FPIF Special Report
September 2004

A Secure America
in a Secure World

Endnotes

1. The General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is currently considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that would include a definition of terrorism, if adopted. For more on this, refer to the Web site of the Sixth Committee at: <http://www.un.org/ga/57/sixth/index.html>.
2. All data is from the corrected version of the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report issued by the State Department. A “significant” international terrorist event is defined as such by the State Department if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons, major property damage (more than $10,000), and/or is an act or attempt that could reasonably be expected to create the conditions noted. Controversy over the original version of the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report raised concerns about methodology and possible political manipulation of the document. The report was revised to show an increase in significant terrorist attacks in 2003 over 2002 and 2001. This report was the first to use data generated by the recently created Terrorist Threat Integration Center. See <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/> for the revised data.
3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 28.
4. Steven Simon, “Update on the War on Terror,” RAND Corporation, September 17, 2003. See also Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002) and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming). For a discussion of the nature of the Afghan-Pakistan network, see: Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2003); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); and Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.
5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 2003/2004 (London: IISS, 2004).
6. Ibid.
7. See Thomas P. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: G.P. Putnam, 2004), p. 31.
8. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,” Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-04-408T, February 3, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04408t.pdf>.
9. For the cost of the Iraq War see Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus, Paying the Price: The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War, June 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/0406costsofwar.html>. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War on Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DOD to Shift Funds from Other Uses, GAO-04-915, July 2004 at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04915.pdf>.
10. Center for Defense Information, Security after 9/11: Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs, January 2003, p. 7. For example, the Department of Defense’s FY 2003 budget is about $48 billion higher than the last pre-Sept. 11, 2001, annual defense budget. This represents a real increase of 15 percent. Yet only about one-third of this increase appears to be for programs closely related to homeland security and combating terrorism. Such activities continue to absorb a relatively small share of the DoD’s overall budget. The Office of Management and Budget and the DoD estimate that the DoD spent roughly $20 billion on these activities in FY 2003 and will spend about the same in FY 2004. This is approximately 5 percent of the annual defense budget. Even given ambiguities in classification, it is difficult to consider more than 20 percent of the DoD budget as essential to counterterrorism operations or capabilities. Also see Foreign Policy In Focus/Center for Defense Information Task Force, A Unified Security Budget For the United States, March 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.
11. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.
12. See, for example, William Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003) among others.
13. See Congressional Research Service, The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related Issues, June 1, 2004, at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32417.pdf>.
14. David Cole and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution (New York: New Press, 2002). Also see: Nancy Chang. Silencing Political Dissent (New York: Seven Stories, 2002); Richard C. Leone and Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New York: Century Foundation and Public Affairs, 2003); and see the work on these issues by the American Civil Liberties Union at: <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=207>, the Center for Democracy and Technology at: <http://www.cdt.org/security/010911response.shtml>, the Center for Constitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and the Rights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.
15. For example, several participants in the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers noted that some companies were unwilling to share essential information because of potential malicious misuse by other private businesses. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors,” Testimony before the Subcommittees on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and on Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 33. This is a small example of the broader problem—absent a more active governmental role in facilitating collaboration among the private companies that control and operate critical infrastructure, responses are likely to be suboptimal, with potentially disastrous results.
16. For a general resource on issues relating to first responders, see the National Academies at: <http://search.nap.edu/shelves/first/>.
17. Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “War, Terrorism and Public Health,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 516-23 and Victor W. Sidel, R.M. Gould, and H.W. Cohen, “Bioterrorism Preparedness: Cooptation of Public Health,” Medicine and Global Survival, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 82-9.
18. Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “War, Terrorism and Public Health,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter 2003, p. 518.
19. Human Rights Watch, “Empty Promises:” Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard against Torture, April 15, 2004, at: <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/>.
