FPIF Special Report
September 2004

A Secure America
in a Secure World

IV. A New Framework

A different strategy would not fight a “war on terrorism” but would treat terrorism as an ongoing threat that needs to be tackled through a strong, coordinated strategy focused upon strengthening civilian public sectors and nurturing the international cooperation so necessary for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. Although the military has a clear role to play, it should be a supporting actor in the fight against terrorism. The challenge that terrorism poses to everyone’s safety necessitates a reevaluation both of conventional ideas about national security and of the dominant responses—typically military—to terrorist threats.

One shortcoming of the current approach has been the Bush administration’s failure to adequately understand and articulate the nature of the threat posed by terrorist networks with international reach—like al-Qaida—to the American people and the world at large. Indeed, as University of Bradford analyst Paul Rogers and Oxford Research Group Director Scilla Elworthy have argued, “the general [U.S.] political process has concentrated almost entirely on seeing the perpetrators simply as fundamentalists acting from motives of sheer hatred for the United States and all it stood for ... little attempt has been made to understand the motivations for this action, or to see it as part of a longer-term strategy, or, indeed, to investigate the political context.”21 It is not uncommon to hear al-Qaida simply dismissed as a bunch of crazy madmen. This is misguided at best and counterproductive at worst. Pretending that terrorism has no link to other forms of politics is ahistorical and will provide poor guidance in crafting an effective response.

Terror is not a creed but a political strategy to extract resources and increase power.22 No longer dependent on sponsorship by sovereign states, modern terrorists engage in a potpourri of transnational crimes to finance their operations. These include illegal immigration, contraband smuggling, visa fraud, piracy, illegal trafficking in human beings, diamond smuggling and tobacco diversion, and associated tax fraud. Although the vast majority of terrorist attacks worldwide continue to be carried out with conventional weapons, such as firearms and bombs, there is a growing concern about terrorists using unconventional weapons, namely, weapons of mass destruction such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.23

Emphasizing military responses to terrorism—an inevitable outcome of using “war” as the policy framework for U.S. anti-terrorism policy—fails on practical grounds alone, independent of any moral or ethical considerations. In such a war the nature of victory is unclear, and the faith leap into war risks a destructive spiral into open-ended conflict and militarization.24 Even worse, the prosecution of a “war against terrorism” risks incurring civilian casualties, triggering a backlash, and intensifying violence and conflict.

War, in other words, is the least effective approach to combating terrorism and should represent the last, rather than the first, resort. America needs a new agenda for combating terrorism—one that secures Americans against terrorist attacks and that integrates the use of force within an international legal and policy framework. This agenda must bring international terrorists to justice, debilitate their capacity to wage terrorism, and undermine the political credibility of terrorist networks by addressing related political grievances and injustices. The following four-part framework for a new national security policy counters terrorism and propagates justice using an approach that:

• Strengthens homeland security by preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating the effects of terrorist violence.
• Strengthens the national and international legal system to insure that those responsible for planning, financing, directly supporting, and engaging in terrorist violence are held accountable. Military force may only be used to advance the rule of law within a multilateral and international legal framework.
• Defends and advances civil liberties, human rights, and democracy both at home and abroad.
• Attacks the root causes of terrorism by addressing the socioeconomic and political conditions that enable terrorism (in whatever form and for whatever ends) to appear to be a viable strategy for pursuing political objectives.

A. Strengthen Homeland Security

Prevention must have a central place in counterterrorism policy. Prevention requires tightened border security, improved intelligence and oversight of intelligence agencies, strengthened protections for critical infrastructure, and denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other items that can be used as weapons (trucks containing hazardous materials, airplanes, etc.). Mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks requires honing disaster preparedness and emergency response plans and strengthening the infrastructures and public services that might either be targets of an attack or that would be necessary to respond effectively to such an attack.

It is too soon to tell if the Department of Homeland Security will be able to effectively coordinate the range of activities essential to insuring domestic safety. However, creation of the new department itself illustrates the degree to which the Department of Defense and other security agencies have focused their efforts on the exercise of military force abroad rather than effectively addressing the unconventional menaces that pose the most immediate threat to the safety of the United States and its citizens. This is not an argument for the Pentagon to take responsibility for directly insuring homeland security, but it does reflect the fact that “national security” has more often focused on the capacity to project U.S. military force abroad than to insure the safety of U.S. citizens and the U.S homeland. In America’s new, heightened sense of the threats to individual and national security, citizens and policymakers should insist that the Defense Department reduce its focus on increasing its global reach and concentrate more on providing the elemental security Americans should expect.

Homeland security is a complex job that requires the coordination of activities by federal, state, and local governments as well as the private sector and individual citizens. Estimates of the federal share in total homeland security spending (including state and local governments and the private sector) are hampered by a lack of reliable data on such spending by non-federal government agencies and businesses. For FY2004 the Office of Management and Budget identified net non-Department of Defense federal government expenditures on homeland security at $33.4 billion, which was between 40 percent and 80 percent of total homeland security expenditures, depending on the estimates used for state and local governments and the private sector.25

The question is, with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, have the administration and its allies in Congress effectively declared victory? If so, they have made a fatal mistake. Many of the most critical steps remain to be taken, and most of them appear boring, almost mundane, and certainly not prime “photo-op” material. Such steps include insuring that local first responders can communicate with each other, protecting all transportation networks, and reinforcing security at private facilities such as office buildings, nuclear power plants, and chemical manufacturing and storage sites.

There are errors of commission and omission in the administration’s approach to homeland security (as embodied in the Homeland Security Strategy and the Homeland Security Act). The errors of commission involve an overly restrictive approach toward civil liberties, civil rights, and transparency in government policymaking and an overreliance on immigration restrictions for border security, addressed in Section 2 below. The errors of omission involve major strategic gaps with respect to the private sector and intelligence operations as well as underfunding critical program areas. (see Box 2).

In terms of economic and educational impacts, the National Academy of Sciences and over 20 other educational and academic associations have noted that problems with the visa security system—including the lack of transparency, arbitrariness, and stigma associated with the current visa processing system—are, discouraging and preventing the best and brightest international students, scholars and scientists from studying and working in the United States, as well as attending academic and scientific conferences here and abroad. If action is not taken soon to improve the visa system, the misperception that the United States does not welcome international students, scholars and scientists will grow, and they may not make our nation their destination of choice now and in the future. The damage to our nation’s higher education and scientific enterprises, economy and national security would be irreparable. … In the long run, a robust network of global interactions is essential to winning this war. Our nation needs a visa system that does not hinder such international exchange and cooperation.26

The visa review system must be reformed so that the need to conduct adequate security checks does not overwhelm understaffed offices and so that more efficient and timely decisions can be made. Such steps are essential if there is going to be an effective public diplomacy program. The United States must demonstrate that past and potential future terrorist attacks will not result in the creation of a fortress America.

1. Improve Intelligence Gathering and Oversight

The Bush administration made several changes since the Sept. 11 attacks to address the intelligence failures that contributed to the success of the attacks.27 These efforts culminated in the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.28 The TTIC includes elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of Defense, and its head reports to the director of the CIA. Furthermore, states and localities have created similar bodies, such as the California Terrorism Information Center, the Los Angeles Operational Area Terrorism Early Warning Group, and similar groups in New York City.

In response to The 9/11 Commission Report, the Bush administration has proposed the creation of a national intelligence director and a national counterterrorism center. The former would play a coordinating role in the intelligence community, similar to one of the roles played by the director of central intelligence (the other role is as head of the CIA). The latter would largely build on the TTIC and would be moved from its current home at the CIA to report to the proposed new intelligence director.

