The Progressive ResponseVolume 4, Number 37
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Around the WorldBy Tom Barry
II. Updates and Out-TakesPERU: DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY
III. Self-Determination Crisis WatchPAPUA: ANOTHER EAST TIMOR?
IV. Outside U.S.HUNTINGTON GUIDES VAJPAYEE IN WASHINGTON
I. Around the WorldBy Tom Barry In the Aftermath of Seattle: Backlash Reigns Although the violence in Seattle was widely condemned by citizen leaders, much of the rhetoric used by these same leaders fosters a violent backlash. Clearly, the militancy of the demonstrations has successfully focused media—and to some degree public—attention on the institutions of global economic governance. There is also growing recognition by global leaders that the negative impacts of globalization need to be addressed. Seeing this success, antiglobalization groups have adopted "shut it down" strategies at international meetings of globalization forums and institutions. The hope was that successive Seattle-modeled protests would delegitimize the institutions of global governance and draw in greater numbers of disaffected citizen groups, coalescing them into a truly international movement that can turn around globalization. The analysts associated with this movement often lend intellectual support to the anarchist backlash on the streets. In his recent book, American University professor Robin Hahnel, a frequent contributor to Z magazine, writes: "We must act like Lilliputian Luddites first and stop corporate-sponsored globalization by any means necessary." For many in the antiglobalization movement, this campaign against globalization is the defining struggle of our era—a life and death struggle that requires all means necessary to stop corporate forces. One possibility is that such a backlash movement could indeed be successful at undermining the credibility and legitimacy of current institutions. In the process of stressing the importance of national sovereignty and local development, such a movement may also help build a global consensus against all forms of global governance—a frightening scenario. Another possibility is that the media and public will grow weary of street demonstrations of disaffected youth, the message of the reformers will be lost in the cacophony of street battles, and the concerns and positive agendas of the antiglobalziation coalition will be dismissed. In the aftermath of DC, Melbourne, and Prague, it is time to ask what the agenda of this movement is with respect to multilateral global governance. The movement makes reference to the power of the U.S. Treasury and the Washington-to-Wall Street axis of power in corporate-led globalization. But the protests have focused not on America’s central role, but on the institutions of multilateral governance that include most of the world’s governments. In the U.S., this anti-global governance strategy has great resonance with those among the left and the right who appeal to the sanctity of national sovereignty. One of the most striking inconsistencies among progressives is their ambivalent embrace of multilateralism. In the political/security arena, multilateralism is supported as the only viable method for advancing international peace and security. Multilateralism in the form of the UN is strongly supported, and unilateralism by the U.S. is consistently condemned. The citizen movements focusing on global economic issues make no such principled declaration in support of multilateral governance, however. The political leaders of other nations, like those of the U.S., are regarded to be the servants of corporate and elite rule. When making the critique that the current governance institutions are incapable of reform, many global economy activists do not at the same time assert that some form of multilateral economic governance is fundamentally important. The succession this year of attempts to shut down the multilateral institutions should raise serious questions about just where the global economy movement is going. Peru: Time for a U.S. Demilitarization Policy The crisis of governance in Peru cannot be laid at the feet of the U.S. government. It is the responsibility of Peruvians themselves to decide the character of their governance. And to a large extent that is what’s happening, as the peacefully escalating popular opposition to President Fujimori’s illegitimate rule has created rising pressure for him to step down. The U.S. has taken public positions against Fujimori’s illegal retention of the presidency and in favor of democratic rule. But the U.S. government’s long and continuing tradition of providing aid and training for the security forces in Latin America makes its stand for democracy look hypocritical. In Peru, the security forces and the intelligence service have been Fujimori’s strongest backers. Without their support, it is unlikely that he could have held on to power so long. Beginning in the early 1980s the U.S. government integrated into its foreign policy a democratization program, consisting of aid for election monitoring and for political opposition in authoritarian states. It also used its public diplomacy to voice support for democratic transitions. In many ways this new support for democracy and opposition to dictatorship was welcome. But the credibility of the democratization program was undermined from the start by its continuing practice of bolstering the security forces in countries where civilian control over these forces was fragile or nonexistent. The essential contradiction between democratization and militarization was never appreciated, or was ignored. Cases of this contradiction between two different thrusts of foreign policy are found around the world. El Salvador, Honduras, Turkey, and Indonesia are prominent examples. Over the past couple of decades, the U.S. government has supported Latin America’s turn toward democracy. As leftist threats faded in the region, U.S. military aid began to decline. But the government’s decision to mount a stronger foreign offensive in what it called the "war on drugs" has meant that U.S. support of Peru’s most retrograde elements—namely the police, military, and intelligence services—once again became routine. While State Department diplomats and White House press officers berated Fujimori for undermining democratization, DOD and DEA agents were encouraging militarization. There exist many concerns about the U.S. directly involving itself in the political affairs of other nations through democratization programs. But there should be little doubt that support for militarization is not consistent with a commitment to democracy. Yes to democratization, but for the U.S. government’s stated support for democratic governance to have any credibility and impact, it must reject its politics of militarization. Instead, demilitarization should be a core U.S. foreign policy principle. (Around the World is a weekly column of news commentary by Tom Barry, FPIF codirector.)
