Nuclear Weapons:
Key Issues for the Nuclear Posture Review

Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information, 202-797-5269

This excerpted Issue Brief of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers is based upon the essay, "Get a policy, please," from the January/February issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

The Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act mandates that "In order to clarify United States nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the near term, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years." The Bush Administration is expected to deliver its review soon.

A thorough overhaul of current U.S. policy is needed. For example, the United States has promised countries forsaking nuclear weapons that they will not be targeted by U.S. nuclear warheads. Yet classified presidential guidance (PDD 60) reportedly leaves open the possibility of retaliation, or even a first strike, against a threat or attack by chemical/biological weapons. U.S. Air Force doctrine based on this guidance states, "Because the United States lacks the ability for an in-kind response to chemical and biological weapons, it must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against all forms of WMD." This doctrine only serves to legitimize the role of nuclear weapons and increase the incentives of other states to retain and/or acquire their own nuclear weapons capabilities.

Another outdated aspect of nuclear policy is the very long and redundant list of targets in Russia and a shorter list of targets in China, a list that has been growing instead of contracting since START II was originally signed in 1993. Current plans also call for maintaining thousands of these weapons on hair-trigger status, which creates, in the words of George W. Bush, "unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch." This excessively large target list, and a Cold War-sized nuclear arsenal on full alert, perpetuate instability more than they provide stability in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

During the campaign, President Bush called unneeded nuclear weapons "expensive relics of dead conflicts." If he is to make good on his May 23, 2000 campaign pledge to "reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than ... START II," and to "lower the alert status" of those forces, it will be necessary for his administration to undertake a fundamental and meaningful overhaul of these outdated, Cold War-era military plans and policies.

Toward a More Rational Policy

Nuclear weapons policy must be considered as part and parcel of overarching U.S. foreign and security policy. That means fundamental questions must be raised. Who is the arsenal aimed at, and what does that say about its current and future composition? What are the security and foreign policy benefits, risks, and costs? Do the current nuclear weapons attack options and target lists make sense in today's security environment? What do the regional commanders and the Joint Chiefs believe they need from a nuclear arsenal today, and in the future?

Second, spending priorities must be examined. Is the some $25 billion per year spent on nuclear weapons justified, or should some of that spending be shifted to conventional defense needs?

Third, the review must take into account the U.S. commitment to pursuing nuclear disarmament under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. government reiterated and enhanced its commitment in May 2000, by signing up to initiate practical measures aimed at incremental implementation, and agreeing to "an unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear-Weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of this nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament."

To this end the U.S. should consider:

• A declaration that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies;
• Replacement of rigid, outdated targeting plans with procedures to promptly develop a response tailored to any situation the United States may face;
• Deep, verifiable reductions of the deployed and reserve U.S. nuclear arsenal to well below 1,000 warheads, possibly retaining a few hundred submarine-based warheads as a survivable force;
• Removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert status;
• Withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

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