The TTIC has several problems that reduce its effectiveness and undermine accountability. Since the TTIC is under the authority of the director of central intelligence rather than the secretary of homeland security, it is disconnected from those with direct responsibility for safeguarding homeland security. This arrangement impedes the TTIC’s ability to develop an effective, integrated approach to countering the terrorist threat to the United States, and it risks duplication that could harm homeland security efforts.29 Furthermore, the TTIC lacks effective congressional oversight, as its director is appointed by the CIA director without congressional approval.30 Finally, the FBI must continue to overcome severe organizational weaknesses with respect to counterintelligence operations. The 9/11 Commission Report details numerous recommendations which, if implemented, would significantly enhance the FBI’s effectiveness as a counterintelligence agency.31

What is most important about intelligence gathering activities is that they are done effectively and that there is coordination both among and between intelligence agencies as well as close interaction with those responsible for operationalizing that intelligence. Furthermore, though there is a need for improved intelligence collection, analysis, and operationalization, such efforts should not run roughshod over basic civil liberties and should not compromise the level of transparency necessary to insure accountability in intelligence operations.

Specific initiatives should:

• Establish a national intelligence director who would be able to exercise budgetary and appointment control over the intelligence community, as proposed by the 9/11 Commission.
• Restructure the TTIC (or similar counterterrorism center) to have it report directly to the head of the Department of Homeland Security.
• Improve intelligence operations through greater international coordination and cooperation in sharing intelligence, developing improved human and technical intelligence capabilities that do not infringe on basic civil liberties.
• Improve oversight of intelligence agencies, in part by requiring greater transparency in the budget for the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
• Increase the personnel assigned to counterterrorist operations, since both the CIA and the FBI continue to operate without adequate support staff for their counterterrorist operations, including, critically, foreign language specialists.32
• Expand federal funding for foreign language study in order to insure an adequate level of skilled translators and interpreters.

2. Strengthen Border Security

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has taken several steps to make U.S. borders more secure, including the Container Security Initiative, new visa and immigration systems under the Department of Homeland Security, efforts to combat forgeries of identity documents, and greater security in airlines, airports, and seaports. Effective border security begins well beyond the actual U.S. borders, in the visa offices of U.S. embassies and consulates and in airports and ports abroad. Bilateral programs will have an important role to play, but more multilateral efforts will be essential if airports, ports, and containers are to be effectively secured.

Several glaring weaknesses remain:

Information from visa and immigration data systems must be fully linked to establish complete immigration histories of visitors and residents, and government agencies must greatly improve their information-sharing capabilities as well as their systems for maintaining watch lists. The State Department has tried for 10 years to get access to FBI information to add to TIPOFF, its terrorist watch list, as the CIA has already done. Centralizing this information in TIPOFF will avoid long visa processing delays, which damage U.S. political and economic relations abroad. The fact that this sharing of information has not yet happened is an appalling example of failed interagency cooperation. Moreover, the United States has still not created a single database of suspected terrorists, relying instead on lists from eight different agencies. This situation has persisted for more than a decade since the first World Trade Center bombing, when the problem first received national attention, and for more than two years since the Sept. 11 attacks, despite the fact that President Bush on several occasions committed the government to creating a single, effective list. On December 1, 2003, an interagency body, the Terrorist Screening Center, was opened within the FBI to consolidate data, weed out obsolete information, and develop new technology to better identify suspected terrorists. However, the TSC suffers “from the lack of a dedicated budget” and “ongoing failures to obtain the cooperation of several agencies to share their information ….” In the view of one congressional staff member, the TSC “is a hollow box.”33

The Container Security Initiative, which aims to provide security for container shipments, is now operable in nearly all of the countries targeted for the first phase of the program. Yet the program remains underfunded by an order of magnitude, according to the Brookings Institution.34 Cindy Williams, a former Congressional Budget Office defense budget specialist, has estimated that shifting $5 billion from the Defense Department would boost inspection of containers by the necessary factor of ten.35 Broader port security also remains an issue as an estimated 70 percent of the ports slated to meet international standards for container security by July 1, 2004 did not meet the target, and U.S. port security remains uncertain due to a lack of staffing and resources.36

The Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection remain woefully underfunded, receiving far below what they need to meet their new missions, which incorporate a whole host of non-homeland security as well as homeland security tasks. (see Box 3).

3. Protect Critical Infrastructure

The Department of Homeland Security has identified at least 16 sectors for critical infrastructure protection: chemical, electricity, energy, emergency management and response, financial services, food, information technology, multistate public transit, real estate, research and education networking, surface transportation, telecommunications, highway, water, and public health. (see Box 4).

The private sector plays a crucial role in securing critical infrastructure, because that sector operates about 85 percent of the nation’s infrastructure. But the Bush administration has taken a laissez-faire approach to the private sector’s role in homeland security, expecting that voluntary efforts by these businesses will be sufficient to achieve homeland security objectives. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has yet to conduct basic risk and vulnerability assessments to help the private sector guide its own investments.

The Department of Homeland Security has promoted the creation of private-sector information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) on a voluntary basis to facilitate private-sector coordination with the federal government on homeland security programs and to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the federal government. Because of the voluntary nature of participation, membership and outreach through the information sharing and analysis centers covers just under two-thirds of the private-sector critical infrastructure in the country, according to the General Accounting Office.37

According to the ISAC council, the Bush administration has not made adequate provision for the participation of the private sector in national-level homeland security exercises conducted by the federal government, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s May 2003 national terrorism exercise (TOPOFF 2), which was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s domestic incident management capability. (In that exercise the participation of the private sector was simulated).38 Furthermore, additional government resources will be necessary to facilitate the operations of these industry associations, to support operations, to increase membership, to develop metrics, and to support capacity-building activities. Four of the most significant private-sector issues of concern involve spent reactor fuel pools at nuclear power plants, the chemical industry, food safety, and information technology.

Nuclear Power Plants

Spent reactor fuel pools at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants represent potentially the most consequential vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Unlike reactors, which are housed inside steel vessels surrounded by heavy structures and containment buildings, spent fuel pools, containing some of the largest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet, are in much more vulnerable buildings. If water is caused to drain from the pools, a catastrophic fire could contaminate an area many times greater than that devastated by the 1986 Chernobyl accident.

The most important step that can be taken to significantly reduce this risk is to place all spent fuel older than five years into thick-walled, dry storage modes. Germany has done this for the past 25 years to protect against airplane crashes and terrorist attacks. The cost of putting the U.S. spent reactor fuel inventory into dry, hardened storage modes over the next 10 years is estimated at $3.5 billion to $7 billion, which could be paid from existing funds collected from nuclear-generated electricity for the disposal of this material.

The Chemical Industry

The risk of terrorist attack on industrial facilities that store large quantities of hazardous chemicals is a pressing homeland security issue. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, there are 123 facilities where a release of chemicals could threaten more than one million people. There are more than 750 additional facilities where such a release could threaten more than 100,000 people.39 The Bush administration is expecting that voluntary measures by the U.S. chemical industry will provide effective protection against terrorist attacks. But without minimal standards, enforcement requirements, or monitoring, such efforts will be inadequate. For example, the members of the chemical industry ISAC cannot even estimate what percentage of the industry is participating in the ISAC.

The Department of Homeland Security needs to establish minimum requirements for the improvement of security and the reduction of potential hazards at chemical plants and other industrial facilities that store large quantities of hazardous materials, as voluntary standards remain inadequate.40 Specific initiatives should:

• Conduct a vulnerability/hazard assessment.
• Develop a prevention, preparedness, and response plan that incorporates the assessment results and includes actions to reduce vulnerabilities by improving security and using safer technology.

