The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues.

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Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

TRAINING THE WORLD'S POLICE
By Lawrence Rockwood & Amelia Simpson

CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: AN FPIF FORUM

DAMPENING ENTHUSIASM FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
By Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner

I. Updates and Out-Takes

TRAINING THE WORLD'S POLICE
By Lawrence Rockwood & Amelia Simpson

(Editor's Note: After facing a wave of opposition in the 1970s because of associated human rights abuses, the U.S. government is once again training police throughout the world with little congressional or public oversight. As part of its review of the new dimensions of the national security state in America, FPIF exposes the growing dimensions of U.S. police training in its new book, Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium. The book, published by St. Martin's Press and edited by Martha Honey and Tom Barry, will be available in mid-February.)

U.S. assistance and training programs to police forces overseas, officially totaling $580 million in 1997, are spread among a number of departments and agencies and are at times co-mingled with military and other types of funding, making accurate reporting extremely difficult. The post-cold war expansion of police aid has not been accompanied by sufficient public and congressional debate or by the creation of mechanisms to guarantee sufficient oversight and accountability. At 1995 hearings, Congressman Lee Hamilton called the conglomeration of U.S. training and assistance programs for foreign police "a multi-headed monster."

For over a century, the United States has been involved with training and assisting foreign police. In 1898, U.S. occupation forces trained local police in the Philippines and Cuba and later elsewhere in the Caribbean and Central America, and, after World War II, in Germany, Japan, Greece, and Turkey and many other countries. In a number countries, the United States helped create gendarme (mixed police-military forces), blurring the lines--which U.S. policymakers like to describe as clear-cut--between police and military forces, training, equipment and functions. In addition, Washington's cold war preoccupation with fighting subversion meant police training programs emphasized "national security" or internal threats to state security over criminal activity against individual citizens. The CIA also placed officers under cover within certain police programs in order to gather intelligence and recruit foreign law enforcement officials as spies for the U.S.

In 1962, in an effort to consolidate foreign police training agencies and increase control over them, President Kennedy established USAID's Office of Public Safety (OPS).

After South Vietnam, Latin America received the most OPS aid, with Brazil getting a lion's share. However, Washington's preoccupation with fighting communism, as well as the nature of police assistance, permitted U.S. collusion in undermining rather than strengthening democratic processes and social reforms. In the early 1970s, congressional investigations and hearings documented widespread human rights abuses by U.S.-trained Latin American and South Vietnamese police. In 1973, the House passed Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act (the law which authorizes most traditional foreign aid programs) , banning further U.S. training of foreign police; exempted, however, were counter-narcotics programs.

During the early 1980s, the Reagan administration sought waivers from Congress which permitted police assistance to counter terrorism, attacks on American citizens, and "communist" (Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and leftist guerrilla) influence in the Americas.

Gradually, without public debate or real congressional scrutiny, the barn door on police aid was again pushed open, and has continued to widen during the 1990s. Police assistance now operates under twelve Presidential exceptions to the 1973 prohibition. Police training and assistance can take place in the U.S. or in the host country, can be provided by either civilian U.S. law enforcement or military personnel, and can fall under State Department or Defense Department supervised programs.

In 1997, 65% of funding for police training and assistance programs came from the Defense Department and only 35% was appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act and supervised by the State Department. The Pentagon's funding for counternarcotics activities permits U.S. military training of foreign police forces, a role prohibited in programs governed by the Foreign Assistance Act. In an era when the U.S. and many countries abroad are espousing the need to strengthen civilian control over both military and police forces, there is growing concern that U.S. police assistance is helping to militarize foreign police forces. Every year, for instance, hundreds of Latin American police officers receive military training at the U.S. Army's School of the Americas, located at Ft. Benning, Georgia.

Program's falling under the Foreign Assistance Act and provided by civilian personnel include the programs in the Justice Departments, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) of the Treasury Department. The FBI, for instance, under its "rule of law" program, trains police in eastern Europe, Russia and Asia, including coordinating the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest. The largest program is the International Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INL) under which the DEA, Customs, Coast Guard and other agencies trains foreign police in narcotics interdiction. The smallest program, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), is operated by Justice under State Department supervision. It began in 1986 to enhance law enforcement capabilities in Latin America and has been expanded into pro-democracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions in Africa and East Europe and the former Soviet Union.

With a bulk of U.S. police assistance linked to counter-narcotics efforts, there is growing concern that some assistance, particularly in Colombia, is being used under for counterinsurgency operations under the facile rubric of fighting "narco-terrorism." In late 1998, Congress appropriated $201.25 million in extra anti-drug money for Colombia's police, nearly tripling the amount of U.S. aid for that year. In addition, U.S. trained-police units in Mexico, Colombia, Peru and elsewhere have been implicated in corruption and human rights abuses. Congress took some limited action by passing the so-called "Leahy Amendment" to the Foreign Operations Act which prohibits aid to foreign security forces (both military and police units) that abuse human rights with impunity.

An additional problem is an absence of comprehensive data and reporting on police assistance appropriations. A 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Foreign Aid, Police Training and Assistance, concluded, "We could not determine the total extent or cost of U.S. assistance to foreign police because some agencies do not maintain such data," adding that official estimates under-represent levels of police aid. The GAO report also found a lack of clear objectives and policy guidelines and a problem of duplicate programs due to insufficient coordination.

The reality is that despite the 1973 ban, the U.S. has, since the early 1980s, been engaged in mission creep, without congressional or public scrutiny. While today police training is often justified as contributing to benign-sounding U.S. foreign policy objectives, including democratization, strengthening civil society, fighting corruption and, most often, stopping illegal narcotics, there has been no fundamental re-examination of the failures of earlier programs or analysis of problems with current ones. To permit congressional and public oversight, foreign police training and aid programs also need to be centralized, regardless of which agency or program provides the funding, personnel and equipment. Until this happens, there should be a moratorium on further police assistance.

(Lawrence Rockwood is a U.S. Army counterintelligence officer and whistle-blower, author of numerous articles on military ethics , and a fellow at the Center for International Policy. Amelia Simpson is a Latin Americanist, specializing in cross-disciplinary Latin American Studies and Women's Studies.)

CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: AN FPIF FORUM

(Editor's Note: As part of the parallel meetings during the WTO meeting in Seattle, Foreign Policy In Focus sponsored an open forum on the contentious issue of China's possible accession to the WTO. The following are notes taken from that forum. FPIF has published two recent documents on the accession issue. Both favor congressional approval of permanent normal trade relations with China. Jim Nolt, a China expert associated with the World Policy Institute, wrote a FPIF policy brief, "China and the WTO: The Debate," which is posted at <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n38china.html> FPIF also published a policy report entitled, "Using China as a Proxy: Risks and Errors," by John Gershman of the Institute for Development Research, which is posted at <http://www.fpif.org/papers/china/index.html> We welcome your comments.

For information about the WTO and congressional procedures involving China's accession to the WTO and the granting of permanent normal trading rights, see Tom Barry, "What's This Organization (WTO): Glossary of Terms and Concepts about the World Trade Organization," Part III, China and the WTO, posted at <http://www.fpif.org/wto_china.html>)

China Panel Gethesemaine Lutheran Church December 2, 1999

Panelists:

Rob Scott, Economic Policy Institute
Anuradha Mittal, Institute for Food and Development Policy
Brent Blackwelder, Friends of the Earth
Mike Jendrzejczyk, Human Rights Watch

Rob Scott:

I explain the economics of accession in my paper, "China Can Wait," available on the Internet at http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/china.html but I will highlight some of the points here. China targets the U.S. for imports. It is the most imbalanced trade relationship in the world. This places pressure on the labor market here. There is a possible loss of 500,000-600,000 jobs and downward pressure on wages. The deal is bad for China too. Increased downward pressure on agriculture, which the US wants to liberalize, in such an economy dependent on agriculture will make it difficult for China to adapt. The U.S. has also lost any opportunity for human rights leverage. The U.S. made a conscious decision not to use this leverage, which makes China a special case. The U.S. business community desperately wants this deal and are beginning a $10 million dollar lobbying effort. Citizens will have to fight this. Much like it did with NAFTA the U.S. is trying to set up a perfect export platform. We have seen the disastrous effects with this agreement and we will see more if the China's deal is sealed.

Anuradha Mittal:

We need to stay aware of the focus of China's accession. Human rights arguments used in the last few days flies in the face of Western imperialism--it is especially ironic with yesterdays suspension of civil rights culminating in a "no protest zone." The U.S. could be excluded from the WTO because of problems with human rights. But this will not happen because of its enormous power. Thus, the WTO is no place for human rights concerns. We need to dismantle or completely retool the WTO. On the democracy front, it is a showing example that the U.S. is the only nation needed to move China's accession forward. (Mittal's position is more fully developed in an essay on China and the WTO that is posted at http://www.foodfirst.org/.)

Brent Blackwelder:

FOE is against China's accession to the WTO. The agreement with the U.S. was made only for the transnational corporations. This lets you know who the beneficiaries are. Clinton could have done something to guarantee human rights, labor, and the environment but this wasn't the case. The failure of China to permit basic civil rights--such as allowing FOE to have an office in China is a perfect example of why we shouldn't be engaging them. We also need to look at how China operates in other multilateral organizations? For example, China's behavior with the recent resettlement project in Tibet funded by the World Bank is shameful. China has largely played a destructive role in most multilateral organizations.

Mike Jendrzejczyk:

There has been no official talks with China in the WTO. The U.S. often has human rights concerns internally. The U.S. should admit to these problems. HRW does not endorse trade agreements. The process of bringing China in is problematic. NTR status will be discussed in the Congress this spring. This should bring up the opportunity to use human rights leverage. In particular, two UN covenants should be pushed for the U.S. to sign. In bargaining with China, we should argue to have Tibet opened up to human rights monitors. Over the long term, engaging China could have positive impacts.

Question: What concessions have each country made?

Scott: On the question of concessions we might be able to get China to sign on to these issues but with their continuing violations of rule of law there are no guarantees that this would make a difference. If we are demanding more on human rights than what we are willing to subjugate ourselves to this is a good reason to keep China out so we can stop our own race to the bottom before throwing more victims in.

Mittal: Finger pointing is an easy trap to get into. If we care about human rights, the WTO is not the right institution. We need to talk about equality. If there we are to have equal and fair trade agreements the negotiators need to be on equal levels. We must stop the "Green Room" tactics and bring all interested parties into the process.

Blackwelder: We could make good laws with a trade agreement. We choose not to.

Jendrzejczyk: I agree with the enforcement point Rob notes. We need to keep China accountable. In 1995 there was the first major vote on human rights. This sort of activity is what we need to nurture. Any sort of external conditions will have internal repercussions that can help promote democratization from within..

Question: Could China still join the WTO without permanent NTR status?

Jendrzejczyk: Yes. The U.S. would have to vote each year but with such uncertainty on China's part it is unlikely the U.S. would reap any of the potential benefits of trade liberalization. This is what happened with Mongolia.

Question: Will giving China greater status in the world make it more responsible?

Scott: No. Similar arguments were made with Russia and Mexico. This hasn't happened and is wishful thinking at best.

Mittal: The WTO is being used as a carrot. It is time to recognize that human rights should be universal. The idea of "teaching people" is a form of imperialism.

DAMPENING ENTHUSIASM FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
By Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner

(Editor's Note: Do humanitarian objectives justify military intervention in the internal affairs of other nations? This is one of the main foreign policy issues in the post-cold war era. Authors Lobel and Ratner address this question in a new FPIF policy brief, which is excerpted below and posted in its entirety at <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n01hmi.html>. Their policy brief cautions against a popular embrace of military interventionism in the name of humanitarianism. According to Lobel and Ratner, "The history of 'humanitarian' military intervention is replete with invocations of humanitarian intentions by strong powers or coalitions in order to conceal their own geopolitical interests.")

Former Amnesty International Secretary-General Ian Martin argues that there is too much "enthusiasm in the human rights movement, and especially in the United States, for military intervention on humanitarian grounds." Although he understands that national sovereignty does not necessarily prevail over the responsibility to prevent mass violations of human rights, he emphasizes that "such international responsibility can be properly exercised only by a multilateral decision of the international community through the UN." Martin states that the legitimacy of such decisions by the United Nations depends "upon a proper distribution of power within that organization, the application of a set of principled criteria for military intervention which is not politically selective, and the development of the ability of the UN itself to maintain the control of a military operation."

Although the Clinton administration has shown scant willingness to seek UN authority prior to using force, there is a step that the United States could more easily take: end its military support for nations committing serious human rights violations. In 1998, Congress enacted the Leahy amendment, a provision in the foreign assistance legislation prohibiting foreign aid funds, including U.S. loan guarantees, from being used to bolster units of foreign security forces that are committing human rights violations. This legislation needs to be extended, strengthened, and fully implemented.

In the past, such provisions have often led to executive branch assertions that governments supported by the United States were, in fact, improving their human rights records. During the 1980s, for instance, the Reagan administration repeatedly certified El Salvador during years when that government was committing terrible atrocities. Currently, both the Clinton administration and Congress have pumped military hardware, training, and advisors into Colombia's armed forces and police, despite evidence of corruption and human rights abuses.

A positive sign in an otherwise bleak environment was the State Department's use of the Leahy amendment in December 1998 to deny, in part, a defense contractor's request for U.S.-government financing to underwrite Turkey's purchase of armored vehicles. A key test of administration arms policy toward Turkey is still pending; whether it will issue an export license for Turkey's planned acquisition of 145 attack helicopters, which would likely be used for the destruction of Kurdish civilian targets.

Finally, the United States ought to strengthen its own participation in international human rights agreements and support the international institutions that enforce such agreements. In the long term, stronger international agreements and institutions will save more lives than questionable ad hoc military interventions. The U.S. should sign and ratify the agreement establishing the International Criminal Court. The Senate should remove the reservations added to treaties (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) that render them non-self-executing or nonenforceable under U.S. law. At present, U.S. courts have been following a double standard of imposing liability against foreign officials accused of committing serious international human rights abuses, while refusing to recognize such claims brought against U. S. officials. To encourage other nations to apply international human rights law in their domestic courts, we must apply it in our courts.

Changing U.S. foreign policy along these lines will not be easy and is unlikely to happen quickly. However, at the close of a century in which scores of millions have been killed in military conflicts and with the rise of new and extreme ethnic, national, and religious conflicts, multilateral cooperation through a more democratic United Nations is more important than ever.

(Jules Lobel is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh Law School and Michael Ratner is an associate at the Center for Constitutional Rights and a Skelly Wright Fellow at Yale Law School.)

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