The Progressive Response

Volume 6, Number 9
March 28, 2002

The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)—a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, FPIF is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/.

Tom Barry, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) www.irc-online.org and codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus. He can be contacted at <tom@irc-online.org>.

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Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)

I. Updates and Out-takes

THABO MBEKI'S NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: BREAKING OR SHINING THE CHAINS OF GLOBAL APARTHEID?
By Patrick Bond

(Editor's Note: Launched in October 2001, the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD online at www.nepad.org) aims to establish a "new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialized countries and multilateral organizations" as a means of putting Africa on a high-growth path. As a project of the African Union, it tries to articulate a regional development strategy. The NEPAD outlines a reciprocal set of commitments between Africa states, donor governments, and the private sector as a framework for managing Africa's integration into the world economy.
Analyst Patrick Bond critically evaluates the NEPAD's promise to promote growth and democracy in Africa, examining both the strategies for integration as well as its technocratic approach to democratic governance. He then outlines an alternative agenda to the NEPAD that is grounded in the struggles of African networks of social justice movements. The paper is available in its entirety at http://www.fpif.org/papers/nepad/index.html
This is the latest contribution to our ongoing efforts to promote South-North Dialog. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the FPIF staff or the boards of either sponsoring organization. Comments are welcome. Please send to John Gershman <john@irc-online.org>.)

This essay considers Thabo Mbeki's analysis of globalization, his strategy and demands for global-scale and continental socioeconomic progress, and his preferred alliances. These topics arise because of his stated intention, in the October 2001 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to establish a "new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialized countries and multilateral organizations"--one that is sufficiently "radical" to lift African GDP growth to 7% per annum.2 That new framework has been emerging since mid-2000, when Mbeki began high-profile international discussions with G-8 leaders about African political economics. NEPAD will be highlighted and endorsed at the G-8 meeting in Alberta, Canada, in June 2002, at the July launch of the African Union in Pretoria, and at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development--with a proposed global "New Deal" modeled on NEPAD--in late August. At such events, protesters who support the cause of global environmental, social, and economic justice will be told, in effect, "Don't worry, you can go home, because Thabo Mbeki is taking care of globalization's shortcomings."

In these settings, and as read through excerpts from speeches (considered below) and the NEPAD document, Mbeki's approach is consistent with what has been termed compradorism. Mbeki and his main allies have already succumbed to the class (not necessarily personalistic) limitations of post-Independence African nationalism, namely acting in close collaboration with hostile transnational corporate and multilateral forces whose interests stand directly opposed to Mbeki's South African and African constituencies.

The project, therefore, is to reform interstate relations and the embryonic world-state system. As NEPAD explains,

While globalization has increased the cost of Africa's ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction... The case for the role of national authorities and private institutions in guiding the globalization agenda along a sustainable path and, therefore, one in which its benefits are more equally spread, remains strong... Africa, impoverished by slavery, corruption and economic mismanagement is taking off in a difficult situation. However, if her enormous natural and human resources are properly harnessed and utilized, it could lead to equitable and sustainable growth of the continent as well as enhance its rapid integration into the world economy.

But to the contrary, the evidence thus far is that "equitable and sustainable growth" and Africa's "rapid integration into the world economy" are mutually exclusive. Although Africa's share of world trade declined during the 1980s-90s, the volume of exports increased, while the value of sub-Saharan exports was cut in half relative to the value of imports from the North.5 Such marginalization occurred not because of lack of integration but because of too much of the wrong sort. For while integrating more rapidly into the world economy via "export-led growth," as demanded by Washington, Africa's ability to grow--either equitably and sustainably, or even inequitably--actually declined in comparison to the period prior to structural adjustment.

Thus, I argue below, the reform strategy will fail, although not because of Pretoria's lack of positionality and international credibility to carry out NEPAD and win endorsements from global elites. After all, since 1994, extremely talented politicians and officials from Pretoria have presided over the board of governors of the IMF and World Bank, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, the Southern African Development Community, the World Commission on Dams, and a host of other important international and continental bodies.

Instead, as argued in five subsequent sections, the failure is already emanating from the very project of global reformism itself, namely, Mbeki's underlying philosophy and incorrect analysis, ineffectual practical strategies, uncreative and inappropriate demands, and counterproductive alliances. Rather than leading the world, Mbeki and his Pretoria colleagues will more likely tread a well-known, dusty path: a post-colonial, neoliberal cul-de-sac of predictable direction and duration. Moreover, notwithstanding mixed rhetorical signals, Mbeki and NEPAD for all effective purposes exclude (indeed, most often reject) alliances with international social, labor, and environmental movements who, in their struggles for socio-environmental and economic justice, are the main agents of progressive global change.

(Patrick Bond <pbond@wn.apc.org> teaches at the University of the Witwatersrand (where he co-directs the Municipal Services Project, online at www.queensu.ca/msp), writes for ZNet Commentaries (www.zmag.org), and is an associate of the Alternative Information and Development Centre (www.aidc.org.za) in Cape Town/Johannesburg and the Center for Economic Justice in Washington/Albuquerque (www.worldbankboycott.org). His recent books include Against Global Apartheid (University of Cape Town Press, 2001); Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal (Africa World Press, 2000), and Elite Transition (Pluto Press and University of Natal Press). Further documentation of problems caused by globalization and neoliberalism are available in his forthcoming Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest (University of Natal Press and Africa World Press, 2002). In relation to Mbeki's uneven relationship with South Africa's northern neighbor, see Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe's Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice (University of Natal Press, Merlin Press, and Africa World Press, 2002).)

IS INDIA GOING THE WAY OF 1930s GERMANY?
By Arun R. Swamy

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new commentary, posted in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0203indhind.html.)

The recent rounds of violence between religious groups in India do more than reveal the fragility of India's secular state. They highlight the inability of Indian democracy to combat what is essentially a fascist onslaught.

At first glance what happened in India appears to be another, if extreme case of religious passion gone awry. A train carrying Hindu activists to the disputed religious site of Ayodhya was firebombed by a mob, killing 58 of the activists. Several days of revenge attacks by Hindus against Muslims followed in the state of Gujarat, killing over 700.

However, India's Hindu Nationalists have always resembled 1930s European fascists more than they do contemporary "fundamentalists." Members of the core organization of Hindu nationalism, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in the 1920s, are given paramilitary instruction, not religious, and wear khaki uniforms reminiscent of Mussolini's brownshirts. While the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), founded in the 1960s, is mainly concerned with religion, it still does not prescribe how Hindus should worship or behave--an impossible task given the diversity of Hindu religious practice.

Instead, like all Hindu nationalists, it is bent on characterizing Muslims as alien and hostile while seeking to unify Hindus around a romantic nationalism in which military prowess plays a central role. Hindu nationalists' emphasis on international prestige has won it the support of the westernized middle class, typically the target of Islamic fundamentalism. Its focus on demonizing Muslims rather than promoting Hinduism is illustrated even by the dispute over Ayodhya, where extremist Hindu groups destroyed a 16th century Muslim mosque in 1992, sparking nationwide sectarian riots in which more than 2,000 people died.

It is this fascist ideology, and the fact that a party espousing it is at the head of the national government that makes the recent anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat so much more disturbing than earlier rounds of riots. As horrific as the recent violence was, more died in 1992. But the political establishment's response this time has been ambivalent and feeble. The paralysis in the political system is emboldening the Hindu extremist organizations responsible for the Gujarat "riots" to press their agenda more forcefully. There are times when India seems to resemble Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s.

The difficulty India's mainstream parties have had in maintaining a united opposition to the BJP's agenda, and the change in the international attitude toward civil liberties following September 11, make it difficult to feel confident that Hindu fascism will be defeated. For this to happen, both centrist parties in the ruling coalition, and India's friends abroad will need to recognize that what happened in Gujarat was not just another instance of religious communities in conflict. Rather, as Indian opposition leaders have charged, it was part of a broader tendency toward eliminating civil liberties and scapegoating cultural minorities in an aggressive effort to impose a unified sense of nationhood on one of the world's most culturally diverse societies.

(Arun.R. Swamy <swamya@EastWestCenter.org> is a fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.)

II. Outside The U.S.

(Editor's Note: FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.," which aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html.)

SECURITY CONCERNS MOUNT IN AFGHANISTAN AS COUNTRY ENTERS CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION PHASE
By Ahmed Rashid

(Editor's Note: The following is excerpted from a new Outside the U.S. Global Affairs Commentary, available in its entirety at http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0203afghan.html)

When British soldiers patrolling the streets of Kabul stop their armored vehicles for a moment, there is an instant traffic jam. Hordes of well-wishers--including blue burqa clad women and laughing children--crowd around them. The British are leading a 4,800-strong force in Kabul, drawn from 19 nations, and known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. It is the most visible sign of the international community's commitment to help stabilize war-torn Afghanistan.

ISAF has helped bring order to Afghanistan's capital. However, as Afghanistan enters the first of several critical stages in its reconstruction, there is mounting concern among the Afghan interim government and international peacekeepers that the West is failing to address critical issues upon which the success of the political process and future stability depend. These include the expansion of ISAF troops to other Afghan cities, the necessary funding for a new national Afghan army and police force and other security-related matters. "The issue of security is the highest priority facing the international community and the Afghan interim government," says Major General Sir John McColl, head of ISAF.

Many observers say improved security in Afghanistan would greatly raise the chances for the successful Loya Jirga (LJ), or grand tribal council. The first genuine LJ since 1964 is scheduled to convene in June. The LJ will choose a new head of state and transitional government for two years and establish the mechanisms to write a new constitution and hold elections in 2004--after 24 years of war.

In late March, former king Mohammad Zahir Shah is expected to receive a mammoth public welcome when he returns to Afghanistan after nearly 30 years in exile. His arrival will kick off intense politicking, as tribes and ethnic groups prepare to select their representatives for the LJ.

At present, the reconstruction process remains fragile, as the interim government struggles to contend with myriad security threats. Warlordism remains rampant in several parts of the country, and in the north there have been intra-warlord skirmishes and organized attacks against Pashtun. The vacuum created by the lack of an international presence outside Kabul is encouraging Iran and Russia to provide support different warlord armies.

The interim government's ability to address security issues is hampered by severe ethnic strains within the cabinet. Inter-ethnic tension is compounded by the fact that Hamid Karzai has been unable to build a constituency amongst his fellow Pashtuns, where there is political anarchy and rampant warlordism--much of it being fueled by Americans who fund warlords to hunt down al Qaeda fighters, and decline to pressure them to be loyal to the central government. The Pashtun warlords Hazarat Ali in Jalalabad and Gul Agha in Kandahar, who have each built up armies of over 12,000 men courtesy of U.S. largesse, are unwilling to work under Karzai.

Every group is trying to pre-position itself to exert the maximum influence in the LJ. Much of the jockeying could be reduced if the international community demonstrated a commitment to the expansion of ISAF outside Kabul. Observers say that only firm international action would place the necessary pressure on Fahim and the warlords to behave. The lack of security outside Kabul is placing additional burdens on ISAF. Royalists are demanding that ISAF protect Zahir Shah when he returns to Kabul and travels to Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif in April. And the LJ Commission is demanding ISAF protection both in and outside Kabul when it is holding large public meetings.

Despite rising ethnic tensions, no warlord or group is at present prepared to take on the central government, or to attack Kabul. Afghans are still optimistic that with Zahir Shah set to return, and 1.7 million children expected to go back to school under a UNICEF program on March 23, a sense of normalcy will return the country. Afghans also remain hopeful that the LJ will be held as scheduled, and that a new political relationship among the factions will emerge.

(Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and author of the books Taliban: Militant Islam and Fundamentalism in Central Asia and Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. This article originally appeared on Eurasianet <www.eurasianet.org> and is reprinted with permission.)

III. Letters and Comments

AFRO-PESSIMISTIC DISCOURSE

Re: "We are the Democrats:" The Crisis in Zimbabwe and the Death of the NEPAD
(http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0203nepad.html)
I have always said that part of the problem with this kind of Afro pessimistic discourse is its overly leader-centric approach. There are other political and social forces at work in Africa: women, the nascent, struggling civil society, for example, as opposed to the aid-dependent NGOs. A couple of men in suits guarded by Sandhurst, Westpoint, USSR, China, or St.Cyr-trained securocrats, when they are not cutting deals with transnationals surely do not reflect the true face of the Africa of permanent struggle on a multiplicity of fronts!

- Fatoumata Toure <lolwe2212@yahoo.com>

MILITARY BASES

Re: U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean
(http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n35milbase.html)
This article is really helpful for a research paper that I am currently involved in. Your information is very useful to me because I am attempting to point out the consequences of U.S. military involvement in Latin American Countries. I guess I like to stir up some problems, etc. Thanks for the info, it is really useful and clear.

- Omar Reyes (email withheld by request)

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Tom Barry
Editor, Progressive Response
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The Progressive Response

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

II. Outside The U.S.

III. Letters and Comments

I. Updates and Out-takes

II. Outside The U.S.

III. Letters and Comments

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