The Progressive Response
Volume 7, Number 13
May 3, 2003
The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.
John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.
Editor: John Gershman (IRC)
Table of Contents
I. Updates and Out-Takes
POLL SHOWS PUBLIC SUPPORTS IRAQ WAR BUT REJECTS UNILATERALISM AND AN IMPERIAL ROLE FOR THE U.S.
By Jim Lobe
ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)
AFTERMATH: CLEANING UP THE MESS
By Conn Hallinan
IT'S THE OIL STUPID
By Michael T. Klare
II. Outside the U.S.
SHIITE AND SUNNI MUSLIMS STRUGGLE TO FILL LEADERSHIP VOID IN IRAQ
By Ahmed Rashid
III. Letters and Comments
DID YOU MEAN THEY ARE UNCIVILIZED? and RESPONSE FROM DAN SMITH
PROBLEMS WITH CLAIMS and RESPONSE FROM DAN SMITH
I. Updates and Out-takes
POLL SHOWS PUBLIC SUPPORTS IRAQ WAR BUT REJECTS UNILATERALISM AND AN IMPERIAL ROLE FOR THE U.S.
By Jim Lobe
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary produced under the auspices of our Project on the Present Danger and is available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305poll.html.)
If the unilateralist hawks in the administration of President George W. Bush were hoping that the easier than expected military victory in Iraq would bring the U.S. public closer to their views, they are likely to be very disappointed by the latest public opinion poll. It shows that much of the public appears to be more in tune with the views of "Old Europe"--a moniker applied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to describe European countries that opposed Washington's rush to attack Iraq--than with those of the neoconservatives around Rumsfeld.
While three in four U.S. adults say they now believe the war was right, according to the most comprehensive poll to date, strong majorities reject either a more unilateralist or military-oriented role for the United States in the future and continue to see the United Nations as the best mechanism for dealing with international crises. Moreover, almost two-thirds of a random survey of adults agreed with the assertion, "The U.S. plays the role of world policeman more than it should," and only 12% agreed with the notion that, "The U.S. should continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems."
The survey, carried out Apr. 18-22 with 865 randomly chosen respondents by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, largely echoes the findings of other recent but far less comprehensive polls by the Gallup organization, Newsweek, and other media companies.
"The public's enthusiasm for the Iraq war appears to be highly compartmentalized," according to Steven Kull, PIPA's long-time director. "There is no evidence of a spillover into other areas. Despite the U.S. victory in Iraq," he said, "public opinion appears to have remained unchanged with regard to the use of military force, the UN, and the role of the U.S. in the world," Kull told a news conference in Washington, DC.
Most striking appears to be the degree to which the public rejects the kind of international role that neoconservative hawks in the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office have proposed for the United States, in which it is not constrained by international mechanisms like the UN Security Council or alliances from taking unilateral action when it deems necessary. When asked to choose among three options to describe the role Washington should play in the world, only 12% favored the pre-eminent world leader position; 76% said "The U.S. should do its share in efforts to solve international problems with other countries;" while 11% said Washington should "withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." The percentage favoring the "pre-eminent" role actually fell from 17% since a similar question was asked in a poll taken in June 2002.
Majorities of the public also disagree with the hawks who oppose a role for the UN in post-war Iraq apart from humanitarian relief. The public is evenly split on whether Washington or the UN should temporarily govern Iraq and build a new government. A small majority (54%) prefers a UN police force to U.S. military forces as the instrument responsible for maintaining civil order, while 57% believe that the UN, rather than the United States, should direct humanitarian relief and economic reconstruction. Given three options for the role of the U.S. military, 54% said it should remain in Iraq and provide security, but that the UN should lead relief and reconstruction. Only 29% said the military should be in charge of all functions, and 14% said the military should "withdraw completely from Iraq shortly after the war is over."
Respondents were also asked which of two options more closely reflected their view of overall U.S. responsibility. One quarter agreed with the option that "we shouldn't spend money on rebuilding Iraq when we have so many problems here at home." Almost three-quarters, on the other hand, agreed that "it would be unwise and immoral for the U.S. to overthrow the government of Iraq and then just leave."
Finally, 86% said that Washington has "the responsibility to remain in Iraq as long as necessary until there is a stable government," with the median estimate of the most likely length of time being two years.
(Jim Lobe <jlobe@starpower.net> is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)
ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305roadmap.html.)
According to the Bush administration, settling Iraq was to be a prelude to settling the Palestinian-Israeli conflict via the Bush "road map." Although yet to be formally released, a draft of the road map was deposited in the British House of Commons library by the Foreign Office on April 13. The following are highlights of and commentary on the draft.
The road map has one immediate problem: it's already running late. Its general timelines envision "Phase III" negotiations at the beginning of 2004 to reach a "final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement" encompassing Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. But "Phase I," which calls for the end of terror and violence by both sides, the "normalization" of Palestinian life (ending curfews, easing curbs on the movement of people and goods, and improving the humanitarian situation), and building Palestinian institutions, is supposed to run from the "Present to May 2003." The "present" is virtually May, so in one month, from essentially a dead start, Palestinians and Israelis have to:
Palestinians
- issue, at the outset of Phase I, an "unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire;"
- declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and make "visible efforts ... to arrest, disrupt, and restrain" those planning attacks "on Israelis anywhere;"
- begin "comprehensive political reform ... including drafting a Palestinian constitution and [preparing for] free, fair, and open elections;"
- rebuild and refocus the security apparatus, consolidating it into three services reporting to the Interior Minister; and
- appoint an "empowered executive" and take steps leading to a "genuine separation of powers."
Israelis
- take steps to normalize Palestinian life;
- "withdraw from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 ...;[and] freeze all settlement activity" as per the Mitchell report;
- issue an "unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-party state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state … and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere;"
- cease "deportations, confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction."
In addition, Palestinian and Israeli security forces will "progressively resume security cooperation," and Arab states are to "cut off public and private funding" to groups involved in violence and terror.
The stumbling block comes with the last point dealing with security, for only if "comprehensive security performance moves forward" will the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) be required to withdraw progressively from the post-Sep. 28, 2000 lands it has occupied. This effectively is an "until and unless" clause, meaning that if suicide bomber and other attacks are not completely (or substantially) stopped (as they probably cannot be), the IDF will not have to begin or continue its "progressive" withdrawal. Moreover, there is no mechanism to settle disputes about the pace of events; the closest thing to a structure for resolving disputes about performance is whatever mechanism for scheduling meetings is established by the "Quartet" (U.S., UN, European Union, and Russia) monitoring the process.
Like many pronouncements of the Bush administration, the road map eschews specifics of how the process will proceed other than by "negotiations between the parties." More importantly, the road map does not specify what will happen when roadblocks are encountered.
(Dan Smith <dan@fcnl.org> is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and a retired U.S. army colonel and senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)
IT'S THE OIL STUPID
By Michael T. Klare
(Editor's Note: The following excerpt is from a new global affairs commentary available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305oil.html.)
On the second day of the invasion of Iraq, U.S. commandos seized two Iraqi offshore oil terminals in the Persian Gulf, capturing their defenders without a fight. "Swooping silently out of the Persian Gulf night," exulted James Dao of the New York Times, Navy SEALs claimed "a bloodless victory in the battle for Iraq's vast oil empire."
Dao's dramatic turn of phrase revealed more about the administration's plans for Iraq than almost every other report from the battlefield. While American forces turned a blind eye to the looting of Iraq's archeological treasures, they moved quickly to gain control over oilfields, refineries, and pipelines. Even before Iraqi resistance had been squelched, top U.S. officials were boasting that Iraq's oil infrastructure was safely in American hands.
Oil had nothing to do with Washington's motives for the invasion, we were told. "The only interest the United States has in the region is furthering the cause of peace and stability, not in [Iraq's] ability to generate oil," said press secretary Ari Fleischer in late 2002. But at a January briefing, an unnamed "senior Defense official" revealed that Gen. Tommy Franks and his staff "have crafted strategies that will allow us to secure and protect those fields as rapidly as possible in order to preserve those prior to destruction, as opposed to having to go in and clean them up after."
When pressed, the "senior Defense official" (presumably Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz) claimed that these fields would be protected so as to benefit the Iraqi people "at some point in the future." Other officials spoke of holding the fields "in trust" for the Iraqis. Nonetheless, the White House has talked with U.S. energy companies about assuming a major role in the postconflict development of Iraq's mammoth reserves.
For now, the administration's main concern appears to be to put existing oilfields back into operation as rapidly as possible so as to help subsidize the costs of occupying and reconstructing Iraq. To insure that this process will move quickly, the Defense Department awarded a noncompetitive, multimillion-dollar contract to Halliburton, the Houston-based oil-services firm once headed by Dick Cheney, to fight fires and repair damage in the oilfields and begin the task of rehabilitation. In the coming months, other U.S. oil-services firms, including Fluor and Bechtel (both with close ties to the administration), will be invited to bid for even more lucrative contracts to rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure. Ultimately, about $5 billion will be needed to restore Iraqi oil production to the levels achieved before the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War.
Managing this complex enterprise will be an "interim authority" made up of Iraqis selected or approved by the U.S. government, presumably including expatriates like Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), who enjoys close ties with the CIA and Defense. It can be safely assumed, however, that U.S. occupation officials will retain ultimate authority over the oilfields during this period. Washington will seek United Nations Security Council resolutions lifting the economic sanctions in order to allow sales of Iraqi oil. But administration officials vow to exclude the UN from decisionmaking on the disposition of Iraqi oil assets.
(Michael T. Klare <mklare@hampshire.edu> author of Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict and a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Mass., is a military affairs analyst with Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). This piece first appeared in The Nation (online at www.thenation.com).)
AFTERMATH: CLEANING UP THE MESS
By Conn Hallinan
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0304aftermath.html.)
When the Bush administration totals up the cost of the Iraq War it had best be prepared to tack on billions more to clean up the toxic residue of how this country wages war, specifically its widespread use of cluster weapons and Depleted Uranium (DU). While the shooting has wound down, the consequences of using these controversial weapons will be around for a long time to come, with clusters taking a steady toll on the unwary and the young, and DU poisoning the air and water.
Cluster munitions--bombs, shells, and rockets that release highly explosive canisters that shred everything from people to tanks--have been an environmental nightmare since the war in Southeast Asia. Of the 90 million cluster munitions dropped on tiny Laos from 1964 to 1973, 30% failed to explode. The result is a national minefield that has killed and maimed more than 12,000 people and which continues to exact an annual toll of 100 to 200. In one 20 square kilometer area, the British Mines Advisory Group, the world's leading bomb clearing organization, recently found 376,000 unexploded weapons, the vast majority of them cluster munitions. More than 50 million clusters were used in the 1991 Gulf War. In the two years following the war, they killed 1,400 Kuwaiti civilians and, as late as last year, 200 cluster weapons were found there each month.
According to Colin King, the author of Jane's Explosive Ordinance Disposal Guide and a disposal expert in Gulf War I, clusters caused "massive problems" in Kosovo, the Gulf, and Afghanistan, and they are "going to cause massive problems in the Gulf again."
Cluster bomb and DU cleanup is likely to be enormously expensive, and who pays for it will be a major question. The Bush administration is depending on Iraqi oil sales to foot most of the bill. But the figures don't add up. At most, Iraqi oil could bring in $18 billion a year, barely enough to feed the 60% of the population dependent on food handouts. Nor does this even address rebuilding the country's infrastructure, ravaged by 12 years of sanctions and the recent war, a price tag that, according to PFC Energy, a Washington consulting firm, will probably run in excess of $300 billion.
Iraq also has a debt burden that may be as high as $383 billion, and no one seems to be stepping forward to write it off. Indeed, the Financial Times called Deputy of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's call for debt cancellation, "mischievous." As Russian Vice Premier and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin pointed out, no one forgave his country's enormous debts.
Unlike in Gulf War I, where the allies picked up most the tab, the Bush administration's "Coalition of the Willing" is flat broke, and the White House has only allotted $2.4 billion to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. On top of that, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been hesitant to step in without United Nations authority.
In part, the IMF is nervous about getting into the business of cleaning up after the American military. "I don't see that for the long-term future you can keep together a world of peace and prosperity just based on military might," IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler told the Financial Times.
In the end it will likely be Iraqi civilians and U.S. occupation troops who will pay the price for the way we choose to wage war.
(Conn Hallinan <connm@cats.ucsc.edu> is the provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
II. Outside the U.S.
(Editor's Note: FPIF's "Outside the U.S." component aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. If you're interested in submitting commentaries for our use, please send your solicitation to John Gershman at <john@irc-online.org>.)
SHIITE AND SUNNI MUSLIMS STRUGGLE TO FILL LEADERSHIP VOID IN IRAQ
By Ahmed Rashid
(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF "Outside the U.S." commentary, available in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0305iraqleaders.html.)
Anti-American protests in Iraq, such as the April 28 incident in Fallujah that left an estimated 15 Iraqis dead, should not come as a surprise to Washington. Most Iraqis don't share the U.S. vision of a reconstructed Iraq resting on a foundation of Western-style democracy. For many, the end of Saddam Hussein's regime has prompted a yearning for a religious and cultural revival, raising the prospect of an Islamic state based on conservative Shiite beliefs.
Although it appears certain that Iraq is set for a revival of Islamic values, at present there remains ample room for religious developments to move in many directions. The revival could move toward the recognition of Iraq's Islamic legacy while making it compatible with greater freedom, economic development, and openness to the outside world. Such is the approach taken by President Hamid Karzai's administration in Afghanistan. It is also possible, however, that the revival may travel down the road toward Islamic extremism, anti-Westernism and sectarian violence that could easily culminate in a new dictatorship.
The lack of a cohesive American post-war political and economic strategy for Iraq--coupled with the arrogance of the Bush administration and Washington's disregard for a historical perspective--is diminishing the chances for the development of a secular democratic government in Iraq. The country is now developing into a battleground between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, who both seek to fill the leadership void created by the quick collapse of Saddam's regime.
The secularism practiced by the Saddam Hussein's Baath Party is now being repudiated by the Iraqi people. At the same time, many Iraqis are again embracing the Shiite form of Islam that the Iraqi regime suppressed for over three decades. That Shiite Islam could be the guiding force in Iraq's reconstruction is easily understood if the country's collective experience during the Saddam era is taken into account. Iraq is a majority Shiite state that was ruled by a small sect of nominally Sunni Muslims under Saddam. Apart from the Kurdish resistance in northern Iraq, the only form of underground opposition to Saddam during Iraq's long night was provided by Shiite religious leaders. Practically the only institutional dissent that could withstand Saddam's ruthless persecution came from mosques.
Shiite Islam, as compared to Sunni Islam, is more hierarchical, disciplined, and political. Just as in Central Asia, where an underground Islam kept people spiritually alive and connected during the Soviet era, so in Iraq the mosques quietly provided people with a spiritual haven and an alternative to the Baath Party for political expression.
Iraq's exiled political leadership favored by the Americans has little standing in the country--not because they are secular, but because they are perceived to be out of touch with the country's current mood and conditions. They are also seen to be too dependent on the support of foreign occupation forces, namely the U.S. Army.
(Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and the author of Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia and a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and to Power Trip: Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11 (Seven Stories, 2003). This first appeared on EurasiaNet (online at www.eurasianet.org).)
III. Letters and Comments
Re: The U.S. Power Complex: What's New
Thanks to Mr. Barry for an excellent analysis and description that recognizes the value of evolutionary as opposed to retrograde policies. For example, the statement that "The creation of a multilateral framework for managing global affairs ... was one of those major turning points." This article surpasses by far Robert Kagan's archaic Paradise and Power "treatise."
- Angela Schreiber <Angela.Schreiber@fes.de>
DID YOU MEAN THEY ARE UNCIVILIZED?
Re: Iraqis Tell Bush Administration: "Thanks. Goodbye. Don't Forget the Lights."
In your third paragraph, you talk about General Garner going there to advice and overlook the reconstruction; and mention that the U.S. will help the Iraqis develop a civil society!! I am sure that the author has some other meaning than what I have interpreted it to be. But for the record, did you mean that their society is uncivilized, and if so, why do you think they are uncivilized people?
- Sujay Mazumdar <sujaymazumdar@hotmail.com>
RESPONSE FROM DAN SMITH:
To speak of "civil society" is essentially the same as speaking of "civic society." It has little to do with "civilization" other than to affirm that everyday discourse is conducted in non-violent (if occasionally heated) exchanges. Civil society in the sense I used it refers to the organizations in a society that contribute to and smooth the interactions of citizens and their government. Such groups include political parties, interest groups, professional organizations, social groups, religious bodies, unions, business, and public interest/private volunteer/nongovernmental organizations. Iraq was not devoid of these completely, but Saddam Hussein carefully watched those that existed to ensure none would become the focal point for discontent or challenge the regime in any way.
Although I generally look forward to seeing Col. Dan Smith's perspective on foreign policy decisions, I must say that I have a problem with some statements in the article: "From Baghdad, Turn Left."
You state that "Iraq harbored terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives." If this is so, it's news to me, and I've been following events in Iraq closely for a year now. If it is so, why no names of these operatives? I take this as just another unproven assertion like the ones made by the Bush administration.
You also mention Abu Abbas, a person that Israel was so concerned about that they let him travel in and out of the West Bank freely. He is hardly a smoking gun and is certainly not a post hoc justification for an illegal war.
Finally, you mention "$25,000 to families of Palestinian suicide bombers." This is a bit of a mischaracterization. Hussein gave blanket coverage to the families of anyone killed in conflict with Israelis, suicide bomber or not.
I don't feel that I'm nit-picking here. Foreign Policy in Focus is supposed to be "advancing a citizen-based foreign policy agenda." For this to happen, the information provided must be presented as accurately and clearly as possible, I think.
- Douglas JE Barnes
RESPONSE FROM DAN SMITH:
Thanks for your message. Two observations.
1. "Harbored" was a bad choice of words. I agree that there was not any active link established between Iraq and al Qaeda. However, Iraq, like Pakistan and Iran, seems to have allowed al Qaeda personnel to transit its territory. Baghdad also never denied that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi received medical attention in Iraq.
2. Abu Abbas could not be held or prosecuted by Israel under its agreement with the Palestine Authority that provided amnesty for all actions occurring before (I believe) 1994.
"Nitpick" all you want; often it is the fine distinctions that are important--as the saying has it, "the devil is in the details." I hope you will continue your close reading and questioning of all sources.
I applaud the article, "The Psychological War at Home and Abroad." I'm a Graduate Student Affiliate of the American Psychological Association and have done some graduate work in Communication and Psychology from a more humanistic rather than statistical approach.
I continue to follow the Iraq news when possible. Many of the stories contain important subject matter. Yet, there have been times when I'd like to see more humanism used by writers analyzing the war. I do hope you report Iraq news when possible. Facts and figures are vitally important. But so is discussing the psychological and emotional behavior exhibited by people during any confrontation.
I look forward to reading more Foreign Policy in Focus reports from a more psycho/psychosocial perspective. Thank you.
- Camille Pierce <scholar@cruzio.com>
Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank—one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail.
We Count on Your Support. Thank you.
Subscribe to The Progressive Response!
To subscribe to The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
To unsubscribe from The Progressive Response, send a blank email to:
lists-unsubscribe@irc-online.orgSimply click the appropriate hyperlink above, or send a blank email to the appropriate email address above.
The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies.
We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to irc@irc-online.org. Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies you may receive.
This page was last modified on
Saturday, May 3, 2003 10:17 PM
Contact the IRC's webmaster with inquiries regarding the functionality of this website.
Copyright
© 2001 IRC and IPS. All rights reserved.