Food and Agricultural Safety

Although a bioterrorism attack on U.S. agriculture is highly unlikely to result in famine or malnutrition, it could have significant human and economic costs and could cause widespread public concern and confusion.41 The recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that arose naturally in the United Kingdom, for example, led to the destruction of millions of animals and cost billions of dollars.42 There is a need for a comprehensive national plan to defend against the intentional introduction of biological agents in an act of terror. Such a plan would outline a research agenda including filling gaps in knowledge about foreign pests and pathogens, defining appropriate roles for federal and state agencies, and making specific preparations to respond to attacks conducted with a shorter list of pathogens and pests representative of the various bioweapons and the plant or animal species they would target. Developing countermeasures for this subset of agents would be valuable to officials and front-line personnel in the event of an attack, even if the agent ultimately confronted does not happen to be on the short list.

And finally, a network of laboratories needs to be created to coordinate the detection of bioterror agents in the event of an attack. A nationwide agricultural bioterrorism communications system, modeled after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “Health Alert Network,” is also necessary. And new technologies are needed to aid in the early detection of bioterror agents, especially genetically engineered ones. Early detection is key to stopping the spread of an agricultural bioterror attack.43

Specific initiatives should:

• Consolidate the responsibility for inspecting food into a single agency; increase the number of food inspectors and their resources to insure security at food processing facilities, and expand capacities for identifying and treating exotic animal diseases.44

Information Technology

Information technology is essential to virtually all of the nation’s critical infrastructures, from the air traffic control system to the aircraft themselves, from the electric power grid to the financial and banking systems and, obviously, from the Internet to communication systems. In sum, this reliance of all of the nation’s critical infrastructures on information technology makes any of them vulnerable to sabotage through their computer or telecommunication systems.45

An attack involving information technology can take different forms. The technology itself can be the target. A terrorist could also either launch or exacerbate an attack by exploiting the IT infrastructure or could use IT to interfere with attempts to achieve a timely response. Thus, IT is both a target and a weapon. Likewise, IT has a major role in counterterrorism—it can prevent, detect, and mitigate terrorist attacks. For example, advances in information fusion and data mining may facilitate the identification of important patterns of behavior that help to uncover terrorists or their plans in time to prevent attacks. Second, emergency response involves the agencies, often state and local, that are called upon to respond to terrorist incidents—firefighters, police, ambulances, and other emergency health care workers. These agencies are critically reliant on IT to communicate, to coordinate, and to share information in a prompt, reliable, and intelligible fashion.46

The threat of a terrorist attack on IT, or “cyberterrorism,”47 is seen today by policymakers and the public as being one of the greatest dangers to the United States. As the director of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, warned, a “terrorist can sit at one computer connected to one network and can create worldwide havoc.”48 The notion of cyberterrorism links the fear of random, violent victimization with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology.49 It is this union that has compounded the fear of cyberterrorism.

Despite such fear, the possibility of a cyberterrorist incident remains small. (see Box 5). A RAND study found that “while most of the current interests have focused on newer, trendier threats to information systems … our analysis showed that some of the ‘old fashioned’ threats pose a greater danger.”50 Al-Qaida’s training manual, “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants,” bears this in mind, noting that explosives are the preferred terrorist weapon, because “explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”51

Those who warn about cyberterrorism often raise the possibility of terrorists hijacking nuclear weapons, airliners, military computers, electrical grids, and food supplies from across the globe. However, most critical government systems, such as those at the Department of Defense, FBI, and CIA, are not connected to the Internet and thus are protected from outside attacks. Other government agencies that developed proprietary systems in a fit of bureaucratic self-preservation left only a select few who understand the systems well enough to compromise it.52 Government systems connected to the Internet are more vulnerable, but since the Internet itself had its beginnings in a Department of Defense project designed to ensure open communications after a nuclear attack, the possibility of taking the entire Internet off-line is remote at best.

Many officials also point out the danger to power grids, oil pipelines, and dams that use “supervisory control and data acquisition” systems. Increasingly, such systems are operated over the Internet, making them more vulnerable to a cyberterrorist. In the past few years, dam and water systems have been hacked, but even after such a breach, it is difficult to cause mass disruption. Emulating government proprietary systems, utility companies use complex processes that require specific technical know-how. Even if such systems were taken over by cyberterrorists, the effect of bringing down an electrical grid would be likened to recent power outages in New York City, a major inconvenience at worst.

Despite these built-in protections, the vast complexity of the Internet, security weaknesses in commercial software, and a movement away from proprietary systems demand that further defenses against cyberterrorism be employed. The Bush administration released the “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” in February 2003 (see Box 6) to help meet the challenges presented by cyberterrorists and wider abuse of the Internet. Although the strategy advances the issues of centralizing security responses, testing civilian agency preparedness, and further securing government cyberspace, it fails to propose new legislation or government oversight to implement the variety of public-private initiatives it proposes.

The National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for implementing the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. Although the division has been effective at creating new organizations to strengthen federal information technology defenses, coordinate responses to systems threats, and improve information sharing, the department’s own inspector general has released two reports criticizing DHS performance in these areas. The first highlights failures in determining priorities, focusing resources to address vulnerabilities, and setting benchmarks to guide the implementation of the national cyberspace strategy.

The report specifically notes that the DHS has failed to:

• Prioritize its initiatives for addressing the recommendations in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace;
• Identify the resources needed to ensure that it can identify, analyze, and reduce long-term cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
• Develop strategic implementation plans, including performance measures and milestones, focusing on the division’s priorities, initiatives, and tasks;
• Institute a formal communications process both within the DHS and for interactions with the public, private, and international sectors;
• Initiate and implement a process to oversee and coordinate efforts to develop best practices and create cybersecurity policies in collaboration with other government agencies and the private sector; and
• Review or update the actions and recommendations in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.53

Equally troubling, the inspector general also found that the Department of Homeland Security’s management of intra-departmental IT issues lags far behind other federal agencies. In particular, the chief information officer at the DHS does not have adequate authority or resources to insure effective strategic management of IT resources within the department. He also lacks the resources to insure effective identification and implementation of information security standards for the department as a whole.54

These DHS shortcomings highlight key challenges facing the implementation of an effective cybersecurity strategy and underscore the need for an alternative policy agenda that would devote adequate resources, legislation, and attention to a balanced and measured response to the vulnerabilities of IT systems.

Specific initiatives should:

Create Greater Incentives in the Private Sector: Though not likely to be a primary terrorist target, the private sector and individuals are subject to economic damage from cyber-criminals. Nearly $12.5 billion in damages were inflicted on the global economy in 2003 from viruses, worms, and other tools used by hackers, according to the research company Computer Economics. This was more than the 2002 figure of $11.1 billion, but much lower than the 2000 level of $17.1 billion.55 Furthermore, hijacking of individual computers could lead to “denial of service” or other types of attacks on critical infrastructure. Thus, private businesses and individuals have a role to play in cybersecurity. Specific initiatives should:

• Promote tax incentives to increase network security expenditures;
• Pass laws to create or enhance liability on the part of manufacturers or network operators for negligent actions or omissions that harm others;
• Mandate insurance requirements or incentives for security investments;
• Require public companies to include a discussion of potential cyber risks or actual security breaches in their annual Form 10-K disclosure, in order to promote attention to security on the part of chief executive officers and boards of directors (similar to the approach utilized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to address Y2K concerns); and
• Create general standards for hardware and software manufacturers.56

Improve Cybersecurity in Critical Public Agencies and Private Organizations:

• As supervisory control and data acquisition systems move from relying on dedicated, proprietary networks to the Internet, systems must be tested and certified to be secure by a state-designated testing agency authorized by the Department of Homeland Security;
• The security of our nation’s cyber networks depends on well-trained computer personnel. Equally important is the security risk these people pose. All personnel responsible for security at government agencies and critical infrastructure locations should have background checks conducted and should pass a computer security certification test;
• The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace’s recommendation to test government agencies’ preparedness and contingency planning should be fully implemented.
• Improve Emergency Response Systems: Emergency responders must have a robust information infrastructure in the face of a real or potential terrorist attack. Since many systems rely upon the Internet and voice communication systems, backup systems must be able to be rapidly deployed. The National Research Council has identified the following areas of priority research:
  • Develop communication systems to handle more capacity for emergency communication and coordination;
  • Create first-responder communication systems that are interoperable between federal, state, and local agencies;
  • Be able to rapidly deploy secure wireless networks in case of emergency.

