The Progressive ResponseVolume 4, Number 10
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-takesTIME TO REASSESS TIBET POLICY WHY CERTIFICATION DOESN’T WORK
II. Letters to the Editor/CommentsRESPONSE TO AFRICA SUMMIT CRITIQUE
I. Updates and Out-takesTIME TO REASSESS TIBET POLICY
The flight of the 17th Karmapa Lama from Tibet to India in January 2000 catapulted Tibet back into the world headlines, creating an opportunity for both China and the U. S. to reassess their policies toward Tibet. Tibet’s status has been intertwined with China since the 7th century through marriages, wars, and treaties. Mongol conquests in the 13th century made Tibet part of a Mongol-ruled Chinese state, while four centuries later the ethnic Manchu Q’ing dynasty further incorporated Tibet into China. In 1912 the13th Dalai Lama's unilaterally declared independence in 1912 but two years later signed a treaty granting Chinese "suzerainty" over both "Inner Tibet" and "Outer Tibet," exercising direct rule over the former while the latter remained autonomous. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reestablished strong central government in 1949, Tibet was regarded as politically "integral" with China but in fact so autonomous that Beijing insisted on a incorporation "treaty" to preempt any claims of independence. But the CCP refrained from stamping out feudalism and theocratic rule. Twice in the 1950s Mao Zedong assured the Dalai Lama that China would make no further inroads against de facto Tibetan autonomy. This policy, however, applied only to Outer Tibet or what was later called the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Other ethnic Tibetan areas, known as Amdo and Kham (Inner Tibet) underwent political transformation. This process of integration sparked rebellion, and minor insurrections in Kham/Sichuan turned into open revolt by1956. Soon support came from the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which as eager to destabilize the communist government. China’s suppression of a 1959 revolt forced the Dalai Lama and 50-60,000 Tibetans into exile. Beijing then subjected the TAR to political and social integration, ending Lhasa’s autonomous rule. During the Cultural Revolution the Red Guards, both Chinese and Tibetan, engaged in wholesale destruction of almost every religious building in Tibet, paralleling antireligious campaigns throughout China. From exile, the Dalai Lama directed refugee resettlement and guerrilla warfare--although he officially renounced all violence. CIA support encouraged insurgent Tibetans to continue their war for independence, but the CIA was more interested in harassing communist China than in Tibetan independence. Following the 1971 visit to Beijing by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the U.S. cut off its support to the Tibetan resistance. The Tibetan rebellion of 15 years quickly dissipated; the Tibetans had been unable to create a sustainable, free-standing military force after 15 years. By the late 1970s China began relaxing its grip on Tibet. In 1978 the Panchen Lama was released from detention, and he began championing the preservation of Tibetan culture. A new round of Dalai Lama-Beijing contacts resulted in several Tibetan-exile delegations visiting Tibet. After these talks faltered in the1980s, the Dalai Lama decided to promote his cause internationally, believing that increased foreign pressure generated by his "Tibet Lobby" would force Beijing to renew serious negotiations. Rising international attention and continued unrest in Tibet sparked a policy debate within China. The moderates argued for more freedom for Tibetan cultural practices and the return of the Dalai Lama, while the hardliners (many of them Tibetan governmental and party officials) urged ending ties to the Dalai Lama and repressing all expressions of Tibetan nationalism. After the Panchen Lama’s sudden death in January 1989, the Dalai Lama was invited for religious funerary ceremonies in Beijing. Even though he was assured that there would be an opportunity for direct high-level talks, the Dalai Lama declined the invitation after his advisers pointed out that the international campaign was giving his cause increasing prominence and objected to the continuing prohibition against his visiting Lhasa. The decision not to go to Beijing and renew direct negotiations was probably the gravest error of his political life. He did, however, agree with the Chinese leadership to accept the reincarnation of the 17th Karmapa in 1992, and there was the suggestion that the Dalai Lama could assist in