The Progressive Response

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org). He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

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Table of Contents

I. Updates and Out-Takes

AFGHANISTAN: IN SEARCH OF SECURITY
By Mark Sedra

BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY TEAM IN DISARRAY
By Jim Lobe

WHY SADDAM DIDN'T COME CLEAN
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)

BRINGING DOWN THE WALLS--A PARTIAL VICTORY IN CANCUN
By Laura Carlsen

A STORY OF TWO SPEECHES: KOFI ANNAN AND GEORGE W. BUSH
By Ian Williams

ARE PRESSURES FROM THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND ISRAEL TOO MUCH FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM TO WITHSTAND?
By Muqtedar Khan

 

II. Letters and Comments

REFRESHING

ON TARGET

REGIME CHANGE AT HOME

I. Updates and Out-takes

AFGHANISTAN: IN SEARCH OF SECURITY
By Mark Sedra

(Editor's Note: Analyst Mark Sedra assesses the security and reconstruction situation in Afghanistan two years after the war began in this piece excerpted from a new special report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/afghanrecon2003.html .)

On May 1, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a visit to Kabul, triumphantly declared that "major combat activity" in Afghanistan was over and that the "the bulk of the country is now secure." Rumsfeld scoffed at those analysts and critics who dared to challenge this optimistic assessment, derisively labeling them "armchair columnists." Four months later, on September 7, 2003, during a return trip to Kabul, Secretary Rumsfeld delivered a very different message. He was in the Afghan capital to shore up an increasingly fragile Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), beset by insecurity and struggling to advance a sputtering reconstruction process.

The defense secretary's surprise visit to Kabul, and Baghdad before that, reflects growing unease in Washington that the two U.S.-led state building projects are faltering. As in Iraq, events in Afghanistan over the past three months have been alarming. August marked the bloodiest month there since the fall of the Taliban. Within a two-day period, on August 12-13, 2003, over 50 Afghans were killed in several isolated incidents across the country.

A number of factors and conditions have led to Afghanistan's security dilemma. A low intensity war, fought between the Taliban and U.S.-led coalition forces has escalated significantly over the past six months; violent clashes between rival warlords continue to break out at various flashpoints, most notably around the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif; the narcotics trade has grown exponentially; and crime rates, characterized by offenses such as theft, extortion, and rape, have surged.

In addition to the direct human and material costs of insecurity, the indirect impacts on humanitarian and development work have been immense. Moreover, the curtailment of humanitarian assistance and the slow pace of reconstruction have engendered growing resentment among the population. This frustration has been directed at the ATA and in some cases has found expression in support for antigovernment spoiler groups. Though few Afghans mourn the fall of the Taliban regime, it is not difficult to find those who would speak nostalgically of the security and stability that it provided. After all, the Taliban's most popular policy was to rid the country of warlordism.

Afghanistan is entering a crucial phase in the ongoing state building process, as national elections and a constitutional assembly, or Loya Jirga, are scheduled to take place within the next ten months. However, in light of recent events, many Afghans and international stakeholders have expressed doubt as to whether these processes are feasible or even desirable under current conditions. The international donor community has taken a number of steps to confront Afghanistan's security crisis, but current levels of international support are simply not commensurate with the scale of the reconstruction and security challenges that exist. Not only is more aid needed, but these funds must be better targeted to meet Afghanistan's immediate priorities--security and the need to provide some semblance of a peace dividend to the beleaguered population.

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has two distinct thrusts: the war against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-i-Islami, primarily in the South and East of the country, and the support of President Hamid Karzai's regime and the concomitant state building process. Unfortunately, these two simultaneous endeavors have, at times, worked at cross-purposes. It is vital that Washington harmonize its two agendas, infusing its overall strategy toward Afghanistan with a greater degree of coherence and consistency.

There are two policy adjustments that the U.S. should make immediately in pursuit of this objective. First, Washington should cease all support to regional warlords under the auspices of the War on Terror. The U.S. has allied itself with several regional powerbrokers, providing them with money, arms, and training for their militia forces in return for the use of those militias in anti-Taliban operations. The relatively small number of U.S. troops deployed in this theater of operations has prompted the Pentagon to rely heavily on local forces. While acknowledging the existence of such strategic relationships in the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. officials are now adamant that such associations have been discontinued. It is accurate that ties with some recalcitrant regional warlords, most notably Bacha Khan Zadran, have been severed, primarily due to their open hostility toward the Karzai regime. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that Washington has maintained strategic relationships with certain regional warlords. Apart from direct material support, the tacit recognition that the Pentagon has offered to many of these figures has been enough to embolden them to challenge the Kabul government. If the ATA is to be successful in reining in the warlords--a crucial task to establish the central government's legitimacy--it will need the unwavering support of the United States. Such support should consist of an unambiguous signal to regional warlords, whether it is Ismail Khan or Rashid Dostum, that the U.S. will no longer condone any activities that could destabilize the Kabul government.

Secondly, the U.S. must exert more muscle on regional states, most notably Pakistan, to observe a policy of noninterference in Afghanistan. Washington has been reluctant to apply concerted pressure on Pakistani President Musharraf out of fear that it could weaken his regime and strengthen Pakistan's radical Islamist parties. Yet the recent clashes on the Pakistani-Afghan border, coupled with clear evidence that the Taliban is regrouping on Pakistani territory with significant support from segments of Pakistan's military and government, demonstrate that immediate action is needed.

With a constitutional Loya Jirga and national elections scheduled to take place within the next ten months, Afghanistan is entering a vital phase of its state building process. The Constitution has already been delayed three months due to the deteriorating security situation. With confidence in the ATA waning, further setbacks to the Bonn process could create a major crisis of confidence in the new political order. The international community must act immediately to shore up the government, stabilize the security situation, and accelerate the development process. Otherwise the tremendous gains already achieved in rebuilding Afghanistan may be squandered. The consequences of a failure to exploit the current window of opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan would be disastrous, for, as Dr. Abdullah candidly stated in July 2003 on a visit to Washington: "I'm not optimistic to say if we lose this opportunity there will be another one" (UN Wire, July 15, 2003).

(Mark Sedra <sedra@bicc.de> is a research associate at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY TEAM IN DISARRAY
By Jim Lobe

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0309Disarray.html .)

President George W. Bush keeps trying to divert the potential "perfect storm" forming from the combination of the constant stream of bad news coming out of the Middle East and growing domestic discontent over the war and occupation in Iraq.

That storm is likely to gain even more force when the public has a chance to absorb this past week's events, which mostly slid under the media radar as Isabel approached the capital. Particularly striking were signs of growing disarray at the highest levels of the administration, revealed by remarks such as Bush's assertion that there was "no evidence" linking Iraq to the September, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon. This statement directly contradicted both what Vice President Dick Cheney claimed as recently as September 14th and what he and some Pentagon officials had been advocating months before the war. Similarly, the assertion by the U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, that the popular resistance to the U.S. occupation might be broader than radical Islamists, foreign infiltrators and Baathist "dead-enders" appeared to contradict repeated assurances by top administration officials in recent weeks.

Other developments of the past week--including the seemingly total collapse of the U.S.-led road map for Israel and the Palestinians, and the tepid response to U.S. appeals for more international support for its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan--suggest that the administration, already reeling from unexpected setbacks in post-war Iraq, is in for a very stormy autumn. Indeed, almost five months after Bush declared an end to major hostilities, his poll and approval ratings have continued falling in the past two weeks and are now close to or below the lowest levels since before the 9/11 attacks.

At the same time, a steadily growing chorus of Democrats, increasingly confident that Bush has made a lethal political error in diverting the "war on terrorism" to Iraq, is clamoring for "heads to roll" at the highest levels of his administration, as the Democratic leader in the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, said this week. Most of those calls are being directed at the Pentagon's civilian leadership, notably the top three officials: Donald Rumsfeld; his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz; and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, who had responsibility for post-war planning. The White House itself is coming under heavy fire, some of it aimed at National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, whose passivity and lack of in-depth foreign policy experience are being blamed for letting the hawks around Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney manipulate the intelligence process and thus capture the policy initiative.

Rather than spurring the creation of a united front, the recurring attacks have seemed to spark infighting among the hawks. After Cheney revived a two-year-old story on a nationally broadcast television news program last Sunday about an alleged meeting between one of the hijackers and an Iraqi spy in Prague in April, 2001, Rumsfeld told reporters three days later he had seen nothing to connect Saddam Hussein to the September 11th attacks, an assessment backed up by Rice and then by Bush himself. At the same time, neoconservatives outside the administration and close to Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Feith kept up an offensive this week denouncing Rumsfeld's refusal to increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to reduce insecurity there. Several neocons, including Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, also assailed Bush's top political adviser, Karl Rove, for allegedly warning Republicans that there must be "no more wars" for the remainder of Bush's first term. The public nature of this infighting is remarkable in an administration that has obsessed about message management and spin control.

(Jim Lobe <jlobe@starpower.net> is a political analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)

WHY SADDAM DIDN'T COME CLEAN
By Col. Dan Smith (Ret.)

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0310clean.html .)

Information emerging from the intelligence community indicates that the Iraq Survey Team looking for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq is coming up empty.

Although the so-called "progress report" is still be written, CIA spokesperson Bill Harlow conceded that former UN inspector David Kay will be unable to "rule anything in or out" despite four months of intensive searching by his 1,400-strong survey group. This hedge moves the U.S. position closer to that of Dr. Hans Blix, whose UN Monitoring and Verification Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no weapons during its four months of inspections in 2002-2003. In fact, Blix now believes that Saddam probably destroyed his WMD stocks shortly after the end of the first Gulf War in 1991 (BBC, September 18).

Yet the White House continues to try to keep alive the idea that Saddam had these weapons, was intent on using them, and thus posed an "imminent threat" to the United States. Last October, unclassified portions of a National Intelligence Estimate stated that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons" and "if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade." As recently as September 14th on Meet the Press, Vice President Cheney referred to "mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted…." On September 22nd, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stated that when the shooting started March 20th, "nobody who knew anything about Iraq believed that Saddam Hussein had destroyed all of his weapons of mass destruction." The next day before the UN General Assembly, President Bush asserted: "The regime of Saddam Hussein cultivated ties to terror while it built weapons of mass destruction. It used those weapons in acts of mass murder and refused to account for them when confronted by the world."

While the Vice President's statement has been undercut by technical weapons experts in both the U.S. and UK, Rice's observation is accurate, as is the President's point about mass murder and the lack of accountability. Unfortunately, no one seems interested in trying to understand why the Iraqis resisted disclosure of what happened to their WMD--after all, UN inspectors had found documents describing quantities of chemicals and "bugs" produced in the 1980s--or why everyone was fooled into the belief that Saddam still had weapons in 2002-2003. The most probable reason why Saddam didn't "come clean" with the world about his holdings of chemical and biological weapons was his reluctance to reveal the extent of Iraq's military weakness after the 1991 Gulf War.

(Dan Smith <dan@fcnl.org> is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) is a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)

A STORY OF TWO SPEECHES: KOFI ANNAN AND GEORGE W. BUSH
By Ian Williams

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a anew global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.presentdanger.org/commentary/2003/0310speeches.html .)

Kofi Annan's speech to the United Nations General Assembly was indeed a strong and incisive condemnation of unilateralism--and thus of the current U.S. administration and its hangers on. But in their eagerness to applaud the temerity of the Secretary General in twitching the eagle's tail, some observers may miss the rest of his message: which is that despite its abuse by Bush and Blair, the United Nations Security Council must come to terms with the need for humanitarian intervention, and, moving some small but measured way toward the concerns of countries that feel themselves to be "uniquely vulnerable."

This invitation to feel the pain of the U.S., not matter how diplomatic it is, was followed by an even less palatable message for the "sovereigntists" such as Russia. He warned that the Council "may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats--for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction." But then, reiterating his call at the Millennium Summit three years ago, he added, without the conditional qualifier, that "they still need to engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights--an issue which I raised myself from this podium in 1999." However, he made it clear that if this were to be done, it should be in a multilateral context, using the "unique legitimacy" of the UN, which he also suggested needed boosting with reforms that would guarantee it greater legitimacy through broader representation.

However, it is understandable that people should concentrate on his strong implied rebuke for the neoconservative-inspired security doctrine now espoused by the United States, and implicitly supported by Tony Blair. Saying the world had "come to a fork in the road," to what "may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded," Kofi Annan spelled out explicitly and in the most public way possible the position he has voiced before, albeit more quietly in off-the-cuff question and answer sessions: the invasion of Iraq was against the UN Charter, and thus in breach of International Law.

Somewhat provocatively, he also suggested that the UN "needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats." This could be an almost puckish reminder: despite all the sound and fury, the dozens of delegates who stood up and inveighed against the U.S. and British assault on Iraq, there was not one resolution put down, either in the Security Council or the General Assembly to condemn, let alone take any sanctions against the perpetrators.

Of course, this calls into question the unique legitimating function of the United Nations. If some states can take illegitimate action with impunity, then this necessarily detracts from both its prestige and its effectiveness. These are all legitimate questions. Sadly, one cannot see that the answers are apparent, at least without a change of heart--and possibly administration--in Washington.

(Ian Williams <uswarreport@igc.org> contributes frequently to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org) on UN and international affairs.)

BRINGING DOWN THE WALLS--A PARTIAL VICTORY IN CANCUN
By Laura Carlsen

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0309Cancunvictory.html .)

As the crowd approached the police barricade, a line of women filed to the front of the march. At a signal, they pulled out wire-clippers and began to cut apart the cyclone fence. When they had finished, the Korean farmers stepped up and with farriers' tools and blowtorches, cut the thick chains that joined the metallic panels and wrapped heavy ropes around the frames. On the count of a ritual drumbeat, the crowd pulled, and one by one the fences came down.

Meanwhile, inside the massive concrete building where the official negotiations were being held, walls were also coming down. That same day, (Sept. 13) Mexican Sec. of Foreign Relations and Chairman of the meeting, Luis Derbez, released a draft declaration after three days of contentious discussion. The draft, practically a wish list of the developed countries, incensed developing countries. They formed an unprecedented block to resist imposition of the draft terms.

Led by India and Brazil, the "Group of 21-plus," along with the African-Caribbean-Pacific block and the Least Developed Countries, began to formulate a solid "NO." Fueled by nongovernmental and social organizations that staged protests, conferred with official delegations, and transferred information through the corridors, poor countries stood unexpectedly firm as they received personal phone calls from President Bush and pressures from both the U.S. and the European Union. Even African nations--dependent for over half their budgets on foreign aid--and countries like Colombia--a major recipient of U.S. support--did not budge. For once, divide-and-conquer tactics failed before a newly established commonality of interests among developing countries.

Although talks finally broke down in the discussion of "new issues"--the addition of trade facilitation, competition, transparency in government procurement, and investment to the WTO--the real parting of ways happened over agriculture. Many developing countries entered the meeting under the banner of cutting agricultural subsidies in the U.S. and the EU. They maintained that the subsidies were unfair, and enabled wealthy countries to take over their domestic markets. Even dyed-in-the-wool free-traders, like host government Mexico, demanded major concessions on agricultural subsidies.

What they got instead were vague and insignificant promises on subsidy reduction, accompanied by further pressures to increase market access. The demand to remove agriculture and food from the WTO altogether gained force confronted with the impossibility of real negotiations with developed countries on agriculture.

When Kenya's minister walked out on negotiations Sept.14 pronouncing "it was all over," jubilation broke out among civil society organizations that had set the goal last November to "derail the WTO." What the business press and developed countries referred to as a "failure," marked the success of developing countries to defend themselves in the labyrinthine organization and a rejection of the closed-door power plays of the wealthy nations. The walls between them had finally broken down.

Outside, protesters had broken down their own walls as peasant farmers joined with women workers from the border plants, and indigenous peoples with Black Block militants. None of the alliances forged is without its tensions and debilities, but they reflect new horizons of resistance to corporate-led trade liberalization policies.

The future, however, is a more sobering matter.

The U.S. has stated openly that it will now pursue its trade agenda through bilateral and regional trade agreements. In those negotiations, like the talks currently taking place on the Central American Free Trade Agreement, developing countries confront the bargaining power of the U.S. alone or in feeble coalitions of the few. If Mexico came out of NAFTA with virtually no concessions to its developing country status, imagine what Nicaragua or El Salvador would be likely to attain. Despite Mexico's experience, conservative governments in these countries continue to believe in the seemingly boundless power of the U.S. market to cure their considerable economic woes.

A fate even worse than a bad multilateral WTO agreement may await the Americas. In the aftermath of the collapse of the WTO negotiations, the U.S. will continue seeking to advance its economic liberalization agenda through bilateral (like the recent trade deal with Chile) and subregional (the proposed Central America Free Trade Agreement) agreements on trade and investment. Capping off these separate agreements is the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Cancún is only a partial victory. The development of fair multilateral trade rules and the defeat of the FTAA will be formidable walls yet to scale.

(Laura Carlsen <laura@irc-online.org> is director of the IRC Americas Program (online at www.americaspolicy.org).)

ARE PRESSURES FROM THE UNITED STATES, INDIA AND ISRAEL TOO MUCH FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM TO WITHSTAND?
By Muqtedar Khan

(Editor's Note: Excerpted from a anew global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0309Pakistan.html .)

Pakistan's national defense strategy centers on protecting the country's nuclear weapons capability from a threat by one or more of three states that are currently working very closely--the United States, India, and Israel. That strategy includes a nuclear first-strike policy.

In that light, the question that Washington needs to address is more complex and requires more subtle geopolitical analysis than what policy makers on the Hill have been indulging in lately: Can the world in general--and the United States, India, and Israel in particular--afford to make such a nation feel as confused and insecure about its relations with them as they have?

Pakistan has perhaps taken more risks than any other nation in the U.S. war on terror. Yet it remains extremely insecure about its relations with Washington. Pakistan's extensive and risky cooperation with the United States has done little to alleviate its own security dilemmas. Pakistan today remains exposed to the dangers of preemptive strikes from the other close U.S. allies in the war on terror--India and Israel.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons, sought primarily for defense against a militarily superior India, seem to have increased the possibility of Pakistan becoming a victim of attacks from more powerful nations far and near, rather than making it more secure.

Washington seems to maintain a strategy of coercive diplomacy combined with economic assistance for Pakistan, which rewards it economically for its cooperation but does not reduce its geopolitical threats. Pakistan, in spite of being a close ally of the world's most dominant power, continues to live in a Hobbesian world.

As Pakistanis, especially the Islamists, are made to feel that their nation is being bullied into working against its own interests and its own people and faith, their anger, resentment and fear is increasing. At seminar after seminar on South Asian security and on the war on terror, I hear Pakistanis express deep concern, confusion and suspicions about Washington's policies and in particular the emergence of a new anti-Pakistan axis created by the United States, Israel and India.

All three of these nations now identify what they call "Islamic terrorism" as the main threat to their own security, and their ultimate nightmare involves Jihadis armed with nukes.

Washington can use the war on terror to develop a semi-formal regional security institution involving the United States, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Starting with the basic limited goal--that is in the interest of all four nations--of keeping the Taliban types out of power in southwest Asia and maintaining regional stability, the United States could reduce tensions and allay fears. This setup may also come in handy as a forum for a future Indo-Pakistani peace process and for resolving the Kashmir issue through regional summits.

The United States can continue to guarantee Israeli security. It must use this guarantee to keep Israel from destabilizing other regions in pursuit of real or imagined threats. An institutional U.S. security interest in southwest Asia will also help to reduce Israeli fears about Pakistani nukes.

Finally, the United States must learn that it cannot have an instrumentalist approach to other nations. It cannot force Pakistan to take risks with its domestic and international balances of power in the U.S. interest without the United States also taking steps to keep Pakistan from being over exposed to strategic threats. A disregard for Pakistani domestic politics gave the Islamist parties a historically unprecedented victory in the last elections, contributing to current tensions in Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi.

Before the nukes are triggered, Washington must learn to nurture its allies while nudging them towards safer policies and pro-U.S. postures.

(Dr. Muqtedar Khan is a Ford Fellow at Brookings Institution and a Fellow of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. He is also director of International Studies at Adrian College and author of American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom. His web address is http://www.ijtihad.org/.)

II. Letters and Comments

REFRESHING

Re: The War In Iraq Is Not Over and Neither Are The Lies To Justify It

While many people sympathize with the U.S. in regard to the terrible terror attacks 2 years ago, your article is very refreshing to read how the Bush administration is trying to mislead or better intentionally drag the American public, the UN, and foreign allies or "allies to be" respective the general foreign opinion into believing the American invasion (in Iraq) is justified on fabricated allegations in the context of the war on terrorism. Unfortunately America has lost a great deal of credibility in the global community--especially in Asia--with downplaying the real threat of North Korea while spending billions of dollars on a cause (Iraq) not directly related to global security, not to mention the complete failure of the American military and intelligence to find, punish, and eliminate Osama Bin Laden and his peers who triggered the avalanche in the first place.

Please keep up with your good work.

- Ti Chan <asiapacificjp@netscape.net>

ON TARGET

Re: Is the Neocon Agenda for Pax Americana Losing Steam?

Jim Lobe, you were right on target. Wish "W" would read this and dwell on what an idiot he's been to let the neocons take charge of our foreign policy. George Washington said it all in his Farewell Address: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all." What's so difficult about this? But then no one in the White House was able to adhere to G.W. advice for the last 55 years either!

- Fritz Adam <fja0527@bellsouth.net>

REGIME CHANGE AT HOME

Re: Is the Neocon Agenda for Pax Americana Losing Steam?

It seems to me that George W. Bush's new stratagem is little more than an attempt to divorce consequence from action. The overall Iraq strategy smacked of incompetence from the beginning--a "fool's mate" brought upon the head of an amateur who knew how the chess pieces moved, but just didn't understand that a good player thinks several moves ahead, not just one move at a time. The consequences (an increasing stream of flag-draped boxes) are a political embarrassment, particularly in the run-up to an election. The solution seems to be to get someone else's troops killed by the same incompetence, while refusing to change policy, and denying that there's any problem--then as the number of American dead declines, the domestic political consequences are lessened. Handing over control also hands over the ability to examine (and comment upon) leadership thus far. And I don't think that's likely to happen without another regime change--this time in Washington.

- Ron Walker <ronwalker@softhome.net>

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