Additional specific initiatives to address critical infrastructure security should include:

• Make ventilation systems on large skyscrapers less accessible to terrorists by modifying air intakes and installing new air filtering systems. This would cost an estimated $1 billion.57
• Insure compliance with the provisions of the Aviation Security Act and expand security for the air cargo system.
• Increase resources and coordination for the protection of information and communications technologies through the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office and the National Infrastructure Protection Center.

4. Support Emergency Responders

In addition to improving emergency preparedness plans, the White House needs to provide support to all levels of government to strengthen infrastructures and public services such as information and communications networks, water and food distribution channels, public health and emergency response systems, utilities and energy, transportation and financial services. Critically, most of these systems consist of civilian public servants, such as fire, police, and rescue departments and public health personnel, all of which will be frontline first responders in case of a terrorist attack.

Strengthening such infrastructures and public services would have significant positive side effects, since natural disasters, ordinary criminals, and infectious disease outbreaks also threaten these systems. The public health system is critical due to its roles both in surveillance (i.e., determining if a terrorist attack has involved biological or chemical weapons) and in the treatment of victims. Recent exercises of mock terrorist attacks have indicated that public health infrastructures are rapidly overwhelmed in cases of WMD attacks, suggesting that the public health system should be a key area for increased spending. These services require both international and national level collaboration, as some of the infrastructures—such as public health and the Internet—cannot just be addressed nationally.

The burden of preparing for and responding to catastrophic terrorist attacks lies primarily outside the federal government at the local and state levels and impacts the private sector companies that own and operate much of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Most of the expertise about both the vulnerabilities and the most practical protective measures to save lives and avert mass societal and economic disruption is to be found outside the federal level as well.

The current federal budget for emergency responders is $27 billion for five years beginning in 2004. Based on assessments from emergency responder groups nationwide, a recent Council on Foreign Relations report estimates that federal, state, and local efforts in this area will fall short by about $100 billion over the next five years.58 Federal funding should make up at least half of this shortfall in order to support a series of improvements including: upgrading public health and hospital preparedness, enhancing urban search and rescue operation capabilities, supplying protective gear and WMD remediation equipment to firefighters and police, and providing training and equipment, and purchasing interoperable communication systems.

The National Guard will play a critical role when the next catastrophic terrorist attack happens on American soil, and it must be well-trained and -equipped. Governors will expect National Guard units in their states to help with detecting chemical and biological agents, treating victims, managing secondary consequences, and maintaining civil order. When called up by governors, the National Guard can be used to enforce civil laws—unlike regular military forces, which are bound by posse comitatus restrictions against performing law enforcement duties. The National Guard’s medical units, engineering units, military police units, and ground and air transport units will likely prove indispensable in helping to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. The National Guard is currently equipped and trained primarily for carrying out its role in supporting conventional combat units overseas. Its homeland security mission can draw on many of these capabilities but requires different emphases.59

Specific initiatives should include:

• Adequate financial support for first responders nationwide;
• Increased funding for public health at the local, state, and federal levels to improve surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks, provide adequate amounts of vaccines and medicines to respond to a bioterrorist attack, and ensure a functioning hospital system capable of treating victims. This includes funding for the biomedical and psychological impacts of terrorist attacks;60 and
• Federally financed training for National Guard units to facilitate collaboration with state civil authorities and to include exercises with local emergency responders in support of the new homeland security plans being developed by each governor.

5. Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons

The anthrax scares in late 2001 showed that terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction do not require large numbers of casualties in order to trigger significant social disruption and fear. One key difference between states and terrorists regarding acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is that states can be deterred from using WMDs by the likelihood of retaliation. Because terrorists are harder to locate, they are less easily dissuaded. As a recent report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nonproliferation Program noted: “the nexus of greatest danger comes at the intersection of terrorists and state stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. It remains very difficult for a terrorist group to produce nuclear weapons material on its own. Therefore, the security and elimination of state stockpiles of weapons and weapon-usable materials must become the primary objective.”61 Most stockpiles of weapons-grade material are not held by rogue or outlaw states but rather by entities otherwise seen as sympathetic to the United States, such as the republics of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, and civilian nuclear power facilities throughout the world. The Bush administration has been unwilling to allocate greater funding for WMD threat reduction programs, which now cost about $1 billion annually.62

At the same time, one should not overestimate the likelihood of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction in an attack. An excessive focus on a WMD attack may lead to inadequate preparations for defending against attacks utilizing conventional weapons. Though terrifying to contemplate, the low probability/high consequence WMD attacks may not represent the most significant terrorist threats. More appropriate risk and threat assessments are necessary to be able to develop appropriate strategies and to prioritize spending effectively.

On the global level, the Bush administration has been hostile to most arms control and disarmament efforts, including the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the ABM Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening these regimes, however, represents one of the best means of preventing access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, reforms of the export control process should mean strengthening the current U.S. system and pursuing better multilateral controls. Especially in this time of heightened security risks, the question the U.S. government should be asking is whether current controls will keep arms, technology, and weapon components out of the hands of terrorists and away from unstable regimes. To do so would require not only improving controls over U.S. equipment but ensuring that recipients of U.S. defense goods and services share U.S. values and protect sensitive U.S. equipment. It would mean creating a truly transparent system, so the public can provide essential commentary on arms transfers. And it would mean working with other nations to establish international arms control regimes of the highest quality.63

Specific initiatives should:

• Extend the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights with impunity, to all weapons transfers and make it permanent. Since 1997, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act has prevented U.S. military aid from going to foreign military units where there is credible evidence of human rights abuses. The law is intended to prevent those specifically accused of abuses from benefiting from U.S. security assistance. But the law would be more effective if it prevented all military equipment—no matter who paid for it—from going to such units. It should also be made permanent instead of needing to be reapproved on an annual basis.
• Follow through on the International Code of Conduct Act, which passed as part of the FY2001 State Department Authorization Act and directed the State Department to pursue a multilateral agreement on arms transfers. The agreement was supposed to prevent arms from going to states that do not respect human rights, are engaged in acts of armed aggression, or support terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under the Clinton administration, the State Department began informal discussions with European exporters regarding such an agreement. But beyond a U.S.-E.U. Declaration on Responsibility in Arms Exports issued at the December 2000 U.S.-E.U. Summit, no real progress has been made, and the code appears to have been put on the back burner. The State Department should recommence talks with other major arms exporters about international normative controls, perhaps beginning with a formal commitment to use the criteria set out in the European Union’s Code of Conduct.
• Develop an international arms trade treaty. Although the International Code of Conduct is intended to be politically binding, the United States should also endorse the idea of a legally binding treaty on the arms trade. Arms control and human rights groups have already developed a draft treaty that would prohibit arms transfers where there is a high risk of weapons being used either to violate international human rights and humanitarian law or to contravene the U.N. Charter’s rules on nonaggression and nonuse of force. This draft treaty sets out minimum core standards designed to prevent the most egregious arms transfers. It is based on the international legal principle that any state aiding another state in the violation of international law (in this case through the transfer of weapons used in the violation) shares in the responsibility for the illegal act.
• Strengthen the conventions for control, nonproliferation, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Fissile Material Control Regime, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This includes enhancing verification measures and reporting requirements, increasing transparency, and insuring adequate resources for agencies responsible for onsite inspections.
• Support the action agenda for the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and other multilateral initiatives to combat proliferation, as outlined in a series of recent reports on nonproliferation. (see Box 7).64
• End efforts to build a National Missile Defense system (also known as “Star Wars”) and redirect funds to nonproliferation efforts.
• Increase funding for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and other efforts to monitor and control weapons material in the former Soviet Union, and provide funding for engaging former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful, commercially sustainable activities.
• Ratify the Protocol on the Illicit Manufacture or Trafficking in Firearms to the Convention on Organized Crime, which the United States has not signed. Implement the action plan on small arms approved at the recent U.N. conference on the trade in small arms.65
• Support the efforts of the new independent international commission on weapons of mass destruction proposed by the Swedish government, chaired by Hans Blix, that was set up in the fall of 2003.

B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable

An effective response to terrorism requires strengthening the national and international legal infrastructure necessary to identify and prosecute the individuals and organizations that facilitate, finance, perpetrate, and profit from terrorism. A strengthened United Nations should be the primary instrument for pursuing this objective. Unilateralist elements within the U.S. Congress and a lack of enthusiasm by members of the administration have been major obstacles to a more sustained and constructive U.S. engagement with the U.N. system. In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration made an apparent U-turn with respect to the United Nations, suddenly recognizing its importance in combating terrorism. For example, there are 10 major U.N. conventions and two protocols dating back to 1963 related to terrorism. (see Appendix 2). Before September 11, 2001, only two countries were parties to all 12 instruments. By the end of 2002, 16 countries, including the United States, had become parties to each of the 12 conventions and protocols. (Currently over 40 countries are parties to all 12). In addition to its rapid campaign to ratify counterterrorism conventions, Washington supported a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions identifying commitments for countries to help combat terrorism. (see Appendix 3).

But that momentary honeymoon seems to have ended with the debate over the invasion of Iraq and with the Bush administration’s ongoing campaign to undermine the International Criminal Court. Such moves weaken the international legal architecture that represents a globalization of America’s firm principles and beliefs in the centrality of the rule of law. Revelations of torture sanctioned by Bush administration personnel and efforts to exempt U.S. troops from Geneva Convention restrictions in waging the “war on terrorism” have also raised legitimate questions over the seriousness of the Bush administration’s commitment to international law.

Specific initiatives should:

• Encourage international police cooperation and bolster Interpol, while avoiding repression of political dissidents; expand extradition treaties, while protecting the rights of dissidents to gain asylum in exile; and strengthen law enforcement cooperation with other countries in counterterrorism efforts.
• Strengthen the U.N. Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and work to create an organization within the U.N. that is solely responsible for issues relating to terrorism, with a focus on monitoring compliance with U.N. conventions on international terrorism.
• Promote the adoption of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes against humanity under international law, in national courts, and based on universal jurisdiction.66
• Strengthen institutions of international law by proposing the creation of a specialized tribunal for judging international terrorists, joining the International Criminal Court, ratifying human rights conventions, and increasing financing for the U.N. human rights regime.
• Exercise military force only to implement the rule of law under an international legal framework. Going to war is always legitimate, if there is imminent danger of an attack, but otherwise the use of military force should be a last resort.

The Use of Force and Preemption

A major weakening of the international legal architecture as it relates to security comes from the Bush administration’s elevation of preemption [actually preventive war] to a policy doctrine as part of the national security strategy in general and for combating terrorism in particular. This has actually reduced rather than increased U.S. security in several ways. First, it reinforces the image of the United States as too quick to use military force and to do so outside the bounds of international law and legitimacy. This can make it more difficult for the United States to gain international support for its use of force and, over the long term, may lead others to resist U.S. foreign policy goals more broadly, including efforts to fight terrorism. Second, elevating preemption to the level of a formal doctrine may increase the administration’s inclination to reach for the military lever as a first choice, even when other tools still have a good chance of working. Third, advocating preemption warns potential enemies to hide the very assets that U.S. leaders might wish to take preemptive action against or to defend the country from. Finally, if the United States enshrines preemption as a core policy doctrine, it legitimates the policy’s adoption by other countries, which increases overall global instability and reduces security, as other countries are emboldened to justify attacks on their enemies as preemptive in nature. (see Box 8).

Let us be clear: preempting terrorist attacks through the use of intelligence and police enforcement methods is to be valued as an important component in the struggle against terrorism. But there needs to be a different emphasis on the use of military force than the Bush administration’s focus on preventive war.67 Deterrence should be the first step, recognizing that preemption is always legitimate under international law, if there is a clear and demonstrable imminent threat. The leadership of al-Qaida and similar groups may not be deterrable and may require a military response. If so, that use of force should have specific authorization from the United Nations Security Council, should include specific goals and a time line, and should be under U.N. control. Any exercise of force should adhere to international humanitarian law and the principles of the “just war” tradition. These principles require that: the objective must be to establish peace, not to exact retribution or revenge; the force used must be only the level necessary to achieve a military objective, not to inflict unnecessary suffering; the weapons used must discriminate between combatants and noncombatants; and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians.68

Specific initiatives should:

• Support the creation of a U.N. Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.
• Follow the steps outlined in international law when confronting states accused of sponsoring terrorism, as was done with regard to Libya following the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Unilateral actions through aid, trade, and sanctions policies or the use of military force are not prohibited, but such actions should be grounded in international law, and, all things being equal, multilateral action is preferred to unilateral action.69
• Limit the Ability of Terrorists to Mobilize Financial Resources: In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration has supported a series of multilateral, bilateral, and domestic initiatives to target the financial assets of terrorist organizations. This is an important first step, and it reflects a 180-degree turnabout from the administration’s prior opposition to increased monitoring of money laundering and tougher regulation of tax havens and offshore financial centers. Under provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the United States came into full compliance at the end of 2003 with all of the recommendations that require special action by the leading international group working on money laundering and terrorist financing, the Financial Action Task Force.70

Some terrorist groups, such as those in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, rely principally on common criminal activities including extortion, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and fraud. Other groups, such as those in the Middle East, rely primarily on commercial enterprises, donations, and funds skimmed from charitable organizations both to finance their activities and to move materiel and personnel. Still other groups rely on state sponsors for funding. In this latter case, a more sophisticated approach is required to combat terrorist financing, including efforts to regulate the trade in conflict diamonds or to develop alternatives to crops like opium poppies and coca. Confronting state-funded terrorism also requires greater exercise of diplomatic skills, technical assistance, and foreign aid than the Bush administration has been willing to provide.71

Several recent reports have detailed weaknesses of the broader efforts to crack down on terrorist financing.72 The U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, concluded that federal authorities were struggling to halt terrorist funding and still did not have a clear understanding of how terrorists move their financial assets. According to the United Nations Monitoring Group, “al-Qaeda continues to receive funds it needs from charities, deep-pocket donors and business and criminal activities, including the drug trade. Extensive use is still being made of alternative remittance systems, and al-Qaeda has shifted much of its financial activity to areas in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia where the authorities lack the resources or the resolve to closely regulate such activity.”73

There has been a dramatic expansion of legislation to combat money laundering and terrorist financing at global, regional, and national levels. Except in jurisdictions that do not have adequate legislation, the major emphasis at the moment needs to be on insuring effective implementation. This is the case with many poor countries, which are still building the capacity of regulators and law enforcement. In such an effort, international cooperation is essential. As a senior Treasury Department official told Congress on March 24, 2004, “we have found that our success is also dependent on the political will and resources of other governments.”74 Both the Bush administration’s broader failure to support multilateralism and the growing anti-American sentiment worldwide hamper such cooperation. The United States needs to be a leader in this realm, but such efforts are hindered both practically and symbolically when it wasn’t until 2004 that the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the bureau of the U.S. Treasury primarily responsible for combating terrorist finance, deployed more personnel to combat illegal financial flows to al-Qaida and other organizations involved in terrorism than to tracking illegal flows to Cuba.75

Specific initiatives should:

• Implement all the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, support the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s initiative on tax havens, and increase transparency in international financial flows.76
• Ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, both of which the United States has signed.
• Work with the Bank for International Settlements to facilitate greater international cooperation among central banks in order to develop effective means to monitor financial flows.
• Support the activities of the Egmont Group (the network of government agencies responsible for addressing money laundering) with both funding and technical assistance in order to expand the capacities of other nations to combat money laundering.

C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home and Abroad

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
Benjamin Franklin, 1759

Counterterrorist and anti-terrorist efforts should not sacrifice the very values Americans are trying to defend while combating terrorism. Washington must listen closely to the mounting concerns of civil libertarians and constitutional rights groups who caution that the new counterterrorism campaign may lead to a garrison state that undermines all that America stands for while doing little to protect citizens against unconventional threats.

Many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act go far beyond what previous anti-terrorist commissions have prescribed regarding the need to expand law enforcement’s power to fight terrorism. For example, bipartisan commissions—such as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) and the National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission)—noted that already-existing guidelines for FBI investigations regarding terrorism were “adequate in scope.” The commissions’ reports emphasize the more difficult—but more important—tasks of effective cooperation and management of interagency investigations and improved coordination among law enforcement agencies at both the domestic and international levels. Such low-profile, low-impact activities require greater attention but don’t translate into sound bites and press coverage.

Popular opposition to the chilling impact of the USA PATRIOT Act and to executive orders on civil liberties has led numerous states, cities, towns, and counties to pass resolutions demanding that local law enforcement not implement the provisions of those regulations that infringe on civil rights.77 Such efforts indicate how out-of-step the Bush administration is with the broad American public regarding the balance between liberty and security.

In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration arrested or detained more than 1,200 people, although the government has refused to disclose exactly how many were apprehended, who they are, or what has happened to all of them. Of these 1,200, at least 762 foreigners who were inside the United States illegally were detained as part of the FBI’s investigation. More than 500 have been deported so far. A recent audit by the inspector general at the Justice Department found “significant problems” with the detentions, including allegations of physical abuse. Only one of the detained foreigners, Zacarias Moussaoui, has been charged with a terrorism-related crime.

These roundups failed to locate terrorists and damaged one of the country’s greatest potential assets in the war on terrorism: the communities of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans. The overemphasis on the immigration system as a tool of border security has resulted in the arrest of a large number of noncitizens on grounds not related to domestic security. This approach has been largely ineffective and has provided the nation with a false sense of security.

In some cases, the administration simply used immigration law as a proxy for criminal law enforcement, circumventing constitutional safeguards. In other cases, the government seems to have acted out of political expediency, creating a false appearance of effectiveness without regard to the cost. The government’s major successes in apprehending terrorists have not come from post-Sept. 11 immigration initiatives but from other efforts, such as international intelligence activities, law enforcement cooperation, and information provided by arrests made abroad.

Washington’s harsh measures against immigrants since September 11, 2001, have failed to make U.S. citizens safer, have violated fundamental civil liberties, have weakened the economy, have reduced worldwide support for the United States, and have undermined national unity.78 In terms of the economy, the costs can include the potential to reduce the number of foreign workers and foreign students in science and technology, thereby possibly reducing income to U.S. higher education institutions and, ultimately, the strength and dynamism of a future U.S. science and technology workforce. Half of all doctoral degrees in engineering, mathematics, and computer science are issued to foreign students, and unnecessarily restrictive immigration rules have made it more difficult for them to work here, reducing potential productivity in the U.S. economy.

Not satisfied with the new powers granted to it under the USA PATRIOT Act, the Justice Department drafted the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (or PATRIOT Act II), which would continue to reduce checks and balances on presidential power and which contains several measures of questionable effectiveness that continue to erode civil liberties.79 When the draft of PATRIOT Act II was leaked, a public outcry forced Attorney General Ashcroft to withdraw his explicit support. But parts of the legislation are now being submitted as amendments to other bills.

It is possible both to defend the country and to protect core American values and principles, but doing so requires a different approach, an approach that does not sacrifice the very values that terrorists seek to destroy, thereby granting them a de facto victory. A new approach would recognize that a balance between liberty and security need not require sacrificing the former for the latter, and it would refuse to sacrifice the fundamental elements of transparency and accountability, which are necessary for democracy to remain vital. Specific initiatives should:

• Review the USA PATRIOT Act’s amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowing surveillance where foreign intelligence is a “significant purpose.”
• Pass legislation that preserves those provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that do not violate civil rights provisions and are effective against terrorism, such as the Civil Liberties Restoration Act and the Security and Freedom Ensured (SAFE) Act.80
• Oppose the use of military commissions to try terrorist suspects under existing military orders and instructions. Such trials would undermine the basic rights of defendants to a fair trial, would yield verdicts—possibly including death sentences—of questionable legitimacy, and would deliver a dangerous message worldwide that the fight against terrorism need not respect the rule of law.

Regarding foreign policy, the administration’s approach to combating terrorism should embody respect for the very human rights that America defends and promotes at home. This means that citizens should loudly proclaim opposition to religious extremism and to actions taken in its name, no matter who is the perpetrator. This also means that citizens should reject zealous policies that undermine human rights norms—including inflicting casualties on innocent civilians—in the name of a war on terrorism, such as proposals for lifting restrictions on the CIA to allow assassinations and the hiring of human rights violators—both measures that the CIA has itself rejected.

In forging international coalitions against terrorism, the administration must not ease restrictions on the provision of military aid, weapons, and military training to regimes that systematically violate human rights. According to Human Rights Watch, both the executive and legislative branches “have taken steps to loosen legal controls on foreign military assistance, paving the way for future arms transfers to governments that are known human rights abusers.”81 This is clearly the wrong path to take. Instead, the United States should strengthen the international legal and human rights regimes and should evaluate its own foreign policies in light of those norms.

In a positive step, the U.N. Security Council has made counterterrorist measures mandatory for all states. However, it has excluded human rights from the work of its Counter Terrorism Committee. Many regional organizations have adopted their own counterterrorist programs, often with sweeping definitions of terrorism and no reference to human rights. Some U.N. human rights bodies and experts have raised concerns but have been unable, by virtue of their limited mandates, to present a comprehensive analysis.

The U.S. should be at the forefront of insuring that counterterrorism operations are intimately linked with human rights concerns. It should insure adequate support for the newly created post of an independent expert to assist both individual nations and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in making recommendations on states’ obligations to promote and protect human rights while countering terrorism. The United States should also insure that the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee expands its scope to include monitoring the impact of counterterrorist measures on human rights.82

D. Attack Root Causes

Combating terrorism requires looking beyond any one terrorist event—horrific as it may be—to address the broader socioeconomic, political, and military contexts from which terrorism emerges. Because terrorism is a particular kind of violent act aimed at achieving a political objective, a preventive strategy must also address its political roots. Addressing root causes is neither a panacea nor appeasement but is instead both a pragmatic effort to address the conditions that enable terrorism and a normative commitment to shape government policies to embody the values that America espouses. A focus on addressing the political origins of terrorism does not mean that U.S. and international authorities should refrain from hunting down those responsible for terrorist acts. The success of these policies will only be fully realized when there are no more breeding grounds for terrorist politics.

U.S. policy must recognize a distinction between international terrorism in general and the specific threat posed by al-Qaida and other extremist Islamist movements. Care must be taken to insure that the United States is not perceived as waging a war on Islam, and attention must be focused on the contrast between illegitimate demands and legitimate demands pursued through illegitimate means. The anti-democratic and jihadist character of al-Qaida’s ideology suggests that even if the United States were to pursue the kinds of alternative policies outlined here, Americans would still be targets of attacks by committed members of al-Qaida and similar groups. Some political and economic contexts that nurture or trigger terrorism include: repressive political regimes, which limit the opportunities for nonviolent expressions of political grievances; failed and failing states, which provide terrorists with unregulated arenas for operations; poverty and inequality, which can enhance support for terrorist acts and provide a source of recruits, even though poverty itself does not cause terrorism; and efforts by one country to institutionalize a position of global dominance, including through alliances with repressive regimes. Addressing root causes is one way of insuring that the efforts of terrorist groups to mobilize support meet as inhospitable a social, economic, and political climate as possible.

Specific initiatives should:

1. Strengthen and Democratize International Bodies for Effective Global Governance:

By proclaiming global dominance as its overarching strategic objective, the United States has made itself a target. Bush’s pursuit of the preventive war doctrine as the foundation of such dominance—embodied in the invasion and occupation of Iraq—can be used to justify the argument that the current “war on terrorism” is in fact a war on Islam. And Washington’s current foreign policy has further reinforced the beliefs of those who argue that the United States is an imperial power intent on holding itself above the law.

In addition to strengthening the U.N. and other multilateral institutions, the United States must reconfigure its approach to security. We suggest a dual focus: on the cooperative arrangements necessary to insure our protection in an era of international terrorist networks with global reach, and on deterrence against possible threats from state antagonists. Such efforts require a vibrant network of global, regional, and bilateral alliances whereby the security of the world strengthens the security of America.

2. End Support for Repressive Regimes:

Longstanding U.S. government support for repressive regimes—particularly in the Arab world, but in the Muslim world more broadly—has facilitated conditions where terrorism can emerge. U.S. support for autocratic governments such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia under Suharto closed off nonviolent forms of political competition among the local citizens. Local rulers, like those in Saudi Arabia, have largely turned a blind eye to the financing of movements and organizations that promote anti-democratic ideologies and, in some cases, engage in terrorist acts. Washington must, in both word and deed, make a clean break with its history of support for such regimes throughout the world.

Despite claims by the Bush administration and others that poverty is a key cause of terrorism (a point we discuss in more detail below), it is political conditions that most shape terrorism. As a National Academy of Sciences study noted, “terrorism and its supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies of extreme political repression and discouraged by policies of incorporating both dissident and moderate groups into civil society and the political process.”83

Similarly, the global projection of U.S. military power abroad, represented by a growing archipelago of overseas military bases, often serves as a physical reminder of U.S. political and military support for repressive governments. Recognizing that this in no way absolves terrorists of culpability in their attacks, reorienting U.S. policy along the lines of respecting basic human rights and democratic freedoms could still contribute to easing—not eliminating—the conditions associated with terrorism.

Let us be clear: democracy is not a panacea, nor are there any panaceas for combating terrorism. Democratic countries such as Spain, Italy, Japan, and Germany have confronted sustained activities by terrorist organizations. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that increased democracy will necessarily, in the short term, lead to a decline in radical Islamist political movements that oppose many U.S. policies, including U.S. support for Israel. But increasing the political space for nonviolent political conflict is the best long-term solution for minimizing the choice by either organizations or individuals to use terrorism to advance their goals.

As a global power, the United States is always likely to be a potential target for terrorists, whatever policies Washington pursues. America’s best defense is to insure that its foreign policies defend and promote basic human rights and democracy. This is both because these values embody the best of America and because when democratic institutions are present and human rights are respected, terrorism of any sort is less likely. When Washington’s policies undermine rather than promote human rights and democratic institutions, the United States is more likely to become a target of terrorists.

The kinds of policies that would be most effective in reducing U.S. support for repressive regimes would include: withholding military aid and opposing weapons sales to countries that systematically violate basic human rights; increasing support for human rights and democracy in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Colombia, and elsewhere through bilateral and multilateral initiatives; reducing the dependence of the United States and its allies on oil imports from repressive governments.

3. Deal with Failed States:

Since the early 1990s, wars involving failed states have resulted in the deaths of about 8 million people—most of them civilians—while displacing another 4 million. These states include Afghanistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Sudan, where those impoverished, malnourished, and deprived of fundamental needs such as security, health care, and education number in the hundreds of millions. Before the toppling of the World Trade Center buildings, the issue of failed states was routinely framed as an issue of humanitarian concern (i.e., refugees and reconstruction). But the events of September 11 and its aftermath have placed the issue of failed states squarely in the mainstream of traditional “national security” policy both in the United States and abroad. Although foreshadowed by earlier security strategy documents under the Clinton administration, post-Sept. 11 concern over failed states has dominated policy debates regarding security, development, humanitarian intervention, and the balance of unilateral and multilateral approaches to foreign policy.84

Failed states have become central elements of concern for security policy for several reasons: they can serve as operational bases and safe-havens for international terrorists; they can often spawn wider regional conflicts, which can substantially weaken security and retard development in their subregions; and they can induce significant costs for the United States in terms of refugee flows, lost trade and investment opportunities, increased spread of infectious diseases, weapons proliferation, billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, and the emergence of regional complexes of war and organized crime.

The failure of the Bush administration to develop an effective strategy to deal with the complex security challenges posed by failed, failing, and flailing states is by now apparent and illustrates, yet again, the dangers of framing efforts to combat terrorism as a “war on terrorism.” The Afghanistan situation, and the broader reality that weak and failing states can provide enabling conditions for the operations of terrorist networks, has highlighted the need for increasing the U.N.’s capacity to engage in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and other “nation-building” activities. Yet Washington remains unwilling to expand support for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates that the world should double its capacity to engage in peacekeeping operations, which would provide a valuable and constructive role for U.S. military assistance that might otherwise be channeled to repressive governments.85 These missions are important not only for humanitarian reasons but for national security ones as well—to deprive terrorists of sanctuaries and sources of income (from diamonds, drug trading, and the like) that they can often obtain in failed or failing states.

Specific initiatives should:

• Strengthen the multilateral forces involved in Afghanistan to provide the security necessary for reconstruction and development; and
• Expand support for peacekeeping initiatives through the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks and expand military assistance aimed at strengthening other countries’ efforts to engage in peacekeeping operations.

