The Progressive ResponseVolume 7, Number 29
Editor: John Gershman (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-Takes
II. Outside the U.S.
III. Letters and Comments
I. Updates and Out-takes TRUTH IN SPENDING
A September 6th New York Times story on Iraq quoted Pentagon spokesperson Bryan G. Whitman as saying: "All known Iraqi munitions sites are being secured by coalition forces." Eighteen days later, testifying on the president's Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Budget request for $87 billion more for Afghanistan and Iraq, General John Abizaid flatly contradicted Whitman. Abizaid told the Senate Appropriations Committee that he had never encountered as much ammunition--estimated at 600,000 tons--as had been discovered in some 2,700 identified storage sites throughout Iraq. He then conceded: "I wish I could tell you that we had it all under control, but we don't." That statement could easily be made about the whole enterprise in Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither is "under control," particularly when it comes to monetary costs. And as a new fiscal year (FY) begins, a thumbnail "truth in spending" review is in order--along with some recent non-defense spending highlights. Starting with FY2003, which just ended, the Pentagon and nuclear weapons programs in the Department of Energy received $382.2 billion in regular FY2003 appropriations. The Pentagon received another $62.4 billion (of $79 billion) in the FY2003 supplemental, bringing the total for defense activities to $444.6 billion. The supplemental allocated another $2.5 billion for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund" while Afghanistan received $167 million in economic aid and another $170 million in military aid (training). The president signed the FY2004 Defense Appropriations bill October 1st, but legislation authorizing $399.1 billion for defense activities (Pentagon and nuclear weapons) remains caught in the legislative process. This snail's pace did not stop the administration from asking for $87 billion more in supplemental spending for FY2004. Some in Congress find very troublesome that at the beginning of FY2004 the U.S. is set to spend at least $486 billion on the military in the next twelve months. This is more than the administration's combined request for discretionary spending for all other government departments and agencies. In fact, the cumulative cost of defense activities at the start of FY2004 accounts for 56% of projected federal discretionary spending. A further supplemental with a significant sum for military activities is almost assured, given that other countries are reluctant to send military forces to Iraq. Nor are expectations high that this month's donor conference will yield large international donations for reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani said his country needed $30 billion for reconstruction over the next five years, but only $2 billion has been pledged so far. And going into the Madrid conference on Iraq, a similar $2 billion is all that participants have provisionally pledged. Beyond the incalculable toll of lives lost and disrupted, the contrast between the financial costs of war and peace could not be more stark. Ongoing military operations just in Afghanistan and Iraq are costing nearly $5 billion a month. In contrast, the administration asked for only $550 million for peacekeeping in its FY2004 budget and another $50 million in the FY2004 supplemental. With a population (2002) of 288.4 million, that $600 million for peacekeeping comes to a little more than $2 per person in the U.S. Estimating the 2004 U.S. population at 290 million, the $486 billion (minimum) to be spent for defense activities in FY2004 represents $1,676 per U.S. resident. (Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org) is a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)
THE SYRIAN ACCOUNTABILITY ACT AND
THE TRIUMPH OF HEGEMONY
On October 15, the U.S. House of Representatives--with an overwhelming bipartisan majority--passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which imposes strict sanctions against the Syrian government. (A similar bill was introduced earlier this year in the Senate and is pending.) Both Republican and Democratic leaders in the House International Relations Committee agreed to not allow for any witnesses opposing the bill to testify at the committee hearings for the bill, which a major shift away from previous U.S. policy that stressed engagement with the nationalist government in Damascus. Given the already somewhat limited trade between the United States and Syria, as well as Syria's growing commercial ties with western European countries, the impact of the sanctions will minimal. What is noteworthy about the vote, however, is that a careful reading of the bill reveals a rather frightening consensus in support of the Bush administration's unilateralist worldview. Only four of the 435-member House of Representatives cast a dissenting vote. Ironically, both politically and economically, Syria has liberalized significantly over the past decade or so. The level of repression is far less than it was during its peak in the 1970s and is significantly less than a number of other Middle Eastern countries, including close U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the size and power of Syria's military has been reduced dramatically from its apex in the 1980s as a result of the dissolution of its Soviet patron. Syrian links to international terrorism have also declined markedly. This begs the question as to why this resolution was passed now? The answer may lie in today's unipolar world system where the United States, rather than supporting comprehensive and law-based means of promoting regional peace and security, insists upon the right to impose unilateral demands targeted at specific countries based largely upon ideological criteria. As the one-sidedness of the vote on this resolution indicates, both the Republicans and the Democrats--including the most liberal wing of the party--now accept this vision of U.S. foreign policy. There are still many reasonable criticisms that can be directed at the authoritarian regime of Bashar Assad and its policies. However, the resolution imposing the sanctions is so filled with hyperbole and double-standards that it undermines its own credibility. In fact, its real purpose may be to simply demonize a government whose main offense appears to be its refusal to support the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. The primary grievances expressed in the legislation against Syria are in regard to the regime's alleged support for international terrorism, its ongoing military presence in Lebanon, its hostility toward Israel, the alleged military threat from its weapons of mass destruction, its alleged support for the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and those Iraqis resisting the U.S. occupation, and its status as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. (Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco, and serves as the Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project (online at www.fpif.org). He is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage, 2002--available through the FPIF/IRC Bookstore).)