II. Updates and Out-TakesPERU: DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY
Peru’s President Fujimori represents a dangerous model of authoritarian populism that may become increasingly prevalent across Latin America. Fed up with existing parties and politicians, rampant corruption, and inefficiency in government, Latin Americans are increasingly turning to populist independents who promise strong leadership in order to bring order to society and discipline to government. The subdued regional and U.S. response to Peru’s fraudulent elections sends a dangerous message to the hemisphere’s growing number of strongman wannabes. As a result of recent developments, however, the international community has been provided with a new opportunity to take strong action to ensure that Peru returns to a democratic path. Such international pressure has had an impact in the past. Though rarely achieving a total turnaround in Peruvian government policy, outside pressure has forced important changes. It led both to the reestablishment of the Peruvian Congress in 1993, following the autogolpe, and to the drafting of a new constitution, although both of these changes were ultimately crafted to Fujimori’s advantage. Domestic and international pressure has obligated Peru to retry before a civilian court American Lori Berenson and to create an ad hoc commission to review the cases of Peruvians in jail on terrorism charges. Ultimately, the success of Fujimori’s neoliberal economic policies is dependent on staying within the good graces of the international community. Thus far he has managed to walk that fine line, but such poise may be increasingly difficult if the political situation deteriorates. International investors expressed relief at the announcement of new elections; failure to move forward effectively could further erode investor confidence and threaten Fujimori’s economic program. Moreover, Peru’s civil society groups are mobilized to see the reform process through and are seeking stronger international pressure. Although the political opposition is internally weak, it remains united against Fujimori and is growing in strength. It now appears to have popular sentiment on its side and is working toward constructing a proposed government of national unity. First and foremost, the U.S. government should focus its efforts on ensuring that President Fujimori follows through with his promises to dismantle SIN and to move immediately toward new presidential and congressional elections under close international supervision. U.S. relations with Peru regarding aid, trade, and other programs should be evaluated through that lens. U.S. assistance to Peru’s security forces, including the notorious SIN, should be discontinued immediately. Military-to-military training programs should cease; no Peruvian soldiers should be brought to the School of the Americas or any other U.S.-based training facilities. Joint military-to-military operations should be canceled. The Clinton administration should publicly call for the detention of Montesinos, for independent investigations into allegations of corruption and human rights violations lodged against him, and for subsequent prosecutions. His U.S. visa should be revoked, and Washington should publicly repudiate the role of SIN in Peru today. There should be full disclosure of information gathered by U.S. officials regarding both the allegations against Montesinos and the recent arms scandal. Then the U.S. Congress should hold hearings on the scandal. All reforms—such as the dismantling of SIN—should be carried out within the context of the OAS-sponsored dialogue. Moreover, the OAS should have responsibility for preparing and monitoring presidential and congressional elections. If prompt movement in this direction does not occur, the U.S. government should cut off all nonhumanitarian aid to Peru, suspend some trade benefits, and vote "no" on loans by the international financial institutions. Likewise, if substantial progress is not made, the OAS should suspend Peru from its ranks until Peru returns to a democratic path. A clear message must be sent both to President Fujimori and across the hemisphere that in the 21st century, fraudulent elections and authoritarian rule are simply not acceptable. Coletta A. Youngers <coletta@mindspring.com>, a senior associate at the Washington Office on Latin America, is currently taking a one-year leave to write a book on the history of the human rights movement in Peru. Sources for More InformationOrganizationsAmnesty International Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos Human Rights Watch Americas Division Instituto de Defensa Legal Peru Peace Network Washington Office on Latin America WebsitesAsociacion Pro Derechos Humanos, APRODEH Defensoria del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office) Peruvian News Organization International News on Peru Peru Election 2000 Public Education Website Peru Home Page (provides links to major media) Transparencia (civil society election monitoring organization)
III. Self-Determination Crisis Watch
PAPUA: ANOTHER EAST TIMOR? Roughly the size of California, Papua forms the western half of the world’s second-largest island, New Guinea. Papua has been known by many names, most commonly today as Irian Jaya (the official Indonesian name) and West Papua (adopted in 1961 by elected Papuan representatives and used by most Papuans). In the interest of simplicity, Papua will be used here. Indonesia took control of Papua from the Netherlands in the 1960s through a highly controversial UN-sponsored process brokered by the United States. Since that time, the indigenous Melanesian population (known as Papuans) has protested Indonesian sovereignty. Indonesian integration-cum-colonization of Papua—implemented with U.S. complicity—has amounted to an undeclared war against the indigenous population. It has brought racial and religious discrimination, wholesale seizure of local communities’ lands, assaults on their livelihoods and cultures, and other severe human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape. Powerful foreign investors and approximately 1 million non-Papuan migrants dominate the territory’s economy and civil and military administration, marginalizing and dispossessing the 1.2 million native Papuans. Brutal human rights violations in Papua were a hallmark of the 32-year, authoritarian regime of Indonesian Army General and President Suharto. Violations continue under the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, including shootings of peaceful demonstrators, torture, and arbitrary detention. Intensifying Indonesian military and militia activities—aimed at derailing Papuans’ nonviolent self-rule efforts—threaten to destabilize Papua and the region. The Indonesian military has moved thousands of additional troops into Papua in recent months and is supporting—with training, arms, and directives—the establishment of "pro-Jakarta" militias in Papua. These units, known as the Red and White Task Force, are similar to those that conducted a campaign of violence in East Timor last year and that continue to terrorize West Timor’s refugee camps. Indonesia’s integration of Papua, through a decolonization process that violated international standards, is the foundation of the current conflict. After World War II, Indonesia—newly independent from the Netherlands—sought to gain control of Papua by laying claim to all Dutch colonial lands. Papuan leaders explicitly rejected integration with Indonesia, and the Dutch launched an initiative to prepare Papua for self-rule. Under the Dutch plan, Papuans completed a territory-wide vote for representatives to the newly established New Guinea Council. In 1961, the Council ratified, with formal Dutch approval, the adoption of the national Papuan Morning Star flag, a national anthem, and a new name for the territory: West Papua. When the UN refused to support Indonesia’s territorial claims, the Sukarno government employed military means, including a planned invasion to "liberate" Papua. The Kennedy administration—seeking to defuse an all-out military confrontation between Indonesia and the Netherlands—initiated UN-sponsored negotiations between the two parties, which culminated in the 1962 New York Agreement. Papuans had no say in the agreement, which brought an end to Dutch sovereignty and established a temporary UN administration. The agreement also called for Papuans to exercise their right to self-determination "in accordance with international practice," including free and informed consent and universal suffrage. The UN turned over control of Papua to Indonesia in 1963, after a brief and inadequate administration period. Having triggered a severe reversal in the territory’s political and economic development, Indonesia formally consolidated its sovereignty over Papua through the 1969 "Act of Free Choice" (AFC). Only 1,025 "representatives" (out of 800,000 Papuans) participated in the process, which Indonesia administered and controlled. Although the UN’s observer reported serious violations of the self-determination process—and 15 countries strenuously contested the AFC’s validity—the UN General Assembly accepted the AFC’s results. Like East Timor, Papua has withstood Indonesia’s military operations and disastrous leadership. Indonesia justifies military operations in Papua on the basis of maintaining internal stability and combating the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM). Since the 1960s, the OPM—a popular, multifactional national liberation movement—has employed tactics of armed resistance and international diplomacy in resisting Indonesia’s takeover. The Indonesian military’s use of force against civilians—generally indiscriminate and excessive, often brutally sadistic—has included massive air assaults and the use of napalm on rural villages. Although the total number of Papuans killed is unknown, estimates by church officials and international observers place the figure at more than 100,000 (roughly ten percent of the population). Abigail Abrash <aea@igc.org> is a Visiting Fellow with Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program. She has monitored human rights issues in Indonesia, with a special focus on Papua, since 1993.
Sources for More InformationOrganizationsAustralia West Papua Association ELSHAM (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia) Human Rights Watch Asia Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights Survival International TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign WebsitesWest Papua News
IV. Outside U.S.
HUNTINGTON GUIDES VAJPAYEE
IN WASHINGTON Prime Minister Vajpayee has returned to India triumphantly after a visit to the United States, which was hailed as a success by President Clinton. A visit of this kind is a success if its objectives have been attained. Apparently what was achieved matched the objectives of both India and the United States. Three decades after President Nixon’s "tilt to Pakistan," many now believe there is a tilt toward India. Among the achievements India can claim are commercial deals worth $6 billion for projects in power, e-commerce, and banking sectors. The Indian government made a concerted effort to accelerate the second-generation economic reforms in preparation for Vajpayee’s visit to the United States. The signal was given that all doors of globalization and all windows of liberalization are now wide open in India. After reaching the U.S., the prime minister reiterated that India was determined to sustain the momentum of comprehensive reforms, noting that important sectors of the country’s infrastructure—power, insurance, banking, and telecommunications—have been offered to private institutions (both domestic and foreign). Kashmir: The "Core" Problem On the issue of Kashmir and Pakistan, the joint statement "reaffirms" the two countries’ "belief that tensions can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia and by peaceful means," stressing the "unacceptability of continued violence and bloodshed as a basis for a solution to the problems of the region." President Clinton told press correspondents that "because of the groundwork his administration had laid, the United States can play a positive role to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which has been at the core of difficulties between India and Pakistan for more than half a century now." This statement caused the Indian government much anxiety. Its anxiety arises more from what the Indian government has not told its people than it does with the U.S. stance. The Indian government cannot accept that the "core" problem with Pakistan is Kashmir. It does not even concede that there is a dispute over Kashmir. The second part of the statement also is contrary to what India has claimed. India insists that it will not accept third-party mediation of the Kashmir dispute. Clinton openly stated that the U.S. is not only qualified to mediate but has already laid the groundwork for mediation. India’s government owes an explanation to its people. The groundwork was probably laid during the Kargil conflict. What has the role of the U.S. on the Kashmir issue been since then? India in the Clash of Civilizations Scenario There is reason to believe that the prime minister and his advisers read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order by Samuel P. Huntington during their visit to the U.S. The theme of the book is a favorite of both India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party policymakers and a section of American policy planners. Huntington’s civilizational conflicts are mostly religious wars, and Islam is depicted as the main culprit. In the Indian prime minister’s address to the U.S. Congress, he said that "in our neighborhood, in this twenty-first century, religious war has not just been fashioned into, it has been proclaimed to be an instrument of state policy." In seeking to draw the U.S. into a common cause against an "obscurantist religious war" as an instrument of state policy in South Asia, Vajapyee began articulating a maximalist agenda for cooperation with the United States. How does one resist the religious war in the neighborhood? At the UN’s Millenium Summit, Vajpayee clearly portrayed India as a pluralistic and open society blighted by cross-border tensions fueled by dangerous religious extremism. He implied that an India that is strong (because it is secular), democratic, pluralist, and open will prevail. But he also addressed a large meeting of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in Staten Island as a swayamsevak, a member of the militant Hindu organization, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS). He vowed to continue to be swayamseva even after he ceases to be prime minister. He assured the meeting that he would build the India of their dreams—of course a Hindu nation—if his party is given two-thirds majority. By attending the meeting, which was dominated by Hindu religious leaders and members of the Sangh Parivar, he opened himself up to charges of intolerance and bigotry. It was edifying to see the Indian prime minister openly championing Hindutva, the ideology of a Hindu nation. Vajpayee probably read the book again and found that Huntington consistently refers to India as Hindu India, and calls all Indians Hindus. In Huntington’s Future of Civilizations, Hindu India is a U.S. ally: "The United States, Europe, Russia, and India have thus become engaged in a truly global struggle against China, Japan, and most of Islam." The Indian side is jubilant about the perceived U.S. accommodation of India’s nuclear arms policy. The joint Clinton-Vajpayee statement noted that "both countries agreed to continue their dialogue on security and non-proliferation, including on defense posture which is designed to further narrow differences on these important issues." India’s nuclear test in May 1998, far from challenging the nuclear club, was a calculated attempt to gain entry into it or at least near it. It showed its readiness for negotiations with the United States on the terms of entry within hours after the nuclear tests on May 11, 1998. In this issue, too, Huntington proved very helpful to India’s policymakers. His book reads, "In 1993 the primary goals of the West as defined in American policy shifted from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation. This change was a realistic recognition of the extent to which some nuclear proliferation could not be avoided. In due course U.S. policy will shift from countering proliferation to accommodating proliferation." At the end of his U.S. visit, the Indian prime minister claimed that India’s international standing has benefited enormously as a result of its nuclear tests. Apparently he believes that a permanent seat in the UN Security Council comes on a nuclear arms chair. (Ninan Koshy <knkoshy@md4.vsnl.net.in>, is formerly Director, International Affairs, World Council of Churches and Visiting Fellow, Harvard Law School.)
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