searching for the 11th Panchen Lama. But tensions escalated again in 1995 when the Dalai Lama (without first consulting Beijing) announced a boy had been selected. The designee and his family were arrested, and Beijing enthroned its own candidate. Since then there has been no progress in Chinese-Dalai Lama relations. U.S. policy has done little to help resolve the Tibet issue. It is a policy that ignores the complex history, is driven by domestic politics, and is inherently contradictory. While officially recognizing Tibet as part of China, the U.S. Congress and White House unofficially encourage the campaign for independence. Problems with Current Tibet Policy Washington in 1943 declared that "...the Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet...This Government has at no time raised a question regarding ...these claims." In line with the policy of its Nationalist allies (Guomindang), the U.S. later officially recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. This position remains U.S. policy today, and it is also the policy of China and Taiwan. Not until the cold war did Tibet become of interest to the U.S. government, which initiated secret talks with Tibetan dissidents in 1950 on the premise that Tibetans were fighting communism not Chinese rule. Washington promised covert aid to Tibetan dissidents if the Dalai Lama would leave China and publicly denounce Beijing. At that time, the Dalai Lama refused to leave Tibet. The CIA threw its covert support to a burgeoning guerrilla movement. In 1959 the Dalai Lama fled Tibet, and he immediately began receiving an annual U. S. stipend of $180,000 for himself and another $1, 550,000 for his cause (which presumably ended in 1971). In the late 1980s the Dalai Lama’s Tibet Lobby found a receptive hearing with the U. S. Congress, whose members were angry at China over nuclear proliferation, trade imbalances, prison labor, and human rights. Hearings were held, amendments added to bills condemning "human rights violations" in Tibet and calling it an "occupied country." In September 1987, when the Dalai Lama was in the U.S. promoting the Tibet Lobby, the first demonstrations in three decades broke out in Lhasa. Continuing for several weeks, the protests were met with harsh police repression. Undoubtedly expressions of U. S. "support" helped spur on the demonstrators, as Tibetans wrongly interpreted congressional testimony and nonbinding congressional resolutions as evidence of a changing U.S. policy. But official U.S. policy remains unaltered. After 1971 U.S. interest in Tibet had waned as relations with China warmed. Mounting pressure from the Tibet Lobby in the 1980s, however, complicated the policy environment. In keeping with its principles of its early alliance with the Nationalists/Taiwan and with the principles of its relations with Beijing, Washington had never recognized Tibetan independence (nor the Dalai Lama’s "government-in-exile" despite its covert support). But the vociferous U.S. opposition to communist China combined with the rising popularity of the Dalai Lama’s cause pressured the White House to open some space in its public diplomacy for the Tibetan issue, resulting in yet another irritant in Sino-U.S relations. Washington’s failure to articulate a consistent and definitive policy has displeased all sides: anti-China politicians, the Tibet Lobby, and the Chinese. Moreover, Washington’s ambivalence and equivocations have proved harmful to Tibetans living in Tibet. During the 1980s, CCP moderates paved the way for increased usage of the Tibetan language, the rebuilding of religious buildings (with more in some regions now than before 1951), and encouragement of Tibetan culture. Officials in power were willing to solidify these policies with the Tibetan pontiff. However, their inability to consummate a deal with the Tibetan religious leadership, the continuing popular protests, and the escalating China-bashing in the U.S. strengthened the power of the CCP hardliners. U.S. public diplomacy skirts the independence issue, focusing on criticism of human rights abuses. Yet recent concessions and overtures to the Tibet Lobby are seen as evidence by CCP hardline factions that Washington’s ultimate goal is to fracture China. Such initiatives as the establishment of Radio Free Asia (RFA), the 1998 appointment of a Special Coordinator for Tibet (a State Department employee who works part-time on Tibet and whom China will never allow into Tibet or to play any role in Chinese-Tibetan affairs), and invitations to the Dalai Lama to the White House have served to strengthen the anti-Dalai Lama, anti-U. S. positions of the hardline CCP faction. This faction has fostered increased repression in Tibet, outlawed pictures of the Dalai Lama, encouraged increased ethnic Chinese migration into Tibet, tightened security in monasteries, obstructed religious practices, and forced monks and Tibetan officials to undergo "patriotic" retraining. As a result, there has been rising animosity toward Chinese rule and increased expressions of Tibetan nationalism--including some terrorism such as bombs in Lhasa. Indeed, these anti-Tibetan policies precipitated the flight of the 17th Karmapa, a 14-year old boy who had previously expressed loyalty to the Chinese state. Restrictions on Tibetan culture, especially religion, also led to the 1964 denunciation of Chinese rule by the Panchen Lama and his subsequent 14-year detention. Once more, repressive practices, which have been fueled in part by ill-considered U.S. practices, alienated a prominent cleric. In the offing, there remains the possibility that the CCP moderates can use this unfortunate development to illustrate the bankruptcy of the hardline approach. Toward A New Tibet Policy The departure of the Karmapa Lama should spur Washington to reevaluate the failures of its ambiguous policy approach. It is time--after a long history of CIA betrayal, congressional grandstanding, and White House pandering to China bashers--for the U.S. to implement policies that truly help the people inside Tibet. Sadly the spiraling success of the international campaign for Tibet has led to a proportional deterioration of the cultural conditions for the people in the TAR through its bolstering of the authority of the hard-liners. Moreover, support from outside Tibet (especially Tibetan RFA broadcasts) persuades some Tibetans that the U.S. supports their cause and encourages them to continue their brave but futile struggles against Chinese rule. Time is short. The Dalai Lama is 65; his death would rob Tibetans of the only person with sufficient authority to negotiate a deal with Beijing. In the absence of a negotiated solution, current Chinese policies are allowing a mass migration of sojourners into the TAR to the point where they may already outnumber the indigenous population in the urban areas where they congregate. The Dalai Lama, like his predecessor, is willing, as he declared in April 1999, to "use my moral authority with the Tibetan people so they renounce their separatist ambitions"... autonomy would be the "best guarantee that Tibet’s culture will be preserved." China, including the TAR, has undergone dramatic changes. Tibet has roads, schools, hospitals, a burgeoning middle class, Internet cafes, karaoke bars, discos, and some 100,000 tourists a year. Religion is widely practiced. There are thousands of Tibetan officials, CCP members, and military recruits in Tibet. Indeed, many of the most ardently anti-Dalai Lama officials are Tibetan. To be sure restrictions on religious practice continue and institutional religion has eroded badly, the average income and literacy rate are the lowest in China and animosity between ethnic groups is growing. There are as many as a thousand political prisoners, mostly clergy who peacefully demonstrated against Chinese rule. Clearly, the political conjuncture in Tibet is far more complex than the Tibet Lobby (and Chinese propaganda) portrays. While condemning human rights abuses, the U.S. must also acknowledge the significant gains in personal freedoms for the vast majority of China’s citizens. The Dalai Lama’s public pronouncements have become more conciliatory recently; an indication he is reaching out to moderate officials who, while apparently not directing policy on Tibet, are still in the government. The U.S. must do the same: support the moderate elements in the Chinese government by portraying Tibet in a more realistic fashion, by inviting Tibetan officials in Lhasa to Washington, and by not pandering to the Tibet Lobby. The events of the past decade have demonstrated that public diplomacy, international hoopla, and the involvement of the world’s governments, especially the United States, have worsened conditions for the Tibetans in Tibet. More realistic policies can help bring about a peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue which is in the interests, and to the benefit, of both Tibetans and Chinese and, ultimately, the rest of the world. (A. Tom Grunfeld is Professor of History at SUNY/Empire State College. He is the author of The Making of Modern Tibet (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1996).)
Sources for More Information:The best overall site for all things Asian is: For an almost daily collection of articles which appear in the world's
press concerning Tibet, see: For another site that collects information pertaining to Tibet, see:
WHY CERTIFICATION DOESN’T
WORK
In 1999 alone, in the name of the "war on drugs," the United States provided Latin America and the Caribbean with more than $700 million in military and police assistance to combat illegal drugs. Since the mid-1980s, Washington has spent more than $25 billion on international drug control programs that have failed to affect either the availability of drugs or the domestic level of drug abuse in the United States. At the same time, the emphasis on armed interdiction has contributed to an increase in violence on both sides of the border, as police forces and the drug runners they pursue seek superior force. And though the United States remains the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs, certification focuses on the supply side and contains no mechanism by which U.S. domestic strategies could be evaluated--a fact that frequently causes resentment on the part of U.S. allies in Latin America and can put other important binational efforts at risk. Certification was enacted by congress in 1986 in order to provide a mechanism through which the U.S. could demand tougher counter-narcotics measures from other governments. Once a year the White House is required to produce a list of major drug-producing or drug-trafficking nations. Each of these countries then faces mandatory sanctions unless the administration "certifies" by no later than March 1 that the country is "cooperating fully" with U.S. anti-narcotics efforts or is taking sufficient steps on its own to meet the terms of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Congress then has 30 days to overturn the president's certification decisions by passing a resolution of disapproval in both the House and Senate that later can be vetoed by the President. In the case of Mexico, this process forces President Clinton to choose between two equally unfortunate options: 1) risk binational cooperation on other policy priorities and not certify Mexico, or 2) ignore Mexico's record on international anti-narcotics cooperation and certify the country. (The third option available is to certify a country with a national security waiver, thereby waiving all sanctions on national security grounds, even though the country is not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-narcotics Policy Alternatives The U.S. Congress could support--or best of all, replace--the certification process by adopting the multilateral mechanism developed by the Committee to Combat Drugs (CICAD) of the Organization for American States (OAS) for combating drugs in a cooperative fashion, by adopting the Multi-lateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) developed by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS)--as the Clinton Administration has advocated. The MEM is a mechanism for countries of the Western Hemisphere to mutually evaluate anti-drug efforts developed and approved by the 34 CICAD member states including the United States. This mechanism, hailed by both the Clinton Administration and Barry McCaffrey the U.S. drug czar as a multilateral approach to the problem of drugs in the Americas, is a result of a pledge agreed to by the Presidents of the 34 CICAD countries at the 1998 Santiago Chile Summit and was approved in October of 1999 at the twenty-sixth regular session of CICAD. The goal of the MEM is to enhance mutual cooperation among members states by making periodic recommendations that will enable these states to improve their anti-narcotic capacity while still respecting the sovereignty and domestic laws of these states and without imposing sanctions. The evaluation is carried out through an in-depth questionnaire consisting of numerous indicators of counter narcotic activity and a final report is then submitted to the CICAD commission. The first evaluation of this mechanism will be carried out by an Intergovernmental Working Group in December 2000 and the results will be released in 2001. It was the hope of the Latin American countries and CICAD members, including the Clinton Administration, that this mechanism would replace the certification process as a multilateral answer to the problem of the increasing availability of drugs in the Americas. Unfortunately, the U.S. Congress does not support the MEM and, therefore, has not allowed it to replace the certification process. This mechanism provides an effective multilateral and transparent alternative to the one-sided certification process lead by the United States and still provides a tangible way to evaluate hemispheric anti-narcotics efforts. If Congress disregards this alternative, a second option is for the United States to channel the international drug policy debate through an intergovernmental forum designed to discuss international cooperation on drug policy issues. In shaping the debate in this way Washington would go a long way toward meaningful collaboration with our Latin American allies and lay the framework for effective international mechanisms. Without a sense of common purpose, allies ultimately have only one incentive--the stick--to cooperate, and the quality of their cooperation will reflect that. U.S. policymakers continue to support the failed certification process and the drug war in large part thanks to domestic political considerations--they do not want to appear to be soft on drugs. They must, therefore, be given alternatives that address this issue. Instead of following strategies that impose a unilateral mandate on neighboring countries, policymakers should develop a framework that fosters mutual respect and cooperation, and could do so without sacrificing-and perhaps even improving-impact. Central to such a shift would be a focus on U.S. actions, as the world's largest consumer of illegal drugs, to focus on the domestic roots of its drug problem. Equally important would be that this policy be a truly coordinated effort on the part of the United States and our Latin American partners and that it demand an evaluation of U.S. progress as well as that of Latin America. Finally, it should be a policy that encourages, instead of corrodes, control of the military by civilian institutions in growing democracies. Anne Seymour is Program Coordinator of the Mexico-U.S. Advocates Network (http://www.heartland-alliance.org/e-page.htm). The author would like to extend special thanks to Eric Olson, Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America, for invaluable input into this article.
Sources for More Information:Drug Policy Foundation Human Rights in Northern Mexico Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Washington Office on Latin America
II. Letters to the Editor/Comments
RESPONSE TO AFRICA SUMMIT CRITIQUE
The National Summit on Africa held February 16-20,2000 was a powerful testament to your hard work, dedication, commitment and investment in the critical cause of strengthened relations between the United States and Africa. Your passionate commitment to a mutually beneficial U.S. African partnership over the past two years and at the National Summit in Washington had a profound impact on U.S. policy makers and the American public at large. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and other American and African officials recognized that you are a bona fide, serious, potential political force. Their presence at the National Summit reflected this awareness. They now understand that Africa Matters to a broad spectrum of the American people. Without you, these dynamics would not have been possible! Although much has been accomplished, a more difficult phase of our work has just begun. The National Policy Plan of Action must be implemented. For this to occur within a reasonable time period, we must work together and develop a viable education and advocacy action strategy that will require support from the State Delegations and thousands more across the United States. During a meeting with Chairs of State Delegations midway through the Regional Summit process and ever since, you the delegates and participants around the nation have pressed the Summit Secretariat to address the question of a post-Summit mechanism to implement the Plan of Action. [This expectation reached its zenith when the Summit's Dialogue and Celebration of Africa exceeded our aspirations.] In reacting responsibly to your expressed sentiments and the call for definitive follow-up action, the Summit Secretariat, consistent with policy directives from the Board of Directors, initiated an internal process to formulate a realistic way forward. Our very preliminary plans to sustain the Summit's work were bolstered by the ringing mandate echoed by thousands of participants at the National Summit on Africa in Washington. Rest assured that we will consult with a cross section of State Chairs and Delegates in reaching final decisions related to structure, methods of communication and the nature of the relationship between the Summit Secretariat and the states. Moreover, in concert with plans to restructure the Board of Directors, we will reserve six Board positions for one representative from each of the six regions. We have already consulted with some of you by telephone concerning the future plans of the Summit Secretariat. Following the special meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board held this weekend, this consultative process will continue through a series of conferences calls. In the final segment of this letter, we find it necessary to address issues raised by some recent communications sent to you. While it is the policy of the National Summit on Africa not to respond to commentary that criticizes its actions, in the interest of transparency, we do feel constrained to provide some observations on a recent electronic article by Jim Lobe and Jim Carlson, which contained several false statements and half-truths. The allegation that the National Summit on Africa used a "top-down approach that failed to adequately consult with existing local groups and long established NGOs with national networks..." is simply false. First, eleven of the major Africa focused groups or groups with Africa as a major area of concern, are members of the NSOA Board of Directors (AAI, the Africa Fund, APIC-WOA, Africa News Service, the African Studies Association, the Constituency for Africa, the Corporate Council for Africa, International Human Rights Law Group, the Modern Africa Fund Managers, USA for Africa, the Africa Office of the National Council of Churches). Reverend Leon Sullivan, Randal Robinson of TransAfrica and C. Payne Lucas of Africare are National Co-Chairs. The labor movement is also represented on the Board. Secondly, the six Regional Summits were democratic and open to all persons, including Africans, residing in the states within a given region. Indeed a special effort was made to ensure that a cross section of the American people would be represented including youth, academics, faith based communities, non-governmental organizations, women's and environmental groups, elected officials, the corporate community, resident Africans and ordinary citizens. This search for diversity was made quite clear to the institutional partners in the six regions, as well as to state representatives when they convened to elect their delegates. Indeed from the very outset of operations, the Summit's stated philosophy and practice has been of inclusion, diversity, bipartisan, and completely open to everyone. Finally, while the NSOA Secretariat did provide a Draft Plan of Action (DPA) based upon a set of thematic issue papers researched and written by African and American academics, NGO representatives and the policy relevant community, all participants in the Regional Summits and delegates at the National Summit were free to