20. For additional discussion on the failures of the Bush administration to adequately address the challenge of reconstruction in Afghanistan, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability, GAO-03-607, June 2003 at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03607.pdf> and Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403, June 2004 at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04403.pdf> and work from Foreign Policy In Focus, such as Mark Sedra, Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction: Where Do We Go From Here? March 2003 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/03afghan/> and Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, Afghanistan’s Problematic Path to Peace: Lessons in State Building in the Post-September 11 Era, March 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html>. For an excellent overview of the impact of U.S. assistance to the resistance against the Soviet Union see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2003).
21. Cited in David Mepham, “Tackling the Roots of Terrorism: Broadening the International Security Agenda,” New Economy, vol. 9, no. 4, December 2002, pp.189-193.
22. For examples of the kind of work that represents such a framework, see: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2003); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998); Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001); Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Charles Tilly, “Violence, Terror and Politics as Usual,” Boston Review, vol. 27, nos. 3-4, Summer 2002 at: <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.3/tilly.html>; Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, March 2004; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 3, Winter 2002/03, pp. 30-58. For previous works, see Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999).
23. See, for example, the much more nuanced understanding present in Matthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,” Parameters, Spring 2004 at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.pdf>.
24. For discussions of the dangers of declaring a war on terrorism as well as problems with this particular global war on terrorism, see Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September 2003) and Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, December 2003). Other views include Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (New York: Interlink, 2003).
25. Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government FY2005 (Washington: OMB, 2005), pp. 25-39. See also Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xii. Reliable data on private sector expenditures on homeland security is particularly difficult to obtain. The most-cited study by Deloitte Consulting and Aviation Week estimate that private sector spending on homeland security was between $45.9 billion and $76.5 billion in FY2003 and would be around $46 billion for FY2004. See Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., “Emerging Security Market Promising But Diffuse,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 10, 2002, at: <http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020610/aw46.htm>. This study relied on a survey of executives, but other surveys by the Conference Board find little evidence of large increases in homeland security spending after FY 2003. A more recent study estimated the amount of private sector homeland security expenditure that would be accessible to homeland security product and service providers at between $6 and $7 billion annually. Civitas Group LLC, The Homeland Security Market, June 2004 at: <http://www.civitasgroup.com/reports/20040627.pdf>.
26. For the statement, see “Statement and Recommendations on Visa Problems Harming America’s Scientific, Economic, and Security Interests,” May 12, 2004, at: <http://www.aau.edu/resources/JointVisaStatement.pdf>.
27. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.
28. The CIA has: doubled the size of its Counterterrorist Center, quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorism analysis, detailed 25 experienced analysts to work with their counterparts at the FBI, and created the position of associate director of central intelligence for homeland security to facilitate the flow of intelligence to agencies engaged in homeland security. The FBI has: disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil; established 66 Joint Terrorism task forces across America with full participation from and enhanced communications with multiple federal, state, and local agencies; created a National Joint Terrorism task force at FBI headquarters; established a Counterterrorism Watch center; initiated new counterterrorism “Flying Squads” to deploy at a moment’s notice; set up Intelligence Reports offices to facilitate the vital flow of information; and trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division.
29. See, for example, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/steinberg20030214.htm>.
30. See, for example, the discussions of an alternative approach, the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Center, proposed by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) in its Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, December 15, 2002, at: <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf>.
31. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States at: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Statement of Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, and Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, “FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, March 23, 2004.
32. U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003, p. 13.
33. Robert Block, Gary Fields, and Jo Wrighton, “U.S. ‘Terror’ List Still Lacking,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2004.
34. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xix.
35. Cindy Williams, “Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security Choices since 9/11,” Paper prepared for ECAAR panel, Allied Social Sciences Association annual meetings, January 5, 2004, at: <http://www.ecaar.org/Articles/williams.pdf>.
36. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838, June 30, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf>. For weaknesses in the security of international ports, see International Maritime Organization, ISPS Code Status Update 05: Continued Improvement in ISPS Code Implementation, June 30, 2004, at: <http://www.imo.org/home.asp>.
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors,” Testimony before the Subcommittees on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and on Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 30.
38. Ibid., p. 37.
39. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of John B. Stephenson, Director Natural Resources and Environment, “Homeland Security: Federal Action Needed to Address Security Challenges at Chemical Facilities,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-04-482T, February 23, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04482t.pdf>.
40. U.S. General Accounting Office, Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown, GAO-03-439, March 14, 2003, at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03439.pdf>.
41. Discussions of the vulnerabilities of the food system predate the Sept. 11 attacks. For example: T. M. Wilson, L. Logan Henfrey, R. Weller, and B. Kellman, “Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture,” in C. Brown and C. Bolin, eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals (Washington: ASM Press, 2000), p. 2357; Dorothy B. Preslar, Director, AHEAD/ILIAD, “The Role of Disease Surveillance in the Watch for Agroterrorism or Economic Sabotage,” November 2000 at: <http://www.fas.org/ahead/bwconcerns/agroterror.htm>; J. Ban, “Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview,” The Arena, no. 9 (Washington: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, June 2000); R. Casagrande, “Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture: The Threat to U.S. National Security,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, p. 92105; and A. S. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs discussion paper 200029, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness discussion paper ESDP200004 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2000) at: <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Responding_to_the_Threat_of_Agroterrorism.pdf>.
42. Committee on Biological Threats to Agricultural Plants and Animals, National Research Council, Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002).
43. Ibid.
44. For other discussions, see S. M. Whitby, Biological Warfare Against Crops (Baskingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002).
45. National Research Council, Information Technology for Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), p. 2.
46. Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002) and National Research Council, Information Technology for Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), pp. 97-98.
47. As with the definition of terrorism, defining “cyberterrorism” is also fraught with difficulties. We have adapted the definition by Mark Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,” in Mark Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism—Fact or Fancy,” Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997 at: <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>.
48. Remarks by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge to the Electronics Industries Alliance, April 23, 2002, available at: <http://www.eia.org/events/springconf/remarks_ridge_1.phtml>.
49. Mark Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism—Fact or Fancy,” Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997 at: <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>. See also Dorothy Denning, “Is Cyberterror Next?” at: <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm>.
50. Glenn C. Buchan, “Implications of Information Vulnerabilities for Military Operations,” in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, John P. White, eds., The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999) at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1016/MR1016.chap10.pdf>.
51. Alan Feuer and Benjamin Weiser, “Translation: ‘The How-to Book of Terrorism,’” New York Times, April 5, 2001.
52. Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly, November 2002, available at: <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html>.
53. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Progress and Challenges in Securing the Nation’s Cyberspace, July 2004 at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_CyberspaceRpt_Jul04.pdf>.
54. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Improvements Needed to DHS’ Information Technology Management Structure, July 2004 at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_CIOReport_0704.pdf>.
55. George V. Hulme, “Investments In Antivirus Software Are Paying Off,” Information Week, May 3, 2004, at: <http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19205575>.
56. Michael A. Vatis, “Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing Our Nation in Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, April 8, 2003, at: <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/ists_docs/testimony_whatsnew.htm>.
57. Large skyscrapers are defined as the roughly 500 skyscrapers with occupants of 5,000 or more. See Michael O’Hanlon et al., op. cit., p. 55.
58. See Council on Foreign Relations, Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, July 2003, p. 2.
59. For a detailed discussion, see CFR Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, October 2002) at: <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf>, pp. 34-36.
60. On the broad public health issues, see Joshua Shemer and Yehuda Shoenfeld, Terror and Medicine: Medical Aspects of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Terrorism (Lengerich, Germany: Pabst Science Publishers, 2003). On the methodology for establishing criteria to evaluate the readiness of metropolitan regions to respond to terrorist attacks, see Frederick J. Manning and Lewis Goldfrank, eds., Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for Evaluating the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (Washington: National Academy of Sciences Press, 2002). For issues involving psychological impacts, see Institute of Medicine, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington: National Academy of Sciences Press, 2003). Concerns about weaknesses in the public health infrastructure that were highlighted in the anthrax attacks were addressed prior to the Sept. 11 attacks. See National Research Council, Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorist Incidents Interim Report on Current Capabilities (Washington: National Academies Press, 1998).
61. George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica T. Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 26.