4. Reorient U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Central Asia:

U.S. policy in the Middle East and Central Asia must also shift. Such a reorientation would include efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to address the political grievances behind continuing unrest in the region. But U.S. efforts to advance democratic politics in the Middle East face a serious credibility gap due to Washington’s longstanding support for authoritarian regimes in the region, its continued support for the Israeli occupation, and its invasion and occupation of Iraq, exacerbated by revelations of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.86 As the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World highlighted in its October 2003 report, “hostility toward America [in the Muslim world] has reached shocking levels.”87

Such a reorientation is perfectly compatible with opposing the bigotry embodied in both al-Qaida’s and other extremist groups’ opposition to Israel’s existence. Washington should continue its strategic and moral commitment to Israel’s right to exist, but there is a distinction between a country’s right to exist and its decision to occupy neighboring lands (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza). Support for the Israeli occupation plays a major role in fueling anti-American extremism, sentiments that al-Qaida has opportunistically used to its own advantage. For example, it was not until Osama bin Laden’s fourth call to arms, issued on the eve of the bombardment of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, that he focused on Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands.88 U.S. credibility in the region and prospects for advancing other objectives are essentially nil until a political settlement is reached in Palestine. As Thomas Carothers has noted, “Real progress with the credibility gap probably cannot be achieved without a substantial rebalancing of the U.S. approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which appears unlikely to occur under the Bush administration.”89

At the rhetorical level, the Bush administration has acknowledged the valuable role that democracy can play in reducing the attractiveness of terrorism. Bush’s initiatives include: a new aid program—the Middle East Partnership Initiative—to support democratic change, the reorientation of existing aid programs in the Arab world to sharpen their pro-democratic content, a diplomatic stance consisting of giving greater praise to those Arab governments that do take positive political steps and putting a little more pressure on those that do not, and a new push to promote Arab economic reform and free trade (with the hope that improved economic conditions will, over the long term, stimulate political reform).

Iraq is not likely to serve as a demonstration project for democratization in the region, even if a stable democracy is installed, which does not seem likely in the foreseeable future, because Iraq does not represent a model of internally generated democratization that could be emulated elsewhere in the region, as happened in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, “it hinges on the much less appealing example of what the application of enormous foreign military force and subsequent political intervention and economic aid can make possible.”90

Moreover, the Bush administration’s predilection for unilateralism has weakened even its small efforts at promoting democratic reform in the region. After a draft copy of its Greater Middle East initiative was leaked in February 2004, the White House had to quickly backpedal.91 The final version of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative has been largely defanged of any significant goals or benchmarks. In moving ahead, the Bush administration would do better to work with the Europeans and to start with smaller, focused initiatives. As Thomas Carothers notes, “The effort can succeed only if it eschews some of the signature elements of that campaign to date, such as the dubious philosophy of ‘you’re either with us or against us’ and the misguided notion that creating fear in the Arab world breeds respect.”92

Specific initiatives should:

• End U.S. financial and military backing for the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza;
• Advocate Palestinian self-determination and a negotiated settlement as outlined in U.N. Security Council resolutions;
• Spearhead efforts to create a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East;
• Strengthen the multilateral forces involved in Afghanistan to provide the security necessary for reconstruction and development;
• Set an immediate timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and channel support primarily through the United Nations to promote reconstruction and development;
• Encourage Iraqi efforts to form a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a tribunal, or some other mechanism to hold accountable those guilty of crimes against humanity and other human rights violations. An immediate step would be to open the files on all U.S. government involvement and relations with the reign of Saddam Hussein; and
• Underwrite efforts to provide secular and nonsectarian education as an alternative to religious schools that promote violent jihadist ideologies.

5. Address Poverty and Inequality:

An expansion of broad-based development can weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits. Sincere, bottom-up, indigenous-guided development can thwart efforts by terrorist groups to entice destitute recruits by offering social services or financial incentives. On the other hand, promises of development that are unfulfilled or underfunded, or development projects and programs that exacerbate inequalities and grievances, can backfire and actually reinforce support for extremist groups.93 Current research suggests that there is no easy, generalizable conclusion in either direction, but poverty deserves to be fought on its own terms, independent of its connections, presumed or otherwise, to terrorism.

The Bush administration has justified its push for greater free trade on the grounds that free trade reduces poverty, which in turn reduces terrorism. There is good reason to doubt all the connections in that syllogism.94 In September 2002, the administration included a chapter in its National Security Strategy of the United States of America on the importance of trade and investment liberalization in the fight against terrorism. The argument is based on the unfounded claim that the current approach to globalization reduces poverty.

According to the World Bank, extreme poverty increased in every region of the developing world outside Asia during the past decade, a period when nearly all countries pursued reforms aimed at opening their countries to the global economy. Excluding China, which still maintains strong government intervention in many areas of its economy, the number of extremely poor people in the developing world increased in the 1990s. So it is entirely unclear that the Bush administration’s emphasis on trade liberalization has had a significant impact on reducing poverty. Furthermore, there appears to be greater evidence that terrorism on the part of subnational groups is associated with political repression, especially the repression of efforts to articulate national and religious identities.95

Development policies that weaken states’ capacities to insure access to, or provision of, basic services can create conditions in which terrorist groups can more easily mobilize support. At the global level, the Bush administration should end its support for trade and investment agreements that reinforce the discredited policies of the Washington Consensus. Instead, the United States should reorient discussions at bilateral, regional, and global economic organizations and meetings toward creating a multilateral framework more conducive to the development of poor countries.96 Washington should also reduce the debt owed to it by developing countries, champion debt reduction efforts at the international financial institutions, and seek an end to structural adjustment lending by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Critics may note that such an agenda does not address the root causes of terrorism, since poor people are not, by and large, leaders of terrorist movements, or even, in the case of al-Qaida, the actual foot soldiers in attacks such as the Sept. 11 skyjackings. Furthermore, critics argue, even the countries of origin of the Sept. 11 highjackers do not rank among the poorest countries. But anti-poverty policies and programs are one important element of the broader arsenal of anti-terror programs, embodying, if nothing else, a healthy dose of enlightened self-interest.

An effective strategy to combat terrorism would promote a policy agenda including the following three distinct but related poverty-alleviation approaches:

First, although rarely drawn from the poorest of the poor, terrorists can use poor peoples’ grievances to legitimate terrorist actions and to raise funds as part of their proclaimed efforts at combating poverty or providing relief and welfare programs to communities that are neither reached by economic growth nor helped by government programs. Genuine, redistributive development can weaken the ability of terrorists to claim the mantle of legitimacy and can thereby serve to weaken their cause.

Second, the United States can gain greater international cooperation in the effort to combat terrorism if it is seen as a good partner with other countries around issues of primary concern to them and their citizens. Poverty and development are such issues.

Third, carefully crafted development projects can help strengthen the capabilities of states whose cooperation is necessary in efforts to combat terrorist financing. Sustainable economic growth can be both a source and a product of increasing state capacity for regulation.

A commitment to this three-pronged approach would demonstrate that the United States is concerned about the deepening social and economic polarization around the world and, instead of pursuing economic strategies that contribute to these deepening divides, is committed to formulating policies that hold more promise for the world’s poor and disenfranchised. Pursuing policies that strengthen the developmental and democratic prospects for peoples worldwide will not render America immune from terrorist attacks. But such a commitment would likely be more effective in diminishing terrorist threats than a reliance on military responses, and it would help solidify a worldwide alliance uniting Northern and Southern nations to hold terrorists accountable for their crimes. Terrorists would then have nowhere to hide.

6. Promote Clean Energy:

The United States should pursue an energy policy at home and abroad that emphasizes conservation, energy efficiency, and renewables and that makes itself and its allies less reliant on imported oil supplies.97

Executive Summary | Introduction | A Failed Policy | A New Framework | Changing Course | Endnotes
App. 1: Funding for Counterterrorism | App. 2: Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism |
App. 3: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Terrorism Post-September 11, 2001
Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism