre-Sept. 11 budgets) appears to be directed at programs and activities closely related to homeland security or counterterrorism operations.10

The Pentagon’s spending priorities downplay nonmilitary approaches, even though many of the real successes in combating al-Qaida in the two years since the Sept. 11 attacks have come from international intelligence sharing and police work. By enshrining preventive war as a policy doctrine in the national security strategy in general and for combating terrorism in particular, the administration has actually reduced rather than increased U.S. security in several ways. For starters, it reinforces the image of the United States as eager to use military force and willing to do so without regard for international law and legitimacy. This can make it more difficult for the United States to gain international support for its use of force, and it may lead others to resist U.S. foreign policy goals more broadly, including efforts to fight terrorism. Advocating preemption also warns potential enemies to hide the very assets that Washington might wish to take action against. Finally, if the United States enshrines preemption as a core policy doctrine, it legitimates its adoption by other countries, which increases overall global instability and reduces security, as other countries are emboldened to justify attacks on their enemies as preemptive in nature.

B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing

Second, the Bush administration has failed to facilitate the sharing of information among intelligence agencies and between federal and local agencies. In Congress’ Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, the initial and final reports of the independent 9-11 Commission clearly identified the failure of intelligence agencies to “connect the dots” and to share information between themselves.11 The Bush administration has responded by creating the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence. The new TTIC has several problems that will reduce its effectiveness and undermine accountability. Placed under the authority of the DCI rather than under the secretary of homeland security, the TTIC is disconnected from those with direct responsibility for safeguarding homeland security. This impedes its ability to develop an effective, integrated approach for countering the terrorist threat to the United States. The TTIC also lacks effective congressional oversight, since its director is appointed by the DCI without congressional approval. Moreover, the FBI needs a massive overhaul if it is to effectively coordinate domestic intelligence operations, due to the fact that it remains at its core a crime-fighting agency.

The failure of the TTIC to constitute an effective response to terrorism is recognized by groups across the political spectrum.12 It has already failed in two of its most basic tasks: producing reliable data and sharing information with agencies responsible for implementing counterterrorist activities or monitoring the performance of counterterrorism programs and policies. The fact that the Department of State had to correct its Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003—the first report whose data was gathered by the TTIC—does not bode well for the collection of reliable intelligence data. In addition, despite repeated requests, in early 2004 the TTIC had still not made available to the Department of State and the Congressional Research Service an unclassified version of its database.13

C. Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties

Third, the Bush administration has undermined democracy at home by rolling back governmental transparency in a manner that reduces accountability and unnecessarily infringes on civil liberties. The White House has impeded the investigation by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States of the conditions that facilitated the Sept. 11 attacks, it has failed to declassify important documents regarding possible ties between Saudi Arabian citizens and the Sept. 11 attackers, and it has compromised the integrity of the Environmental Protection Agency by pressuring it to alter its reports on environmental health in lower Manhattan in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

On the civil liberties front, Attorney General John Ashcroft has demonstrated a consistent willingness to spearhead what a broad range of citizen groups—from the American Civil Liberties Union to the National Rifle Association—have viewed as an intrusive and dangerous effort to expand the government’s ability to spy on its citizens. It was only with a broad range of citizen mobilization that the most repressive elements of the initial draft of the USA PATRIOT Act were deleted from final legislation.

Some provisions of the act, such as those relating to money laundering and aviation security, are laudable. But as legal analysts David Cole and James Dempsey have noted, the USA PATRIOT Act imposes guilt by association on immigrants; authorizes executive detention on the suspicion that an immigrant has at some point engaged in a violent crime or provided humanitarian aid to a proscribed organization; allows the government to deny entry to aliens for “pure speech” reasons, resurrecting a relic of the McCarthy era; expands the government’s authority to conduct criminal searches and wiretaps without first showing probable cause that the subject is engaged in criminal activity; sanctions secret searches in cases that have nothing to do with terrorism; gives the CIA access to the power of grand juries; reduces judicial oversight of intrusive information-gathering activities; and expands the access of the FBI to a broad range of records.14 Finally, the Bush administration weakens U.S. claims to support democracy and the rule of law through its use of military commissions to try “enemy combatants.”

D. Undermining Homeland Security

Fourth, current policy undermines domestic security. Despite some successes in improving airline and border protection, the Bush administration’s plan for homeland security is flawed in both strategic approach and resource allocation.

In addition to the unnecessary restriction of civil liberties discussed above, the White House has unduly relied on immigration restrictions to address border security and has been lax in protecting critical infrastructure, an estimated 85 percent of which is owned or controlled by the private sector. The Bush administration has taken a laissez-faire approach to the private sector’s role in homeland security, expecting that voluntary efforts—rather than regulations—will be sufficient to achieve domestic safety objectives. But even in the absence of terrorist attacks, it is clear that national security will not be provided through voluntary initiatives alone, as demonstrated by a series of system failures ranging from blackouts in the Northeast in 2003 to recurring computer virus outbreaks. As a classic public good, adequate security cannot be produced by the market.15

On the resource side the Bush administration has failed to meet the basic needs of emergency responders, has underfunded critical agencies like the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Coast Guard, and has created new unfunded mandates for local governments, forcing them to transfer scarce funds from social services and public safety to homeland security tasks. For example, only about $750 million in federal funds apparently was directed to the nation’s three million emergency responders in 2002 for training and equipment needed to react to terrorist attacks, although the administration had promised $3.5 billion. There is also inadequate funding for basic services in the fight against terrorism. For example, the administration’s 2004 budget included $2 billion in cuts from crime prevention and public safety programs, and the proposed FY2005 proposed budget cuts $805 million from emergency responders over FY2004 levels.16

Moreover, the administration’s anti-terrorism programs in the public health sector are not strengthening the public health infrastructure in an integrated way but are instead creating new funding and program categories, exacerbating existing fragmentation. For example the administration has diverted funds from multipurpose infrastructure-building to single-agent preparedness (namely smallpox), according to the Institute of Medicine. The focus on bioterrorism has diverted state and local health departments from other urgent public health work on a range of issues.17 One report suggests that the diversion of public health resources to instead focus on bioterrorism contributed to the worst outbreak of tuberculosis in Seattle in 30 years.18

E. Weakening International Institutions

Fifth, White House posturing is weakening international institutions. The Bush administration has been hostile to a whole set of multilateral institutions that are central to enhancing global law and security, from the International Criminal Court to nearly all multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, including the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the ABM Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening these agreements, however, represents one of the best means of preventing access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the Bush administration has been unable or unwilling to demand greater funding for bilateral WMD threat reduction programs, which now total about $1 billion annually.

The Bush administration’s campaign against the International Criminal Court is a good example of how to mobilize the political will to link other country’s positions on human rights issues with military aid. The tragic dimension is that this linkage is serving to undermine rather than strengthen international law and is weakening U.S. claims to be a world leader in the struggle for human rights. The revelations of torture and abuse in Afghanistan and at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the efforts to unilaterally exempt U.S. counterterror operations from the Geneva Conventions, the return or transport of terrorists or other national security suspects to countries where torture is a widespread or systematic problem,19 and the continued legal limbo of detainees in Guantanamo all reflect a cavalier approach to global human rights and international law. Such behavior makes hypocrisy and double standards appear to be the norm.

F. Failure to Attack Root Causes

Sixth, the Bush administration has failed to address the root causes of terrorism and the social and political contexts in which terrorism thrives, such as failed states, repressive regimes, and the role of poverty—global wealth inequality can create conditions of support for terrorist acts and can provide an environment for recruits, even though poverty doesn’t cause terrorism.

These strategic flaws are easily visible in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which recognizes that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” However, the 2002 NSS offers no vision of how to deal with failed or failing states, let alone a concrete set of policies or programs aimed at addressing the security challenges posed by failed states. Administration officials are unwilling to recognize a need for the kind of “nation building” activities that they denigrated prior to the Sept. 11 attacks. Such efforts would require a more systematic and constructive engagement with the United Nations and with other countries, a redirection of resources within the Pentagon toward various forms of peace operations for the military, and an expansion of nonmilitary humanitarian and development programs.

At the national level, the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy identified failed states as a critical U.S. security concern in part due to their links with international terrorism and in part because failed states harbor other global security threats such as transnational crime, drugs, and HIV/AIDS. Despite this warning in the NSS, the White House has neither articulated a comprehensive strategy for engaging failed states nor identified the scale of resources needed to do so. A delicate balance of unilateral and multilateral approaches would need to characterize such a operations, which could easily conflict with the administration’s current emphasis on promoting free trade agreements.

Washington has launched new foreign aid efforts, but much of the debate has bypassed failed or weak states and focused on “good performers,” democracy promotion efforts (a difficult task in failed states), and allies in the war on terrorism. Such restrictions may actually facilitate further state failure rather than strengthening the mechanisms of governance necessary to provide basic security and legitimacy. The foreign economic policy debate needs to be enriched to incorporate the creative use of aid, trade, and investment in creating the conditions necessary for strengthening weak and failed states and thus enhancing overall governance.

As the first target in the post-Sept. 11 war on terrorism, Afghanistan represents a cautionary tale. Since the successful toppling of the Taliban and the disorganization of al-Qaida’s leadership, the Bush administration has not demonstrated a willingness to commit the human and financial resources necessary to promote reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, failing to even request any monies for Afghanistan in its initial budget request for FY 2004. This approach is shortsighted for three reasons. First, it repeats the same errors of the late 1980s, when Washington backed the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. While U.S. support did not “create” al-Qaida, that assistance did create the conditions that facilitated the creation of al-Qaida, destroyed the Afghan state, and internationalized the extremist jihadist movement. Second, it ignores the need for strengthening the Afghan state so as to undermine the remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban, subordinating the warlords to central control, and providing an enabling environment for an effective and broad-based reconstruction and development program. Third, it reinforces the view that the U.S. war in Afghanistan was about vengeance, further undermining what remaining reservoirs of support America has in the Arab and Muslim world.20

In an equally troubling development, the Bush administration has taken advantage of the crisis surrounding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to pursue an expanded free trade agenda justified on the grounds that free trade leads to growth, which reduces poverty and thereby reduces terrorism. It has pursued this agenda despite the evidence that terrorism is driven by political and ideological grievances rather than economic injustices. The White House argument is also based on the unfounded claim that the currently dominant approach to economic globalization reduces poverty. According to the World Bank, extreme poverty increased in every region of the developing world outside Asia during the past decade, a period when nearly all countries pursued reforms aimed at opening their countries to the global economy.

Finally, the Bush administration has failed to address the issue of energy security and to reorient domestic U.S. energy policy to promote conservation and the use of renewables. Such steps would increase America’s autonomy with respect to the Middle East and would strengthen the security of the energy infrastructure at home.

Executive Summary | Introduction | A Failed Policy | A New Framework | Changing Course | Endnotes
App. 1: Funding for Counterterrorism | App. 2: Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism |
App. 3: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Terrorism Post-September 11, 2001
Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism