Transforming the Military

Cindy Williams, MIT Security Studies Program, 617-253-1825

Background

The Department of Defense and a wide array of scholars and visionaries have argued that the U.S. military is on the threshold of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). That revolution, sparked by rapid advances in information technologies and information processing capabilities, is said to have the potential to transform the essential elements of the armed forces, favoring them with a decisive advantage in future warfare. Recently, many proponents have shifted terminology from "RMA" to "military transformation."

Technological obstacles like limited capacity for jam-resistant communications or easy countermeasures may limit prospects for the more ambitious goals of transformation. Operational problems like information overload can limit the military usefulness of some ideas that sound good on paper. While proponents often point to the modest costs of experimenting with new ideas, actually implementing them can have substantial costs. Moreover, transforming the military will require enormous political capital. Nevertheless, it seems critical that the Defense Department explore new approaches to solve military problems-approaches that capitalize on new technologies and may be more cost effective than current ways of fighting.

Campaign Promises

In speeches before the election, President Bush described a "revolution in the technology of war" that would substitute mobility, agility, and swiftness for mass and size and would capitalize on information systems, stealth, and precision-guided weapons. He vowed:

To challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense;
To modernize existing weapons and equipment selectively;
To replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies;
To skip a generation of weapons;
To earmark at least 20 percent of the procurement budget for acquisition programs that propel America generations ahead in military technology.

The Rumsfeld Transformation Task Force

How well the President delivers on the promise to transform the military may not be clear until next January, when he submits the FY 2003 budget to Congress. One press report indicates that Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation Task Force will recommend going forward with nearly every system inherited from Clinton administration plans and adding new development programs for space-based radars, weapons-carrying space planes, anti-satellite weapons, and space-based radars. Another indicates that the task force has prepared an "A" list of programs it considers most related to transformation, including space-based radars, the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle and Comanche helicopter, and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Continuing with Clinton administration programs. Going forward with most of the programs of the last administration raises budget concerns and does not match the President's promise to modernize existing systems selectively. For example:
- President Bush intimated during the election campaign that keeping all three tactical aircraft programs (the Navy F/A-18 E/F, the Air Force F-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter) made no sense. Indeed, the three programs are expensive; at production rates envisioned in the Clinton program, costs of the three will average about $14 billion a year between 2005 and 2015, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The planes are not transformational in technology or military role. Cost effective alternatives include refurbishing and modernizing existing aircraft, or purchasing new items off cheaper production lines.
- The Transformation Task Force reportedly sees the Army's Comanche helicopter and the Interim Armored Vehicle as transformational. But the Comanche will be as vulnerable as other helicopters to one of the most likely dangers of future battlefield: man-portable air defenses. The Interim Armored Vehicle, a good choice for future peace operations, does not skip a generation of technology.
Adding New Development Programs. New development programs will be needed if the Bush administration is to make good on its promises. But it is important to recognize that programs with modest costs in the early stages of exploration and experimentation can lead to substantial costs later. For example:
- A space-based radar system would allow U.S. forces to track and locate moving or emitting targets in real time, even at night and through clouds. Such a system would seem to meet the vision of propelling America ahead in technology. Early research and experimentation might be carried out for $10-50 million a year. But total costs may come to $15-25 billion.
- The Global Hawk reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle fits with the Administration's promise to replace existing systems with new technologies and strategies. But the eventual cost for one aerial vehicle with its associated ground system will be more than $50 million. Thus, Global Hawk is far from the "cheap drone" that some people envision when they think of UAVs.
Adding new capabilities to existing systems. This may be the most cost-effective way to improve capability in many areas. For example:
- Improving the sensors on Joint STARS aircraft and adding datalink terminals on a variety of systems would capitalize on information technologies at relatively low cost.
- Adding modern munitions and new capabilities to existing bombers would strengthen U.S. force projection capabilities without the investment in additional bomber aircraft.