The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)—a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, FPIF is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/.

Tom Barry, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) www.irc-online.org and codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus. He can be contacted at <tom@irc-online.org>.

We Count on Your Support!

Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

CLIMATE CHANGE AFTER MARRAKESH: SHOULD ENVIRONMENTALISTS STILL SUPPORT THE KYOTO PROTOCOL?
By Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou

YEMEN, THE UNITED STATES, AND AL-QAIDA
By Stephen Zunes

LIVING ON THE BRINK, AGAIN
By Jonathan Schell

II. Outside the U.S.

THE ARROGANCE OF OCCUPATION
By Lev Grinberg

KARZAI: FROM LIGHTWEIGHT TO HEAVYWEIGHT
By Ahmed Rashid

III. Letters and Comments

FREE OIL FROM CORPORATE CHAINS

YIKES: RIGHT WING AGENDA

U.S. MULTILATERALISM

I. Updates and Out-takes

CLIMATE CHANGE AFTER MARRAKESH: SHOULD ENVIRONMENTALISTS STILL SUPPORT THE KYOTO PROTOCOL?
By Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou

(Editor's Note: While the U.S. bombing campaign proceeded in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and others continued to undermine the efforts to address global climate change through the Kyoto Protocol. As Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou argue in a new FPIF discussion paper--excerpted below and available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/marrakesh.html--the protocol remains weakened, but not fatally flawed, and it opens new opportunities and challenges for climate and economic justice activists. In particular, climate change will become a central axis for understanding and addressing the North-South divide, making climate justice a necessary element of any sustainable development and economic justice agenda.)

In a previous article for FPIF, written after COP6bis in Bonn, (see Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Bonn and Genoa: A Tale of Two Cities and Two Movements (August 2001) http://www.fpif.org/papers/kyoto.html) we argued that despite all the weakening that the Kyoto Protocol had suffered, the Bonn Compromise had made it ratifiable, and had to be counted as a major victory. We argued that with Kyoto's ratification carbon would actually be priced, that new principles for the protection of the global commons would be established, and that the structures necessary to eventually strengthen the climate regime would be put into place. And we added a few elements of hope: that as the reality of climate change becomes more sensible and the climate protection coalition stronger, it would become possible to step past Kyoto to the global, equity-based treaty that might actually work.

At COP7 in Marrakesh, the Kyoto Protocol was weakened even further--it is, now, the Marrakesh Dilution of the Bonn Compromise to the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, and despite the often-dispiriting nature of Kyoto's loopholes, we believe that the essential situation remains unchanged. Particularly in today's grim international context, the ratification of even this weakened first-generation climate treaty must be counted as a major victory for democratic, multilateral environmental governance. And this remains true despite 9-11, despite the arrival of the U.S.-led "anti-terror coalition," and despite the newly uncertain fate of the Bonn coalition.

If the deal is so bad, why do we support it? And it is bad, there's no doubt about this. Not only is the now almost final Kyoto Protocol weak (a matter that can always be explained away by arguing that it's a first step), but it establishes precedents (banking of credits, credits for BAU forestry) that bode ill for future negotiations, particularly as they create loopholes that bias, and even corrupt, the all-important second commitment period negotiations. Further, the process has clearly established some general precedents--that the field belongs to the strong, and that countries can always weaken the treaty further by threatening to walk--which suggest that even in the second period we may not move substantially closer to an adequate climate regime.

Still, there's a bright side, and it may be a decisive one. First, a crucial battle has been won, if only by not being lost. Climate change has been deemed a serious problem, demanding coordinated international action. Furthermore, the principle of historical responsibility has been established, at least outside the U.S. and Australia. The North caused the climate problem, and the North must seriously address it before the developing world is obligated to come along; this is a settled matter.

Second, carbon will soon have a price. Clearly, the high-emitting countries have expended huge efforts to ensure that the price remains low, at least in the coming period, but, still, they're swimming against the tide. And the fact that carbon will have a price will mark a major change in the way we think about energy production and consumption, and make a real impact on how consumers, corporations, governments, and multilateral institutions address energy services.

Third, the EU/G77 climate protection coalition, together with the environmental NGOs, has begun to take the center stage in global environmental negotiations. It's clearly still a weak coalition, as was proven by its inability to prevent the further weakening of the climate treaty in Marrakesh, but it was nevertheless strong enough to prevent the U.S.'s rejection from completely torpedoing the negotiations. This pro-environment, sustainable development coalition stands in uneasy tension with coalitions operating in other spheres of international politics; but this, too, is a sign of change. The environment will remain as an issue of increasing global salience even when the current war has faded from view, and the climate talks will probably remain the dominant venue for concretely addressing sustainable development.

This last point is critical, for in the next round of talks--addressing the second commitment period--the issue of North/South equity will be moving rapidly to the center of the debate. Battle lines are already being drawn. The U.S. is clearly maneuvering to make the acceptance of emissions restrictions by large developing countries a condition of its own participation, and the environmental NGOs, the South, and the Europeans are all, each in their own way, preparing stands. Questions abound. Will the Southern elites allow themselves to be bought off with "development" as usual? Will Europe really stand with the South in rejecting the continued appropriation of the global commons by the North? Will the larger "equity agenda" ever make it into the mainstream? No one believes that emissions growth in the South can remain unrestricted indefinitely. But does a person born in the South have the same right to the atmosphere as a person born in the North? If the answer is yes, as we believe it must be, the North has a real obligation to help finance true "clean development" in the south--not in the token fashion of the CDM, but on the scale of the tens of billions of dollars annually that would ultimately be associated with tradable permits allocated on a per capita basis.

This is the challenge facing the climate protection coalition--Europe, the developing countries, and the NGOs-in the coming years. Sure, sinks must be watched, and all the myriads of rules and mechanisms, but we cannot allow ourselves to bog down in the details of implementing Kyoto. We have to build the understanding at all levels--among the public as well as the policy elites--that (as we've been saying all along) Kyoto is just a first step, and that the climate talks are of necessity a forum for fundamentally addressing the North/South divide. If we cannot reach solidarity when the global climate is at stake, what hope can we have for the future?

(Paul Baer and Tom Athanasiou are cofounders of EcoEquity, which anticipates a phased transition to a second-generation climate treaty based on (tradable) per-capita carbon emission rights. To subscribe to EcoEquity's Climate Equity Observer, see www.ecoequity.org, or write <ceo@ecoequity.org>.)

YEMEN, THE UNITED STATES, AND AL-QAIDA
By Stephen Zunes

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary, posted in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0112yemen.html.)

There has been increasing attention on Yemen as the possible next major focus in the U.S. campaign against terrorism. Yemeni government forces have begun a crackdown against suspected Al-Qaida members and supporters, and a number of armed clashes have ensued. This comes just weeks after the November 26th meeting in Washington between President George W. Bush and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in which the Yemeni leader promised cooperation in the struggle against terrorism and President Bush promised additional security assistance to support that effort.

When Yemen, serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, voted against the U.S.-led effort to authorize the use of force against Iraq to drive the country' military from Kuwait, a U.S. representative was overheard declaring to the Yemeni ambassador that it was "the most expensive vote you have ever cast." The United States immediately withdrew $70 million in foreign aid to Yemen while dramatically increasing aid to neighboring dictatorships that supported the war effort.

Ideological and regional clan-based rivalries led to a civil war in 1994, with the south seceding. Ironically, despite being led by some former communists, the Saudis actually supported the secessionists as an effort to destroy what they saw as a dangerous democratic experiment on their southern border. However, northern forces succeeded in forcefully reuniting the country within months.

Banditry and lawlessness continues to be widespread in rural areas. There has been a series of kidnappings of Westerners in recent years, though these have been more for ransom than for political reasons and--with one tragic exception--all have been released unharmed.

Also in recent years, the United States has raised concerns about major operations by the Al-Qaida network within Yemen's porous borders. Many Yemenis participated in the U.S.-supported anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan during the 1980s, becoming radicalized by the experience and developing links with Osama bin Laden, a Saudi whose father comes from a Yemeni family. In October 2000, the U.S. Navy ship Cole was attacked by Al-Qaida terrorists while in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing seventeen American sailors. Various clan and tribal loyalties to Bin Laden's family have led to some support within Yemen for the exiled Al-Qaida leader in the face of U.S. attacks this fall, even among those who do not necessarily support his reactionary interpretation of Islam or his terrorist tactics.

A moderate Islamist Party serves as a junior member of Yemen's coalition government. Yemen serves as an example of how Islamist movements will tend toward moderation when allowed to organize openly, in contrast to countries where repression can lead to violence and radicalization. The presence of a large number of Al-Qaida members and sympathizers within the country is a reflection not of government support or complicity, but the general lawlessness of this impoverished society, where clan and tribe often carry more authority than the state. Most Al-Qaida activists in Yemen are believed to be foreigners.

With the U.S. threatening direct military intervention in Yemen to root out Al-Qaida, the Yemeni government's decision to crack down may be less a matter of hoping for something from Washington in return for its cooperation, than a fear of what may happen if it does not. The Yemeni government is in a difficult bind, however. If it is unsuccessful in breaking up the terrorist cells, the likely U.S. military intervention would probably result in armed resistance and a bloody counterinsurgency campaign by foreign forces. If the government casts too wide a net, however, it risks tribal rebellion and other civil unrest for what will be seen as unjustifiable repression at the behest of a Western power and a threat to the country's shaky experiment with political pluralism. Either way, it would only increase support for extremist elements, which both the U.S. and Yemeni governments want to see destroyed.

(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as a senior policy analyst and Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus, online at www.fpif.org.)

LIVING ON THE BRINK, AGAIN
By Jonathan Schell

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a speech given by Jonathan Schell at an FPIF conference at NYU on Weapons of Mass Destruction after 9-11, and posted online in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/presentations/wmd01/schell.html.)

If you want to understand the magical, the glamorous, the unshakable appeal that nuclear weapons have for the leaders of states and others, just start asking yourself why it is that in ten years time, we wish to live under the threat of instant annihilation from that rotting old arsenal in Russia. They're not willing to give up our arsenal in order to rid ourselves of that threat. Now if you can explain that back, I think you would be getting very close to the reason why these weapons have such a grip on the imagination of those who have them.

I would be very much remiss if I didn't share with you the direction that I think is the right one and the one in which we should go:

First, we can not look at the different aspects of the issue of weapons of mass destruction in isolation from one another any longer. They have to been seen as whole.

Second, the U.S-Russian decisions about their arsenals are going to set the pace for the whole show. If we decide that we have to have 2,000 nuclear weapons in the year 2010, we are guaranteed that other poorer nations will say, as India has already said, that they don't want to live with nuclear apartheid. The two-tier world, to use a phrase beloved by the strategist, is an unstable world. It's got to go one way or the other. Either it's going to go to zero nuclear weapons, or it's going to go to a much fuller proliferation.

Third, proliferation in our day does not mean proliferation to only countries. This applies to all three types of weapons of mass destruction. It means proliferation to groups that are not countries, such as al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden, and the others. Because in a world of proliferating weapons of mass destruction and blurring brinks that I've been speaking about, the globe is awash in this technology. And we're not going to be able to get it under control.

In conclusion, control in this case begins at home. I do not think we can be serious about nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism, if we're not serious about nonproliferation. And I don't think we can get serious about nonproliferation until we get serious about the existing possession of these arsenals, which means the possession of them by the eight nuclear powers, led by the United States and Russia. So, from my point of view, there is no solution to this fresh wave of rising danger without a commitment, starting with the United States, to proceed to a world without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. It's a tall order, I know, but I think it's the clear need of our time.

(Jonathan Schell is currently The Nation's peace and disarmament correspondent, as well as the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute.)

II. Outside the U.S.

(Editor's Note: FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.," which aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html.)

THE ARROGANCE OF OCCUPATION
By Lev Grinberg

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from an Outside the U.S. commentary, posted in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/0112arrogance.html.)

Present Israeli action against Arafat was preceded by the construction of an arrogant and paternalist discourse on the "character of Arafat." We, Israelis, are at liberty to dismiss one leader and appoint another in his place. This arrogance, in relation to Arafat, highlights the underlying dimension of the failed Oslo peace process and the Camp David Summit. The discourse labeling Arafat as the essence of the Palestinian problem did not achieve predominance by virtue of the campaign waged by the settlers' leaders in the occupied territories and the extreme right. Rather, it is the discourse of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, developed after the Camp David Summit aiming to hide their resounding failure. The over-simplified reduction of the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the character of Arafat, and hence the self-evident, magic-wand solution of "removing the obstacle," was constructed by the leaders of the "Left," following their need to explain away the fiasco of their term of office.

The arrogant discourse is reflected in the urge to enthrone in Arafat's place an alternative, more "obliging" leader, and in the paternalistic argument that "we know what is better for the Palestinians." In effect, each wing of Israel's political spectrum opts for a leader who would best serve its respective purposes. The "moderates" in the Government prefer a moderate, dressed in a business suit who would consent to deal in a rational, Western manner, and the "extremists" fancy a Hamas type who could legitimize an open and sanguinous war against "the Palestinian evil." The two camps share the same discourse that the burden for resolving the crisis is on Arafat's shoulders, while simultaneously avoiding Israel's own responsibility. In fact the government is fighting Arafat and his forces, preventing him and the Palestinian authorities from succeeding in any possible effective struggle against extremist Islam, because Palestinian extremism and terror facilitates hiding the core problem of occupation.

Arrogance and paternalism is the underlying effect of occupation, which is not peculiar to the Israeli situation. European settlers who occupied regions inhabited by non-Europeans have developed similar discourses. The local inhabitants were classified as inferior and primitive, and deserving no individual rights, certainly no collective right to their homeland. Such has been the state of affairs in Israel/Palestine since the onset of the colonization, and the Oslo peace accords introduced no fundamental change. The land belongs to us, Israelis, we are its masters, and the Palestinians must accept whatever we are benevolent enough to offer them. The indignation of the "Left" toward the Palestinians following Camp David is over their ingratitude and their refusal to accept Barak's "generous" offer. The support of the U.S. for the Israeli attitude caused despair among the Palestinians.

The Oslo accords were shaped according to the hegemonic arrogance of occupation. Having been initially "granted" Jericho and Gaza, Arafat was placed "on probation." If he passed the test, he would be awarded additional territory; if not, the process would be halted, as Rabin proclaimed (Netanyahu was more direct, as in the slogan he coined: "If they provide results, they'll get more, if they don't, they won't!"). Resumption of the Oslo process depended upon Arafat's "good conduct," his grades to be determined by Israel. Arafat was expected to deliver what the Israeli army had failed to procure: security for the Israelis. However, he wasn't entitled to protect the security or independence of his people. Hence Arafat's authority was not derived from the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights, rather from Israel's consent to his presence; hence it is also feasible to expel him.

(Lev Grinberg <lev@bgumail.bgu.ac.il> is a political sociologist, and the Director of the Humphrey Institute for Social Research at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.)

KARZAI: FROM LIGHTWEIGHT TO HEAVYWEIGHT
By Ahmed Rashid

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Outside the U.S. commentary, posted in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/0112karzai.html.)

Hamid Karzai has traveled a long distance politically over a relatively short period of time to emerge as the leader of Afghanistan's provisional council. In the 1980s, Afghan warlords and Western diplomats considered Karzai a lightweight--an intellectual who was a voracious reader and a snazzy dresser. Now, he is being counted upon to lead the effort that breaks Afghanistan's two-decade-long cycle of violence.

While he attempts to unite the 30-man cabinet and begin the difficult task of setting up an effective administration, Karzai will be challenged to accommodate several powerful warlords, including the Persian speaking leader Ismail Khan in Herat, the Hazara warlord Karim Khalili, and the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum in the north.

Karzai will be helped by the three modernizers in the Northern Alliance leadership--Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, General Mohammed Fahim, and Younis Qanooni. All three respect Karzai and, in fact, behind the scenes quietly told the UN before the Bonn talks began that they would be happy to work with Karzai if he were nominated as the future head of the interim government.

"Karzai is a man who shares our vision of building a modern, stable Afghanistan and creating a multi-ethnic government," Dr. Abdullah told me in an all-night conversation at his home in Kabul, just before the Bonn negotiations began. "We trust Karzai, he is a patriot who will put Afghanistan first rather than his clan, his tribe, or his ethnic group," Abdullah added.

Abdullah's views, which were echoed by Qanooni, were stunning because it was evident that the three were ready to dump their own leader Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was the recognized President of Afghanistan. The troika's support for Karzai is indicative of tension within the Northern Alliance, with Rabbani fighting to beat back challenges to his authority mounted by younger members of the leadership. Although Abdullah, Gen. Fahim, and Qanooni can secure the support of their own Tajiks, it remains to be seen whether they can sway other ethnic groups to win support for Karzai's administration.

Until just a few years ago, Karzai, who speaks six languages--Pushtu, Dari, Urdu, English, French, and Hindi--had not seen military action. During the resistance to the Soviet invasion of 1979-89, he served as a mujaheddin adviser and diplomat. In that capacity, Karzai was a frequent visitor of embassies in Islamabad. He also ran a small hotel in Peshawar. He maintained a relatively low profile following the departure of Soviet forces. Like many Afghans, however, he lamented the inability of the mujaheddin warlords to set aside their differences and rebuild Afghanistan in the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet-supported regime of Najibullah.

