The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

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Editor: John Gershman (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

FRONTIER JUSTICE #20
What Next for Pax Americana?

THE U.S. AND POST-WAR IRAQ: AN ANALYSIS
By Stephen Zunes

EYES ON DIFFERENT PRIZES
By John Feffer

U.S. AND INDIA--A DANGEROUS ALLIANCE
By Conn Hallinan

FROM BAGHDAD TO TEHRAN?
By Jim Lobe

II. Outside the U.S.

PAX ROMANA VERSUS PAX AMERICANA: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES OF IMPERIAL MANAGEMENT
By Walden Bello

III. Letters and Comments

DEMOCRATS SHOULD PAY ATTENTION

DEATH FOR PROFIT BUSINESS

I. Updates and Out-takes

FRONTIER JUSTICE #20
What Next for Pax Americana?

(Editor's Note: Frontier Justice is a weekly column written alternately by Tom Barry and John Gershman, foreign policy analysts at the Interhemispheric Resource Center, chronicling instances of U.S. unilateralism and its assault on the multilateralism framework for managing global affairs. It is part of the new Project Against the Present Danger. These columns are now indexed on the www.presentdanger.org site at: http://www.presentdanger.org/frontier/2003/index.html.)

By John Gershman

With the occupation of Iraq firmly underway, and despite the uncertainties on the ground and within the occuppying administration, some neoconservative analysts are already looking ahead--and not just to Syria or Iran or North Korea. "The real question now is how the United States can leverage its victory in Iraq to uphold, expand, and institutionalize the Pax Americana," says Thomas Donnelly in a recent issue of the American Enterprise Institute's National Security Outlook. Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI and served as the deputy executive director at the Project for the New American Century from 1999-2002.

Donnelly's piece focuses on shaping the overall framework guiding the Bush doctrine and the practical challenges facing the institutionalization of unipolarity, and recognizes, unlike some of the less nuanced advocates of unilateralism, the importance of multilateral institutions for managing empire. Two key developments include efforts to refocus on China and soft-pedaling the unilateralist nature of the exercise of U.S. imperial power.

Back to China?

Donnelly encapsulates what he sees as the Bush doctrine in practice:

In a nutshell, the practical application of the Bush Doctrine amounts to "rolling back" radical Islamism while "containing" the People's Republic of China, that is, hedging against its rise to great-power status. A corollary is to prevent strategic cooperation, formally or de facto, between either terror states or terrorist groups in the Islamic world and Beijing.

This description of Bush administration practice draws upon Harvard political science professor Samuel Huntington's suggestion of a Confucian-Islamic connection that could emerge as a result of the "Clash of Civilizations." The recent appointment of Aaron Friedberg, a well-known neoconservative hawk on China, to Vice President Dick Cheney's staff, indicates that there remains ongoing positioning to insure that the rapprochement between the U.S. and China since the September 11th attacks does not displace the view of China as a strategic competitor, which had animated much of the neoconservative wing of the administration prior to 9/11.

Donnelly doesn't seem to share the same hysteria over China as some of his ideological fellow travelers, noting that "While it is true that China has the potential to become the canonical 'global peer' of the United States, and already possess the ability to complicate American strategy in many places, the global 'correlation of forces' seems very heavily in our favor." This frame suggests that there will be ongoing tension within the administration and the think tanks that house neoconservative ideologues over the scope and severity of the "China threat."

Multilateralism in the Service of Empire

At the same time, there appears to be a growing recognition that the simple celebration of unilateralism is both bad public relations and bad policy. As Donnelly notes, "It is difficult to imagine how the United States can maintain global leadership without running the risks of 'imperial overstretch' unless it forges a new set of international institutions, or at very least, radically reforms the current ones. Even a sole superpower needs strategic partners."

While citing liberal internationalist John Ikenberry approvingly, Donnelly's vision of multilateralism is all about facilitating U.S. imperial rule and has nothing much to do with international law. Furthermore, he shows that the neoconservatives are more "radical" than conservative--for the agenda Donnelly outlines is an agenda of institutional transformation, not one oriented at protecting the status quo, other than the position of the U.S. as an unchallenged superpower.

Donnelly argues that the post-World War II experience of creating NATO and the UN offers lessons for the present, but that neither the UN nor NATO in their current forms is suited for achieving U.S. policy objectives. Both institutions are constrained by their origins as defensive institutions established to promote order and stability against a revolutionary threat from communism. In contrast, he argues, institutionalizing Pax Americana requires organizations willing to promote instability (i.e., liberty) where necessary. [Note that it is liberty and not democracy that is the goal.]

His outline for a reformed United Nations--or a successor organization--would value liberty more than stability or state sovereignty and would dedicate itself to helping repressed peoples secure their individual political rights rather than tolerating repressive regimes. This form of cosmopolitanism and internationalism is a distinct departure from traditional conservative ideals of realpolitik or the isolationist view of Pat Buchanan.

On the military front, Donnelly's new NATO would be more agile and flexible and be better able to provide forces for a variety of new missions rather than simply as a defensive coalition. Holding out more hope for a reformed NATO than a reformed UN he notes that "It is the NATO architecture that allows willing participants in U.S.-led operations to 'plug and play'." This framework would represent the means of institutionalizing the "coalition of the willing" to support and facilitate U.S.-led military operations where it deemed them necessary, creating the institutional infrastructure for the doctrine of preventive war.

The challenge for a truly global Pax Americana, and one concerned about China in particular, is to extend close U.S. military ties outside of Europe with a major focus on strengthening the multilateral security architecture of Asia. He argues that such arrangements would not need to be as "formal a structure as the Atlantic alliance … but it could provide the practical and training basis for the wide range of coalition operations that might be necessary in the coming decades."

Donnelly also makes explicit his view of the key supporting players in this drama of institutionalization, of an empire that increasingly dares to speak its name: Great Britain, "new Europe," India, and the wealthy traditional allies in East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. Latin America and Africa are absent from the program.

Whatever one thinks of the vision of Donnelly and other neocons have outlined, one thing is clear. The gauntlet has been thrown. The George W. Bush administration will not be accused of not being able to deal with "that vision thing."

For more see:

What's Next? Preserving American Primacy, Institutionalizing Unipolarity
By Thomas Donnelly, April 22, 2003
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16999,filter./pub_detail.asp

(John Gershman <john@irc-online.org> is the codirector of Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

THE U.S. AND POST-WAR IRAQ: AN ANALYSIS
By Stephen Zunes

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new policy report available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/papers/usiraq2003.html .)

There has been a disturbing degree of triumphalism following the overthrow--perhaps "evaporation" is a better word--of Saddam Hussein's regime in the face of invading American forces. Even putting aside the appropriateness of this kind of gloating in the face of such death and destruction--including thousands of civilian casualties--it is striking that few people are asking whether the U.S. or the rest of the world is safer now as a result of this overwhelming American military victory.

Operation Iraqi Freedom has about as much to do with freedom as Sports Illustrated's annual swimsuit issue has to do with marketing swimwear: it is little more than an afterthought, a rationalization, and a cover for the hegemonic designs of the Bush administration and its Republican and Democratic supporters in Congress.

Yet the other rationalizations simply did not have much credibility. The supposed threat to American and regional security from the much-talked-about Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appears to have been a ruse. No such weapons have been found thus far, likely validating the assessment of many independent strategic analysts, key Iraqi defectors, and former chief UNSCOM weapons inspector Scott Ritter that Iraq's WMD program had been effectively dismantled.

Likewise, no significant Iraqi link to the al Qaeda network has been established. Even before the invasion, Bush administration claims of Iraqi backing for terrorist groups contradicted prior assessments by the State Department and various U.S. intelligence agencies. Now, despite the capture of many thousands of Iraqi documents and the interrogation of Iraqi intelligence officials, there appears to have been no significant Iraqi support for terrorist groups for more than a decade.

There was never any debate about the repressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime and the genuine relief that many Iraqis feel regarding the end of the pervasive climate of fear that had gripped the country for a generation. At the same time, it is significant that Iraqi celebrations over the regime's collapse have been relatively muted. A few hundred celebrants in a city of five million should not be portrayed as representing the sentiments of the population as a whole. Indeed, outside of some Kurdish areas of Iraq, there has not been much gratitude expressed by the population in response to the U.S. invasion. Though some American analysts have drawn analogies to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the overthrow of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, those 1989 celebrations were much larger and more enthusiastic. There is a big difference between tearing down the statues of an ousted dictator yourself and having it done by an invading army.

(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is Middle East editor of the Foreign Policy in Focus project (online at www.fpif.org) and is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003). He is an associate professor of politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies program at the University of San Francisco.)

EYES ON DIFFERENT PRIZES
By John Feffer

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305roh.html .)

Roh Moo-hyun is coming to Washington with a public and a private message. Publicly, the South Korean president will affirm his government's desire to strengthen its relationship with the United States and bring a peaceful end to the nuclear crisis with North Korea. The private message, which won't appear in any newspaper headlines, will be: "Mr. Bush, please don't screw things up for us."

The two Koreas have been moving closer together, despite the rhetoric coming out of Washington and Pyongyang's persistent attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon. According to the South Korean ministry of unification, interactions between North and South Korea last year were the most intensive since regular contacts began in 1989.

This year, after removing mines from the Demilitarized Zone, the two countries established the first road link in fifty years, and several delegations have already made the trip north. A sixth reunion of divided families has also taken place. The two sides will soon begin construction on a huge joint industrial park just north of the border.

Roh Moo-hyun is keeping his eyes on the prize of greater inter-Korean cooperation. If the two Germanys were able to pull of such a feat during the most dangerous years of the cold war, surely Korea can follow suit. Unfortunately, both North Korea and the United States are eyeing very different prizes.

Since taking office in 2000, President Bush has steered U.S. relations toward this isolated country into a diplomatic cul-de-sac. Even before including North Korea in the infamous "axis of evil," the Bush administration was keeping an ever-elusive prize in its sight: regime change in Pyongyang.

Toward this end, the administration has campaigned against any policies that might extend the life of the current North Korean government, from the 1994 Agreed Framework to South Korea's engagement policy. The Bush team has so far relied on economic containment and diplomatic non-engagement to bring down the North Korean government. Should these strategies prove insufficient, the administration has also drawn up several military scenarios, including a surgical strike on North Korea's nuclear complex.

In its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, Pyongyang has been an accomplice in this deterioration in relations. During the 1990s, North Korea considered its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining chips and deterrents. In the late 1990s, it became clear that the bargaining chip of a potential nuclear program was not securing the kind of diplomatic recognition (from the United States or Japan) or economic carrots (nuclear energy, foreign direct investment) that North Korea expected. Pyongyang enlisted the help of Pakistan to develop a secret uranium enrichment program and, when the Bush administration brought a new hard line to Washington, accelerated this program in 2001.

(John Feffer, <johnfeffer@aol.com> is the editor of the forthcoming Power Trip: Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11 (Seven Stories, 2003) and writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He is currently finishing a book on U.S.-Korean relations.)

U.S. AND INDIA--A DANGEROUS ALLIANCE
By Conn Hallinan

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305india.html .)

In the wake of the Iraq War, growing tensions with Iran, and a possible confrontation with North Korea, it would be easy to miss the formation of yet another Washington think tank. But the freshly minted U.S.-India Institute for Strategic Policy is an organization to watch and one that may help reveal the next target of American power: containing China.

The Institute, closely aligned with the ultra-conservative Center for Security Policy, is the outcome of a series of quiet meetings and low-profile joint military operations between the U.S. and the government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, dominated by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

In May of last year Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and one of the most hawkish members of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle, hosted a meeting of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group to map out joint defense strategies for the two countries. These included planning joint naval patrols of the strategic Malacca Strait, workshops on ballistic missile defense, and cooperation in defense technology. While the goal, according to conference documents, was to build "stability and security in Asia and beyond," according to PR Chari of the New Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, "stabilization" is a code: "What they really mean is how to deal with China."

China is certainly on the minds of administration-linked think tanks. As Lloyd Richardson of the Hudson Institute told the Financial Times, India has the "economic and military strength to counter the adverse effects of China's rise as a regional and world power. India is the most overlooked of our potential allies in a strategy to contain China." That analysis was paralleled in a recent, classified U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) document revealed by Jane's Foreign Report. The document argues that "China represents the most significant threat to both countries' (India and the U.S.) security in the future as an economic and military competitor." The document also quoted an unnamed U.S. admiral as saying that both the U.S. and India view China as a strategic threat, "though we do not discuss this publicly." The document goes on to observe that U.S. relations with its "traditional" allies in Asia--South Korea and Japan--have become "fragile," and concludes that "India should emerge as a vital component of U.S. strategy."

The administration lifted sanctions against India for its 1998 violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and resumed arms sales. Even the White House's choice for Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwell, must have set off alarm bells in Beijing. Blackwell was a member of the Vulcans--candidate George W. Bush's team of foreign policy advisers--most of whom opposed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and supported deployment of an ABM system. The Chinese have long felt the ABM system now being assembled in Alaska is aimed at them.

Joining up with the Bush administration's strategy to "contain" China may not be a path India wants to follow. China is indeed a growing power in Asia, with the sixth-largest economy in the world. But there is no evidence it is particularly aggressive. It has certainly played a peacemaker role on the Korean peninsula.

And military competition with China will be painful for the average Indian. India spends $14 billion a year on its military, while half of its children are malnourished, and 350 million people go to bed hungry. One third of India's one billion people are illiterate, and the country spends only 1.9% of its Gross Domestic Product on education, about half of what most East Asian countries spend.

The burdens of poverty and illiteracy are likely to be far more destabilizing to India than Chinese influence in Asia, and India should have no illusions that a military alliance with the U.S. will open the aid spigots. American foreign aid has been declining for decades, and U.S. economic difficulties, coupled with the Iraq War, will undoubtedly accelerate that trend.

(Conn Hallinan <connm@cats.ucsc.edu> is the provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

FROM BAGHDAD TO TEHRAN?
By Jim Lobe

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305tehran.html .)

With Iraq under U.S. occupation and Syria's leaders shaken by a series of high-level threats from top Bush administration officials, Iran has come under increased U.S. pressure. As officials in Washington talk about "Iranian agents" crossing the border into Iraq to foment trouble for the U.S. occupation, a leading neoconservative strategist Monday said the United States is already in a "death struggle" with Tehran, and he urged the administration of President George W. Bush to "take the fight to Iran," through "covert operations," among other measures.

The appeal by the chief editor of The Weekly Standard, William Kristol, followed last week's surprise announcement that U.S. military forces had signed a surrender agreement with rebel Iranian forces based in Iraq that permits them to retain their weapons and equipment, including tanks, despite their formal designation by the State Department as a terrorist group. The agreement between the military and the Mujahedeen Khalq sparked speculation that Washington may deploy the group, which had been supported by Baghdad for more than 20 years, against Tehran or its allies in Iraq, despite its terrorist tactics.

"The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East," wrote Kristol in the Standard's latest issue. "The next great battle--not, we hope, a military battle--will be for Iran. We are already in a death struggle with Iran over the future of Iraq," added the editor, who is closely associated with Richard Perle and other neoconservatives in the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board (DPB).

Kristol's blast reflects the ongoing and increasingly intense policy debate within the administration between hawks centered in the Defense Department and Vice President Dick Cheney's office on the one hand and "realists" in the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the other.

The hawks have been encouraged in that view by much of the Iranian exile community, according to Gary Sick, a Columbia University expert who served on the National Security Council under the Carter administration. "The argument among the American ayatollahs (of conservatism) is that the only solution for Iran is to get rid of the regime," says Sick. "They say that the Iranian people are ready to rise up, the regime is about to collapse, but people in Iran say this is just nonsense. The situation in Iran was far more unsettled in 1999 than it is now," added Sick, who noted that suspicions among Iranians that Washington is already trying to manipulate the internal situation is "complicating the life of (Iran's) reformers."

But, notes Richard Augustus Norton, an expert on Shia Islam at Boston University and a retired U.S. army colonel who served in UN operations in Lebanon, the neoconservative approach "plays into the hands of the hard-liners [in Iran]. The Bush people are certainly right that there is a large constituency within Iran that favors better ties [with the U.S.]. But most Iranians, including the reformers, regard the government as legitimate." Norton continued, "It seems that Kristol and others are more intent on creating chaos and instability than they are with changing things for the better."

The fact that prominent neoconservatives closely tied to administration hawks are now calling for covert action against Tehran, combined with the surrender accord with the Mujahedeen, will, in any case, make it far more difficult for forces with influence in Iran to press for cooperation with Washington. Sick said he was "totally surprised" by the surrender accord, whose details still have not been released. "The notion that we would join forces with (the Mujahedeen) really undercuts the whole idea of our war on terrorism," he noted, and will preclude "any kind of working arrangement with Iran."

But Kristol and his comrades in and out of the administration insist that there is no point in working with Tehran anyway and much to be gained by helping oust the "theocrats." "Iran is the tipping point in the war on proliferation, the war on terror, and the effort to reshape the Middle East. If Iran goes pro-Western and anti-terror, positive changes in Syria and Saudi Arabia will follow much more easily. And the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement will greatly improve," wrote Kristol.

(Jim Lobe <jlobe@starpower.net> is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)

II. Outside the U.S.

(Editor's Note: FPIF's "Outside the U.S." component aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. If you're interested in submitting commentaries for our use, please send your solicitation to John Gershman at <john@irc-online.org>.)

PAX ROMANA VERSUS PAX AMERICANA: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES OF IMPERIAL MANAGEMENT
By Walden Bello

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Outside the U.S. commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0305empire.html .)

After its successful invasion of Iraq, the U.S. appears to be at the height of its power. One can understand why many feel the U.S. is supreme and omnipotent. Indeed, this is precisely what Washington wants the world to think.

No doubt, the U.S. is very powerful militarily. There is good reason to think, however, that it is overextended. In fact, the main strategic result of the occupation of Iraq is to worsen this condition of overextension.

Overextension

Overextension refers to a mismatch between goals and means, with means referring not only to military resources but to political and ideological ones as well. Under the reigning neoconservatives, Washington's goal is to achieve overwhelming military dominance over any rival or coalition of rivals. This quest for even greater global dominance, however, inevitably generates opposition, and it is in this resistance that we see the roots of overextension. Overextension is relative--an overextended power may in fact be in a worse condition even with a significant increase in its military power if resistance to its power increases by an even greater degree.

This point may sound surreal after the massive firepower we witnessed on television night after night over the past month. But consider the following and ask whether they are not signs of overreach: the failure to consolidate a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan outside of Kabul; the inability of a key ally, Israel, to quell, even with Washington's unrestricted support, the Palestinian people's uprising; the inflaming of Arab and Muslim sentiment in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, resulting in massive ideological gains for Islamic fundamentalists--which was what Osama bin Laden had been hoping for in the first place; the collapse of the cold war "Atlantic Alliance" and the emergence of a new countervailing alliance, with Germany and France at the center of it; the forging of a powerful global civil society movement against U.S. unilateralism, militarism, and economic hegemony, the most recent significant expression of which is the anti-war movement; the loss of legitimacy of Washington's foreign policy and global military presence, with its global leadership now widely viewed, even among its allies, as imperial domination; the emergence of a powerful anti-American movement in South Korea, which is the forward point of the U.S. military presence in East Asia; the coming to power of anti-neoliberal, anti-U.S. movements in Washington's own backyard--Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador--as the Bush administration is preoccupied with the Middle East; an increasingly negative impact of militarism on the economy, as U.S. military spending becomes dependent on deficit spending, and deficit spending becomes more and more dependent on financing from foreign sources, creating more stresses and strains within an economy that is already in the grip of deflation.

Just a few days after its military victory over a fourth-rate power, we are already witnessing the political quicksand that the Americans have stepped into in Iraq, as fundamentalist Islamic political currents among the majority Shiites appear to be the political inheritors of the deposing of Saddam Hussein. If a stable, pro-U.S. order in the Middle East is Washington's goal, then that is nowhere in sight. What is likely instead is greater instability that will tempt Washington to employ more military power and deploy more military units, leading to a spiral of violence from which there is no easy exit.

(Walden Bello <W.Bello@focusweb.org> is a professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines and executive director of Focus on the Global South (online at www.focusweb.org) where this first appeared and is reprinted by Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

III. Letters and Comments

DEMOCRATS SHOULD PAY ATTENTION

Re: Poll Shows Public Supports Iraq War but Rejects Unilateralism and an Imperial Role for the U.S.

As the Democratic Party struggles to develop a platform that will resonate with the public in 2004, it should pay special attention to this poll. So-called "New Democrats" seem content to limit their fiercest attacks to Mr. Bush's domestic agenda; yet these poll results indicate the president's vulnerability on foreign policy, too. By attacking, specifically, the administration's unilateralism, Democrats can still espouse the resoundingly popular goal of "international security" while appealing to equally popular misgivings about the means by which the U.S. is pursuing it. Particularly by decrying the staggering economic costs of a unilateral Iraq reconstruction, the Democrats have an opportunity to highlight eloquently the connection between the administration's irresponsible foreign and domestic policies. The truly "electable wing" of the Democratic Party, after all, will prove to be the one that can favorably distinguish itself from the president on the greatest number of policy fronts.

- Ben Van Heuvelen <bvanheuvelen@wesleyan.edu>

DEATH FOR PROFIT BUSINESS

Re: Fateful Choice Statement

Forgive me for adding this, but we need to get private multinational corporations out of the death for profit business. Military weapons need to be wrenched from private profiteers and placed into the state. That would solve most of the problems.

- Janis Schmidt <jlschmidt@gwtc.net>

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