The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues.

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Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Update and Out-Takes

NEW SECURITY CONCERNS IN AFRICA
By William Minter, Africa Policy Information Center

PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL-SYRIA NEGOTIATIONS

II. Letters from Readers and Comments

AILEEN KWA HAS IT WRONG

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR NGOS

I. Updates and Out-Takes

(Editor's Note: The following analysis of African security issues is excerpted from a new FPIF special report, "United States and Africa Starting Points for a New Policy Framework," by William Minter, a Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Policy Information Center. This report is posted at <http://www.fpif.org/papers/africa/index.html> and will also appear in a new FPIF book, Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium to be released by St. Martin's Press in late February.)

The end of the cold war generated significant progress in negotiating the end to a series of African conflicts. The thirty-year regional war associated with the apartheid regime's struggle to survive ended with the emergence of a democratic South Africa and the end of conflicts in Mozambique, Namibia, and, at least temporarily, Angola. The overthrow of the Mengistu dictatorship in Ethiopia in 1991 led to the successful conclusion of Eritrea's struggle for independence.

Yet the 1990s have also seen a bewildering profusion of old and new internal conflicts, most notably in Angola, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Rwanda, Congo (Brazzaville), and Congo (Kinshasa), including not only the genocide of more than a half million people in the space of a few months in Rwanda but also massive abuses against civilians in each country mentioned. In 1998, the specter of more conventional interstate conflict emerged as well, with the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as the danger that the Congo (Kinshasa) maelstrom would continue to suck its neighbors into deeper confrontation with each other.

This is one arena in which modesty is particularly appropriate for critics of administration policies, given the intractable, complex, and diverse causes of ongoing conflicts and the disagreement among international agencies, civil society groups, and progressive analysts about what is to be done in particular cases. Anyone who does not admit to being uncertain about analysis and prescription applying to the range of conflicts mentioned above is either dishonest or uninformed.

Starting Points for Conflict Control

In formulating conflict control policies, the following suggestions are, therefore, offered as starting points rather than conclusions.

Arms Control Efforts: While important, arms control efforts are insufficient to halt Africa's conflicts. Measures such as the international treaty to ban landmines, new efforts to monitor and restrict the flow of small arms, and international bans on weapon sales to parties guilty of gross human rights abuses against civilians are important. The U.S. failure to sign the Ottawa landmine treaty is a blatant example of U.S. indifference to the emerging international consensus on this issue. Continued progress in these arenas is worth campaigning for, despite foot-dragging by the U.S. and other major global weapons suppliers. However, such international arms control efforts are likely to have little short-term effect on particular conflicts, unless they are vigorously and deliberately employed to weaken the military position of a particularly recalcitrant party to the conflict, such as UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the right-wing rebel army which has waged a 25-year war against the Angolan government.

Economic and Political Context for Conflict: Economic problems both lead to and result from armed conflicts. They are also often closely tied to the absence of democratic institutions and processes for managing the distribution of national--and often scarce--resources.

The "vicious circle" phenomenon applies with a vengeance to the two-way interaction between conflict and economic development. For example, competition for scarce land and vulnerability to dropping coffee prices in Rwanda and Burundi is one factor contributing to the escalation and intractability of conflict in those countries. Meanwhile in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the supply of arms has often been dependent on smuggling in diamonds and other commodities. Conflict, moreover, is one of the major factors impeding African economic development not only by disrupting directly affected countries but by eroding general business confidence, given the tendency of outside observers to lump the entire continent south of the Sahara into one amalgam.

Difficult to Isolate Conflicts: Conflicts not only threaten the countries directly involved but also generate powerful ripple effects within African regions and for the continent as a whole.

Individual country success stories, however significant, cannot be isolated from the impact of conflict in their region and even across regional boundaries. The U.S. strategy of countering Afro-pessimist stereotypes and promoting development by concentrating on a handful of "successful" countries is dangerously shortsighted and incomplete. Ongoing conflicts even within Senegal and Uganda, for example, tie into instability across their borders. Within a given region, the spillover impact of refugees and border insecurity even from conflicts in small countries can be significant. When a giant such as Congo (Kinshasa) in central Africa dissolves into an arena of shifting battlefields, the divisive shock waves extend even to east and southern Africa. If the unresolved struggles for democracy in Nigeria or Kenya were to lead to a similar downward spiral, the impact on their regions and beyond would be similarly dramatic.

U.S. Influence to Encourage Compromise: In most current African conflicts, the U.S. should add its influence, whether by direct mediation or by supporting the efforts by others, to the encouragement of all-party negotiations aimed at compromise solutions. However, there may be exceptions in which taking sides is appropriate. And inadequately planned diplomatic involvement may sometimes be worse than no involvement at all.

There is no guarantee of success nor any magical formula for international facilitation of peace accords, despite a burgeoning of the conflict resolution industry in the post-cold war period. Nevertheless, what influence the U.S. has should be directed toward seeking compromise solutions. It is important to avoid encouraging intransigence by supporting favored governments or leaders. In Africa's current conflicts, there are few plausible candidates for "good guy" status deserving of unconditional military support, much less military aid or exemption from criticism for human rights abuses. And it may sometimes be necessary to include in negotiations even forces that are responsible for horrific abuses of human rights--if they retain significant capacity to cause military damage or enjoy the adherence (voluntary or involuntary) of major population groupings.

There are two major qualifications to this rule that need to be noted, however. Peace talks with a military leader with a demonstrated history of sabotaging peace agreements may create the illusion of progress toward peace, while in reality serving as a recipe for repeated failure. In such cases, most prominently UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Angola, negotiations in bad faith--and international willingness to promote them--contribute to continuing war, not to peace. The other proviso is that negotiations encompassing only military leaders with questionable political legitimacy, without some mechanism for involving unarmed opposition political groups and civil society, are unlikely to promote sustainable solutions to conflict. Although predictions are perilous, this seems to be a fatal flaw in efforts to stem the fighting in Congo (Kinshasa).

Cautious Foreign Involvement: International involvement in major crises--exceeding diplomacy and including the delivery of humanitarian aid, provision of peacekeeping forces, or, in the worst instance, military intervention to block or limit genocidal assaults on civilians--is often necessary. But no intervention is neutral, and the chances of prolonging a conflict or making it worse are significant. One case in point is the enormous humanitarian intervention to aid refugees after the Rwandan genocide, which served in large part to strengthen those forces with primary responsibility for the killings.

A blanket "no external intervention" guideline with respect to internal conflicts should be recognized as de facto support for the strongest "internal" party. The Organization of African Unity's post-independence consensus on nonintervention in internal conflicts may have decreased the chances for interstate conflict, but it also reinforced existent regimes. This longstanding consensus is now eroding rapidly.

In recent years, there is increasing recognition, including at the OAU, that massive abuses of human rights in internal conflicts --most particularly those reaching the scale of genocide--may justify external intervention. But there seems to be no emerging consensus--and there is very unlikely to be one--on who should intervene and who should decide when abuses are massive enough to justify intervention. As a result, countries and groups of countries are now likely to intervene in conflicts based on varying definitions of their own interests.

The concept of a purely humanitarian intervention, intended merely to aid innocent civilians and devoid of political or military implications, is a fraud. An intervention with a limited mandate--e.g., to protect corridors or relief supplies--may or may not be justified in a particular case. But it will have political consequences; it will weaken some forces and strengthen others. Armed parties who gain access to relief supplies because they control access to civilians, whether in Somalia, Sudan, or other conflicts, quite accurately regard this humanitarian relief as one of the factors affecting their military prospects.

It is therefore unlikely that any formula for determining a justifiable intervention will be adequate. There is no avoiding political judgments about particular situations, which are linked to one's evaluation of: 1) the relative merits (and demerits) of the internal parties in conflict, 2) the relative merits (and demerits) of the potential interveners, and 3) the likely de facto, unintended, and long-term consequences of an intervention as well as its announced goals and short-term, life-saving potential.

It does make sense to be very cautious in supporting external intervention in internal conflicts, whether by neighbors or by multilateral forces. Even if innocents can be saved or the "good guys" (or more likely, the "less-bad guys") can be aided to win by outside forces, the sustainability of such an outcome is questionable once the outside party's interest wanes. But the exceptions are numerous enough to make a blanket prohibition unwise--interventions can in fact save lives, tip a military balance toward one side, or enhance the possibility of negotiation. Decisive action to reinforce and expand the mandate of the UN force in Rwanda as the genocide was beginning in early 1994 might have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Other examples are more ambiguous. Leading Congolese scholar and democracy activist Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, for example, is a strong critic both of Laurent Kabila's government that succeeded Mobutu and of later Rwandan intervention in 1998 against Kabila. However, he argues that the original military intervention by other African countries to overthrow Mobutu in 1997 was justified.

Peacekeeping Support: The U.S. should contribute to peacemaking in Africa's conflicts, but successes are likely only if U.S. involvement is coordinated with engagement by African and international mediators. Support for peacekeeping by UN or regional organizations should take priority over support for bilateral partners.

The presence or absence of U.S. involvement--whether in the form of diplomatic pressures, financing to bolster peacekeeping and conflict-resolution at the UN and regional organizations, or logistical support for relief operations--is a key factor in sustaining outside intervention. Though the Clinton administration has provided some such support, e.g., for UN forces in Angola and West African forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the glaring U.S. default in payment of UN dues undermines Washington's credibility as well as any effective international capacity to respond to crises.

Meanwhile, U.S. training missions for African armed forces are expanding without open accountability or civilian review. According to a Washington Post investigation,27 special forces have been engaged in training exercises in 31 of 54 African countries, including many currently engaged in conflict, such as Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda. The scale of the operations, known as the J-CET program, is probably not yet large enough to have much influence on military balances. Some activities carried out under J-CET or other Pentagon programs, such as training in de-mining, specific support for African peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief, are likely justified. But training programs can also send signals of partisan support or approval for military forces involved in conflict or human rights abuses. They build unexamined links between the U.S. military and African armies. There is little evidence that they contribute to their stated objectives of promoting the values of democracy among trainees, and their contribution to peacekeeping capability is unproven. Without full provision for transparency and monitoring by civilians outside the Pentagon--including African human rights groups--such bilateral programs should not continue.

The proliferation of bilateral U.S.-African military ties is disturbing not necessarily because of the weight of any one program or involvement nor because of the existence of a grand plan for U.S. engagement, but because the scale of the financial resources available to the Pentagon makes accountability problematic even for the congressional committees responsible for oversight and for U.S. diplomatic representatives, much less for civil society either in the U.S. or in African countries. It is particularly disturbing that the standard J-CET mission includes instruction in FID (foreign internal defense), defined in training manuals as attempting "to organize, train, advise and assist" a foreign military so that it can "free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."28 Not only are such internal functions more appropriately the responsibility of police, not militaries, but army and police units involved in similar U.S. training in Latin America, Indonesia, and elsewhere have been responsible for widespread human rights abuses.

William Minter is the Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Policy Information Center in Washington, DC, and has authored and coauthored many books on Africa. This essay expresses the author's personal views and does not necessarily reflect the positions of APIC as an organization.

For More Information

Africa Policy Information Center
http://www.africapolicy.org/

PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAEL-SYRIA NEGOTIATIONS

(Editor's Note: The following are some brief perspectives by experts associated with Foreign Policy In Focus on the ongoing Israel-Syria negotiations taking place in Pennsylvania. An FPIF special report on U.S. Middle East policy will soon be posted at <http://www.fpif.org/papers/mideast/index.html>)

As'ad AbuKhalil is an associate professor in the Department of Politics & Public Administration at California State University at Stanislaus and the author of the Foreign Policy In Focus report, "U.S. Policy in Lebanon" [forthcoming in late January]. AbuKalil argues, "The Syrian-Israeli talks are not likely to produce lasting peace as long as the balance of forces remain in favor of the American-Israeli alliance. These peace talks are controlled by conquerors who have benefited from American global hegemony."

Ghassan Bishara, formerly a reporter for 16 years in the Middle East, currently serves as the Media Outreach Director for the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). Bishara notes, "Despite the current stagnation, these talks are likely to end up with some sort of an agreement. The stakes are too high for Syria to walk away. However, what happens afterwards will be crucial as talk of an Israeli referendum is surfacing. International law--not an Israeli referendum--should determine the future of the occupied Golan Heights and southern Lebanon."

Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of politics at the University of San Francisco. He has authored a chapter in Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium titled "Continuing Storm: The U.S. Role in the Middle East" and the Foreign Policy In Focus policy report, "U.S. Policy Hampers Chances for Israeli-Syrian Peace" from which the following statement is drawn:

Should Israel make peace with Syria, they would also likely make peace with Lebanon, whose foreign policy is essentially controlled by Damascus. In effect, Israel can have the Golan or they can have peace. They can not have both. That is why Israel would be far more secure without the Golan than in keeping the Golan. Many Israelis, including some top military officials, recognize this.

Yet the Israeli government has not formally committed itself to withdraw from all of the occupied territory under even the most favorable circumstances. And the Clinton administration has refused to insist that they do so. Until that changes, the hope this new round of negotiations brings will be for naught.

To advance the peace process, U.S. policy towards the negotiations needs to change. At minimum, it should include the following:

• Reconfirm U.S. commitment to the peace process and support for Israel's legitimate security concerns.
• Insist that U.N. Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 446, and all other relevant resolutions be enforced, which would include a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Syrian land in return for verifiable security guarantees, as well as the removal of those occupying illegal settlements.
• A willingness to suspend economic and military aid to Israel until it comes into full compliance with all outstanding UN Security Council resolutions.
• Encourage a process that will eventually lead to full diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries.
• Support efforts to create more democracy and civil society in Syria and all nations of the region.

II. Letters from Readers and Comments

AILEEN KWA HAS IT WRONG

I've been enjoying "In Focus" for quite awhile. So I thought I'd send along a strong objection to Aileen Kwa's stance on WTO vis-a-vis labor and environmental standards. [See "WTO and Developing Countries" by Kwa at <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n35wto.html>] Kwa takes the unfortunately very standard developing-country position that it's prejudicial to the interests of these countries for labor and environmental standards to be accepted as allowable trade considerations. The argument is that "labor standards in the U.S. have steadily improved in concert with the country's economic development."

This short-sighted position obscures the existence of conflicting interests within developing countries. Workers and citizens in those countries are harmed, not helped, by race-to-the-bottom development based on attracting capital at any environmental or human cost. So are workers and citizens in the developed countries, and progressives should be concentrating on building international alliances around that--not bolstering "their" business sector's freedom from limits on labor and environmental degradation.

Developing countries are quite right to oppose new WTO liberalization measures and demand a focus on implementation first. Why not use their willingness to address social standards as a bargaining chip in pursuit of that?

Thanks, and keep up the good work!

Don Goldstein <dgoldste@alleg.edu>
Department of Economics
Allegheny College

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR NGOS

As a new subscriber, I very much appreciate what I have read today regarding the challenge of shifting U.S. policy toward a more multilateral approach. ["Challenges and Conundrums of a New Global Affairs Agenda," by Tom Barry at <http://www.fpif.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n46.html>] I found the analysis of NGO roles very helpful in setting out the context in which such organizations as the Quaker United Nations Organization operate. I have a web site which may be of interest, dealing with the "dynamics of confusion" in governments and the general public, from the standpoint of a layman in the political arena. The site features a series of fuzzy cognitive maps forecasting various "what-if" scenarios which I put up in real time during and after the Kosovo war. Site URL is <http://users.neca.com/williamtaylor/>

William R. Taylor <williamtaylor@neca.com>

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