The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)--a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, FPIF is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/.

We Count on Your Support!

Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT WON'T END COLOMBIA'S WAR
By Jason Thor Hagen, Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy

QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S TRADE STATUS AND FAST TRACK
By Tom Barry

CHINA POLICY: PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES

END U.S. SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN REPRESSION
By Stephen Zunes

II. Outside the U.S.

HARD-LEARNED LESSONS: PLAN COLOMBIA AND DEMOCRACY IN PERU
By Carlos Reyna Izaguirre

I. Updates and Out-Takes

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT WON'T END COLOMBIA'S WAR
By Jason Thor Hagen, Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy

(Editor's Note: The Colombian security forces haven't been able to absorb all the U.S. military and policy assistance coming. So the Bush administration announced that more of this drug control/counterinsurgency assistance for the Andean region would be in the form of alternative economic development programs. It would be unwise, argues Jason Thor Hagen in a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, to bet on such schemes as crop substitution or rural infrastructure to bring peace to Colombia--or to stop the flow of drugs to the United States. But Colombia's entrenched and privileged power structure makes any real alternative development that primarily benefits the poor highly unlikely. The commentary, excerpted below, is posted in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0105altdev.html.)

Washington's contribution to Plan Colombia has been widely criticized for its emphasis on interdiction and aerial eradication at the expense of alternative development in the areas where coca and opium poppy are grown. Alternative development, as conceived in Plan Colombia, is offered to small farmers (those with less than three hectares of coca) who voluntarily eradicate their illegal plants within twelve months in exchange for credit, technical advice, and marketing assistance as they switch exclusively to legal crops or the care of livestock. Although the bulk of alternative development funds go to crop substitution, infrastructure improvements in roads, potable water, sewerage, electricity, education, and health services are also planned for the long term. Critics of Plan Colombia, such as the European Parliament, have called for increased spending on rural infrastructure and social programs as an alternative to the military buildup currently underway. The Bush administration seems to be responding positively to these critiques, and has proposed more spending on alternative development in the Andean region.

Yet, it would be unwise to bet on such schemes as a way of bringing peace to Colombia or stopping the flow of drugs to the United States. Even if the U.S. and Colombian governments were to take alternative development seriously, there are staggering obstacles to overcome.

Colombia consistently ranks as one of the world's most corrupt countries, and Colombians are particularly distrustful of agricultural institutions, which have long been used by political bosses to distribute pork. Even bureaucracies created and managed under the oversight of international financial institutions are notoriously corrupt and inefficient, and they have failed to earn the confidence of peasants, who constitute the vast majority of Colombian farmers.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is working closely with PLANTE, the Colombian government's alternative development agency. PLANTE was created in 1996 to work on issues of crop substitution and productive infrastructure in remote areas where coca is grown. However, it has been understaffed and underfunded since its inception, it has done very little for coca growers, and it is now suffering severe financial difficulties. It also lacks the technical expertise necessary for the ambitious undertaking that USAID envisions.

There has been no meaningful coordination between PLANTE personnel and the pilots spraying pesticides on coca fields during the past several months. At times, they seem to be in direct conflict. Many agricultural projects (such as rubber, cacao, and plantain trees as well as yucca, corn, vegetable gardens, livestock, and fish ponds) sponsored by international development organizations have been affected by aerial spraying. Peasants participating in PLANTE's own projects have seen thousands of acres of their crops destroyed, and many have reverted to coca cultivation. Their confidence in legal markets, tenuous to begin with, has been severely undermined.

Furthermore, the money designated for alternative development has not yet materialized, after eight months of assurances to hundreds of peasants who have signed pacts. By failing to deliver on early promises, PLANTE and USAID are compromising the entire long-term effort and will face diminishing cooperation in the future.

Unfortunately, even if fumigation were to end and the money for alternative development were to arrive, many of the underlying causes of the war would remain. Living among competing armed actors, peasants' planting decisions are often determined more by intimidation than by free will or economic rationality. For similar reasons, many are reluctant to participate in local government and community decisionmaking, which USAID claims is critical for positive results. The designers of alternative development have not sufficiently recognized the constraints posed by the hostilities into which their projects are inserted. In particular, they have not addressed the ways in which those hostilities limit the freedom of unarmed peasants.

Those concerned about illegal drugs entering the U.S. should focus on the U.S. demand for drugs. Through such an approach, positive results are more likely, and costs can be better controlled. Those who desire peace in Colombia should press for judicial reform, land redistribution, and respect for human rights. And we should all ask hard questions about U.S. interests in Colombia and determine who benefits from the militarized antidrug strategies that are, to many observers, an obvious failure and a national embarrassment.

(Jason Thor Hagen <jasonthorhagen@yahoo.com> is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Pittsburgh. He lived in Colombia for 3 ½ years as a Fulbright scholar and visiting professor at universities in Bogotá. He is currently interning at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy in Minneapolis and completing a thesis about agricultural policymaking in Colombia.)

QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINA'S TRADE STATUS AND FAST TRACK
By Tom Barry

China's Trade Status

The contentious debate about China's trade status will likely be revived in the next couple of months, despite U.S. congressional approval last year of permanent normal trade status (PNTR) for China. The congressional debate reflected a larger public debate about U.S.-China relations and about the costs and benefits of U.S. economic engagement with China. As such, it echoed the annual debates surrounding approval of normal trade relations (NTR) status for China. Last year, however, the annual NTR vote was preceeded by a new U.S.-China trade pact that set the stage for China's entry into the World Trade Organization. It was fully expected that China would indeed be admitted to the WTO following the U.S. blessing of its accession. But negotiations over the terms of China's accession bogged down, due to questions about how quickly China was expected to liberalize its agricultural sector and also because of divisions within the Chinese leadership over implementing the new liberalization rules. A year after Congress approved PNTR status, China is not yet a WTO member.

Congress made PNTR status contingent on China's entry into the WTO. In effect, this meant that China would have only temporary NTR status obligating Congress annually to renew (or disapprove) this status until China does accede to the WTO. Since 1991 a congressional coalition has sought unsuccessfully to deny China NTR status. It is likely that this same bipartisan coalition will again oppose normal trade status for China this summer and seek to void last year's decision to grant China PNTR status if it becomes a WTO member. The coalition raises diverse arguments against approval of nondiscriminatory trade relations with China. Many members from manufacturing districts argue that the U.S. trade deficit with China will deepen, thereby further endangering the jobs of their constituents. Others stress that China should be discriminated against in U.S. trade because of its human rights abuses, labor practices, and inferior environmental safeguards. Another faction argues that China represents a military threat to the United States, and as a communist nation has no place among the free market nations of the WTO. The new designation of China as a "strategic competitor" rather than "strategic partner," combined with continuing tensions resulting from the spy plane crisis, may fuel new congressional opposition to the prevailing policy of economic engagement with China.

In short, there was nothing "permanent" about the decision on China's trade status last summer, and the contention surrounding China's trade status will once again flare up this summer.

(For more information, see the chapter on "China and the WTO," in What's This Organization (WTO): A Glossary and Terms and Concepts about the World Trade Organization (FPIF, 2000) at: http://www.fpif.org/wto/china.html.)

CHINA POLICY: PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES

(Editor's Note: The following is a draft statement on the principles that should guide China policy. The two sponsoring organizations of Foreign Policy In Focus helped draft the statement, and FPIF was one of the organizations that convened two discussion groups about a progressive agenda on U.S.-China relations. Please send your comments on this draft to Andrew Wells-Dang <andrew@apcjp.org>, and, if you would like them circulated in the Progressive Response, to Tom Barry <tom@irc-online.org>.)

DRAFT-May 2001

PROGRESSIVE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA

WHEREAS a politically, socially, economically, and environmentally stable, prosperous, and peaceful China is in the interest of all peoples on both sides of the Pacific Rim;

WHEREAS respect for basic economic, social, cultural, civil and political human rights is the foundation for political stability and economic prosperity both within our respective countries and in relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China;

WHEREAS both China and the United States are contributing variously to regional and global political instability through policies to increase military capacities in the region, strengthen military alliances, export weapons, deploy new ballistic missiles, build destabilizing missile defenses, and expand nuclear forces;

RECOGNIZING that current patterns of economic development in both China and the United States are obstacles to economically just and environmentally sustainable development;

RECOGNIZING many opportunities where our peoples and governments may offer positive assistance and encouragement to one another along our respective paths to human, political, social development, and environmental stewardship,

We recommend that the United States Government adhere to the following principles in its relations with China:

HUMAN RIGHTS

Provide positive incentives to assist and encourage the development of the rule of law and respect for basic human rights in China on the basis of the international norms and standards expressed in existing international human rights covenants and ILO conventions. Such norms and standards include the right to organize independent trade unions, the release of political prisoners, the development of democratic institutions, the protection of religious freedom, and the right to development.

Treat China consistently according to these international norms and uniform standards and utilize sanctions sparingly and only after other diplomatic means have been exhausted.

Support multilateral and cooperative action to strengthen adherence to these standards, focused in such a way as to have the greatest impact on members of the governing regime whose policies the international community seeks to change.

Recognize the right of the people of Taiwan to determine their future and that the majority currently support the status quo over other options.

Recognize the right of the people of Tibet, Xinjiang, and other minority regions under Chinese jurisdiction to full autonomy, including the preservation of their distinctive culture, religion and livelihoods, and that state-sponsored migration programs to such regions undermine that autonomy.

Encourage respect for basic human rights and democracy in the Hong Kong S.A.R.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Support improved relations between China and the United States through peaceful means--not through military threats, intimidation, or war.

Promote arms control and disarmament across the Taiwan Strait, as part of broader multilateral efforts to reduce the sale and transfer of weapons worldwide.

Provide positive incentives to China and Taiwan to assure peace and stability across the Strait and support the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan by the peoples of Taiwan and China. In the meantime recognize one China, with two systems, in coexistence across the Taiwan Strait.

Resolve disputes peacefully through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, or, if this cannot be achieved, through adjudication by appropriate international bodies under the terms of international law.

Provide positive incentives to assist and encourage China's full participation in and compliance with existing international arms control and disarmament agreements.

Promote new multilateral, regional arms control and disarmament initiatives in the region to reduce military tensions and the threat of war.

ECONOMIC JUSTICE

Do not oppose China's entry into multilateral economic and environmental organizations.

Provide positive and generous incentives and assistance to China to develop economically in an environmentally sustainable manner. These might include assistance in health care, education, green technology, micro-enterprise, strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Support equitable trade and investment agreements between and including China and the United States that recognize the significant disparities among countries while also respecting the rights of workers, assuring the provision of basic human needs, and protecting the environment.

Implement legislation that creates an independently monitored code of conduct for U.S. corporations and their contractors which includes respect for basic labor rights.

Provide sufficient training and transitional assistance to workers in the U.S. and China who are displaced as a consequence of structural economic changes.

Provide positive incentives to assist and encourage China's full participation in and compliance with existing international environmental conventions and agreements.

Promote new bilateral and multilateral environmental initiatives in the region to support environmentally sustainable development.

Promote increased travel, scientific and cultural exchanges, and cooperation between China and the United States, as well as between China and Taiwan.

Draft prepared by:
Ned Stowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Andrew Wells-Dang, Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace; Erik Leaver, Institute for Policy Studies; and John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center.

We welcome your suggestions for the final version of this statement. Please send comments to Peter Morcheck <peter@fcnl.org>.

END U.S. SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN REPRESSION
By Stephen Zunes

(Excerpted from an FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0105egypt.html.)

The quick conviction on Monday in a political court of Dr. Saad El-Din Ibrahim and 27 associates is a serious blow against Egypt's burgeoning pro-democracy movement. It also raises serious questions about continued U.S. military and economic aid to the increasingly authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak.

Dr. Ibrahim and his colleagues served with the Ibn Khaldun Center for Developmental Studies, a think tank dedicated to the promotion of civil society in Egypt and throughout the Arab world. Last year, the Egyptian government shut down this internationally renowned center, known for its study of applied social sciences in Egypt and the Arab world. Its monthly publication, Civil Society, has been an important source of information and analysis for scholars across the globe.

Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance. As long as the Mubarak regime knows that U.S. aid will flow regardless of its violations of internationally recognized human rights, there is little incentive to change its patterns of abuse.

The nearly two billion dollars in military and economic aid designed to prop up the Mubarak regime has also been rationalized as needed to "support the Camp David Accords." This largesse of U.S. taxpayer dollars was originally designed as a one-time implementation of the 1978 peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Since most peace agreements have led to demilitarization, not increased arms shipments, the largely military nature of the aid package was controversial even then.

However, Democratic and Republican administrations, as well as both parties in Congress, have continued pouring this military and economic assistance into the corrupt and autocratic Egyptian government annually for each of the twenty-three subsequent years. Concerns by pro-democracy groups in Egypt and human rights groups in the United States that such aid was only making further repression possible have been rejected by Washington, with the Orwellian response that such aid "supports peace in the Middle East."

The growing popular anti-American sentiment in Egypt, the largest and most important country in the Arab world, stems not so much from U.S. support of Israel as it does from U.S. support for Mubarak's dictatorial rule. As with support for the Shah of Iran, the U.S. may find itself faced with a successor regime embittered by the longstanding U.S. support of the ousted dictator.

(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is Middle East/North Africa editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project. He serves as an associate professor and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco.)

II. Outside the U.S.

(FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.," which aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. For this issue, we asked Carlos Reyna to provide a Peruvian perspective of the drug war's impact. Excerpted below, his entire essay is posted at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0105peru.html.)

HARD-LEARNED LESSONS: PLAN COLOMBIA AND DEMOCRACY IN PERU
By Carlos Reyna Izaguirre

What is the main risk of the so-called Plan Colombia for Peru? The principal danger is that it will become a beachhead for a renewed militarization of the public affairs that should be handled by civil authorities and institutions--specifically, the campaign against drug trafficking. This new outbreak of the militarization of the public order could, in turn, interfere with and complicate the democratization currently underway in Peru.

Why is this possible? Remilitarization could occur if the interdiction efforts to be carried out through Plan Colombia are successful, because this would once again displace drug cultivation and trafficking toward Peruvian territory. According to specialists, the Peruvian jungle would be a better alternative than either Bolivia or Ecuador--because of both the quality of Peruvian coca as well as the country's geographic, social, and institutional characteristics.

The areas potentially or already used for coca cultivation are vast and difficult for the police to monitor. Unemployment and recession have grown worse in the last three years, and many impoverished peasants or unemployed may swell the ranks of the coca-growing peasants. Some cells of Sendero Luminoso remain active in the coca-growing areas. All this could trigger increased drug trafficking, while providing an argument for the military to take charge of operations requiring force.

The problem is that Peru's armed forces have not yet sufficiently strengthened the morale of their officers and troops so as guarantee that they will not once again become corrupted by contact with drug traffickers.

The Peruvian military has just embarked on a process of institutional reform, while an interesting debate is beginning on their role in a democracy. The idea that they must not assume duties beyond those strictly related to national defense has been gaining adherents of late, and this encourages the country's democratization.

Unfortunately, the spirit of Plan Colombia and of U.S. government initiatives regarding drug trafficking increases pressure for a greater involvement of the armed forces in antidrug efforts. Hence, just as in the early 1990s, the eagerness to produce short-term results as well as the emphasis on military solutions could once again translate into an intensification of drug trafficking in Peru and a resumption of extrainstitutional roles by the armed forces. And this would stymie the building of democracy and, ultimately, interfere with efforts to stamp out drug trafficking. How difficult it is to learn from the mistakes of the past.

(Carlos Reyna Izaguirre <creyna@desco.org.pe> is a senior analyst at Area de Investigación DESCO in Peru.)

Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank--one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail.

We Count on Your Support. Thank you.

Subscribe to The Progressive Response!

To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:

To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.org

Simply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above.

The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.

Please consider taking our online users' survey by going to: http://www.fpif.org/form_survey.html.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to irc@irc-online.org. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.

IRC
Tom Barry
Editor, Progressive Response
Codirector, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: tom@irc-online.org

IPS
Martha Honey
Codirector, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: ipsps@igc.org

This page was last modified on Wednesday, November 14, 2001 12:59 PM
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.