NEW CHENEY FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER
SETS SITES ON SYRIA
Vice President Dick Cheney's office continues to grow as a homebase for prominent neoconservative foreign policy strategists. Earlier this year Aaron Friedberg, a prominent neoconservative China hawk joined Cheney's staff, (China Hawk Settles in Neocons' Nest, http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305friedberg.html). The latest addition is David Wurmser, a neoconservative strategist who has long called for the United States and Israel to work together to "roll back" the Ba'ath-led government in Syria, who joins Cheney's staff as an adviser on the Middle East. Wurmser, who had been working for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, joined Cheney's staff under its powerful national security director, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, in mid-September, according to Cheney's office. The move is significant, not only because Cheney is seen increasingly as the dominant foreign-policy influence on President George W. Bush, but also because it adds to the notion that neoconservatives remain a formidable force under Bush despite the sharp plunge in public confidence in Bush's handling of post-war Iraq resulting from the faulty assumptions propagated by the "neocons" before the war. Given the recent intensification of tensions between Washington and Damascus--most recently touched off by this month's U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution deploring an Israeli air attack on an alleged Palestinian camp outside Damascus and approval by the House of Representatives of a bill that would impose new economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria--Wurmser's rise takes on added significance. His status as a favored protegé of arch-hawk and former Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) also speaks loudly to Middle East specialists who note Perle's long-time close association with Cheney, Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld's chief deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz was the first senior administration official to suggest that Washington might take action against Syria amid reports last April that Damascus was sheltering senior Iraqi leaders and weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the U.S. invasion. ''There's got to be a change in Syria," Wolfowitz said at the time, accusing the government of President Bashar Assad of "extreme ruthlessness." Rumsfeld subsequently accused Syria of permitting Islamic "jihadis" to infiltrate Iraq to fight U.S. troops. Perle, who last week was in Israel to receive a special award from the "Jerusalem Summit," an international group of right-wing Jews and Christian Zionists who describe themselves as defenders of "civilization" against "Islamic fundamentalism," has made no secret of his own desires for confrontation with Damascus. In a series of interviews, Perle applauded Israel's attack on Syrian territory--the first since the 1967 war--in alleged retaliation for a Palestinian suicide bombing in Israel. "I am happy to see the message was delivered to Syria by the Israeli air force, and I hope it is the first of many such messages," he said. Perle also said he "hope(d)" the U.S. would itself take action against Damascus, particularly if it turned out that Syria was acting as a financial or recruitment base for the insurgency in Iraq. "Syria is itself a terrorist organization," he asserted, insisting that Washington would not find it difficult to send troops to Damascus despite its commitment in Iraq. "Syria is militarily very weak," he said. Damascus has been in Wurmser's sights at least since he began working with Perle at AEI in the mid-1990s. For the latter part of the decade, he wrote frequently in support of a joint U.S.-Israeli effort to undermine then-President Hafez Assad in hopes of destroying Baathist rule and hastening the creation of a new order in the Levant to be dominated by "tribal, familial, and clan unions under limited governments." Indeed, it was precisely because of the strategic importance of the Levant that Wurmser advocated overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in favor of an Iraqi National Congress (INC) closely tied to the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. "[W]hoever inherits Iraq dominates the entire Levant strategically," he wrote in one 1996 paper for the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. (Jim Lobe is a political analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.)
SELF DETERMINATION STRUGGLE IN
THE WESTERN SAHARA CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE UN
After much wrangling from the French, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1495 right on the July 31st deadline for the rollover of the MINURSO peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. In the best diplomatic tradition, the resolution affirmed the commitment to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, even while it seriously compromised on it by supporting a peace plan that would allow the Moroccan settlers in the territory to vote on independence in five years. As with Israeli settlers on the West Bank, these Moroccan colonists are there in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits countries from transfering their civilian population onto territories seized by military force. The Security Council had fought off a similar plan last year, but this time former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's special representative, adjusted the plan to provide for a genuine Sahrawi autonomy in the five years before the proposed referendum. This was an ominous sign for the increasingly autocratic rule of King Mohammed in Morocco itself, not to mention leading to uncertainty about the result of the referendum: one fixed principle of Rabat's policy has been never to allow a vote that its principals cannot control. The Polisario Front and its principal ally Algeria had surprised everyone two weeks earlier by supporting the new plan. It may even be that they supported the plan precisely because they knew Rabat would oppose it. For weaker states, it is sound diplomatic strategy to maneuver your opponents into defying the United States and the rest of the world. In the longer term, it looks as if Polisario and Algeria have scored a significant diplomatic victory by playing along with Baker's peace proposals and the resolution that was moved by the United States. Morocco's one small victory was that the resolution cited Chapter VI of the UN Charter dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than Chapter VII which would have implied mandatory implementation of UN decisions. There are some striking similarities between Morocco's takeover of Western Sahara and Indonesia's takeover of East Timor that same year, giving some hope that--as with East Timor--international law and basic principles of justice might win out over realpolitik. Indeed, the Polisario has had far more diplomatic support than the Fretilin ever did, with their Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic being formally recognized by 75 countries and the SADR sitting as a full member state in the Organization of African Unity. However, there are two factors working against Sahrawi independence. One is that despite their impressive efforts at building well-functioning democratic institutions in the self-governed refugee camps where the majority of their people live, the Sahrawis have never had the degree of international grassroots solidarity that the East Timorese were able to develop, which eventually eroded support of the Indonesian occupation by Western powers. Secondly, the Moroccan monarchy from the beginning has used its conquest of what it calls "the Sahara provinces" as a means of maintaining its nationalist credentials and popular support despite its autocratic and corrupt rule and the nation's struggling economy. The United States has long seen the Moroccan monarchy as a linchpin in advancing Western interests in the region, first as a bulwark against Communist influence and more recently against radical Islam. If Morocco lost the referendum for Western Sahara after pouring in such a tremendous amount of financial resources and lives for the sake of controling the territory, it could lead to enormous instability and perhaps even the monarchy's overthrow. In addition, there is the economic interest in the mineral-rich territory: The Moroccans have just given an exploration contract in the territory to an American oil company, Kerr McGee, which has strong links to Vice President Dick Cheney and the Texas oil gang in the administration, which includes Baker. Of course, one would, in the best spirit of Casablanca, be shocked, shocked, to think that this had anything to do with his or the administration's public espousal of the Moroccan position. The granting of a concession to TotalFinaElf naturally helped make France's already strong support even more fervent. However, Morocco's case was hindered rather than helped by the contracts. In response, the Security Council asked for a legal opinion from UN Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Hans Corell. His low-key report was nevertheless devastating for the Moroccan legal position, reminding council members that Morocco's occupation was in defiance of rulings by both the International Court of Justice and the Security Council itself, since no valid act of self-determination has yet to take place. After alienating much of the international community for undermining the United Nations' authority and running roughshod over international legal principles in regard to Israel/Palestine and Iraq, the Bush administration may be reluctant to push its luck too far in making it possible for its Moroccan ally to get away with such an illegitimate territorial aggrandizement. Such moderation in U.S. foreign policy, however, may be possible only if the international community and the American public make it politically difficult for the Bush administration to do otherwise. (Ian Williams contributes frequently to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org) on UN and international affairs. Stephen Zunes is the Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org). He serves as an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco and is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage, 2002--available through the FPIF/IRC Bookstore.)