modify the document as they saw fit, with no interference from the Summit Secretariat. In citing the support for the African Growth and Opportunity Act by the President Clinton, the Secretary of State, Senior Director for Africa at the NSA, and Secretary of Transpiration Slater, Messrs. Lobe and Cason neglected to point out that every single African official who spoke at the Summit including the Secretary General of the OAU, the Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Africa, the Vice President of Nigeria, the foreign ministers and the Ambassadors to United States from Senegal and South Africa, voiced their firm support for the Africa Trade bill and called for its rapid passage. Indeed we support the African leaders in their desire for a trade bill. The charge cited in the article that the National Summit was being "controlled by people with an emphasis on trade and investment and that"... these are the new colonizers" is intriguing, since a colonizer is one who settles in a colony. In contrast, it is perhaps those who think they know what is best for Africa, despite Africa's clear statements to the contrary, that are acting in a paternalist manner characteristic of the former colonial powers. The allegation that the National Summit is "being hijacked by a leadership with a corporate friendly agenda" or will be dominated by corporate interests is silly at best. In October 1998, the Board of Directors adopted a policy with respect to corporate funding that states, inter alia " in identifying and evaluating prospective donors, the Summit will take into account the overall governance and corporate responsibility record of each corporation. In researching corporations special consideration will be given to human rights, workplace and diversity issues, environmental record, operations abroad, and corporate giving history." Every corporation that was approached for funding was checked in advance through a due diligence procedure at the Secretariat's fund-raising secretariat based at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. Upon completion of this review process, the file was submitted to the Board of Directors for its approval. All corporate gifts received were approved if not by the unanimous consent, then by the vast majority of the Board. The lion's share of the financial support has come from the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. To suggest that a diverse group of corporations who gave a total of $315,000 in the five weeks preceding the National Summit would have any serious influence when even those that provided $6.8 million tried in no way to influence the substantive positions in the Draft and the final National Plan of Action, simply makes no sense. Virtually all non-governmental organizations seek and accept funds from corporate donors and have corporate representatives on their respective Boards of Directors. All of the NGOS, including Africa focused groups, actively seek and receive foundation grants, which are, after all, resources generated from corporate profits. The report that the "final assembly was clouded with charges by many grassroots and non-governmental organizations rooted in the antiapartheid (sic) movement that the mobilizing effort put into the Summit risked being hijacked by a leadership with a "corporate friendly agenda, " is untrue. Only one individual read a document for which signatures were being sought during the conference. The delegate from New York was given the opportunity to speak, not to avoid a disruption as implied by reporters, but rather because the National Summit supports the articulation of diverse points of view. The fact that no petition was presented at that time suggests that this was a position of a very small minority. Moreover, apartheid in South Africa was sui generis involving clear racial, class and ideological cleavages. The democratization of South Africa can be attributed not only to the struggle waged by the African liberation movement, but also to the sustained, valiant and effective efforts of the anti-apartheid movement in the US and other parts of Europe. That battle has been won and the role played by American anti-apartheid groups, including most of the individuals on the Summit Board, should be commended. However, the issues that challenge the rest of Africa are more complex and require different analyzes and responses. With respect to the personal attacks against the President of the National Summit on Africa, it is important to note for the record that Leonard Robinson was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in 1983 with responsibility for U.S. economic and commercial policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, not Southern Africa and the controversial policy of constructive engagement. Inside the Department of State he repeatedly warned fellow policy makers that American policy toward Southern Africa was wrong and that the Free South Africa Movement would succeed in mobilizing American public opinion against the constructive engagement policy. He left the Department of State in 1984 when it became clear that his warnings were ignored to become the first President of the U.S. African Development Foundation. Initially, Congressionally funded with an appropriation of $1 million, by the time he left in 1990, its Congressional funding had risen to $17 million. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1990 to 1993, his portfolios included West and Central Africa, narcotics, democracy and terrorism. In 1992-93, 62.4% of all drug traffickers arrested at JFK International Airport were Nigerian. Illicit drugs interdicted through these arrests were headed for the streets of our inner city communities and constituted a threat to U.S. national security. In 1993, Leonard Robinson, while working for the then law firm of Washington & Christian, the firm, with the encouragement of U.S. authorities, agreed to assist the Government of Nigeria in establishing a drug interdiction program, including initiating a polygraph system for all police officers, security personnel and border guards, and to help formulate an official drug policy. Leonard Robinson and others presently working with Africa focused organizations, worked on this project. This work was conducted in the national security interest of America. As noted by the reporters, the National Summit on Africa process was modeled after the United Nations world conferences. One of the cardinal principles of the UN system is sovereign equality, which is rooted in the belief that every nation, despite the views and actions of its government, should be treated with courtesy and respect, and has the right to articulate its views before the world forum. Ralph Bunche, former Under Secretary General of the UN, once said that there are no crosses or tombstones on the battlefield of debate. The accepted practice to express dissent is to leave the room, rather than disrupt a session, which intrudes upon the rights of others. The Summit extended an invitation to every African Head of State with whom the United States has diplomatic relations. President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, with the encouragement of the Department of State, accepted the Summit's invitation. Several other nations like Benin, Senegal, Tanzania and Mozambique were in the midst of electoral campaigns or had just held elections. For reasons of protocol, many other African Heads of State were reluctant to make a commitment to attend the National Summit, prior to the confirmation that President Clinton would address the Summit. The article by the reporters quotes heavily from a confidential internal document requested by the Board of Directors in November 1999. It was a discussion paper and was not projected as official policy. Leaking this document to the press represents a breach of confidence. As it turned out, the Board of Directors considered a set of recommendations from the Executive Board at its meeting in February 2000 and decided by a vote of 16 for, 4 against and 1 abstention to agree in principle to the establishment of a Phase II of the National Summit on Africa for the purpose of implementing the National Plan of Action, following broad consultations with Africa focused groups and other interested constituencies. In this connection, perhaps the most puzzling position cited in the article was that the National Summit on Africa was established with the understanding that it would end with the completion of the National Summit and that, therefore, to prolong it is a breach of faith. Does that mean that the Constructive Engagement position of the Reagan Administration should never have been reversed? No organization, university, corporation or government policy is static. Dynamism requires that institutions respond to new realities. The delegates from around the country energized by the Summit process have forcefully called upon the Summit to continue its work - - especially to educate Americans about Africa and to ensure implementation of the National Policy Plan of Action - - and to keep them involved in it. Why invest significant resources and work to create a constituency if you are not prepared to sustain it? The very essence of effectiveness is to always follow-through on what you initiate. In conclusion, the National Summit on Africa has been in existence only slightly more than three years. Growing pains and other challenges not withstanding, it admittedly is not perfect. As has been publicly acknowledged, there is room for improvement and strengthening of operations, including communications with those you who comprise a vast and growing network. However, what took place in Washington two weeks ago was no mirage, you experienced it, you made it happen. Do not allow anyone to challenge this reality--nor its historic, constructive impact. Nothing worthwhile in life is gained with out vision, determination, good luck and the right mix of a dedicated core of people to a common purpose. In the final analysis, all the National Summit on Africa seeks is that the realities of Africa be known and understood by the American people; that the support base for Africa in the United States expands dramatically and that American policy towards the nations of the African Continent be responsive to their legitimate needs and our respective mutual interests. As over 600 papers around the world have reported, you have demonstrated the Africa Matters to Americans. There is no turning back. We must all stay the course. Herschelle S. Challenor
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