The Progressive Response
Volume 7, Number 8
March 17, 2003
The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.
John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.
Editor: John Gershman (IRC)
Table of Contents
I. Updates and Out-Takes
HIGH NOON: DUELING RESOLUTIONS AT THE UN
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)
AFRICA POLICY OUTLOOK 2003
By Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan
PRESIDENT BUSH'S FEBRUARY 26 SPEECH ON THE FUTURE OF IRAQ: A CRITIQUE
By Stephen Zunes
THE PENTAGON BUDGET: MORE OF THE SAME. MUCH, MUCH, MORE.
By Christopher Hellman
THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEBATE: INFERNAL SYMBIOSIS
By Max B. Sawicky
LESSONS FROM QADDAFI
By Ronald Bruce St. John
II. Letters and Comments
I. Updates and Out-takes
The Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) is seeking a communications director to help us distribute our analysis more widely. The job description can be found on the IRC website at: http://www.irc-online.org/job_comm-dir.html.
HIGH NOON: DUELING RESOLUTIONS AT THE UN
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303hinoon.html .)
George Bush of "Osama bin Laden--dead or alive" fame, should feel right at home. At the UN, there are at least three draft Security Council resolutions being circulated. It's five minutes to High Noon, and the sheriff, alert for bushwhackers (veto-wielders), is strapping on his guns, preparing to walk onto the street to face down--his allies.
That's right. Allies, this time including his most steadfast deputy, Great Britain. Facing a revolt against his Iraq policy in his cabinet, in his parliamentary party, and among his people, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been desperately trying to find middle ground between the other major powers of "old Europe"--France, Germany, and Russia--and the United States. Last week, he induced the White House to incorporate a new paragraph into the original U.S.-UK-Spanish draft resolution, which set a March 17 deadline for Iraq to have "demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate, and active cooperation" and to be "yielding possession...of all weapons, weapon delivery and support systems and structures"--or it will be declared to have failed to seize "the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002)."
While the U.S. military does not require the participation of the 45,000 British troops now in the Gulf, the White House needs the diplomatic cover that Downing Street affords. But the Bush administration seemed unduly impatient with the delay caused by the need for additional UN Security Council (UNSC) debate on the proposed amendment, particularly when Europe's "old axis," led by France, declared the March 17 deadline unacceptable.
Another problem with the U.S.-UK-Spanish draft was the lack of objective criteria against which to compare Iraq's performance. Sensing that a resolution without "benchmarks" would be DOA (dead on arrival) in the Security Council--even the "middle six" (Pakistan, Chile, Mexico, Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea) UNSC members were uncomfortable with this omission--London tried again. The new effort enumerated six steps that the Baghdad regime would have to implement to avoid war. First, Saddam Hussein would have to publicly admit in Arabic to owning and concealing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and declare he was ready to surrender them. Second, he must allow 30 key scientists to be interviewed outside Iraq. Third, he must give up all remaining chemical and biological stocks, especially anthrax, or provide credible evidence of their destruction. Fourth, he must provide full disclosure of Iraq's unmanned drone aircraft programs. Iraq must also (fifth) commit to the destruction of its "mobile laboratories" and (sixth) to all proscribed missiles. Critically, the determination of the completeness of Iraq's compliance would be left to the UNSC, not to the chief inspectors.
The last three benchmarks would seem easy to do, as would the second, although the latter probably would take more time to arrange and implement than Washington is willing to grant. (Indeed, the White House was insisting until March 13 on a vote while not giving any extension on the March 17 deadline.) The third could also take considerable time because UN inspectors would have to evaluate the "evidence" presented by Iraq.
The administration claims it is near the nine votes needed for UNSC approval (barring a veto) of a new resolution. But horse operas are like other operas; they're not over until the sun sets in the West (the equivalent of "the fat lady sings"). As long as the clock doesn't strike Noon, anything--including a diplomatic breakthrough in the UNSC or Baghdad--can happen.
(Dan Smith <dan@fcnl.org> is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) is a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)
AFRICA POLICY OUTLOOK 2003
By Salih Booker, William Minter, and Ann-Louise Colgan
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new special report published jointly with Africa Action and available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/africa2003.html .)
In 2003 U.S. policy toward Africa will be driven almost exclusively by geopolitical considerations related to Washington's war plans against Iraq, and by its geostrategic interests in African oil.
In a dangerous replay of the cold war, the U.S. is likely to ignore Africa's priorities, placing military base rights above human rights. The war against AIDS, by far the most important global war effort and an urgent priority especially for Africa, will continue to suffer from a lack of resources. An American war on Iraq would also have a major negative impact on the global economy with dire consequences for African development. In 2003, U.S. unilateralism is likely to be directly at odds with African interests in building multilateral approaches to its greatest challenges from HIV/AIDS to international trade rules and peacekeeping.
Last year African efforts toward building greater political and economic unity were often offset by failure to provide collective leadership on its most pressing challenges. The African Union replaced the 39-year-old Organization of African Unity as a framework for stepped-up cooperation across the continent. The new Union, as it is expected to evolve out of a process of accelerated integration, is seen as more ambitious than the European Union.
The most dramatic failure for both African governments and world leaders last year was in combating HIV/AIDS. Despite the ever-louder chorus of warnings and promises, neither the rich countries nor most African governments moved beyond a snail's pace in responding to the emergency. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria received only a fraction of the resources needed. The South African government stalled on providing antiretroviral drugs to people living with HIV/AIDS. And both grassroots and government health programs around the continent continued to be crippled by lack of resources.
At the beginning of 2003, instead of giving priority to the fight against AIDS, the U.S. stood on the brink of war in Iraq, a prospect that cast a looming shadow over every other issue. In January, Nelson Mandela called on the world to "condemn both Blair and Bush and let them know in no uncertain terms that what they are doing is wrong." At the meeting of the African Union in early February, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa warned that war in the Gulf region could trigger an economic meltdown in Africa and set development back more than three decades. But Washington's lack of regard for African opinion was illustrated earlier by the perfunctory cancellation of President George Bush's projected January visit to five African countries.
At the end of January, President Bush surprised many by accepting, for the first time, the need to supply antiretroviral drugs and by promising additional resources for Africa to fight AIDS. But if the U.S. fails to at least triple its spending on AIDS this year, the gesture will be seen in retrospect as simply a public relations adjunct to the push for war on Iraq. Early signs were not encouraging.
(Salih Booker <sbooker@africapolicy.org> is executive director, William Minter <wminter@igc.org> is senior research fellow, and Ann-Louise Colgan is a research associate at Africa Action (online at www.africaaction.org). This report is published jointly with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
PRESIDENT BUSH'S FEBRUARY 26 SPEECH ON THE FUTURE OF IRAQ: A CRITIQUE
By Stephen Zunes
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303aeispeech.html .)
Considerable attention has been given to President George W. Bush's February 26 speech before the right-wing American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC outlining his vision of the Middle East in the aftermath of a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq. The speech was broadcast live over national radio and television and given widespread coverage in the print media, yet few critical voices questioning the major points raised in this sanctimonious and highly misleading address were given the opportunity to offer commentary. Below are excerpts of some key portions of the speech followed by some critiques that listeners and viewers were unable to hear:
"In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world--and we will not allow it."
The Bush administration has yet to provide any proof that Iraq is currently building or hiding such weapons. Even if in the likely event that the Iraqi regime has squirreled away certain proscribed materials, it is unclear as to how they would be able to dominate the Middle East or intimidate the "civilized world." Two other countries in the region (Israel and Pakistan) already have nuclear weapons and several others are believed to have chemical and biological weapons, all in excess to even the most alarmist assessments of what Iraq may currently possess. Iraq, alone among these countries, is under strict military and economic sanctions that deny them access to much of the raw materials and technology that enabled them to initially develop their weapons of mass destruction during the 1980s, virtually all of which were accounted for and destroyed during the 1990s. As a result, it is unclear as to how Iraq could develop an arsenal that could dominate and threaten anybody, particularly with the United States and its heavily armed allies acting as a deterrent.
"Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers."
While the Iraqi government has offered some financial aid to families of Palestinians killed in their struggle against Israel--including relatives of suicide bombers--there is no evidence that Iraq has actually sent any money. Most of the funding of terrorist groups in Palestine comes from Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally that annually receives billions of dollars worth of arms transfers as well as military and police training from the Bush administration. Iraq has little to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this stage. The major obstacles to a democratic Palestinian state are the internal corruption of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli occupation, not Iraq.
"If the members rise to this moment, then the Council will fulfil its founding purpose."
The founding purpose of the UN Security Council is to protect international peace and security, not to legitimize the invasion of one country by another.
"We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human freedom to change lives and nations. By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world."
This is why free people in the United States and around the world must work even harder to stop President Bush from invading Iraq.
(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is an associate professor of politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project (online at www.fpif.org) and is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (available at www.commoncouragepress.com).)
THE PENTAGON BUDGET: MORE OF THE SAME. MUCH, MUCH, MORE.
By Christopher Hellman
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303pentbudget.html .)
On February 3, the administration of President George W. Bush released its budget request for fiscal year 2004 (FY'04). As part of this request, the Pentagon is seeking $399.1 billion, $379.9 billion for the Defense Department and $19.3 billion for the nuclear weapons functions of the Department of Energy. The total figure is $16.9 billion above current levels, an increase of 4.4%.
There are a number of popular misconceptions about the Pentagon's annual budget request. The first is that these funds pay for actual combat operations, when by and large they do not. The reason for this is simple; it takes more than two years for the White House to develop and for Congress to approve a budget that covers just one year. It is impossible to plan that far in advance for unexpected events that will require federal funds. Such events include natural disasters such as floods and droughts, and wars. These events are referred to as "contingencies," and federal law provides mechanisms for funding these unanticipated requirements outside the normal budget process. So, while the public perception is that military operations in Afghanistan and the build-up in the Persian Gulf are funded through the defense budget, and that continued spending increases are therefore necessary, this is not actually the case. Meanwhile, the administration is already discussing adding $60 billion to $95 billion in one or more supplemental appropriations to cover the costs of the war in Afghanistan and military operations in the Persian Gulf.
A second common misconception is that higher military spending enhances homeland security. In reality, homeland security--preventing future terrorist acts within the United States and responding to attacks should they occur--is primarily a function of state and local governments--the so-called "first responders"--and federal agencies outside the Defense Department such as the FBI, FEMA, and the Coast Guard. The Defense Department's involvement is basically limited to the collection and dissemination of intelligence information--a function that the Pentagon would perform with or without the threat of terrorist attacks--developing ways to respond to biological and chemical attacks, and flying air defense combat patrols over the United States. These activities account for roughly $10 billion annually, or less than 3% of the proposed FY'04 budget. Only the air combat patrols, which cost roughly $2 billion, are new functions. Meanwhile, other federal agencies including those in the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, receive just over $41 billion for homeland defense in the FY'04 request. This is 10% above current levels, and 64% above two years ago. And while the allocation of additional resources is certainly necessary, it is, in reality, too early to tell whether all necessary requirements are being met. And one potential shortfall may be in federal support to states for first responders.
The simple fact is, when it comes to the defense budget, we do not actually get what we think we are buying. Since the September 11th attacks the annual defense budget has increased by roughly $60 billion, and will reach over one-half trillion dollars by the end of the decade. Yet despite these increases, the expected goals of higher military spending--preventing terrorism, safeguarding Americans against terrorist attacks, and creating a military best suited to meet the challenges of the 21st century--will not be met. Instead, tens of billions of dollars will be wasted, as other critical needs go unmet.
(Christopher Hellman is a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information (online at www.cdi.org) and writes for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEBATE: INFERNAL SYMBIOSIS
By Max B. Sawicky
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303budget.html .)
The cacophony of the coming war threatens to drown out any reflective debate on President Bush's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2004. The distraction may extend to the point where Congress does not take the time to consider the President's proposals, much less pass any. Many tend to focus on the austerity implied by the budget, but more subtle dynamics are afoot. The austerity is not as severe as it is cracked up to be, but there are radical, far-reaching structural reforms put on the table.
Cuts can be found, of course. This time around, the victims include civilian investment in public "physical capital" (infrastructure), transportation, community and regional development, and training, among others.
But it would be misleading to focus on the numbers, in and of themselves, because there is a more fundamental pattern to the way budgeting has transpired during Bush's term in office.
In a nutshell, the game works like this: the President proposes a very lean budget for non-defense spending. The Republican-dominated Congress spends a fair amount more than the President proposes. Then Bush signs the legislation.
The consequence of this shadow play is that the preordained commitment to austerity on the domestic side of the budget precludes the consideration of important spending initiatives that could respond to the nation's needs. For instance, state and local governments have been hit hard by the slowdown and are forced to cut services. The Federal government could alleviate this problem with general fiscal assistance. Another example: instead of talking about killing Amtrak, the Congress might talk about how to augment the nation's rail system for the sake of economic development and increased transportation options. The increases take on a higher pork quotient. Meanwhile, military spending since 2000 has grown by roughly a hundred billion dollars in annual terms.
The overall spending changes in question are not large, when compared to the Gross Domestic Product. The change in the federal budget's non-defense discretionary share of GDP from 2000 to 2003 is less than a percentage point (from 3.3 to 3.9%). But this change does exceed the common conception of the President's tolerance for growth in government. Over the course of President Clinton's term in office, eight years rather than three, non-defense discretionary spending decreased from 3.7 to 3.3% of GDP.
In summary, we have too much political contentment with too little progress in responding to domestic priorities. There's your infernal symbiosis.
How the coming war will affect the legislative process remains to be seen. Perhaps unpopular measures will be pushed through, while the public's attention is fixed on the conduct of the war and terrorist threats. Perhaps initiative of any sort will just stall. Perhaps when the Bush administration owns up to the cost of the war in Iraq, that will encourage Congress to reconsider the tax cuts passed in 2001. The Pentagon is now owning up to projected war costs of 60 to 95 billion dollars, in addition to the costs of a post-conflict military occupation. None of these costs are included in the current deficit projections. In either case another year will have been wasted, and the nation's problems will continue to be neglected.
(Max B. Sawicky <sawicky@epinet.org> is an economist at the Economic Policy Institute (online at www.epinet.org) and writes for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
LESSONS FROM QADDAFI
By Ronald Bruce St. John
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303qaddafi.html .)
In April 1986 American pilots bombed multiple targets in Libya. One of the targets, the residence of Libyan leader Mohammar Qaddafi, was destroyed and his two-year-old adopted daughter was killed. The "collateral damage" included the French embassy, a chicken farm on the outskirts of Tripoli, and other civilian sites. Unconfirmed reports put noncombatant casualties at up to one hundred people.
The attack was in response to alleged Libyan involvement in a string of terrorist incidents, including the bombing two weeks before of a West Berlin discothèque in which two Americans died. Following the air strikes, the Reagan administration, completely misreading their impact, argued Qaddafi had changed his ways and ended Libyan support for terrorism. The opposite was the case. The Qaddafi regime responded almost immediately to the attack in a string of terrorist reprisals lasting almost four years.
The evidence suggests the immediate Libyan response included the murder of a kidnapped American and two Britons in Beirut, an attack on a U.S. embassy employee in Sudan, and a Libyan missile fired at a U.S. installation in Italy. Pan Am Flight 103 was later destroyed in December 1988 over Scotland and UTA Flight 772 blew up over Niger in September 1989. Libyan officials were eventually convicted of involvement in both the Pan Am and UTA terrorist attacks.
Inside Libya, the air strikes rallied radical elements behind Qaddafi and demoralized any opposition in the Libyan armed forces. Outside, the American crusade embarrassed exiled Libyan opposition groups, undermining their credibility and leaving many to argue the military option was for Libyans and Libyans alone. Internationally, the attack accentuated the very real differences separating Washington and its European allies on how to deal with terrorism in general and Qaddafi in particular.
It was only in the 1990s that Qaddafi began to change his ways. A combination of bilateral U.S. sanctions, quiet diplomacy, and a multilateral UN sanctions regime played a major role in the shift in Libyan foreign policy.
Seemingly terrorism-free for a more than a decade, Qaddafi today can best be described as a "rogue" trying to come in from the cold. He immediately denounced the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. Actively supporting the war on terrorism, Libyan officials rushed to share with their American and British counterparts intelligence on al Qaeda and related Islamic militant groups. Libya also paid compensation to the families of the victims of the UTA bombing and has agreed, in principle, to compensate the families of the victims of the Pan Am tragedy.
The Bush administration should apply the "lessons learned" from Libya to its treatment of Saddam Hussein. Violence in the Middle East, as most recently demonstrated in the Israeli-Palestinian case, most often leads to retaliation, perpetuating an ongoing cycle of violence. It can also have unexpected, undesirable consequences. With Qaddafi, the international community achieved desired policy change only when it moved from the use of force to the use of a basket of commercial, diplomatic, and legal remedies. Rather than rush to attack Iraq, the Bush administration should first give the UN inspectors and the quiet diplomacy in process in the region every chance to work.
(Ronald Bruce St. John is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). His latest book is Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Penn Press, 2002).)
II. Letters and Comments
I cannot believe that the members [of the Security Council] are so divided on the issue of Iraq. Short of Saddam Hussein again killing his neighbors with biological and chemical weapons, what will it take for you to vote "Yes" on resolution 1441 and its amendment? There are hundreds of violations by Iraq and there are hundreds of photos from satellites and testimony from defectors that prove Hussein has the weapons of mass destruction. Forget the veto from France because France has too much money invested in Iraq but I don't recall Russia asking permission to invade Chechnya. Stop making this a political battle and make it a "social" battle and liberate those people like we did in Afghanistan. If the world's powers had intervened in 1938, there would not have been a holocaust.
The people of Iraq want to be liberated and the Kuwaitis wake up every day wondering what Hussein is going to do today as the madman he is. If you do not back the resolution of 1441, you (as a whole) have made yourselves irrelevant and obsolete.
- Leslie Gottlieb <melgottlieb@juno.com>
Iraq's failure to disarm is just another failure of the UN. Time after time the UN passes resolutions that it refuses to back up. How many resolutions will it take until something is done about Saddam Hussein and his henchmen? Why does the free world have to worry about a madman who is managing to divide the UN, with countries who have vested interests, and those who care.
- Lynne Bowsky <lcbowsky@msn.com>
Re: Endgames: Washington, UN, and Europe
Wow, the article Endgames: Washington, UN, and Europe gave me a whole new perspective on why the Bush administration is pushing for war against Iraq. I really appreciate Peter Howard's efforts to write such an article. I look forward to reading more of his articles in the future.
- sheila maultsby <sheila@slideandspin.com>
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