The Progressive ResponseVolume 3, Number 39
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-TakesLADIES, REMOVE YOURSELVES CUBA: POLICY AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE FREE TRADE, RESTRICTED TRAFFIC USE OF CHILDREN AS SOLDIERS
II. Comments
I. Updates and Out-TakesLADIES, REMOVE YOURSELVES
When U.S. Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) and several other House Democratic women entered a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting this week to call for hearings on the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the drama cast Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) in the familiar role of autocratic chairman and number one adversary of Democrats who believe he deliberately thwarts Clinton administration initiatives out of spite for lawmakers and activists that he commonly opposes. When Woolsey didn't comply with Helms' request that she "please be a lady" and leave the proceedings, he ordered capitol police to remove her and her colleagues at once. Unfortunately, the event was reported in the New York Times and Washington Post more as a conflict in personality between a right-wing senator and liberal, female members of the House than a protest over an international convention signed by the United States and over 160 other nations nearly 20 years ago that has yet to reach the Senate floor. Human rights supporters hope the event will draw wide attention to what is described as an "international bill of rights for women" that has been ratified by every industrialized nation in the world except the United States. To receive ratification in the U.S., two-thirds support in the Senate is required. The treaty contains 30 articles including the establishment of an international tribunal to monitor violence, poverty, discrimination, lack of legal status, property rights, health care, education, and credit for women. Once ratified, the U.S. would qualify for putting a representative on CEDAW's governing committee composed of 23 experts in the fields covered by the Convention. According to the official preamble: "In electing the experts, consideration is given to equitable geographical distribution and the representation of different forms of civilization, as well as the principal legal systems." Wednesday's event is a powerful reminder that time is running out for the Clinton administration. At the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the U.S. committed to ratification of CEDAW by the year 2000. Although President Clinton, the First Lady, and Secretary of State Albright have all called ratification an administration priority, Helms has met little challenge in committee to pass CEDAW on to the Senate floor. The basis for his blockade, one would assume, is Helms' bedrock conservative mistrust toward UN treaties in general. Unfortunately, the head-butting between the Clinton White House and Republican controlled Senate has yet to draw any better reason for U.S. failure to play the role of international partner instead of global maverick who is above international law on so many important treaties. With the session winding to a close, Helms undoubtedly will hold up to existing pressure, and CEDAW will, at best, become a campaign issue in 2000. Considering the treaty's history, however, CEDAW might just fade from public view altogether before the 106th Congress begins another session. CEDAW was signed by President Carter in 1980, the year after it was approved by the UN. Over the next 19 years, it passed out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only once, in 1994, but dissolved on the Senate floor without a vote. During the Reagan and Bush administrations, passage was never a policy goal, and the treaty was shackled by committee haggling that led it to the Justice Department for review and conditionality, where again little action was taken. Rep. Woolsey has been sponsoring a resolution to take CEDAW to the Senate floor every year since she arrived at the House in 1993. Wednesday's letter to Chairman Helms had 111 House cosponsors (Connie Morella-MD, the only Republican signee) and was not the first time the Senate was petitioned. In 1998, United Methodist Women--the official women's organization of the United Methodist Church--with the participation of Rep.Woolsey and other House members circulated a petition to the Senate with more than 10,000 signatures calling for ratification hearings. Yet this grassroots effort generated much less national attention than Wednesday's brief confrontation. Despite a lack of interest in forging ahead in the Senate, there exists a growing grassroots campaign effort. Over 100 active national membership organizations are supporting local advocacy campaigns to urge individual senators to push for passage out of committee and final approval for the treaty. Seven states have passed resolutions supporting U.S. ratification and San Francisco has adopted the treaty's principles and appropriated funds to monitor compliance. San Francisco is a now a model for activists and legislators working in Seattle, Atlanta, and other cities to pass the treaty language as well. For more informationAmerican Bar Association, Individual Rights Section Center for Women's Global Leadership U.S. Rep. Lynn Woolsey's Office U.S. Rep. Nancy Pelosi's Office
CUBA: POLICY AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
In recent years, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been guided by two primary objectives or "tracks": to isolate the Cuban government and to provide support to the Cuban population. The former has generally taken priority, precluding various measures that would help the Cuban people but might indirectly benefit the government as well. Elements of the first track have been in place since 1960, when the U.S. imposed an economic embargo on trade between the two countries. Although many expected an emphasis on isolation to decline with the end of the cold war, recent years have instead brought an intensification of U.S. pressure tactics, initiated primarily by the legislative branch. The Cuban Democracy Act, passed in 1992, prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, urged other countries to restrict trade and finance arrangements with the island, approved economic sanctions for any country providing Cuba assistance, and prohibited ships docking in Cuba from entering U.S. ports for six months. At the same time, "track two" of the Cuban Democracy Act created possibilities for providing "support to the Cuban people." These included the authorization of regulated donations of food and medicine to Cuba, payments to Cuba for telecommunications services, and travel to Cuba for journalistic, religious, or educational purposes. Though humanitarian in intent, many of these initiatives were later justified by U.S. officials as yet another means of subverting the Cuban government. Already apprehensive about increased people-to-people contact, Cuban leaders found in such rhetoric both genuine cause and political justification for greater restrictions in this sphere, resulting in less space for interaction than before the U.S. "opening." The U.S. has taken small steps in recent years to cooperate with Cuba on regional security interests. In 1994, for example, responding to a rafter crisis involving tens of thousands of Cubans, Washington and Havana negotiated a comprehensive migration agreement and have continued to meet every six months for ongoing talks. There is also modest interaction in the counternarcotics realm between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Patrol, which share limited tactical information on a case-by-case basis for interdiction of suspicious vessels. In sum, the U.S. government continues to maintain pressure on the Cuban government in the form of longstanding economic sanctions, which have intensified in recent years. At the same time, the U.S. has initiated circumscribed attempts to provide humanitarian and moral support to the Cuban population. There has also been modest government-to-government collaboration in areas where other concerns override the two countries' political conflict, particularly migration and drug trafficking. Toward a New Foreign PolicyBefore specific proposals can be contemplated, fundamental changes must be made in Washington's policy framework. Without such changes, new measures are likely to be incoherent and ineffective. First, U.S. policy toward Cuba should focus on the long run, abandoning its focus on the current regime to evaluate and prepare for challenges and opportunities that are likely to arise in the future. In the same vein, Washington should reorganize its policy priorities to reflect the comparative importance of various interests and objectives. In particular, engagement of future Cuban leaders, support for the Cuban population, and protection of strategic U.S. interests should take precedence over isolating Castro. One of Washington's highest priorities should be to engage Cuba's current second-tier officials. As the country's likely future leaders, they must be brought into dialogue eventually, and the outcome is likely to be better if this happens sooner rather than later. Specifically, the U.S. should eliminate remaining restrictions on granting U.S. visas to high-level Cuban government officials and should permit regular communication between them and their U.S. counterparts. This would also serve Washington's presumed interest in exposing these individuals to the virtues of multi-party democracy and free markets. The U.S. should increase its outreach to the general Cuban population as well, focusing on two objectives: providing meaningful support and dispelling perceptions of hostility. Most compelling in both respects would be the elimination of all restrictions on the sale of food and medicine. Additional gestures of support could include ending existing limits on monetary remittances to individual Cubans, on family reunification visits, and on all forms of travel. Measures should continue to be explored for establishing regular commercial flights and direct mail service between the two countries. Ideally, Washington should also rescind the portions of Helms-Burton that directly reinforce Cubans' fear of U.S. domination. At a minimum, the aggressive rhetoric often present in the Clinton administration's Cuba policy statements, which is already decreasing in intensity, should be replaced by a clear statement of commitment to respect the Cuban people's right to self-determination, even if their choices clash with U.S. preferences. The administration should also establish effective control over Radio Marti, in part by returning its operations from Miami to Washington, and should ensure that its broadcasts communicate a message of support and goodwill to the Cuban population. In addition, the U.S. should work more closely with Cuba to protect its strategic security interests in the region, particularly to combat the growth of drug trafficking, corruption, and organized crime. Modest progress has been made in this area, and several small initiatives are currently under consideration that would result in a more effective regional counternarcotics strategy, including authorization of telephone communication between Cuban and U.S. authorities in time-sensitive vessel-interdiction situations (versus the current fax system, which slows the exchange of information.) Washington may also post a U.S. "interdiction specialist" in Havana to interact directly with Cuban counterparts on antinarcotics cases. For the future, the U.S. should begin at least contemplating more comprehensive counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, including the provision of badly needed equipment and technical assistance. Due to domestic factors in both Cuba and the U.S., neither side is likely to initiate a bold change in its stance toward the other. Any constructive measures are therefore almost certain to be incremental. Even so, a steady series of gradual measures has significant confidence-building potential and could ultimately create the conditions for negotiation of more fundamental issues at some point in the future. (Shawn Malone is the coordinator of the Cuba Program at the Georgetown University Caribbean Project.) Source for More InformationCenter for International Policy, Cuba Project Council on Foreign Relations, Cuba Task Force Cuban American National Foundation Cuban Committee for Democracy Cuban Research Institute Cuban Studies Institute Human Rights Watch Inter-American Dialogue Cuban Democracy (Torricelli) Act of 1992 Libertad (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996 National Website of the Republic of Cuba U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Department of State U.S. Department of the Treasury
FREE TRADE, RESTRICTED TRAFFIC In his speech supporting an amendment to the Highway Safety Bill restricting the entry of Mexican trucks to the United States, Rep. William O. Lipinski (D-IL) raised the specter of "millions upon millions of unsafe Mexican trucks on U.S. highways and byways." On the face of it, it's a clear-cut issue: Mexican trucks and truck drivers are not subjected to the same safety standards as in the United States and therefore represent a threat to U.S. highways. Lipinski's amendment received overwhelming support from his colleagues in a 415-5 vote last week. Senate approval is likely, and Clinton has indicated that he also supports the measure that will levy harsh fines ($10,000 and a six-month suspension for a first offense) on Mexican truck drivers that venture beyond the border zone. Teamster President James Hoffa praised the congressional action, saying that "allowing these unsafe Mexican trucks to continue to traverse the U.S. without regard for our laws is unacceptable." Although there are safety issues involved in cross-border trucking, the vote banning Mexican truck drivers had more to do with protecting U.S. jobs than protecting lives. Ninety percent of U.S.-Mexico trade is carried by trucks. NAFTA aimed to facilitate trade in the region by lowering tariffs and easing restrictions on trade, services, and investment. At the U.S.-Mexican border, truck traffic has increased in the wake of NAFTA, but Mexican trucks are still required to off-load their cargo in the border commercial zone where it is than transferred to a U.S. trucking company. During the NAFTA negotiations, Mexican trade officials won assurances that this roadblock would be removed, allowing Mexican truckers to take their cargo into the American heartland. First, the Department of Transportation, responding to Teamster and citizen pressure, delayed implementation of the first phase of truck traffic liberalization that would have allowed Mexican truckers to travel throughout the border states. The second and final liberalization allowing Mexican trucks to travel throughout the U.S. was scheduled in NAFTA to begin in January 2000. The congressional action was hailed in the press as a big victory for labor. Clearly, if the U.S. government had complied with the provisions of the trade agreement it signed, many U.S. truckers would lose their jobs to Mexican trucking firms that would haul produce and manufactured goods from Mexico directly to U.S. outlets. Just as clearly, U.S. action blocking the implementation of this part of NAFTA was not a victory for international labor solidarity. Continued U.S. action to keep Mexican truckers off U.S. highways highlights a key contention of developing countries: namely that developed countries are increasing their use of nontariff barriers to protect jobs and markets. The trucking issue is also an illustration of rising concern in the United States and other developed countries that liberalized trade and investment places their health, environmental, safety, and labor standards at risk. Supporters of measures to block access to Mexican trucking point to large disparities in U.S. and Mexican trucking regulation. According to a recent report by the Department of Transportation (DOT), Mexico does not restrict the number of hours drivers may operate a vehicle without rest, has no vehicle maintenance requirements, performs no roadside inspections, and has not developed a dependable system to trace safety histories of drivers or carriers. Furthermore, a 1998 DOT survey along the border found that 44% of Mexican trucks had safety violations compared to 25% of U.S. trucks, although there is no evidence that Mexican trucks operating in the border zone have been a threat to highway safety. The AFL-CIO has declared that it will oppose U.S. entry of Mexican trucks until Mexican trucking companies, trucks, and their drivers meet U.S. truck standards, driver standards, vehicle emissions standards, and labor standards. For the past several years the Mexican government has been attempting to resolve the dispute and what it regards as a clear violation of NAFTA through the dispute resolution process of NAFTA's Free Trade Commission. Furthermore, Mexico claims that its truckers are ready and willing to meet the same standards required of their Canadian counterparts. It has suggested that the United States establish a certification procedure for Mexican truckers wanting to deliver cargo in the United States. However, neither the federal or state governments (particularly Texas and Arizona) have demonstrated any resolve to increase truck inspection facilities in the border region despite a major increase in cross-border traffic since NAFTA went into effect. The Mexican trucking issue highlights three key contentious issues in the larger free trade debate.
At least for now, because of the way these issues are playing out in U.S.-Mexico relations, "millions upon millions" of Mexican trucks will not be endangering highway safety and U.S. jobs.
USE OF CHILDREN AS SOLDIERS At the beginning of this century, wars were fought primarily on defined battlefields between men in governmental armed forces. Today, dozens of wars specifically target civilians--now 90% of all war casualties--and their communities' social institutions. Children have become increasingly involved in these wars, both as civilian victims and as combatants. Poverty, the social disruption, and destruction stemming from these wars, and the proliferation of small and cheap weapons are major factors in making child soldiers a growing phenomenon.
II. CommentsI read your report: Iran: Time For Detente (by Stephen Zunes) with interest. It was a good article and I agreed with a lot of the points made.(see Iran: Time for Détente at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n28iran.html) There were however a few points that I found difficult to accept. I may not have understood them as you may have intended. "Washington could propose ending its support for Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon in return for an end to Iranian support of the Lebanese Hezbollah resisting that occupation." Unfortunately, Hezbollah, Iran, & Syria are not trying to simply remove Israel from their protection zone in southern Lebanon, but their view has long been to drive all Jews into the sea. "Similarly, the best way to stop any potential procurement of nuclear weapons by Iran is to support the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such a move would require both the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the region and a pledge by Washington to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Iran has long supported such a nuclear-free zone agreement." Similarly, Iran has never been known to be willing to hold on to an agreement. They tend not to have any problem signing all these agreements but they do not lay any value to it. Anthony Hoglind
Carl Conetta, the co-author of the FPIF policy brief "Military Strategy Under Review" (available at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n03mil.html) and codirector of the Commonwealth Institute, is organizing an important symposium: TEN YEARS AFTER THE WALL: TRENDS IN POST-COLD WAR U.S. SECURITY POLICY, which will be held on November 11-12, 1999, at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 135 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts. It is sponsored by the Project on Defense Alternatives of the Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Among the panel discussions planned are the following: U.S. Security Cooperation: Trends, Problems and Prospects; Post-Cold War U.S. Policy on the Role, Use, and Utility of Armed Force; Affording Peace: The New Defense Budget Paradox; The Recent Evolution of U.S. Military Posture: Strategy, Missions, Structure; The United States and China: Toward a New Cold War? Among the many panelists will be Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues, Union of Concerned Scientists; Randall Forsberg, director, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies; Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute; Steven Miller, director, International Security Program, JFK School of Government; and Janne Nolan, director, International Programs, The Century Foundation. The symposium is free of charge. However, space is limited and advanced registration is recommended. For further information, visit http://www.comw.org/pda/nsymp.html or call Aaron Katz at (617) 547-4474.
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