The Progressive ResponseVolume 3, Number 45
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-TakesUSING CHINA AS A PROXY: RISKS AND ERRORS U.S. POLICY HAMPERS CHANCES FOR ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE
II. Letters from Readers
I. Updates and Out-TakesUSING CHINA AS A PROXY: RISKS
AND ERRORS
With the smell of tear gas from Seattle still lingering, China is returning to center stage in both the trade and security areas, and U.S. relations with it promise to be a central foreign policy issue in the 2000 election. Some U.S. activists central to the protests in Seattle have targeted the vote on granting China permanent Normal Trading Relations (NTR) status as their next target for mobilization, with AFL-CIO spokeswoman Denise Mitchell noting that "The China vote is going to become a proxy for all of our concerns about globalization." Recent developments on the security front are also increasing China's profile in U.S. foreign policy. Five days after the trade agreement was signed, the U.S. and China held their first military-to-military contact since NATO's May, 1999, bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. The Clinton administration agreed in July to pay $4.5 million in what it termed "humanitarian payments" to those injured in the embassy bombing and to the families of those who died. Still unresolved issues include U.S compensation to China for the physical damage to the embassy and Chinese compensation to the U.S. for damage to its embassy and consulates from the demonstrations following the bombing. Lingering Chinese suspicions about U.S. antimissile defense systems, the Cox report on Chinese spying, the Kosovo war and embassy bombing, as well as U.S. concern on human rights, the spy scandal, labor issues, and Taiwan, have turned even low-level military contact into a controversial proposition. Furthermore, new conditions in the Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress in October require detailed reports on any military contacts with the People's Liberation Army, including who participated, how much was spent, and what was disclosed. Even some within the Pentagon criticize these rules as overkill. High-level military contacts are unlikely to begin until mid-2000. The spy scandal took a new turn on December 10, as Wen Ho Lee was indicted on 59 counts of illegally removing highly classified design, construction, and testing data from the Los Alamos weapons laboratory where he was employed. The indictment accused Dr. Lee of transferring classified information into unclassified computer files at the Los Alamos laboratory and downloading other material onto portable tapes. The indictment said that seven of the tapes that Dr. Lee had made, containing critical nuclear secrets, could not be found. The most serious offenses in the indictment, removing classified nuclear weapons data, are punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison. The indictment accused Dr. Lee of mishandling nuclear data but did not accuse him of spying or of any espionage offenses related to a foreign government. China has steadfastly denied such espionage. China's Massive Economic ChallengesThe permanent NTR vote is the next step following the November 15 agreement between the U.S. and China on specific issues regarding China's accession to the WTO. China has also completed such negotiations with Canada and Japan and only needs to complete one with the European Union to cover the fourth of the Quad countries--the dominant players within the WTO. The agreement signed on November 15 included some special benefits for United States companies to the exclusion of other WTO members, such as a delayed reduction of U.S. quotas for Chinese textile exports, safeguards for import surges, and access to parts of China's financial sector. (For more details see Progressive Response, Volume 3, no. 44, available at <http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume3/prog3n44.html>). It is ironic that China's ability to play a key role in preventing the Asian and global economic crisis from worsening is because its economy is not an open, liberalized one in the image the U.S. has been trying to export elsewhere. China's lack of foreign exchange convertibility has prevented extensive speculative attacks on its currency. The November 15 agreement represents commitments by the Chinese government to significantly open sectors of its economy (especially in finance) that sheltered China from some of the contagion effects of the Asian crisis. If implemented, the agreement will also deepen the internal divisions that have emerged since China's economic opening to the international economy. The social and ecological costs of China's transformation since 1979 have been immense. Growing inequality within urban areas and between urban and rural areas suggests that significant grievances and unrest lie just below the surface. There are regular reports of demonstrations, particularly in rural areas, relating to corrupt local officials, floods, and high taxes. After the flooding of the Yangtze in mid-1998, there were 130 reports of rural rebellion in four provinces, including attacking and occupying government offices. China has allowed the first bank to fail since 1949 and is in the process of privatizing large sections of its economy, including enterprises previously managed by the military. The financial sector, both state banks and the provincial and municipal fund-raising and investment institutions known as ITICs, are also in serious trouble. China has also begun a restructuring of non-bank financial institutions. Managing this transformation--especially at a time when overall and export growth rates are slowing and the political effects of the dramatic inequality that has accompanied rapid growth are becoming more salient--presents massive challenges. Divergent Views on China and the WTOThe Clinton administration is now facing the results of allowing commercial interests to dominate other concerns in shaping policy toward China. In the five years since the Clinton administration formally delinked progress on human rights from the annual vote on granting China temporary NTR (formerly Most Favored Nation or MFN) status, the number of congressional representatives voting in favor of NTR has slowly but steadily increased. The vote for permanent NTR status may be different, both because it is an election year and because at least some of the forces mobilized at Seattle have targeted China as their next issue. Opponents and supporters of permanent NTR status (which is framed as support or opposition of China's entry into the WTO) span a spectrum from outright opposition, support with conditions, and outright support, and, for lack of a better term, none of the above. Outright supporters include the business community with interests in expanded trade and investment opportunities in China--primarily, but not exclusively, larger transnational corporations. Opponents include some of the labor, consumer, environmental, and human rights groups demonstrating in Seattle, but also right-wingers trying to isolate what they perceive as an aggressive China, businesses in sectors like textiles and garments that will be threatened by low-cost imports from China, and Christian fundamentalists concerned about China's persecution of Christians. Some labor and other groups see opposing China's entry into the WTO as a tactical move because reforming the WTO to add a social clause and/or environmental conditions would be more difficult with China inside the WTO, and they see China strengthening the largely Southern opposition to the inclusion of labor and environmental conditions on trade within the WTO. This odd alliance leads to occasionally incoherent analyses. For example, Robert Scott of the U.S. labor-associated Economic Policy Institute presents arguments that combine many of the above positions in a way that is more identifiably nationalist than progressive, arguing that "China can wait" in its entry to the WTO because the government violates labor rights, is a non-market economy, and pursues economic policies that regulate foreign investment in a manner that serves the developmental objectives of the Chinese state. These regulations have been important to the relatively successful development strategies of several Asian countries and were a major target of the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Furthermore, such regulations can be used to force the transfer of greener production technologies, a major objective of sustainable development advocates. While the criticism of labor and human rights violations in China is on target, it seems ironic for a pro-labor think tank to argue that the Chinese economy should restructure itself in a more laissez-faire fashion. The position of support with conditions is reflected by Human Rights Watch, which argues that Congress should exchange human rights conditions for permanent NTR status. They argue, for example, that within one year of receiving permanent NTR, China should be required to ratify at least one of the two UN human rights treaties it has signed. It should begin a process of dismantling the huge system of "reeducation through labor" which allows officials to sentence thousands of citizens to labor camps annually for up to three years without judicial review. And it should be required to open up Tibet and Xinjiang to regular, unhindered access by UN human rights and humanitarian agencies, foreign press, and independent monitors. The "none of the above" group argues that focusing on China's entry into the WTO diverts progressives from the very real issues for which the China vote is a proxy: peace and security, labor and human rights, and environmental sustainability. They point out that permanent NTR and WTO membership do not increase the access of goods produced in China to U.S. markets, but will increase the access of U.S. goods, services, and capital in China. Furthermore, they argue that focusing on China's membership in the WTO as a defining issue runs the risk of stigmatizing China as the source of U.S. economic problems, reinforces the interests of the most reactionary and racist members of the opposition camp, holds China to a double standard, and diverts attention away from the practices of corporations in the global economy. What might this debate mean for human rights? China's record on human rights is clearly mixed and uneven. At the national level, explicit challenges to the Communist Party's monopoly of power are met with repression. Yet some spaces in civil society, albeit closely watched, have been carved out for organizations (other than independent labor unions) that are not explicitly political, and there is a not insignificant process of fairly competitive elections in China's rural villages. More than 75% of China's total population lives in rural areas and votes for their village committees every three years. However, on the national level, the recent crackdown on the Falun Gong religious organization highlights the extent to which the government continues to fear the creation of large-scale public organizations outside of Party control. China and Human RightsChina signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998. It is unclear when either will be ratified. (The U.S. has only ratified the ICCPR). In 1999, the U.S. sponsored a resolution critical of China at the UN Commission on Human Rights, but did so in a somewhat unenthusiastic manner, waiting until shortly before the Commission met to announce its intention to do so, rather than trying to build support earlier. In contrast to China's foreign policy stance on military and economic issues, it has been much less eager to embrace multilateral institutions in the human rights field. The September 1998 visit by UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson received mixed reviews, but it set the stage for the United States to advance its agenda as part of a multilateral rather than merely a unilateral agenda. Some human rights organizations gave Clinton high marks for his comments during his visit in June 1998 that the Tiananmen crackdown was wrong and for arguing that "stability in the twenty-first century will require high levels of freedom" in China. But, in contrast to its commercial agenda, summitry has mainly been a missed opportunity for the U.S. human rights agenda. The two major areas relating to self-determination and human rights regarding China are Hong Kong and Tibet. The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Great Britain to China on July 1, 1997, and the installation of the new Special Administrative Region (SAR) government were arguably the most important events in the territory's history. The political transition produced no dramatic crackdowns, no arrests, and no bans on demonstrations. The U.S. should monitor the human rights situation to insure that China maintains its commitments to respecting democracy and human rights. The Clinton administration has continued a long-time U.S. government policy of ambivalence about Tibet. The United States should pressure the Chinese government to respect human rights in the region. In the near term, at least three issues of particular importance surrounding Tibet should be pursued: release of Tibetan prisoners who have not used violence; securing verifiable information on the whereabouts and current status of the nine-year-old Panchen Lama, the second highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism; and securing improved access to Tibet for the international press and human rights organizations. China's impact on the global as well as regional environment points to a positive role for the United States to support the transfer of sustainable transportation, energy, and ozone-safe technologies in a rapid fashion. This should be done through the Export-Import Bank and OPIC, as well as through other bilateral and multilateral efforts. China as a Security ThreatChina remains the major issue in U.S. security policy in Asia. The currently dominant security policy in the Clinton administration holds that China has essentially replaced the former Soviet Union as the chief strategic threat to the United States in the region, and the U.S. should essentially retain its containment strategy, with China as the new target. The basis of this strategy includes a strengthening of cold war-era bilateral military alliances with the development of a Theater-based Missile Defense system that would cover South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Revelations in early-to-mid 1999 indicating a pattern of Chinese nuclear weapons and missile technology espionage dating from the 1970s to the mid-1990s has raised fears of China as an enemy to the highest level in 20 years. China's defense budget has grown by more than 50% in real terms over the course of the 1990s and is to increase 15% in 1999. China's occupation of 11 islands and reefs in the Spratlys, including Mischief Reef, 378 kilometers from the Philippines, is also used as evidence of China's expansionist nature (virtually all habitable portions of the Spratlys have now been taken by various claimants, including Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei). But the view of China as an expansionist power needing to be contained ignores several facts. First is that China has the largest number of bordering countries of any country in the world, including long-time adversaries Russia, Vietnam, and India. The new Central Asian states carved out of the former Soviet Union are seen as potential threats, in part because they may ally with minority groups within China. In China's nuclear arsenal of roughly 400 warheads, only about 20 are capable of reaching the United States (which has more than 8,300 operational warheads, nearly all of which could be targeted against China). China's long-range ballistic missiles number fewer than two dozen, carry a single warhead, and are liquid-fueled. All 982 U.S. ballistic missiles, including 432 aboard invulnerable Trident submarines, carry multiple warheads (MIRVs) and are solid-fueled, and thus can be launched on short notice. The accusations of espionage are more telling of the weaknesses in U.S. security than of providing any significant evidence that the Chinese have used this data to gain a qualitative strategic advantage relative to the United States. A more balanced conclusion would be that the espionage reveals that the privatization of the management of the nuclear weapons labs did not adequately take into account national security concerns. A report by Clinton's Foreign Intelligence Advisory concluded that a "culture of arrogance" at the weapons labs had "conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen" while another report by the General Accounting Office said the Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories had ignored warnings about their lax security for years. As none of the counts against Wen Ho Lee include accusations of espionage, it may be that the indictment is actually an attempt to demonstrate progress in the investigation so as to defuse Republican attacks during the 2000 election campaign. Since the furor over alleged Chinese espionage waned over the summer, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials narrowed the list of nuclear secrets that Beijing most likely stole while expanding the pool of potential suspects. After three years of a narrow focus on the Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab in New Mexico and Wen Ho Lee, officials now acknowledge that the classified information China most likely stole was accessible to hundreds of people at several federal facilities. A primary piece of evidence continues to be a 1988 Chinese document that suggests China stole valuable information about nearly every major weapon in the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, including the W-88 miniaturized submarine warhead that is one of America's most sophisticated weapons. This document was a key element of the report issued by a congressional committee chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox on Chinese nuclear espionage earlier this year. The Cox Report pointed to that document as evidence of the extent of China's spying at U.S. nuclear labs. More recent assessments by U.S. intelligence agencies, however, conclude that a large portion of the information in that document most likely came from publicly available documents, some of which contained misinformation about American weapons. In the case of the W-88, intelligence officials now believe the 1988 Chinese document, which U.S. officials obtained in 1995, contains only a couple of pieces of classified information that could have been stolen only from secure facilities. The growing dominance of commercial over security issues (as evident in the cases of the missile launches by Loral and Hughes) points to the dangers of having U.S. business interests shape peace and security issues toward China. Within the Clinton administration, a faction led by the Treasury and Commerce departments and promoted by transnational corporations opposed and continues to oppose security-based restrictions on trade and commerce, arguing that China's partial liberalizations make it a land of enormous trade and investment opportunity. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that "China does not have the resources to project a major conventional force beyond its territory," and points to China's engagement with multilateral institutions and conventions as a reflection that China is willing, if it can participate as a full partner, to participate in multilateral security institutions. Today, China's major concerns are dealing with massive economic and political transformations--transformations that will only become more dramatic if China enters the WTO and meets its commitments under the various agreements it signs with the Quad powers. In such a context, an aggressive U.S. military posture strengthens the realpolitik advocates within China's security apparatus. A better strategy would recognize the longer-term strategic benefits of enmeshing the U.S., China, and Japan within multilateral security frameworks that provide the opportunity for confidence-building measures, mutually verifiable force reduction and disarmament commitments, and that address the multiple nonmilitary threats to security in the region. ConclusionChina will be an important foreign policy issue in the coming year. Stigmatizing China as a threat to U.S. economic and military security may win sound-bites and even votes. But such a position deters a more progressive agenda. It is understandable that some progressives would hang their agenda on the legislative hook of China's permanent NTR status and WTO membership. But there are dangers in such an approach, and it is not true that other legislative hooks do not exist. Under the legislation that approved U.S. entry into the WTO, the executive branch must prepare a report on U.S. gains and losses from its membership in the WTO and deliver it to the Congress on January 1, 2000. For up to 90 days after that date, any senator or representative can request a vote on maintaining U.S. membership in the WTO. If the WTO is the problem, then push for reform or abolition of the WTO, or push for the U.S. to withdraw from the WTO--don't make China the referendum on the WTO. By using China as a proxy, progressives risk promoting self-righteous double standards and sacrificing a distinctly progressive internationalism that differs from both the internationalism of free traders and the nationalism of populists. U.S. unilateralism in foreign policy has been more often an instrument of anti-progressive forces than progressive ones, and progressives must beware its pitfalls and superficial appeal. Instead a more long-term view, not to mention a more humble and less self-righteous approach, might include:
(John Gershman of the Institute for Development Research is the author of an FPIF policy brief on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.)
Sources for More InformationBates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution, "China's
Hollow Military" in The National Interest, No. 56, Summer
1999, posted at Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Security Situation
in the Taiwan Strait posted at Human Rights Watch on the U.S.-China Agreement, posted at U.S. Business Principles for Human Rights of Workers in China, posted
at Catharine E. Dalpino, Visiting fellow, Brookings Institute, Policy
Brief #50, posted at
U.S. POLICY HAMPERS CHANCES
FOR ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE
The initial optimism at the resumption of Israeli-Syrian negotiations may be misplaced. Though it is encouraging that the Israeli prime minister and Syrian foreign minister are meeting face-to-face-the highest level talks ever between these two rivals-their positions are too far apart at this time to expect any quick resolution. Despite media accolades about Secretary of State Madeleine Albright "getting Syria on board," it was Israel--not Syria--that broke off the talks in 1996, after a series of terrorist attacks in Israeli cities. Though the Israeli government acknowledged that the Syrians were not involved in the bombings, Tel Aviv used the attacks as an excuse to cut off negotiations, which did not resume until this week. Given that Israel is widely viewed as a pro-Western democracy and that Syria is a dictatorship that once had close ties with the Soviets, there has been a bias in the peace process toward Israel among many Americans. This perspective is compounded by the fact that for most of Israel's history, the Syrians refused to negotiate, financed terrorist groups that attacked Israeli civilians, and sought Israel's destruction. Underlying the Clinton administration's bias, of course, is the important role that Israel plays in advancing American strategic interests in the region and the perceived obstacle that Syria seems to face in advancing these same interests. As a result, few Americans recognize the fact that, in the current negotiations, Syria's position is actually more moderate than Israel's and is more consistent with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which the U.S. pledged would be the basis of the talks when they opened in Madrid in 1991. The premise of these resolutions was that the Arab states would provide security guarantees for the state of Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories--i.e., "land for peace." Israel has occupied much of the Golan Heights in southwestern Syria since 1967. By 1991, the Syrians had already formally accepted these resolutions. During the negotiations between 1991 and 1996, Syria pledged to provide Israel with such long-desired security guarantees as the demilitarization of the Golan Heights, permission for international monitors and peacekeeping forces, and the signing of a non-aggression pact. Israel, however, is now saying that such security guarantees are not enough and is demanding full diplomatic and economic relations prior to a withdrawal. Although Tel Aviv's desire for normal diplomatic and economic relations with its neighbors is quite understandable, these long-term goals should not be a requirement for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Syrian territory. UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 require only that Syria provide security guarantees, nothing more. Syrian President Hafez Assad has gone a step further by promising eventual diplomatic relations. Other points of contention are Israeli demands for access to Syrian water resources and further demilitarization by Syria beyond the Golan without comparable demilitarization on the Israeli side. President Clinton is pushing Syria to accept the Israeli position, which is essentially a case of moving the goal posts. In short, after years of criticizing Syria for refusing to accept 242 and 338, the U.S. is now criticizing Syria for insisting on their full implementation. U.S. policy toward the negotiations needs to change. At minimum, Washington should do the following:
(Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He has spent time on both sides of the Golan Heights and has met with both the Syrian and Israeli foreign ministers. His articles on the Israeli-Syrian conflict and the negotiations have been published in Middle East Policy, International Journal, and other publications.)
II. Letters from ReadersCOMMENTS AND LETTERS ON CHINA AND THE WTO
"The attempt to bring China into the WTO... is less likely to reform
China, as its advocates claim, than it is to further deform the WTO. And
it is more likely to detract from the WTO's already questionable legitimacy
than to add to it.... The real debate is not...whether to engage China,
but what are the terms of that engagement, and whose values are to be
represented.... America's working families understand the cruelty of a
world economy regulated in favor of the corporations.... Over two-thirds
oppose bringing China into the WTO without further progress on human rights
and religious freedom.... Incorporating enforceable workers' rights, human
rights and environmental protections in every U.S. trade and investment
agreement is the right way; admitting a repressive China into the WTO
is the wrong way."
"As a large and powerful country, China (like the United States)
prefers bilateral approaches to problems where it can essentially bully
smaller countries into submission. Bringing China into the WTO and its
dispute resolution framework would be a very useful step forward.... [However,]
entry into the WTO will inevitably hasten the privatization of state-run
enterprises and will increase unemployment by a sizable margin. True,
these enterprises are often inefficient, but they currently function as
very important social welfare programs. It would be disastrous to dismantle
these enterprises rapidly. It is not likely that foreign companies or
foreign capital will be able to absorb all the unemployed. I also fear
that China's environmental situation, which is precarious, will not benefit
from WTO accession. The government has not revealed very strong Green
tendencies, and the potential for being accused of erecting 'non-tariff
barriers to trade' will only make matters worse. In general, I think that
WTO membership for China is inevitable and in some cases positive. But
I think it is important to acknowledge the considerable problems associated
with accession."
"The U.S.-China deal will not be good for workers in either country.
In China, it's predicted that tens of millions of people will lose their
livelihoods, with virtually no safety net to fall back on. From a U.S.
perspective, it's wrong to assume that expanded export markets and foreign
investment opportunities in China for U.S. corporations will automatically
benefit U.S. workers. Even conservative economists concede that rising
inequality and the stagnation of U.S. wages during much of this decade
can be attributed in large part to globalization, as corporations use
their increased mobility to pit workers and communities against one another.
The welfare of U.S. workers is linked to the welfare of workers around
the world, and the welfare of developing country citizens depends on strong
labor and environmental protections and development strategies that promote
a rising standard of living for the average person, not just profits for
corporations. Once China has WTO membership, the leverage to promote stronger
human rights and environmental standards in that country is lost."
"The current framework for adding China to the WTO is the wrong
framework. It is true that China's human rights record is not the worst
among the WTO members. However, our conclusion is not that we must therefore
add China to the WTO, but rather that we must continue to pursue a transformed
WTO that (among other changes) would require adherence to internationally
recognized human rights for all countries. In addition, we propose that
any nation that wants to join the WTO should adhere to (or show they are
taking steps to adhere to) internationally recognized labor and environmental
rights. For current members, every two to three years there would be a
review and countries that fail would be excluded from the WTO. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, for instance, has proposed a joint
WTO/ILO Advisory Body be set up to oversee the implementation of a workers'
rights clause. If a country was in breach of its obligations, the ILO
report would make recommendations to the country and, if necessary, offer
technical assistance and make additional resources available to help countries
address the violations."
"Human Rights Watch believes that China's membership in the WTO
could increase respect for human rights, but only if it is combined with
consistent external pressure. China's commitment to abide by global trading
standards will not automatically yield a greater commitment to international
human rights standards unless China's major trading partners insist on
that connection.... [G]etting China to make concessions on human rights
will require the kind of determined, hard-nosed bargaining by the administration
that sealed the WTO agreement. It's now up to Congress to jump-start the
process with human rights conditions on permanent NTR [Normal Trade Relations]."
"Friends of the Earth opposes China's admission into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The Clinton-Gore Administration's deal to admit China
into the WTO will block sorely-needed environmental and democratic reform
of this global trade body, and show that the Administration's real trade
priority is boosting corporate profits--not promoting democracy, environmental
protection and human rights.... Since the WTO operates by consensus, one
country can thwart reforms sought by others. We fear that China, with
its anti-democratic government and history of human rights abuses, will
take a leading role in blocking efforts to make the WTO more open and
to address its effects on the environment and workers' rights."
"The only thing worse than the WTO as it is, is the WTO with China
as a member, especially under the terms the Clinton administration signed.
The few citizens groups who hoped WTO might be reformable are now saying
that if China gets in, there is no hope WTO would become more sensitive
to labor, environment, or human rights policies."
Anyone who is opposed to the Chinese joining the WTO needs to be reminded that the United States' own economic system is not a paragon of virtue, and has aspects of the system of a rogue nation. We have prison labor and sweat shops. And many WTO members--including democratic countries like India--have child labor. Maybe some WTO members are offended by the quasi-slavery conditions faced by many farm workers in parts of the United States. A member country could say that U.S. law that makes it possible to execute a teenager is an offense against humanity. Of course it is appropriate to castigate China for accepting only those human rights that suit its political and economic interests. Different cultures might nurture different values, but the UDHR was drafted 50 years ago to reflect universal aspirations and standards for human dignity. But the U.S. conditions placed on China amount to a policy of moral imperialism, clearly framed to suit rich countries. They would result in a ban on child labor without any guarantee that parents could find jobs, but inhuman treatment of migrant farmworkers would not be affected. Many of the developing nations that belong to the WTO complain that the previous Uruguay Round of trade talks (1986-94) only yielded benefits for industrialized countries. Mostly they are right. Northern countries have continued to protect their home markets while dumping surplus production on the poorer southern countries, undercutting local production and driving unemployment higher. Today we need to point the finger at trade agreements such as the WTO and NAFTA rather than at China. Let's not forget that NAFTA eliminated over 400,000 jobs in the U.S., and drove some 28,000 small enterprises in Mexico out of business. The WTO and NAFTA are a direct cause of unemployment and poor working conditions, not the tool to correct these problems. The time has come to step back from this mania for free trade at any cost--and the selective bashing of some countries while turning a blind eye to others--and seek a new start. The bottom line is that ... the WTO is bad for people everywhere, whether they are Chinese, American, Mexican or Indian. It's not China joining the WTO that hurts American workers--it is the WTO itself. (Anuradha Mittal is Policy Director of Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy <http://www.foodfirst.org/>. She is author of the recently published book, America Needs Human Rights.)
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