The Progressive Response

Volume 7, Number 24
August 12, 2003

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

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Editor: John Gershman (IRC)

 

Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

APOLOGIES TO OUR READERS

LIBERIA: BEYOND THE TROOPS-NO-TROOPS DEBATE
By Emira Woods and Carl Patrick Burrowes

WHY WE SHOULD TRANSFER THE ADMINISTRATION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS: FOUR THESES
By Stephen Zunes

BUSH ADMINISTRATION DIVIDED OVER THE ROAD TO TEHRAN
By Jim Lobe

 

II. Letters and Comments

DISMAY and A RESPONSE BY PAUL LOEB

UN MANDATE IN IRAQ GOOD FOR IRAQIS

SOVEREIGNTY THE TOUGHEST PROBLEM

SUFFERING OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE

 


I. Updates and Out-takes

APOLOGIES TO OUR READERS

On Wednesday, July 30 someone using a mailserver named accesskenya exploited a security hole in our Progressive Response listserver. A number of you received several mailings between Wednesday and Friday, then, containing viruses bearing our email address. We are profoundly sorry for any inconvenience or disruption this may have caused.

As soon as we became aware of the situation we immediately began working with our listserv host to correct the problem and also informed listserv members of the steps we were taking. We have eliminated the security flaw and have also added some additional security measures to prevent similar attacks from happening in the future. Additionally, please know that we never send attachments through our listserv, and in general don't send attachments unless we've received a specific request to do so by a particular user, so any attachments you may receive via email in the future purporting to be from us can be safely disregarded as another bogus attempt to spread a virus.

We want to highlight that this was an explicit attack on FPIF's electronic resources--attacks that we expect, sadly, to increase. We are taking steps to make FPIF's website and electronic outreach less vulnerable to such attacks. However, there will always be ways to make an email appear (at least superficially) to come from someone you trust, when in fact it is from a spammer or hacker, so please beware of any unsolicited attachments in particular.

We want to thank everyone who sent emails or called us to let us know they were being victimized and apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused. If you have become infected with the virus, there are directions at

http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=WORM_LOVELORN.B

for how to clear up the problem. (You only need to worry about the attachments you received if you're running a Windows system; this virus does not work on Macintosh, OS/2, UNIX, or Linux boxes.)

Thank you again for your support and your patience.

John Gershman
Editor, Progressive Response on behalf of the FPIF staff

 

LIBERIA: BEYOND THE TROOPS-NO-TROOPS DEBATE
By Emira Woods and Carl Patrick Burrowes

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new policy report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/liberia2003.html .)

Fueled by media images of carnage and desperation, a debate has been begun regarding a possible U.S. role in Liberia, but so far it has been all troops or no troops, without adequate attention to the big picture. The initial response of the Bush administration has been to send a military assessment team, which received a warm reception from war-weary civilians.

With two rebel movements closing in on the government of warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor, humanitarian conditions throughout the country are dire: half the population is malnourished and are facing outbreaks of cholera. In the capital, Monrovia, the war is affecting one and a half million people who have sought refuge. Once a vibrant and bustling seaport, the city lies in ruin, with no running water or electricity. Unemployment stands at 80% and the average income is U.S. $83 per year.

The nation's eagerness for U.S. involvement is rooted in the deep and complicated ties that have bound the two countries for over 180 years. As is often noted, Liberia is an outgrowth of the United States, founded in 1822 as a haven for free African Americans. During World War II, the country provided bases for U.S. military campaigns in North Africa. After the War, Liberian iron ore and timber flowed to U.S. ports, while streams of American television shows, popular music, and well-known consumer brands went the other way. Liberia was a major supplier of natural rubber to the United States until the 1970s, when prices plummeted due to competition from synthetics. After the U.S.-trained army seized power in the 1980s, American military aid increased from $1.4 million to $14 million annually, effectively militarizing the society and allowing the expanded army to become increasingly repressive in its bid to retain power. Despite these long-standing relations, a devaluation of Africa's strategic value at the end of the cold war led the United States to abruptly withdraw from Liberia, which contributed to the implosion of the state.

Given this history, the U.S. has an obligation to help with Liberia's recovery, but assistance ought to extend beyond the dramatic and militaristic. If Liberia is to break its cycle of violence and decline, six major peace-building tasks will need to be undertaken--all of which would benefit from American financial and technical assistance: establishing a governing structure; enforcing peace; stemming the flow of weapons to the region; kick-starting the economy; and recovering looted assets.

The most urgent task facing Liberia--and probably the most important--is the creation of a government capable of undertaking the difficult tasks of rebuilding and rehabilitation. Toward that end, Liberian politicians, including representatives of Taylor's government and two rebel factions, have been meeting for several weeks in Ghana to form an interim government. But these talks are following the same flawed script that between 1990 and 1998 produced four transitional governments, each of which collapsed. First, they are being conducted behind closed doors by many of the same self-selected warlords and political elites who have failed to produce a lasting peace in the past. Second, they have focused on distributing government ministries to rival military and political factions. In the past, this formula has produced an executive branch that is representative and inclusive, but also inefficient and prone to collapse given the rivalries and antagonism it contained. It yields a structure without legitimacy or coherency, both sorely needed for the tasks of national reconstruction.

The Bush administration could help break this cycle by providing diplomatic support and security for the talks to be held in Monrovia, ensuring input from civil society, and scrutiny by the Liberian media. To reduce paralyzing antagonisms, nominees should be appointed only if they win support from three-fourths of the delegates participating in the talks. This would minimize participation in government by odious human rights violators and encourage the selection of fresh candidates, producing a more coherent and deliberative interim government. More importantly, Liberians should be encouraged to address their legacy of severe human rights abuses through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission or a War Crimes Tribunal--or both.

(Emira Woods is co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC. Carl Patrick Burrowes is chairperson, Communication Studies, Morgan State University, Baltimore, and co-author, The Historical Dictionary of Liberia (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, MD).)

 

WHY WE SHOULD TRANSFER THE ADMINISTRATION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS: FOUR THESES
By Stephen Zunes

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0307untrans.html .)

The invasion and occupation of Iraq posed new challenges to peace and justice activists. The growing credibility crisis of the Bush administration with respect to Iraq, as well as the ongoing crisis on the ground in Iraq, provides us with new opportunities. Below I present four theses on one campaign that could use these opportunities in a creative way: a campaign to turn the administration of Iraq over to the United Nations.

1. A United Nations administration would be more likely to bring peace and stability to Iraq.

The United States government is widely perceived by most Iraqis and other Middle Easterners as being less interested in the well-being of the Iraqi people than it is in the advancement of American political, military, and economic interests in the region. The apparent eagerness of the United States to invade Iraq, the gross exaggeration by U.S. officials of Iraq's military capabilities and its ties to terrorism, and many of the policies pursued by U.S. military authorities since the collapse of the Iraqi government have led many to see the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq not as an act of liberation but an act or imperialism.

By contrast, administration by the United Nations--which represents the entire international community, including eighteen Arab states--is less likely to be seen as a foreign military occupation but rather as a transitional administration, and is therefore less likely to encourage armed opposition. Without the disruption of a growing armed insurgency, efforts at restoring basic services, maintaining stability, and setting up a democratic and representative Iraqi government would be far easier.

2. Turning over control of Iraq to the UN would be in the best interests of Americans.

American soldiers continue to die every week in Iraq. American deaths since the end of formal hostilities will likely soon surpass those killed during the war itself. The consultative council appointed by U.S. occupation forces appears to have little power or credibility among the population and Iraq appears to be a long way from genuine self-governance. It is unlikely that the Bush administration will be able to bring to power a new Iraqi regime that has the support of the majority of the Iraqi people.

The ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq, particularly the killings of Iraqi civilians by American soldiers, is resulting in the growth of anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab and Islamic world. This could increase the ranks of extremist groups like the terrorist al Qaeda network, whose leaders are now more easily able to portray the United States as an imperialist power committed to the conquest and subjugation of Muslim peoples and the exploitation of the region's natural resources. This would be far more difficult to do, however, if Iraq were instead provisionally governed by an international regime under UN auspices.

3. The United Nations could succeed in such an effort.

The United Nations, like other intergovernmental bodies, is an imperfect organization made up of a large number of governments with their own distinct national interests. However, because the UN represents virtually the entire international community and would be under a clear mandate to help bring stability and democracy to Iraq, it is less likely to allow narrow political and economic interests to shape its decisions.

Rarely has the UN been called upon to govern an entire nation. The most clear-cut precedent for a direct UN administration of a country for a period of time until it was ready for self-rule involved East Timor. This former Portuguese colony was under a UN trusteeship for two years between the withdrawal of Indonesian occupation forces and the establishment of an independent, democratically elected government last year. While much smaller than Iraq, East Timor in many ways presented an even more formidable challenge than Iraq: It is one of the poorest countries in the world, one-third of its population lost their lives in the initial Indonesian invasion and occupation in the late 1970s, and much of the country's infrastructure was destroyed in a scorched-earth policy by Indonesian occupation forces and their East Timorese collaborators as they withdrew in September 2000. Despite some logistical problems, the UN operation in East Timor has widely been hailed as a major success and the new East Timorese government has emerged as a strong and democratic U.S. ally.

4. Such a campaign is winnable.

Public opinion polls published during the first week of July indicate that 60% of the American public believes that the United Nations should take leadership in post-war Iraq. Not surprisingly, there is strong support from liberals who have traditionally been skeptical of U.S. unilateralism and have supported a stronger role for the United Nations. However, these is also strong support from some moderates and conservatives who believe that there should be greater burden-sharing in the cause of nation-building and that it should not primarily be Americans who sacrifice lives and resources to bring greater freedom and stability to Iraq.

Bush administration officials may decide that fighting off reasonable proposals for a UN administration may call into question their last remaining credible rationalization for the invasion: the desire to bring stability and democracy to Iraq. In insisting that the United States, not the international community, has the right to determine the future of Iraq, it would only increase uncharitable speculation regarding the actual U.S. motivation for controlling that oil-rich country. The result could be that the administration may find that it would be in its favor to cut its losses and acquiesce to domestic and international pressure.

(Stephen Zunes <zunes@usfca.edu> is Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project (online at www.fpif.org) and serves as an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (available online at www.commoncouragepress.com).)

 

For more discussion on strategic choices facing the peace movement see:

Hope Out of Quagmire: Iraq and Peace Movement Opportunities
By Paul Rogat Loeb
http://www.fpif.org/papers/hope2003.html

Terminating the Bush Juggernaut
By Jeremy Brecher
http://www.fpif.org/papers/juggernaut/index.html

Going Global: Building A Movement Against Empire
By Phyllis Bennis
http://www.fpif.org/papers/justice2003.html

 

BUSH ADMINISTRATION DIVIDED OVER THE ROAD TO TEHRAN
By Jim Lobe

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.presentdanger.org/commentary/2003/0308iran.html .)

After the occupation of Iraq, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush appears to be torn between moving from Baghdad on to Tehran, or refocusing on al Qaeda as the main target in the "war on terrorism."

According to a series of leaks by U.S. officials, Iran has offered to hand over, if not directly to Washington then to friendly allies, three senior al Qaeda leaders and might provide another three top terrorist suspects that Washington believes are being held by Tehran. But its price--for the U.S. military to permanently shut down the operations of an Iraq-based Iranian rebel group that is on the State Department's official terrorism list--might be too high for some hard-liners, centered in the Pentagon and Vice President Dick Cheney's office, who led the charge for war in Iraq. Members of this group see the rebels, the Mujahedin el Khalq (MEK), or People's Mujahedin, as potentially helpful to their ambitions to achieve "regime change" in Iran, charter member of Bush's "axis of evil" and a nation that is believed to have accelerated its nuclear weapons program in recent months.

The question of what to do about the reported Iranian offer is one of the issues being discussed by Cheney, Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice during Bush's summer vacation at his Crawford, Texas ranch.

The State Department has been pushing the administration to engage Iran more directly in pursuit of the best deal possible and was reportedly authorized to hold one meeting with the Iranians two weeks ago. Washington and Tehran broke off bilateral relations during the U.S. embassy hostage crisis in 1980, but quiet meetings were held over the past year, until they were broken off in mid-May after administration hard-liners charged that a series of terrorist attacks carried out against U.S. and other foreign targets in Saudi Arabia May 12th were organized from Iranian territory, presumably with the approval of elements of its government.

But the same hard-liners reportedly oppose a deal with Tehran, which they depict not only as a sponsor of terrorism determined to acquire nuclear weapons, but also an exhausted dictatorship teetering on the verge of collapse that could be easily overthrown in a popular insurrection, with covert U.S. help or even military intervention. The hawks are backed by the Likud government in Israel, which has been urging Washington to go after Iran since even before the war in Iraq. As soon as Iraq is dealt with, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told the New York Post last November, he "will push for Iran to be at the top of the 'to do' list."

Pentagon hard-liners, who exert the greatest control over the occupation authority in Iraq, last month authorized the re-birth of the arm of Saddam Hussein's intelligence service--the Mukhabarat--that worked on Iran, according to the Pentagon-backed Iraqi National Congress (INC), which is helping in the effort. That was the same unit that worked closely with the MEK under Saddam Hussein.

The MEK, which began in the late 1960s as a left-wing Islamist movement against the Shah but broke violently with the leaders of the Islamic Republic after the 1978-79 revolution, was given its own bases, tanks, and other heavy weapons by the Iraqi leader during the Iran-Iraq War, all of which it retained during his regime to use in raids against Iran, but also to help Hussein put down unrest, particularly after the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. forces bombed the group's bases in the initial phases of the Iraq campaign earlier this year, but negotiated a cease-fire and eventually a surrender as Washington expanded its control over Iraq. Yet the group has been permitted to retain most of its weapons, remain together, and, despite its listing by the State Department as a terrorist group and Tehran's demands that it be completely dismantled, continue radio broadcasting into Iran.

Although the MEK, which displays many of the characteristics of a cult in its hero-worship of its "first couple," Maryam and Massoud Rajavi, appears to have intelligence assets inside Iran--the group was the first to alert Washington to the existence of a previously unknown nuclear facility earlier this year--most Iran specialists believe it has no popular following there whatsoever, and is mostly despised due to its alliance with Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. "It's hard to see how they could ever be seen as a political asset to the United States in Iran," one administration official who favors a deal said. "The (MEK) is precisely the kind of common enemy against which both the reformists and the conservatives--and even the students--are likely to rally against."

A deal would also re-confirm to an increasingly skeptical Islamic world that al Qaeda was indeed the primary target of Bush's war on terror and not simply a pretext for a major intervention in the Middle East and the Gulf to ensure U.S. and Israeli domination of the entire region, say analysts here. "Our priority should be al Qaeda, and if we can engage the Iranians tactically to get some high-ranking al Qaeda operatives, we should," Flynt Leverett, the top Mideast expert on the National Security Council under both Clinton and Bush until his departure earlier this year, told the New York Times on August 2nd. The same analysts argue that disbanding the MEK would help demonstrate that Washington is not applying a double standard to different terrorist groups, depending on their usefulness.

But the Pentagon reportedly remains resistant to stronger action against the group. "There is no question that we have not disbanded them, and there is an ongoing debate about them between the office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department," Vince Cannistraro, a former counter-terrorism director in the Central Intelligence Agency, told USA Today in early August.

It appears that some officials believe the MEK could yet serve some purpose.

(Jim Lobe <jlobe@starpower.net> is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)

 


II. Letters and Comments

DISMAY

Re: Hope Out of Quagmire: Iraq and Peace Movement Opportunities

I continue to be dismayed at the connection, in print and news media, with the failure of foreign and domestic initiatives and the mental attitude of activists. These two statements, separated by a couple sentences at the beginning of the text are deeply frustrating to those of us who believe that one earns and keeps political power not by capitalizing on disaster but by offering up new, fresh, creative ideas. Loeb writes: "In the glow of the Iraq war's initial military success, most American peace activists felt profoundly demoralized... as Bush's occupation faces a deepening quagmire, shifting public sentiment opens up major new opportunities for activism."

The implication, maddeningly, is that the left has nothing to offer but criticism and no way to win but by hoping for and exploiting defeat and disasters inflicted on the country. I find this cynical in the extreme and devastating to constructive dialogue.

- M. Booth <4TUNATEONE@COMCAST.NET>

RESPONSE BY PAUL LOEB

I agree completely that the Left needs creative ideas, where we take our own initiative. That's why I wrote this piece. Fact is, however, peace activists were demoralized during the war, and profoundly so. If the letter writer wasn't, they were the exception. And Bush is making a ghastly mess of Iraq, just as many of us predicted. The cynical path would be to do nothing in response except to point out the mess. The appropriate response is to demand accountability for the mistakes that got us here, as activists are doing through campaigns like Win Without War and MoveOn.org's Misleader campaign, and then to come up with some visions that could actually make this a safer world, and begin to dig us out of the hole that policies like those of Bush have placed us in. Either we seize on new opportunities, or we don't, but to imply that we do best by paying no attention to the shifts in the political landscape is a recipe for ineffectiveness. Which is why I wrote the piece, to help give us a creative way forward.

 

UN MANDATE IN IRAQ GOOD FOR IRAQIS

Re: Hope Out of Quagmire: Iraq and Peace Movement Opportunities

Good article--but there's an important piece missing: why a UN mandate and peacekeeping force would be good for the Iraqi people and their future. There are moral as well as strategic reasons to emphasize this. It is morally right to do everything we can to restore basic services, peace, and normality to people who have suffered for so long--and international aid under UN auspices will likely do much more in this regard--and in a faster and more sustained manner. And it is strategically smart because it bolsters the argument against the U.S. going it alone.

- Peter Snoad <psnoad@yahoo.com>

 

SOVEREIGNTY THE TOUGHEST PROBLEM

Re: The Need for UN Police

Excellent article. Great suggestion. I agree with you 100%! Last year my article in the Humanist Magazine on the UN's Brahimi Report gives the same conclusion: a standing and quickly available Peace Force to protect the citizens wherever needed and to maintain stability and respect for law. Working out the UN political "sovereignty" dilemma will be the toughest battle, since oftentimes it's the menacing regime-currently-in-power that citizens need protection FROM!

- Beth K. Lamont <beth@Corliss-Lamont.org>

 

SUFFERING OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE

Re: A Moment of Truth for the Humanitarian Enterprise

I wholly agree that at any given time and situation NGOs have to adapt and try to bring about changes in the face of severe obstacles. We don't have to agree with the policies of the U.S. government to work in the field, nor should we stop doing every thing possible to try to stop any policy that runs against human rights or excludes NGOs from working in a neutral climate.

I believe that the suffering of millions of human beings is of paramount importance, beyond "idealism" and the "right ethics." Modern history has taught us that no unpopular measure is sustained against the wishes of people for long and even U.S. policymakers are now spending huge efforts in trying justify themselves to the people. With the power of the new media and a world where the general masses are well-intentioned, we have hope and we can defeat all things bad by being involved, doing our best, and carrying on trying to change things without throwing in the towel.

- Syed Z Hassan <szhassan@globalperspectives.co.uk>

 


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