"Like so many mujaheddin, I believed in the Taliban when they first appeared on the scene in 1994 and they promised to end the warlordism, establish law and order, and then call a Loya Jirga to decide upon who should rule Afghanistan, " Karzai told me in an interview in late September. "I gave the Taliban $50,000 U.S. to help run their movement and then handed over to them a large cache of weapons I had hidden away. I met Mullah Omar several times and he offered to appoint me as their envoy to the UN," Karzai said wistfully. "The tragedy was that very soon the Taliban were taken over by Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI) and they became a proxy for a foreign power. Then they allowed Arabs and other foreigners to set up terrorist training camps on Afghan soil and I began to organize against them," he said. "By 1997 it was clear to most Afghans that the Taliban were unacceptable because Osama bin Laden was playing a leadership role in the movement. I warned the Americans many times, but who was listening--nobody," he added.

From his home in Quetta, Karzai began to organize anti-Taliban opposition in 1998. He found support among some Pashtun tribal chiefs, who were angry with the Taliban for their close ties with Arab radicals. The Taliban reacted to Hamid Karzai's move swiftly. They murdered Karzai's father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, in 1999--an act that appalled Karzai's Popalzai tribe. The elder Karzai had been chief of the Popalzai tribe, a former government minister, and immensely respected for his wisdom amongst the southern Pashtun tribes.

(Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and author of the book Taliban: Militant Islam and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. (Yale University Press, 2000). This originally appeared on Eurasianet (http://www.eurasianet.org/) on December 10, 2001.)

III. Letters and Comments

FREE OIL FROM CORPORATE CHAINS

Looking at the current volatile state of global affairs makes it abundantly clear how much energy and its consumption dictate nearly every decision, and how every decision is interrelated. It takes no genius to use hindsight, but let us suppose that the U.S. had streamlined renewable energy systems when they were first available, and the quasi-governmental corporate energy interests did not inhibit funding for research and development of alternatives to fossil fuels. Would we have gone into Saudi Arabia and Iraq? Would Iraq have gone into Kuwait? And would we be in Afghanistan worrying about retribution, a drawn-out war, and the further threats of domestic terrorism--especially on our prized nuclear industry? It's time we started to see the effects of being dependent on oil and other fossil fuels, as well as nuclear energy. It's time that America realized the need to rid ourselves of this dependence and demand a change in energy consumption rates and methods. The technology has been there for years, but why would a profit-seeking business want to change a system that their shares of energy are based on. Oil interests will not give in to renewable energy until they absolutely have to. Until the consumer force demands from the government and the market renewables, Big Oil will sit back and ride the finite cash flow from oil well to assembly line. If we really want a free market, free it of its chains to corporate oil, or else our foreign policy will continue to be manipulated completely by business.

- Colin Hubbell <colinhubbell@hotmail.com>

YIKES: RIGHT WING AGENDA

I just browsed over www.newamericancentury.org. [See Jim Lobe, "Hawks Take Aim at Iraq," at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111hawk.html ] Yikes! I wouldn't do this right before bedtime. I believe it is important that the country be made aware of these beliefs/goals stated by the undersigners of this statement (statement of principals). Someone should take ads in the Times etc. with the text in full. Maybe with the title "does this country really know who is steering the ship" or "this is what the majority of Americans/Supreme Court voted for." The names on this statement sure look like a formidable puppet show company. This is a very strong statement/websight that deserves a very strong Newtonian reaction (before they cause a plutonium reaction).

- Ted Ackley <ackted@hotmail.com>

U.S. MULTILATERALISM

Ian Williams' commentary ["The UN and the U.S. in Afghanistan," at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111afghanun.html] is balanced and more optimistic than I expected about whether this latest "tasting" by the U.S. of a multilateralist stew will really have a permanent effect--whether new behaviors will emerge, beyond the so-called "war" on terrorism. I hope he is right. But I wonder why he is as optimistic as he is. Is it because the world has changed, U.S. policy has changed, Powell has emerged from his cocoon, all of the above, something else?

- James Blight <james_blight@brown.edu>

Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank—one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail.

We Count on Your Support. Thank you.

Subscribe to The Progressive Response!

To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:

To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.org

Simply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above.

The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to irc@irc-online.org. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.

IRC
Tom Barry
Editor, Progressive Response
Codirector, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: tom@irc-online.org

IPS
Martha Honey
Codirector, Foreign Policy In Focus
Email: ipsps@igc.org

This page was last modified on Friday, December 21, 2001 4:09 PM
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.