62. For discussions of the steps needed to enhance controls over biological and biotechnological research while not stifling scientific advancement, see: Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Defending Against Biodefence: The Need for Limits,” Biological Weapons Convention special paper no. 1, January 2003 at: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/spec01.htm>; John Steinbruner, “The Protective Management Of Biotechnology,” presented at the conference “Biosecurity: Science in the Balance” sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, February 15, 2003, Denver, CO, at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/AAASpresentation.htm>; John D. Steinbruner and Elisa D. Harris, “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 2003 at: <http://www.nap.edu/issues/19.3/steinbruner.htm>; and John Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther, “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Protective Oversight System,” CISSM Working Paper, February 2003 at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/finalmonograph.pdf>. For discussion of the issues involved in verification of these agreements and the kind of cooperative security approaches necessary to make them work, see Nancy Gallagher, “Verification and Advanced Cooperative Security,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002) and Nancy Gallagher, The Politics of Verification (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). For specific discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, see Elisa D. Harris, Research Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, Testimony on “Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the War on Terrorism,” before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 12, 2002, at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/People/SEN%20GOV%20AFFS%202-12-02.htm>.
63. Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., Challenging Conventional Wisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks of Arms Export Reform (Washington: Federation of American Scientists and Center for Defense Information, 2003), pp. 213-19.
64. See the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, 3 volumes (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003) and George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica T. Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).
65. For discussions on the efforts to weaken controls on arms exports, see Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., Challenging Conventional Wisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks of Arms Export Reform (Washington: Federation of American Scientists and Center for Defense Information, 2003).
66. See them at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf>.
67. For a discussion of what an alternative security budget would look like based on a different strategic approach see Foreign Policy In Focus/Center for Defense Information Task Force, A Unified Security Budget For the United States, March 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.
68. For a deeper discussion of such a strategy see Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (New York: Interlink, 2003).
69. On Libya, see Christopher Boucek, Libya’s Return to the Fold, Foreign Policy In Focus special report, April 2004, at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004libya.html>.
70. Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) and Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2004). The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There are currently 33 members. For more see: <http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.htm>.
71. U.S. General Accounting Office, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms, GAO-04-163, November 14, 2003, at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf>.
72. See, for example: Ibid; various reports from the United Nations 1267 Monitoring Group; Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); and Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2004).
73. Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule, “Fighting Terrorist Finance,” Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 87-104 and U.S. General Accounting Office, “Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Face Continuing Challenges in Addressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering,” Testimony before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-501T, March 4, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-501T>.
74. Cited in Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2004), p. 7.
75. At the end of 2003, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had four full-time staff working on tracking potential violations of laws forbidding financial flows to al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein and 21 working on illegal flows to Cuba. In early 2004, the Bush administration created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence to lead Treasury’s efforts to cut the lines of financial support to international terrorists, a critical component of the administration’s overall effort to keep America safe from terrorist plots. The TFI is led by a new undersecretary and two assistant secretaries and consolidates the supervision of OFAC, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of Asset Forfeiture, and the Office of Intelligence Support. But as of May 2004 Senator Max Baucus, the ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Committee, claimed that the Treasury Department still has more staff assigned to tracking money to Cuba than to al-Qaida. See Statement of Senator Max Baucus, Oversight Hearing of the Treasury Department and Terrorist Financing, May 19, 2004, at: <http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/051904mb.pdf>. According to the Department of the Treasury, they currently have 55 staff within OFAC tracking terrorist finance and 40-45 tracking the various sanctions programs against countries like Cuba.
76. For details on the Financial Action Task Force, see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/> and for the listing of the 2003 version of the 40 Recommendations, see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/40Recs-2003_en.pdf>.
77. For up-to-date information regarding such resolutions see the Bill of Rights Defense Committee at: <http://www.bordc.org/index.html>. For analysis of PATRIOT II, see the work of the American Civil Liberties Union at: <http://www.aclu.org/>, the Center for Constitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and the Rights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.
78. See Migration Policy Institute, America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11 (Washington: 2003) at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf>. On the issue of weakening our economy, see Genevieve J. Knezo, Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education, Congressional Research Service, April 8, 2002.
79. See <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11817&c=206> and documents at the Paul Revere project at: <http://freedom.idahogreenparty.org/>.
80. For more information on the Civil Liberties Restoration Act, see the analysis by the Rights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>. For more information on the SAFE Act, see the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s analysis at: <http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/PATRIOT/safe_act_analysis.php>.
81. Human Rights Watch report, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance After September 11, February 2002, pp. 34.
82. Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2003, at: <http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.htm>.
83. Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell, eds., Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 2002).
84. See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 85-96, and Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004) at: <http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf>.
85. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003).
86. For further discussion, see Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, December 2003, pp. 403-6 as well as work from the Democracy and Law Project that he leads at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at: <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/drl/drl_home.asp>.
87. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 2003), p. 15, at: <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/Testimony/Peace.pdf>.
88. See the text of the message at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/south_asia/1585636.stm>. He also discussed the suffering of Iraqi children under the U.N. sanctions regime, another concern broadly shared by Muslims worldwide.
89. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, December 2003, p. 405. Other issues with respect to credibility are discussed in Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, working paper no. 35 at: <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.
90. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, December 2003, p. 405.
91. See the discussions by Tamara Cofman Wittes in The New U.S. Proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation, Saban Center Middle East Memo #2, May 10, 2004, at: <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/wittes20040510.htm> and Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, working paper no. 35 at: <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.
92. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, December 2003, p. 406.
93. For the negative view, see Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. For the positive view, see Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), case studies of Northern Ireland, Palestine, and the Philippines. But, as Cragin and Chalk note, inadequately funded or administered programs can create rising expectations, which are subsequently unmet. This can generate a backlash and reinforce nascent support for terrorist activities.
94. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. See also David Gold, “The Economics of Terrorism,” Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) Case Studies (May 2004) at: <http://www.ciaonet.org/frame/casefrm.html>; C. Berrebi, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians” (Princeton University, September 2003) at: <http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/477.pdf>; Basel A. Saleh, “Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection,” Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economics, vol. 6, 2004 at: <http://www.sba.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/saleh.htm>; Basel A. Saleh and David Laitin, “Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism,” Mimeo (Princeton University, November 2003); and Alan Richards, “Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Toward Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2003 at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/radcalsm.pdf>.
95. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. Also see, Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, vol. 299, 2003, pp. 1534-1539, and Scott Atran, The Strategic Threat from Suicide Terror, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, December 2003 at: <http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=311>.
96. There is no shortage of proposals as to what such a framework or frameworks would look like. For representative examples, see four publications by Dani Rodrik: “Getting Institutions Right,” April 2004 at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/ifo-institutions%20article%20_April%202004_.pdf>; “How to Make the Trade Regime Work for Development,” February 2004 at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/How%20to%20Make%20Trade%20Work.pdf>; The Global Governance of Trade as If Development Really Mattered (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2001) at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/UNDPtrade.PDF>; Making Openness Work: The New Global Economy and the Developing Countries (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1999) as well as Lance Taylor, Santosh Mehrotra, and Enrique Delamonica, “The Links Between Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Social Development: Theory and Policy” in Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, eds., Development with a Human Face (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); and Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, Reclaiming Development—A Manual of Alternative Economic Policy (London: Zed Press, 2004). Though some of these proposals differ, they share an essential common ground: there needs to be room for diversity in approaches to industrialization and development, such diversity would provide for a range of acceptable forms of state intervention by poor and rich countries alike, and the current set of trading rules serve largely to benefit corporations in wealthier countries.
97. For examples of what an alternative strategy would look like see Foreign Policy In Focus, PetroPolitics, January 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/03petropol/> and the Apollo Alliance <http://www.apolloalliance.org/>.

Executive Summary | Introduction | A Failed Policy | A New Framework | Changing Course | Endnotes
App. 1: Funding for Counterterrorism | App. 2: Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism |
App. 3: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Terrorism Post-September 11, 2001
Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism