The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

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Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

BUSH'S HOMELAND INSECURITY
By John Gershman

HEXAGONAL HEADACHE
By John Feffer

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CANCUN AND BEYOND
By Carlos M. Correa

COLOMBIA QUAGMIRE: TIME FOR U.S. POLICY OVERHAUL
By Virginia M. Bouvier

INDIA, PAKISTAN CELEBRATE INDEPENDENCE DAY BUT NOT FREEDOM
By Muqtedar Khan

 

II. Letters and Comments

OVERLOOKING SOME KEY FACTS AND RESPONSE BY Conn Hallinan

IT'S EASY TO COMPLAIN BUT WHAT'S YOUR SOLUTION? AND RESPONSE BY Col. Daniel Smith (Ret.)

I. Updates and Out-takes

BUSH'S HOMELAND INSECURITY
By John Gershman

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0309emergency.html .)

Two years after the 9-11 attacks, funding for emergency responders--firefighters, law enforcement officers, public health and emergency medical personnel, and others first on the scene in case of a terrorist attack--remains dangerously low.

While the Bush administration focuses on funding the occupation of Iraq, it's failing to insure the security of Americans at home. The needs are real and don't involve lots of new, fancy technology. Funds are needed to place essential equipment in the hands of emergency personnel and provide them with the appropriate training.

Examples of glaring weaknesses abound:

• On average, according to the National Fire Protection Association, fire departments across the country have only enough radios to equip half the firefighters on a shift, and breathing apparatuses for only a third. Only 10% of U.S. fire departments have the personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse.
• Many of America's 73,000 police, fire, and other public-safety agencies still can't talk to each other in major emergencies due to a lack of interoperable communications systems.
• Most states' public health labs still lack basic equipment and expertise to respond adequately to a chemical or biological attack. Only two state labs can test for biotoxins and 39 states recently reported that their laboratories were not prepared to safely accept samples that might contain multiple hazards (e.g., a chemical and a biological agent).
• Most cities do not have the necessary equipment to determine what kind of hazardous materials emergency responders may be facing.
• To date there has not been a substantial training exercise to test national and local readiness in response to a chemical attack.

This state of affairs is inexcusable two years after the 9-11 attacks. It represents a telling contrast with the Bush administration willingness to mobilize political resources to secure funding for war and occupation in Iraq or cut taxes on the wealthy.

For example, only about $750 million in federal funds was directed to the nation's three million first responders in 2002 for training and equipment for responding to terrorist attacks, when the administration had promised $3.5 billion. Even worse is the transfer of necessary funding for basic services to fund the fight against terrorism. For example, the administration's proposed 2004 budget includes $2 billion in cuts from crime prevention and public safety programs.

The current federal budget calls for spending $27 billion for emergency responders over the next five years, while local and state governments plan to spend up 3 times that amount over the same period. Professional associations of emergency responders and leading emergency response officials from around the country estimate that these planned expenditures fall roughly $100 billion short of what's needed to insure that emergency responders have the training and equipment they need to respond to future terrorist attacks. This shortfall of $20 billion per year represents a few months of funding for the $1 billion per week occupation in Iraq. The federal equivalent of loose change won't meet our emergency responders' needs.

Even more troubling is that the Bush administration and its allies in Congress have allowed homeland security funds to be treated like candy in a piñata. Funding for emergency responders has been allocated as new forms of pork barrel spending rather than hard-headed assessments of where vulnerabilities and needs are greatest, thereby placing many Americans at greater risk.

America's local emergency responders will always be the first to confront terrorist incidents. Their efforts in the first moments following an attack will be essential to saving lives and reducing panic.

Their courage--like the police and fire professionals who entered the World Trade Center on September 11--insures that they will respond to crises with whatever resources they have. We must demand that they have what they need to do their jobs safely and effectively. Our security requires it. Honoring the memories of those who sacrificed their lives on September 11th demands it.

(John Gershman is the codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) and a senior analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource Center (online at www.irc-online.org). He is a contributor to the recently published book Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11 (Seven Stories Press 2003).)

HEXAGONAL HEADACHE
By John Feffer

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0309nk.html .)

It is a testament to the absurdly low expectations attached to the diplomatic abilities of both North Korea and the United States that pundits have avoided the obvious conclusion concerning the recently concluded Six-Party Talks in Beijing.

They were a disaster.

Here's the rub, though: the hardliners in Washington got exactly what they wanted and may get hoisted by their own hubris as a result.

The two indicators frequently cited as evidence that the talks went smoothly are: none of the six delegations stormed out of the meeting hall and all sides agreed to meet again within two months. For a brief moment the day after the delegates went home, North Korea told the truth about the talks--that they were a failed effort and probably a waste of time--before returning to a more open-ended pledge to continue participating. Without any sign of compromise from Washington, though, North Korea is pushing forward with its nuclear program along with the threat to test a nuclear weapon.

Hardliners such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the State Department's John Bolton are probably greeting this result with little jigs of exultation. Pyongyang couldn't have followed their script any better. Its skepticism concerning future talks has made North Korea look militantly ham-fisted. Russia and China are ever more frustrated with their erstwhile ally. And a nuclear test, should North Korea be so technologically equipped or politically stupid to hold one, would be the checkered flag to signal the final lap toward regime change.

The hardliners in Washington have made no secret of their distaste for negotiations with North Korea and so contrived to ensure that the Six Party talks would fail. For instance, they made sure that the talks would not involve any negotiations. Negotiations require give and take, and despite rumors floated in the press about potential flexibility on a non-aggression pact or a package of economic incentives, there was no wiggle room in the U.S. position in Beijing.

This uncompromising stance is all the more remarkable given that both sides are talking about roughly the same elements of a deal--ending North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for various economic, political, and security guarantees. The chief disagreement, at least on the surface, concerns sequence. In other words, should North Korea freeze its program first or should the United States offer security guarantees first? That the two sides couldn't begin to address the issue of sequence in Beijing suggests that the talking cure is not fully subscribed to by either side.

The Six Party Talks were flawed as well because the particular multilateral format only encouraged North Korea's infamous "cornered badger" behavior. Outnumbered five to one over the validity of its nuclear program, North Korea couldn't effectively marshal what remains of comradely feeling in China and Russia. Nor could it exploit the obvious fact that the United States can only count on limited support from one country in the region (Japan) for a more aggressive solution to the stand-off. The informal discussions, particularly between the U.S. and North Korea, were scant. The formality of the presentations precluded much in the way of creative thinking (for example, a joint economic deal from Russia and South Korea) or creative pressure (on either North Korea or the United States to be more flexible).

China's role as convener of the talks was, of course, a plus. However, it has come up against a stubborn law of diplomacy: you can bring six parties to the table, but you can't force them to compromise. This was the primary flaw of the meeting. Hardliners on both sides have been, at some level, happy to pursue "talks without negotiations." North Korea wants more time to develop its nuclear program. The United States wants more time to see if the government in Pyongyang will collapse. To move from talks to negotiations, both sides will have to be pressured into more flexible positions.

North Korea's reputation in the world these days is not exactly sterling. The Bush administration wanted, through the Six Party Talks, to isolate the country further by demonstrating that it can't play well with five others. To do so, however, the U.S. delegation had to act just as uncompromisingly. This lack of diplomacy prompted China to declare after the talks that U.S. policy was a "main problem," a sign that the hardliners in Washington may well have overreached themselves. If another round of talks do take place within the next two months, the hardliners might not be able to pull of a repeat performance.

The flaws in the structure and outcome of the Six Party Talks should not lead to the conclusion that engagement and diplomacy are failed options. Neither side has yet pursued engagement, not since relations took a turn for the worse when George W. Bush assumed office. Rather, responsibility for the hexagonal headache in Beijing should be attributed to the failures of non-engagement. Diplomacy is still the best method of resolving the current crisis. We just haven't seen any of it yet.

(John Feffer <johnfeffer@aol.com>, editor of Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11 (Seven Stories Press), writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He is the author of the forthcoming North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven Stories Press).)

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CANCUN AND BEYOND
By Carlos M. Correa

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new commentary from the IRC Americas Program available in full at http://www.americaspolicy.org/wto/2003/0309trips.html .)

The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) brought about a very important change in international standards relating to intellectual property rights. Because of its far-reaching implications, particularly with respect to developing countries, the agreement has been one of the most controversial components of the WTO system. Strong disagreements on the scope and content of the Agreement emerged during the Uruguay Round negotiations, both between developed and developing countries and among developed countries themselves. Implementation of the Agreement and its review under the "built-in agenda" have also been contentious with regard to many aspects of the Agreement.

The developed countries (particularly the USA) insisted upon the negotiation and adoption of standards on intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the Uruguay Round, based on the argument that strengthened protection of IPRs would promote innovation as well foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer to developing countries. Although the TRIPS Agreement only became effective in advanced developing countries on January 1, 2000, meaning that there has not been much time to assess its impact, most developing countries seem to remain unconvinced about the benefits that they will obtain from the implementation of the new IPR standards. Moreover, many of them fear that the costs to be paid may be too high, particularly in critical areas such as public health. Essentially, many developing countries feel that despite the balance sought in some provisions, the Agreement mainly benefits technology-rich countries. There are a number of reasons for these concerns, of which the two most critical are: that higher levels of IPR protection do not appear to lead to tangible increases of FDI in or technology transfer to developing countries and that in some sectors IPRs appear to act as a powerful barrier to access to technologies and products, particularly by the poor.

In sum, developing countries generally feel that the concessions they made during the Uruguay Round with respect to IPRs are not providing them with significant benefits. Strong asymmetries in the development of and access to technologies remain or are even growing. Developing countries are bearing the costs of a system of reinforced IPR protection under the WTO, while enjoying few of its potential advantages. Concrete steps should be taken to redress the asymmetries of the international IPRs system.

(Carlos M. Correa is director of the Post-graduate Courses on Intellectual Property and of the Masters Program on Science and Technology Policy and Management of the University of Buenos Aires. He can be reached at <quies@infovia.com.ar>. This paper is partially based on "The TRIPS Agreement from the perspective of developing countries," in Patrick Macrory and Arthur Appleton (Editors), in The Kluwer Companion to the World Trade Organization, Kluwer Law International, London (forthcoming 2003).)

COLOMBIA QUAGMIRE: TIME FOR U.S. POLICY OVERHAUL
By Virginia M. Bouvier

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a recent policy brief produced by IRC Americas Program and available in full at http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2003/0309colombia.html .)

A three-year long peace process initiated by Colombia's former President Andrés Pastrana failed last year, and a war-weary public elected Alvaro Uribe in August 2002 with a mandate to address Colombia's grave security concerns. Despite the sunny portrait projected by some U.S. media, however, storm clouds are looming. After Uribe's first year in office, violence continues unabated in Colombia, and security has deteriorated for much of thecivilian population. Political space for legitimate dissent and the defense of basic human rights is being undermined, dire human needs continue to go unaddressed, and the "democratic security" policies of the Uribe government are intensifying an already severe humanitarian crisis. More than two million of Colombia's 44 million people have been internally displaced by the conflict. The U.S. Department of State reported that the number of internally displaced persons grew by more than 400,000 in 2002 alone, as selective assassinations, massacres, and armed confrontations drove entire communities off their lands.

Recent signs indicate that violence is becoming increasingly entrenched in Colombia. The conflict now claims the lives of some 19 civilians each day--up from 12 lives per day in 2000. The government and the largest guerrilla organization, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC, by its Spanish initials), are at a standoff, following the February 2002 breakdown of three years of negotiations.

The war has expanded to virtually all areas of the country. Paramilitary units have increased their presence in areas previously controlled by the FARC, such as Putumayo, while they have also consolidated their control in major urban areas such as Medellín and Barrancabermeja. As the country's irregular armed forces are showing increased strength, violence against the civilian population has intensified, triggering new displacements of 90,000 Colombians in the first three months of 2003 alone. Arbitrary detentions, especially of peasants and human rights defenders, are also on the rise, as are complaints of human rights abuses by government security forces in the government-designated "rehabilitation zones" in the departments of Bolívar, Sucre, and Arauca. Yet there is no credible prosecution of high military and government officials accused of human rights crimes. Complicity between elements of the military and paramilitary groups shows no sign of diminishing, and Colombian authorities have failed to pursue some 3,000 outstanding orders of detention for paramilitary members and guerrillas.

U.S. involvement in Colombia is deepening rapidly and with relatively little public debate. With more than 2,000 personnel from 32 U.S. agencies, the embassy in Bogotá now surpasses that in Cairo as the largest U.S. embassy in the world. The U.S. now has more troops and civilian contractors on the ground in Colombia than ever before. As of July 2003, 358 U.S. troops were in Colombia. This represents a tripling of the 117 U.S. troops stationed in Colombia in November 2001, although it remains beneath the congressionally mandated cap of 400. Five U.S. citizens employed as contractors were killed in Colombia this year, and 21 U.S. government-titled aircraft have been downed there since 1998.

As Plan Colombia enters its final phase, U.S. policy is at a crossroads. Before policymakers commit the U.S. to further engagement in Colombia, they should conduct a thorough analysis to ensure that U.S. policies are not supporting a corrupt or abusive military, contributing to the deterioration of democratic institutions, or endangering the health of Colombia's environment and people. Washington must use its leverage responsibly to work with those in Colombia who seek an end to the war, to create a climate that will be conducive to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and to provide security guarantees for those who agree to demobilize.

The U.S. must work with the Colombian government to end impunity for those who violate international standards of human rights and to develop and marshal the necessary resources for a plan that addresses the vast humanitarian crisis of Colombia's internally displaced and refugee populations. To do otherwise is to ensure the continuation of a conflict rooted in desperate poverty, severe economic inequities, and exclusionary political institutions.

(Dr. Virginia M. Bouvier, <vbouvier@usip.org> is Program Officer in the U.S. Institute of Peace's Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is an independent institution established and funded by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the USIP, which does not advocate specific policies.)

INDIA, PAKISTAN CELEBRATE INDEPENDENCE DAY BUT NOT FREEDOM
By Muqtedar Khan

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0308indpak.html .)

With Aug. 14 and 15 marking the 56th anniversary of the independence of Pakistan and India from British colonial rule, it is a sad commentary on the political condition of South Asia that even though the region has been independent for over half a century, it is still not free. Today, both India and Pakistan are gripped in the frenzy of a religious fervor that is fundamentally negative in its orientation. Religious activism and mass mobilization in both nations is directed against, rather than standing for, something.

India's religious revival is taking the form of a Hindu nationalist movement, Hindutva, which is rabidly opposed to secularism and to religious minorities. The movement showed its true saffron in March 2002 when it retaliated against alleged Muslim rioting by unleashing a state-sponsored pogrom that slaughtered, murdered, and burned alive over 2,000 Muslims. In addition, nearly 200,000 Muslims' property was seized and their businesses and livelihoods destroyed, making them refugees in their own homeland. Today, thanks to the Hindutva movement, the color saffron stands more for the color of Muslim blood than Hindu faith.

U.S. officials' discrimination against the Muslim minority in the United States following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks by Arabs on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon pale in comparison to the Indian officials' treatment of them after the rioting that killed 60 train passengers in a fire. In Gujarat, India, both politicians and bureaucrats worked with mobs to facilitate the massacre of Muslims. In Gujarat, the stench of burning flesh was mixed with the stench of the burning of India's secularism, pluralism, democracy, and hopes for freedom.

Perhaps in terms of shock value and implications for the future, the Hindutva movement has perpetrated the worst crime against India's soul since its independence. Nations should not harbor mass murderers in leadership positions. The events of Gujarat will come back to haunt India as it aspires for international recognition and seeks an important role in global governance.

In Pakistan, attempts to apply Islam in the public sphere quickly lead to violence against some religious minority. Muslim extremists continue to enjoy great freedom in Pakistan. They seem to have only one purpose in life, to find communities that they can hate and target for violence. Ahmadis, Shiis, and Christians have all experienced the violent hatred of Islamization in Pakistan. In the past 10 years, religiously motivated sectarian violence has taken thousands of lives in Pakistan and prevented the emergence of a stable state or the establishment of a safe society. Democracy still remains only a glimmer on Pakistan's horizon.

With the growing Talibanization of Pakistan and the emergence of extremely odious characters such as Maulana Fazlur Rahman as prominent political forces, the future prospects of Pakistan remain deeply entangled with religious hatred and violence. If religious parties do not immediately abandon the path of rhetoric and ideology in favor of moderate and pragmatic programs, it is but a matter of time until Pakistan itself will become a victim of terrorism by Muslim militants and most certainly the next stop in the United States' war on terror.

Besides giving religion a bad name, religious zealots have contributed to the destabilization of South Asia and heightened the prospects of a nuclear disaster. As religious extremists jockey for positions of power in India and Pakistan, their past records and the thought of seeing their murderous hands on nuclear triggers are rapidly becoming another source of nightmares for security experts in the region and elsewhere.

(Muqtedar Khan (online at www.ijtihad.org) is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom. He writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

II. Letters and Comments

OVERLOOKING SOME KEY FACTS

Re: Arming India Isn't Route to Peace

Conn Hallinan's article overlooks some key facts. First, it is not India that labeled Pakistan an "Islamic terrorist state," that credit goes to General Zia with substantial U.S. patronage. Second, it assumes that the BJP calls the policy shots alone in a coalition Government; even a rudimentary knowledge of parliamentary politics will negate such ideas. Third, India's defense policy is not Pakistan-centric, it has to take into account China. India is paying the price for giving refuge to Dalai Lama, and yet "liberals" who get teary-eyed for the Tibetans show no sensibility to India's concern over potential Chinese aggression. Fourth, India's concern over terrorism is genuine, we have lost more lives to this menace than 20 World Trade Center's combined, do not preach to us from 4,000 miles away about peace.

We have built a successful democracy, however flawed, in a country with 18 major languages, 5 major religious groups, and 4 major ethnic groups, despite poverty and its associated problems. Riots do happen, but we are holding together, and we will hold. Lastly, every country has to look after its strategic interests, if at this moment they lie with the U.S. fine, tomorrow we might find that China is a better ally! Whatever we do we will do it keeping India's interest in mind, not some peacenik in the U.S. or elsewhere with utopian ideas on world peace and understanding.

Pritam Banergy <prit_banergy@yahoo.co.in>

RESPONSE BY CONN HALLINAN

"Riots happen"? Thousands of people are killed, tens of thousands of people turned into refugees, all under the eyes of the BJP dominated Uttar Pradesh state and its police force, and it just "happened"? It just "happened" that L.K Advant, the second most powerful leader in the BJP, and Home Minster, led the movement that culminated in the 1992 Babri Mosque riots, the worst since partition in l947? I think not, and your creative use of the passive voice is most telling. The BJP leadership whipped up those riots, and used them in a coldly calculated way to advance their electoral goals. If India "holds together," it will be in spite of the Hindu fanaticism of the BJP and its more sinister allies in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the World Hindu Council.

China is not a threat to India, but it does figure into the goals of the U.S. in the region. Does the author really think the U.S. gives two hoots in hell about Indian interests unless those interests dovetail with U.S. goals in Asia? Such naivete is touching.

And what are India's interests? Should they not be to feed the 300 plus millions of people who go to bed hungry each night? Or to buy aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and artillery spotters? For what? To be a U.S. spearholder in the region? Or to be a regional, maybe international, nuclear power? Keep at it and India might become a colonial power just like the British.

India's concerns about terrorism are indeed real. So the solution is more guns and repression? Or sitting down and finally resolving the situation in Kashmir? That resolution, by the way, is not up to India and Pakistan, but the people of Kashmir. Occupation and repression is a dead end, as the U.S. is rapidly discovering in Iraq.

As for preaching from 4,000 miles away. I will indeed "preach" about the Middle East, Central Asia, the Pacific, Europe, whereever I think the humanity is endangered and the clouds of war are gathering. If that makes me a "peacenik" I gladly accept the title.

 

IT'S EASY TO COMPLAIN BUT WHAT'S YOUR SOLUTION?

Re: Quagmire what Quagmire?

OK. Colonel Smith's article makes it clear that Iraq is a very, very difficult situation and there is a lot to complain about--but does he have any easy answers? I doubt it. This article just complains, it doesn't offer a solution to Islamic-based terrorism. Just doing nothing and wringing one's hands, or saying "Please, please don't attack us" isn't a solution. You have to do something. Bush may not have picked the easiest path, but I suspect there is no easy path. I think that all the successful paths may involve large amounts of blood and treasure. The greatest generation of the 20th Century had to face WWII, this may be our trial. The question is will we face or just wring our hands?

- Tom Hughes <TEHughes@aol.com>

RESPONSE BY COL. DANIEL SMITH (RET.)

Thank you for your comments.

Among the occasional necessities of life is the need to restate the blazingly obvious, which can be done by accumulating and presenting evidence that reality is being ignored, by posing fundamental questions that appear not to have been asked, or by acting the "gadfly" by highlighting failures of policy and programs that nonetheless continue to be tried. Now none of these paths obligates one to provide alternatives, but that is not the objective, which--like the two-by-four and the Missouri mule--is to get attention focused on the problem.

What follows are comments related to points in your critique or some background that might further explain parts of the original article.

Terror is no more "Islamic based" than it is Catholic, Protestant, or Hebraic (to stay with the religions "of the Book"). Those who engage in terrorist activities may recite passages from religious writings to justify their actions to themselves and to the world, but terror essentially is non-denominationally specific violence (physical and/or mental) undertaken to create a state of fear and submission in a target population that allows those perpetrating the terror to accomplish their objective(s). I find it interesting that suicide per say is not condoned in any of these religions, including Islam. But if there is a cause, even if it is completely hopeless, we speak not of suicide but of "giving one's life for the cause."

The bane of U.S. culture is the double assumption that in every instance something must be done BY the U.S. and done NOW. In the case of Iraq in 2003, the UN and IAEA inspectors were doing quite well. Saddam was unable to do any work on WMD, meaning he was not an imminent threat--the ostensible reason we invaded the country and ended up creating the current dilemma. This was not a war of necessity in terms of timing or threat; it was a war of choice by the administration based on an eleven-year-old plan first described in Dick Cheney's Pentagon.

There is no easy, face-saving way out of the reality the U.S. has fashioned in Iraq. The essential error was in ignoring the UN after the Security Council refused to endorse the Bush war plan. It is ironic that a White House that so adamantly refused to give UNMOVIC and IAEA more time to work now is pleading for more time to get things right in Iraq.

Despite the facts that the U.S. has the largest economy in the world, the strongest military in the world, annually spends more on the Pentagon than the next 15 countries combined devote to their armed forces, the reality of the 21st century is that superpower status no longer is justification for others to fall unquestioningly into line. In the past, power and possessions (wealth) constituted the more or less objective measurements of international reality--what inelegantly could be termed "the international pecking order." In the new century, communications capabilities available to ordinary people--instant, unregulated, multi-faceted, globe-circling, twenty-four hour--can create such intense perceptions (and misperceptions) that "reality" itself is modified, if not recreated, in situ. This is an under-appreciated restraint on the choice of options available for action--particularly unilateral (or nearly unilateral) employment of military power--and an equally under-appreciated generator of unintended consequences.

One should not forget that in the 1991 Gulf War, the first President Bush built a coalition which, besides contributing troops (including contingents from a number of Arab and Islamic countries totaling 209,000 personnel), paid for all but $7.35 billion of the approximately $61 billion (1991 dollars) war costs. In addition to the direct ongoing operational costs of U.S. forces now in Iraq--$4 billion a month--the current administration's FY2003 supplemental provided $4.1 billion to other countries for their cooperation as well as $53.4 billion for the Pentagon to fight the war. In the pending supplemental announced by the President September 7th, the Pentagon's slice will be $66 billion. The isolation of the U.S. in Iraq is further highlighted by the reticence of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, both usually swayed by U.S. positions, to provide loans and other financial aid to an Iraq without a permanent government and one occupied by U.S. forces.

In a real sense, as evidenced by frequent mention of the Marshall Plan and the rebuilding of Japan after World War II, the administration is trying to apply 20th century "solutions" in a 21st century environment. It badly misjudged going in, and only this past week, quite belatedly began re-adjusting its approach from "'we' have to do something" to reaching out for (some one say demanding) help from international organizations. But the "new" approach will not be easy either unless the White House is prepared to cede more political and economic authority--and responsibility--to what in 1945-1952 was a fledgling institution itself--the UN.

In the same vein, the real "trial" for "our generation" (whoever that includes) will not be terrorism, for unlike in WWII, the U.S. as a continuing, functioning democracy is not in danger. The real trial will be re-learning the art of international leadership in an era of rapidly shifting perceptions about the nature of power and its applications in a world of evolving multinational centers of gravity.

Generals are frequently described as always preparing for the last war. Perhaps it's time to ponder whether our political leaders have a parallel propensity to implement an outdated peace.

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