The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

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Editor: John Gershman (IRC)

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

IRAQ: DESCENDING INTO THE QUAGMIRE
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

PENTAGON MOVING SWIFTLY TO BECOME "GLOBOCOP"
By Jim Lobe

THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ: AN EXPERIMENT WITH UNILATERAL HUMANITARIANISM
By Joel R. Charny

ROAD MAP: SHARON & THE RECORD
By Conn Hallinan

 

II. Outside the U.S.

INDIA MAY SEND TROOPS TO IRAQ
By Ninan Koshy

 

III. Letters and Comments

CHALLENGES FOR UN POLICE and RESPONSE by Don Kraus

VERY PLEASED

I. Updates and Out-takes

IRAQ: DESCENDING INTO THE QUAGMIRE
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new policy report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/quagmire2003.html .)

Between May 1, when President Bush declared that major combat in Iraq was over, and June 26, 57 U.S. and eight UK military personnel have died in Iraq. That is more than one death every day. To the U.S. and UK toll must be added the sometimes tens or scores of Iraqis, both Saddamists--military, intelligence, fedayeen, non-Iraqi volunteers--and innocent civilians.

Having splashed the President's declaration over their electronic and newspaper front pages and magazine covers, the media are edging ever so gingerly toward serious questioning of what kind of "war" U.S. and UK troops (the "Authority") are fighting in Iraq. "Counterinsurgency," a 1960s buzzword, has already re-appeared in some reports. The dreaded "quagmire" has also been voiced. The Pentagon denies it is doing "body counts"--although the media always seems to know the number of guerrilla dead. Can "free fire zones," "five o'clock follies" (the daily official U.S. military briefings in Saigon), and "light at the end of the tunnel" be far off?

These phrases bring to mind Bernard Fall, author, chronicler, and journalist in the Vietnam War. Very early in that war--December 10, 1964--Fall delivered a lecture at the Naval War College on "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." Parts of his presentation seem as current today in the context of Iraq as they were in 1964 for Vietnam.

For example, Fall believed that the real objective of guerrilla (or small) war methods is to advance "an ideology or a political system." The U.S. government saw fighting as the primary challenge and responded by seeking a military solution. In so doing, it misjudged the depth and extent of political action by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong--the primacy of "political, ideological, and administrative" control--and thus the true nature of their "revolutionary warfare." Moreover, in failing to properly assess the political and ideological (nationalistic) forces at work in Vietnam, the Johnson and Nixon administrations tended to mischaracterize (or ignore) the multitudinous economic and social cross-currents that were represented by those committed to the cause of Vietnam unification under Vietnamese leaders.

The result was a steady build-up of U.S. personnel and equipment and the expenditures of billions of dollars, none of which brought the U.S. any nearer to the tunnel's end--but all of which added to the casualties on both sides and exponentially increased the alienation of the civilian population. Even Buddhist monks protested, with some expressing their opposition to the repressive Saigon government and the actions of its U.S. ally through self-immolation. As Fall noted, "One can do almost anything with brute force except salvage an unpopular government."

In Iraq, as one phase of the "global war on terror," the Bush administration chose war and occupation, and must now face the consequences of its choices. Having dislodged the previous regime by force, the U.S. increasingly is caught in the quagmire of depending on force to control the Iraqi people in the name of national and regional "peace." But "peace through war" or the threat of war is a costly chimera, both for the "victor" and the loser. This truth was well understood by the 19th Century British statesman Edmund Burke, who noted that "War never leaves where it found a nation."

What remains to be seen is what price will be exacted from the U.S. public--and in what condition Iraq will be in two, five, or 10 years.

(Dan Smith <dan@fcnl.org> is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)

PENTAGON MOVING SWIFTLY TO BECOME "GLOBOCOP"
By Jim Lobe

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306globocop.html .)

Much like its successful military campaign in Iraq, the Pentagon is moving at breakneck speed to redeploy U.S. forces and equipment around the world in ways that will permit Washington to play "Globocop," according to a number of statements by top officials and defense planners. While preparing sharp reductions in forces in Germany, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, military planners are talking about establishing semi-permanent or permanent bases along a giant swathe of global territory--increasingly referred to as "the arc of instability," from the Caribbean Basin through Africa to South and Central Asia and across to the North Korea.

The latest details, disclosed by the Wall Street Journal on June 10th, include plans to increase U.S. forces in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea from Yemen, setting up semi-permanent "forward bases" in Algeria, Morocco, and possibly Tunisia, and smaller facilities in Senegal, Ghana, and Mali that could be used to intervene in oil-rich West African countries, particularly Nigeria. Similar bases--or what some call lily pads--are now being sought or expanded in northern Australia, Thailand (whose prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, has found this to figure high on the bilateral agenda in talks in Washington, DC this week), Singapore, the Philippines, Kenya, Georgia, Azerbaijan, throughout Central Asia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Qatar, even Vietnam, and, Iraq.

"We are in the process of taking a fundamental look at our military posture worldwide, including in the United States," said Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz on a recent visit to Singapore, where he met with military chiefs and defense ministers from throughout East Asia about U.S. plans there. "We're facing a very different threat than any one we've faced historically."

Those plans represent a major triumph for Wolfowitz, who 12 years ago argued in a controversial draft "Defense Planning Guidance" (DPG) for realigning U.S. forces globally so as to "retain preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our own interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

The same draft, which was largely repudiated by the first Bush administration after it was leaked to the New York Times, also argued for "a unilateral U.S. defense guarantee" to Eastern Europe "preferably in cooperation with other NATO states" and the use of pre-emptive force against nations with weapons of mass destruction--both of which are now codified as U.S. strategic doctrine. The same draft DPG also argued that U.S. military intervention should become a "constant fixture" of the new world order. It is precisely that capability toward which the Pentagon's force realignments appears to be directed.

With forward bases located all along the "arc of instability," Washington can pre-position equipment and at least some military personnel that would permit it to intervene with overwhelming force within hours of the outbreak of any crisis. In that respect, U.S. global strategy would not be dissimilar to Washington's position vis-a-vis the Caribbean Basin in the early 20th century, when U.S. intervention from bases stretching from Puerto Rico to Panama became a "constant feature" of the region until Franklin Roosevelt initiated his Good Neighbor Policy. Indeed, as pointed out by Max Boot, a neoconservative writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, Wolfowitz's 1992 draft, now mostly codified in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA, is not all that different from the 1904 (Theodore) Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted Washington's "international police power" to intervene against "chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society."

Remarkably, the new and proposed deployments are being justified by similar rhetoric. Just substitute "globalization" for "civilization."

(Jim Lobe <jlobe@starpower.net> is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)

THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ: AN EXPERIMENT WITH UNILATERAL HUMANITARIANISM
By Joel R. Charny

(Editor's Note: In our latest contribution toward discussing the political and ethical challenges facing humanitarian relief groups working in occupied Iraq, Joel Charny of Refugees International offers an analysis of the implications for U.S. humanitarian relief NGOs within a relief and reconstruction framework controlled by the Pentagon, and the lack of public debate that has characterized the transformation of the U.S. approach to humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. For a previous contribution to this debate see Kevin Murray's commentary at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306humane.html. The following excerpt is from Charny's commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306dodreconst.html .)

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and its coalition partners, embodies a new approach to post-conflict humanitarian action. This approach unifies security, governance, humanitarian response, and reconstruction under the control of the Department of Defense. Humanitarian action is unilateral in character and linked inextricably to the U.S. security agenda in the context of the global war on terrorism. The UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations, traditionally the coordinators and implementers of humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction programs, are expected to play supportive roles within an effort managed by the Pentagon.

While public attention has focused on the Iraq war as the expression of the Bush administration's new national security policy of pre-emptive self-defense, there has been virtually no public discussion of the far-reaching implications of the administration's new approach to humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. These implications include:

• Militarizing humanitarian assistance to a degree not seen since the founding of the UN and the expansion of the capacity and impact of global nongovernmental organizations.
• Giving the military responsibility for diplomatic, political, and humanitarian tasks that it is unqualified to perform effectively.
• Minimizing the contributions of donor governments and independent agencies, since most foreign governments, UN agencies, and NGOs are reluctant to collaborate with the U.S. military, thus vastly increasing the financial and administrative burden on the United States.

This approach represents a radical break from the multilateral character of post-conflict efforts over the past decade in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. While the record of these operations is mixed, with only East Timor being an unequivocal success, UN leadership on balance has been positive, especially in establishing the legitimacy of the emerging post-conflict political authority. In Afghanistan, the UN demonstrated that it could work on political issues within the framework of a U.S-led military campaign. The UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, brilliantly managed the post-Taliban political consultation process that resulted in the creation of the internationally recognized Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. Unilateral political management by the U.S. would not necessarily have resulted in the same outcome.

(Joel R. Charny is vice president for policy with Refugees International (online at www.refugeesinternational.org), a Washington, DC-based humanitarian advocacy organization. He wrote this for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

ROAD MAP: SHARON & THE RECORD
By Conn Hallinan

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full online at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306sharon.html .)

One thing to keep in mind about the current push for peace between Israelis and Palestinians is that Ariel Sharon is one of the most consistent political figures in the Middle East, and he keeps his word. It is a deeply chilling observation.

Back in the early 1970s, when Sharon engineered the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, he was always clear that they were permanent, and that their primary function was military. "They guard both the birthright of the Jewish people," he told the newspaper Ha'aretz, "and also grant us essential strategic depth to protect our existence." For all his talk about "painful concessions" in the present "road map," those priorities have never altered a whit.

However, like any good general, deception is always central to his strategy.

In the uproar created over his use of the word "occupation" to describe Israeli presence in the Territories, most people missed the fine print. Sharon did indeed use the word, but quietly told his supporters that the "occupation" referred to the Palestinians in "those cities," not the land. In short, while Israel intends to maintain its hold over the West Bank, it doesn't want the burden of feeding and providing basic services to the increasingly impoverished Palestinian population. Some 1.8 million are presently being fed by various international agencies.

Asked by Likud lawmakers if ending the "occupation" meant freezing settlements, he told them there were "no restrictions" against expanding the settlements: "you can build for your children and your grandchildren, and I hope for your great-grandchildren."

The key to understanding the Prime Minister, says Israeli Knesset member Yossi Sarid, is that "Sharon is a deceiver."

The settlements of Shiloh and Beit El are a case in point. Sharon told the New York Times "I know that we will have to part with some of these places. As a Jew, this agonizes me." But when asked about the two settlements by the conservative Jerusalem Post, he said, "Jews will live there," and made it clear that the Palestinians would never regain control of Shiloh and Beit El.

The present "road map" is a three-stage plan whose goal is the eventual establishment of an "independent, viable, and sovereign Palestinian state" by 2005, and peace for Israel. But is hard to imagine how that would come about if Israel maintains its 150 plus settlements in the Occupied Territories.

Continuing to allow some 220,000 Israeli settlers (plus another 200,000 in East Jerusalem) to remain in place is a non-starter for the Palestinians. As the Palestinian's chief negotiator Saeb Erekat says, "It's either the settlements or peace. Both cannot go together."

(Conn Hallinan <connm@cats.ucsc.edu> is the provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

II. Outside the U.S.

(Editor's Note: FPIF's "Outside the U.S." component aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. If you're interested in submitting commentaries for our use, please send your solicitation to John Gershman at <john@irc-online.org>.)

INDIA MAY SEND TROOPS TO IRAQ
By Ninan Koshy

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new Outside the U.S. commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2003/0306indtroops.html .)

Responding to the U.S. request to send troops to occupied, post-war Iraq, India's army is going full steam ahead with preparations for possible deployment. Meanwhile, Indian policy makers are grasping for justifications that the mobilization would be under a UN umbrella and would serve the national interest, neither of which is plausible.

This futile groping would have found no place on India's agenda if the authorities in the Ministry of External Affairs had heeded the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Indian Parliament.

In early May, Washington asked New Delhi to depute a sizable Indian military unit to help restore law and order in Iraq. Both U.S. President George W. Bush and his Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeated the request to India's Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani during his June U.S. visit.

In between those dates, on May 23, the Security Council ratified Resolution 1483, making no mention whatsoever of the UN assuming a peace-keeping role in Iraq or offering the proverbial umbrella that some Indian government leaders and critics see as an argument for the country's troop deployment.

(Dr. Ninan Koshy <knkoshy@vsnl.com> is a political commentator based in Trivandrum, Kerala, India, author of The War on Terror: Reordering the World (LeftWord Press, New Delhi, 2003), and a regular analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

III. Letters and Comments

CHALLENGES FOR UN POLICE

Re: The Need for UN Police

In the "International Rule of Law and Antiterrorism Act" is there any mention of the country requesting the cops (in this case, the U.S. in Iraq) being required to abide by international law? If so, it would be impossible to even consider sending UN police to legitimize what is by UN standards an illegal occupation of a sovereign state. This legislation should be dead on arrival and there should be no room for promoting it here under the present circumstances.

- Eric Walberg <eric@albatros.uz>

Response from Don Kraus:

The legislation (HR1414) primarily calls for the U.S. to support the creation of such a force, but it does not stipulate its design. That said, although Coalition for UN was and is opposed to the U.S. war in Iraq, the role that a UN Civilian Police Corp could play there-and elsewhere--is to make the lives of Iraqi's more secure by helping to restore law and order. When you are in the middle of chaos, it doesn't matter who started it nearly as much as who will help you regain some semblance of normalcy.

VERY PLEASED

Re: Winning Round Two of American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds

I was very pleased to read R.S. Zaharna's piece on the lessons and new goals of American Public Diplomacy. It is certainly clear that we have not yet succeeded in finding common ground with the Arab populations abroad. Ms. Zaharna is correct to assert that our public diplomacy efforts are even more essential during times of conflict, especially the conflicts that the U.S. is now engaged in. In the Arab world, people-to-people diplomacy is essential. It is culturally relevant and it can succeed, but to do so I believe we must take a lesson from the past.

Following World War II and the internment of so many Japanese-Americans in the United States, our nation faced a very similar battle to the current situation in the Middle East. We had to find ways to reach out to the Japanese population; we had to find common ground. To do so our government focused on student exchange and culture. By 1955, three years after occupation ended, we had established 14 Cultural Centers across Japan with open-shelf book and magazine collections, films, and speakers. Further, we promoted cultural events, like performances of Carousel and On The Town, photo exhibitions, and seminars by novelist William Faulkner. We found that the path to success required both mass communication and personal contact.

I congratulate Foreign Policy in Focus on this piece and I certainly hope that our government can learn from the lessons of the past, when funding was available to have these public diplomacy successes. In the current appropriations process even a $10 million increase would do wonders to help our ability to personally reach out to the world, not just send mass television campaigns and McDonald's. Ms. Zaharna was exactly right in her comment that "public diplomacy, like traditional diplomacy, is more about building relationships than sending out messages." Hopefully our government will heed the lessons of the past, and act accordingly.

- Jack H. Shellenberger, President, Japan-America Student Conference, Inc. <jascinc@jasc.org>

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