The Progressive Response

Volume 7, Number 4
February 17, 2003

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

We Count on Your Support!

Editor: John Gershman (IRC)

I. Updates and Out-takes

CHANGE OF MAIL SERVER FOR THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE

Due the growth of subscriptions to the Progressive Response, we have transferred the list to a new listserver, online at riseup.net. This should not have any affect on your subscription--the PR will look as it always has, and will continue to arrive from "Progressive Response, IRC" with the subject line unchanged as well. However, you will need to make note of new subscribe and unsubscribe directions for the list, which we have noted in the footer of this message. If by any chance you should experience a problem with delivery or formatting of the Progressive Response, however, please contact us at webweaver@irc-online.org.

PENTAGON PLANNING, NOT DIPLOMACY, SETS U.S. AGENDA ON IRAQ
By Michael T. Klare

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.presentdanger.org/commentary/2003/0302milplan.html.)

The Pentagon's schedule for war will likely mean that the UN inspection process in Iraq is nearing its conclusion. As planned, the United States appears to moving steadily toward an invasion of that country aimed at removing Saddam Hussein and installing a new, more pliant government. The Bush administration argues that the timing of this move is a response to the imminent exhaustion of the inspection process. In fact, it is the other way around: The inspections were allowed to move forward by Washington only so long as they did not interfere with the pace of U.S. military preparations. Now that U.S. forces are ready to strike, the inspections can be dispensed with entirely.

For months, the attention of much the world has been focused on the diplomatic contest at the United Nations over the wording of Security Council resolutions on Iraq and the scope of UN inspections process. This has led many observers to conclude that the pace and timing of the coming showdown with Iraq has largely been determined by the dynamics of diplomatic debate in New York. However, it is not diplomacy that has determined the timing of war but rather the outcome of disputes within the administration over the nature of the war plan to be followed.

All last fall, it appeared that U.S. diplomats led by Secretary of State Colin Powell were in agony over the slowness of deliberations at the UN Security Council. But while there is no doubt that Powell genuinely sought international backing for the attack, he was never quite as anxious about the pace of events as he appeared to be because he knew that the fighting could not begin until February 2003, at the earliest. It is only now, with the onset of battle but weeks ahead, that Powell is truly concerned about the tempo of diplomatic action, struggling now to obtain a second UN resolution authorizing the use of force before the troops commence their attack.

Clearly, it has been the pacing of U.S. war preparations and not the political environment at the United Nations that has shaped administration strategy over the past few months. Until now, the White House has been able to conceal this underlying reality because so many eyes were focused on developments at the UN headquarters in New York. Once the fighting begins, however, the outright cynicism and deceitfulness of the U.S. strategy will quickly become apparent, further turning world opinion against the United States.

(Michael T. Klare <mklare@hampshire.edu> is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Mass., and the author of Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books / Henry Holt). He is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) on military affairs. Information for this article was obtained from The New York Times for April 28, July 5, 10, and 29, and Sept. 21 and 23, 2002; The Washington Post for July 28 and 31, and Sept. 21, 2002; and the Los Angeles Times for Sept. 10, 2002.)

PENTAGON TRUMPS THE POOR IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN AID PROPOSALS
By Tamar Gabelnick

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0302budget.html.)

Reading the headlines about the new foreign aid budget--"Bush proposes huge increase in foreign aid" (AFP), "Bush Seeks Funds to Fight AIDS Globally" (AP)--one would think that the Bush administration had developed a new commitment to helping the world's poor and marginalized communities. But a closer look at the numbers shows quite a different story. Though the proposed foreign aid budget is $2.4 billion more than last year's request, one-third of the total is not going to build new roads or schools, but to supply foreign militaries with U.S. arms and training. Even the sections of this budget designated as non-military aid are heavily targeted to critical states in the war on terrorism, reflecting the dominance of national security priorities over the foreign aid budget.

The administration has requested $18.82 billion for the fiscal year (FY) 2004 foreign operations budget, compared to $16.46 billion requested in FY2003. (A note to those out there who still think that foreign aid makes up a large portion of the U.S. budget: this year's foreign aid figure represents less than 0.9% of the $2.2 trillion budget, or less than 0.2% of GDP.)

According to a White House Fact Sheet, one of the president's main goals with the FY2004 budget is "promoting compassion." But this assertion is not borne out by the figures. For example, the total request for basic education aid in developing states is $212 million, whereas the increase alone in foreign military financing (FMF)--or funds given to states to purchase U.S. weapons--is $307 million. The administration also scored big with its announcement of a new, "well-funded" effort to combat HIV/AIDS. But this program is to spend only $3 billion a year on average ($2 billion is budgeted for FY04). Compare that to a hefty $4.4 billion annual budget for FMF, plus about $1.5 billion in additional security assistance for counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and other programs. In other words, given a choice between providing free drugs for AIDS patients or books for developing young minds, and giving away weapons to militaries of often-repressive regimes, the administration has chosen the latter.

Before the American public starts applauding the administration's newfound commitment to international development, it should look closely at where the aid is going and for what purposes. An increase in foreign aid would certainly be welcome, but only if it's going to address the world's most pressing needs: improving health care, reducing poverty, and protecting the environment. The more the Pentagon's imprint is felt on the State Department's priorities, however, the more the funds for these goals are going to be crowded out of an already miniscule foreign aid budget. Without a serious commitment to tackling these problems, the U.S. government is never going to significantly reduce the risk of terrorism.

(Tamar Gabelnick <tamarg@fas.org> is director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists and writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

OSAMA BIN LADEN'S MESSAGE TO THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD: "I AM NOT THE ENEMY. AMERICA IS."
By R.S. Zaharna

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Global Affairs Commentary available in full at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0302binladen.html.)

Score another public diplomacy point for Osama bin Laden in his war with the United States to win the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world. At a time when the Bush administration seems determined to attack Iraq, the cradle of Arab civilization and home of the early Muslim Abbassid dynasty, bin Laden has come up with a message of hope and inspiration as well as tactical advice.

The Bush administration may make much of the latest bin Laden tape aired on Al-Jazeera. News reports further stated that the tape would bolster America's case that the Bush administration has been making, namely, that there are links between bin Laden and al Qaeda with Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein. After listening to the tape, in Arabic, there does not appear to be that connection. What the Americans perceive is not what the Arab world is likely to perceive.

Most significant about the bin Laden tape is its timing. Two points stand out. One is the imminent nature of the war against Iraq. People in the region are fearful and Arab leaders have been conspicuous by their silence. The only leaders speaking out are in Europe. Bin Laden spoke to the fears of the people with a message of hope and inspiration, "be patient" and rely on God and your faith. On the surface, such a message may seem ludicrous to a technology-driven society such as the United States. However, for people in the region, faith is seen as a very powerful weapon, especially when there is little else to that they can fight with. That bin Laden chose to speak to the people at this time, knowing their fears, underscored his image as a leader.

Bin Laden's timing was significant for another reason: today is the first day of a major Muslim holiday, the Eid al-Adha. The holiday is one of two major Muslim holidays, the first holiday occurs after the holy month of Ramadan and the second occurs approximately 40 days later. The first, Eid al-Fitir, is the "little feast," and the Eid al-Adha is the "big feast." During both occasions, sending greetings to families and friends tops the list of things to do. Greetings made on the "first day" of the three-day holiday carry more weight than those on the second or last day. Even though no one knows his whereabouts, bin Laden reinserted himself firmly within the fabric of Muslim society by airing his message on the first day of the Eid.

Rather than any specific group of evil-doers, bin Laden's audience appears to be the whole of the Arab and Muslim world. Speaking in a manner that resonates of commonality, he conveys a powerful underlying message of solidarity: "I [Osama bin Laden] am not the enemy. The United States is." That generalized message, made to a generalized audience and occurring within the context that it did does not bode well for the young American troops and the emotional terrain they soon may be entering. If America and its troops are hoping to be seen as the liberators of Iraq, bin Laden has just eclipsed the United States with another, more powerful message to the entire region.

(R.S. Zaharna <zaharna@american.edu> is a Middle East analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and an assistant professor of public communication at American University. Zaharna served as a media analyst for the Palestinian Delegation to the Washington peace talks (1991-93).)

ADDRESSING IRAQI REPRESSION AND THE NEED FOR A CHANGE OF REGIME
By Stephen Zunes

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0301iraq.html.)

As the administration's rationales for invading Iraq--such as Baghdad's alleged ties to al Qaeda and claims of an imminent nuclear threat--have crumbled under closer scrutiny, the administration and its allies in Congress and the media are increasingly emphasizing a point that cannot be disputed: the repressive nature of the Iraqi regime.

While the threat from Iraq has been greatly exaggerated, the nature of the Iraqi regime has not. President Ronald Reagan's claim that Sandinista Nicaragua was a "totalitarian dungeon" was hyperbole in the extreme, but it is not an inaccurate description of Baathist Iraq.

Iraq under Saddam Hussein is arguably the closest approximation in the world today of a genuine fascist state. The level of repression, militarization, cult of personality, forced mass political mobilizations, and ethnic chauvinism are all hallmarks of a fascist system.

The level of brutality of the Iraqi regime has declined markedly since the 1980s, not due to any lessened ruthlessness of the regime, but because the ability of the government to oppress opponents--particularly those in Kurdish regions--has been significantly reduced. In addition to impact of war damage, sanctions, and inspections on lessening the machinery of repression, the internationally backed autonomy for the Kurdish regions has also limited Saddam's bloody reach. It is noteworthy, however, that at the height of Iraq's repression during the 1980s, the United States not only refused to call for Saddam Hussein's overthrow but provided the regime with military and economic assistance that supported the repression. Furthermore, when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons to massacre thousands of Kurdish civilians in Halabja and elsewhere during this period, the U.S. government tried to cover it up by falsely claiming that it was the Iranians--then the preferred enemy--who were responsible. Therefore, Bush administration claims that a U.S. invasion of Iraq is necessary because Saddam Hussein "gassed his own people" cannot be taken seriously.

Still, Saddam Hussein's regime--like all such repressive regimes--must not remain in power. The growth of democratic rule that has swept Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia and Africa over the past two decades must come to include Iraq as well.

How has the downfall of scores of such autocratic regimes in the past twenty years been accomplished? In no case was it done through foreign invasion. In only a handful of cases was it done through internal armed revolution. In the vast major of cases, dictatorships were toppled through massive nonviolent action, "people power" movements that faced down the tanks and guns and swept these regimes aside.

Why hasn't this been successful in the case of Iraq? Most of these successful nonviolent pro-democracy movements have been centered in the urban middle class. In Iraq, however, thanks to the devastation to the country's civilian infrastructure during the U.S. bombing campaign twelve years ago and the resulting sanctions, the once-burgeoning middle class has been reduced to penury or forced to emigrate. It has been replaced by a new class of black marketeers who have a stake in preserving the status quo. Furthermore, with sanctions forcing the Iraqi people to become dependent on the regime for rations of badly needed food, medicine, and other necessities, people are even less likely to take the already extraordinary risks of challenging it.

Many Iraqis believe that if United States had pursued a more rational policy over the past two decades, regime change would have taken place years ago as a result of initiatives of the Iraqi people themselves. The sanctions have not only had serious humanitarian consequences--resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children from malnutrition and preventable diseases--but have actually strengthened Saddam Hussein's grip on power.

The key to regime change without the horrific consequences of war, then, rests in the United States allowing the United Nations to lift the economic sanctions that primarily impact ordinary Iraqis while maintaining military sanctions and strict monitoring of dual-use technologies that strengthen the hand of the regime.

The bottom line is this: While the repressive nature of the Iraqi government is all too real, it must not be used to justify increasing the suffering of the Iraqi people through war.

(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is an associate professor of politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco, and serves as the Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project (online at www.fpif.org). He is the principal editor of Nonviolent Social Movements (Blackwell, 1999) and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage, 2002).)

POWELL'S DUBIOUS CASE FOR WAR
By Phyllis Bennis

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Global Affairs Commentary available online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0302powell.html.)

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council on February 5 wasn't likely to win over anyone not already on his side. He ignored the crucial fact that in the past several days (in Sunday's New York Times and in his February 4th briefing of UN journalists) Hans Blix denied key components of Powell's claims.

Blix, who directs the UN inspection team in Iraq, said the UNMOVIC inspectors have seen "no evidence" of mobile biological weapons labs, has "no persuasive indications" of Iraq-al Qaeda links, and no evidence of Iraq hiding and moving material used for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) either outside or inside Iraq. Dr. Blix also said there was no evidence of Iraq sending scientists out of the country, of Iraqi intelligence agents posing as scientists, of UNMOVIC conversations being monitored, or of UNMOVIC being penetrated.

Further, CIA and FBI officials still believe the Bush administration is "exaggerating" information to make their political case for war. Regarding the alleged Iraqi link with al Qaeda, U.S. intelligence officials told the New York Times, "we just don't think it's there."

The most compelling part of Powell's presentation was his brief ending section on the purported al Qaeda link with Iraq and on the dangers posed by the al Zarqawi network. However, he segued disingenuously from the accurate and frightening information about what the al Zarqawi network could actually do with biochemical materials to the not-so-accurate claim about its link with Iraq--which is tenuous and unproven at best.

A key component of the alleged Iraq-al Qaeda link is based on what Powell said "detainees tell us…". That claim must be rejected. On December 27 the Washington Post reported that U.S. officials had acknowledged detainees being beaten, roughed up, threatened with torture by being turned over to officials of countries known to practice even more severe torture. In such circumstances, nothing "a detainee" says can be taken as evidence of truth given that people being beaten or tortured will say anything to stop the pain. Similarly, the stories of defectors cannot be relied on alone, as they have a self-interest in exaggerating their stories and their own involvement to guarantee access to protection and asylum.

In his conclusion, Powell said, "We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace." It is certainly at least partially true that the UN resolution was an effort to "preserve the peace," although it is certainly not true that the U.S. wrote 1441 to preempt war. Rather, the Bush administration intended that the resolution would serve as a first step toward war.

Finally, the "even if" rule applies. "Even if" everything Powell said was true, there is simply not enough evidence for war. There is no evidence of Iraq posing an imminent threat, no evidence of containment not working. Powell is asking us to go to war--risking the lives of 100,000 Iraqis in the first weeks, hundreds or thousands of U.S. and other troops, and political and economic chaos--because he thinks MAYBE in the future Iraq might rebuild its weapons systems and MIGHT decide to deploy weapons or MIGHT give those weapons to someone else who MIGHT use them against someone we like or give them to someone else who we don't like, and other such speculation. Nothing that Powell said should alter the position that we should reject a war on spec.

(Phyllis Bennis <pbennis@compuserve.com> is a Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and director of IPS' New Internationalism Project (online at www.ips-dc.org). She is a Middle East analyst for FPIF (online at www.fpif.org).)

IRRELEVANCE AND CREDIBILITY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND NATO
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0302irrelevance.html.)

Relevance--or rather its opposite, irrelevance--seems to be one of the many mantras of the Bush administration with respect to the United Nations.

President Bush declaimed on the subject in his September 12, 2002 address to the UN General Assembly: "The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. The entire world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"

Most recently, on February 9, 2003, at a congressional Republican Party policy forum, he reiterated the theme: "It's a moment of truth for the United Nations. The United Nations gets to decide shortly whether or not it is going to be relevant in terms of keeping the peace, whether or not its words mean anything."

As part of these rhetorical assaults on the UN, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (among others) has tried to draw a parallel between the League of Nations and the United Nations. Rumsfeld's comparison, however, is faulty. He notes, accurately, that the League's irrelevancy was exposed--and its demise assured--when it failed to respond meaningfully to Emperor Haile Selassie's plea for help when Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935.

But Rumsfeld misses the mark by equating the League of 1935 with the UN of 2003. A more apt comparison is the UN in 1990, just after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Then the UN, through the Security Council (for which no equivalent existed in the League) did act by endorsing the U.S.-led coalition of 35 countries that reversed Iraq's aggression in 43 days. And he misses the mark this time by assuming that military force is the only (or only remaining) option open to the UN.

But the UN is not the only organization incurring U.S. wrath for not toeing Washington's line. It seems that the venerable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also is on the road to irrelevancy. At a high-level meeting the weekend of February 8-9, three "old Europe" countries blocked NATO approval to initiate planning to help Turkey defend itself from attack should a U.S.-led war against Iraq begin. The essential argument reportedly made by the three--Belgium, France, and Germany--is that approval of the U.S. proposal would signal that the alliance had given up on peaceful means of resolving the Iraq question before all options had been tried and exhausted.

The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Nicolas Burns, responded to "old Europe" for the administration: "This is a most unfortunate decision. Because of their actions, NATO is now facing a crisis of credibility" (Washington Post, February 10).

A crisis there is, but it is one whose origin lies in the intense U.S. war rhetoric and massive war preparations.

(Dan Smith <dan@fcnl.org> is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) is a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)

POWELL AT THE UN: ANOTHER STEP FORWARD ON THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD
By Ian Williams

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0302powell2.html.)

Colin Powell's presentation did not immediately effect any road to Baghdad conversion in the UN Security Council, but it was not intended to. As advertised, the evidence contained no smoking guns, and since much of what Powell said was sourced to anonymous defectors, it lacked the dramatic conviction of a named and visible witness. However, it was more effective in reinforcing the existing suspicions of Security Council members that Iraq was hiding weapons programs from inspectors.

He was much less effective in persuading other members of Iraqi links with al Qaeda. Most of the speakers in the Security Council politely ignored that part of his presentation, presuming it was aimed for internal American consumption, since it clearly has strictly limited export potential. Even Tony Blair has been backpedaling on this version of "Six Degrees of Separation," since he seems to listen more to his own intelligence agencies than does President George W Bush--and he has to confront a skeptical House of Commons.

Ironically, Powell's speech certainly also convinced many members that the U.S. had been holding back information from the UN inspectors, leading to a gently implicit rebuke to Washington. Council members repeatedly called on "all countries" to share immediately any evidence they have with Messrs Blix and El Baradei. What they were asking in a timorously polite way was, "why did you not tell the inspectors?" After all Powell himself had said that they were "inspectors, not detectives," so why not provide the occasional clue?

Others noted the usual mismatch between what the Washington rumor-mill promised and what actually appeared. Powell did not substantiate the allegations that the Iraqis had learned hours ahead of surprise inspections and cleared the sites. That had led to allegations of leaks from the UN, since some people in Washington, even when the organization is doing their bidding, can never resist a kick at it.

While the presentation, unsurprisingly, added to British Foreign Minister Jack Straw's conviction that the time had run out for Iraq, all other delegates drew different conclusions: the need for multilateral consensus and to work through the United Nations. They called for stronger support for the inspectors, enhancing and reinforcing their teams, and called upon Iraq for cooperation. Significantly, though, only the Iraqi ambassador actually tried in anyway to rebut what Mexico's Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez called the "valuable information" offered by Powell.

However, it is almost certainly misreading Powell's intention to judge his performance by whether or not he convinced the Security Council, or indeed the outside world, of Iraq's guilt. The real message being presented was that Washington is on a short fuse, and that while it would like the United Nations to go along, the United States is prepared to go it alone.

This message should be parsed in the context of last year's threat to close down all peacekeeping operations if the U.S. did not get its way over exemptions for the International Criminal Court. Powell's presentation was not an ultimatum to Iraq--but to other Council members. The U.S. is prepared to wreck the organization if it does not get its own way on this.

(Ian Williams <uswarreport@igc.org> is a UN analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

II. Outside the U.S

(Editor's Note: FPIF's "Outside the U.S." component aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. If you're interested in submitting commentaries for our use, please send your solicitation to John Gershman at <john@irc-online.org>.)

COULD THE WAR GO NUCLEAR?
By Paul Rogers

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Outside the U.S. Global Affairs Commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0302nukewar.html.)

The issue of the possible Iraqi use of chemical weapons is once again raising the question of whether nuclear weapons might be used against Iraq. At first sight the very idea seems so unlikely as to be not worth considering, yet three important points arising from recent developments make it necessary for us to do precisely that.

First, Britain's Minister of Defense, Geoff Hoon, has repeated earlier warnings of possible nuclear use. In his appearance on the David Frost Program on BBC TV on 2 February, he said: "We have always made it clear that we would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in conditions of extreme self-defense. Saddam can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use nuclear weapons."

This could be interpreted simply as a further effort to deter the Iraqis from using chemical or biological weapons, but the second and third points suggest an even more worrying situation. The second point, therefore, is that the United States simply does not know all the sites where Iraq may be hiding any chemical or biological weapons, and many of them may be hidden too deep underground for conventional weapons to destroy. Iraq is already subject to intensive surveillance, and this will be continued at an even higher level once the war starts. Indications of movement of chemical or biological weapons from deeply buried and previously hidden sites may come very suddenly, placing a premium on their immediate destruction.

This brings us to the third point, illustrated in a highly significant article in the Los Angeles Times (January 26) by a well-informed defense analyst, William J. Arkin. According to Arkin, planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons against Iraq is actively under way at U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha. Citing "multiple sources close to the process," Arkin specifies two potential roles for nuclear weapons: attacking Iraqi facilities located so deep underground that they might be impervious to conventional explosives, and thwarting Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, Arkin cites sources within U.S. Central Command (the military command responsible for a war with Iraq) saying that a Theatre Nuclear Planning Document has already been prepared for Iraq.

The combination of these three elements--statements from people such as Geoff Hoon about a willingness to use nuclear weapons, the evident reality that some key Iraqi targets cannot be destroyed except with nuclear weapons, and William Arkin's report that planning for such use is now being actively undertaken--is highly significant.

The conclusion is that the Pentagon is in apparently happy concert with Britain's Ministry of Defense that the use of nuclear weapons may be appropriate in the coming war with Iraq. If the weapons are used, then the nuclear threshold that has held since 1945 will disappear and we will move into an even more dangerous world--as other states scramble to develop their own deterrents in the form of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Apart from all the other issues involved in the prospective war with Iraq--civilian casualties, regional instability, humanitarian crisis, environmental catastrophe--this alone is sufficient evidence to indicate why a war with Iraq could be so exceptionally dangerous.

(This article was first published in its entirety on the global issues website (online at www.opendemocracy.net) as part of an ongoing debate about Global Security. Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University and is openDemocracy's international security correspondent. He is a consultant to the Oxford Research Group. The second edition of his book Losing Control has just been published by Pluto Press.)

III. Letters and Comments

TRIBUTE TO ORWELL

Re: An Annotated Overview of the State of the Union

I thoroughly enjoyed this article and appreciate the logical and exhaustive point for point disputation of the major foreign policy segments of Mr. Bush's speech. It is indeed a tribute to Mr. Orwell that a modern head of state in the information age will say the exact opposite of the truth and then take for granted that those statements are true by virtue of the fact that he has spoken them. Clearly Mr. Orwell meant his book to be more of a warning than a playbook, unfortunately that is how the Bush administration views it.

- Doug Hofeling <dhofeling@yahoo.com>

ARGUMENT DOESN'T HOLD WATER

Re: The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives

I think the argument that the administration's motives are about oil is unconvincing. If what we really wanted was cheap oil, why wouldn't we just buy it from Saddam, lifting the sanctions? I'm sure we'd get a very competitive price. It'd be a lot less expensive than getting it by means of war. Not to mention a lot more secure. If Saddam and Osama really are mortal enemies, as you have been at pains to point out, and our government is as unconcerned with human rights problems as you say it is, why not just be Saddam's friend again? It would be much cheaper. The oil companies have been clamoring for this. For these reasons, the oil argument doesn't seem to hold, uh, water.

- William Youmans <billyouman@aol.com>

BAFFLED

Re: The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives

An extremely insightful article. I am encouraged that such analyses are being produced in America, but am completely baffled as to why almost none of your elected representatives in Congress seem to reflect these opinions. The blind parochialism of Congress' support for President Bush gives outsiders the impression that the American people as a whole support the proposed war on Iraq. In Australia it is becoming increasingly apparent that the governing Liberal Party is quite alone in supporting America's war on Iraq, and there are loud rumblings of discontent even among the Liberals. A poll yesterday revealed that 76% of the Australian population did not support an American war on Iraq, without UN sanction, despite the unqualified support from John Howard to George Bush. It is despicable that these old white men have such sway over world affairs.

- Sheila Rajan <crimescn@iinet.net.au>

TERMINATE SADDAM HUSSEIN

Re: The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives

Michael Klare lists 3 motives announced by the Bush administration for going to war with Iraq: (1) Eliminating weapons of mass destruction, (2) Combating terrorism, (3) Promoting democracy.

However there is another most important reason in most reasonable people's minds: putting a stop to Saddam's career of murder. He has already attacked his own Kurds, his own Shiites, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, using weapons of mass destruction. Add to that his routine assassination of all who oppose or even comment on his regime.

The UN has had 12 years but has failed to do the job, and in this time thousands more innocent men have been murdered and women suppressed or mutilated and children deprived of a fair upbringing. In the name of humanity, we need to terminate him once and for all.

- Ian Bryce <ibryce@apscglobal.com>

GOOD WORK

Re: The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives

Thank you for a well-constructed, non-emotive, analysis of why the Bush administration is so keen to take action in Iraq. I just wish all thinking people around the world could read this article before it is too late.

Keep up the good work!

- Dean Rosario <drosario@ozemail.com.au>

Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank—one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail.

We Count on Your Support. Thank you.

Subscribe to The Progressive Response!

To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:

To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.org

Simply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above.

The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.

We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to irc@irc-online.org. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.

This page was last modified on Monday, February 17, 2003 6:45 PM
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Copyright © 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.

The Progressive Response

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

II. Outside the U.S.

III. Letters and Comments

I. Updates and Out-takes

II. Outside the U.S

III. Letters and Comments

Subscribe to The Progressive Response!