A NEW BEGINNING FOR WTO AFTER CANCUN
Forget the spin you have been reading about the "failure" of the World Trade Organization meeting in Cancun. It was one of the most successful international meetings in years because it redefined how trade can benefit the poor and how the developing world can be real players in these negotiations. In fact, if policymakers and global trade negotiators were paying attention, Cancun could lead to trade talks that actually bring about fair trade, and the benefits to both the developing and the developed world that have long been promised. What did we learn in Cancun? Three things: First, that equitable and effective global trade agreements can't be negotiated when the balance of power rests exclusively with the wealthiest nations. Second, that civil society has a legitimate and useful role in these discussions. And third, that fair trade, trade that ensures that producers are paid a fair price and workers are paid fair wages, is the world's best hope for a sustainable trading environment. The most remarkable success in Cancun was the WTO meeting itself. What happened was simply that most of the countries refused to go along with the demands made by the cabal that has been running things up until now. It was the first time that the World Trade Organization began to feel like a truly global organization--not just an extension of the US government's foreign and domestic economic policy. In previous Ministerial meetings, there have been small hints of shifting power relations at the WTO, but Cancun was a breakthrough: a giant shift in the balance of forces in global politics. A second outstanding feature of the Cancun meeting was the working partnership between many governments, especially from the developing world, with non-governmental and civil society groups that provided much needed technical analysis and just plain old political support. At both the Ministerial level and in the day-to-day negotiations at WTO headquarters in Geneva, developing country governments with smaller staff face a severe disadvantage straining to keep up with the blizzard of proposals and frenzy of meetings. In fact, this makes up a critical element of US government strategy--to keep other countries off balance and on the defensive in these talks. In the lead-up to Cancun, many of the officials from these countries acknowledged the useful informational role played by NGOs and civil society to counter this challenge. Third, there was the International Fair Trade Fair, the first ever gathering of producers from around the world that market their goods and services on the basis of global trade rules written to benefit the poor. For those paying attention, the Fair Trade Fair of Cancun could provide the inspiration and ideas for a way out of the current WTO deadlock. The basic principles are simple: make sure that producers are paid a fair price and that workers are paid fair wages. In addition, certified fair trade rules require direct connections between the buyers and producers and continuous environmental improvement. It is a matter of political will, not a lack of good ideas that led to the Cancun collapse. With enough political will, great ideas like fairly traded goods and fair trade rules can carry us forward towards long-term prosperity. Cancun is probably best understood as an open door for genuinely worldwide trade negotiations. A real balance in political power at the WTO could usher in an era of more sustainable systems of local and regional production and consumption as well as greater democracy and social justice globally. (Mark Ritchie is President of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (online at www.iatp.org). Kristin Dawkins is IATP's Vice President for International Programs and a member of the Advisory Committee for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
II. Outside the U.S.U.S. GETTING TOUGHER ON SERBIA
With three little words, the United States Senate has set itself on what seems to be a collision course with Belgrade over the surrender of The Hague's most wanted man. The fateful words--"including Ratko Mladic"--appear tucked away inside a financing bill for American aid to Serbia. If, as seems probable, the bill becomes law, Belgrade will have to choose between holding onto General Mladic, the former head of the Bosnian Serb army who is one of the men The Hague tribunal wants to put on trial, and getting aid money for its shattered economy. The Senate bill does not come in isolation. Last weekend, Secretary of State Colin Powell demanded action in handing over both Mladic and the former Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic. And U.S. war crimes ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper, visiting the Bosnian Serb capital Banja Luka, announced a U.S. $5 million bounty for anyone bringing Karadzic in, though of course "dead or alive" does not apply--The Hague needs him alive. Meanwhile NATO troops and Hague investigators have launched 11 armed raids across Republika Srpska to grab documents needed for prosecutions. All this followed last week's annual reports by Hague president Judge Theodor Meron and Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, cataloguing their continuing cooperation problems with Belgrade and Zagreb. Now, according to Del Ponte, Serbia is not just refusing to cooperate, but threatening to withdraw support. The key issue exercising American minds is that the court is supposed to close in 2010--but it cannot close if all the cases are not finished. And those cases will not be finished until all indictees have been brought in. In 2001, Congress agreed to give Belgrade's new democratic government more time to arrest suspects. And in 2002, it agreed to give it more time. Earlier this year, yet more time was given after the shock assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister who had bravely engineered the arrest of Milosevic. But now the waiting time appears to be almost over, with the Senate bill expected to become law sometime in the next few weeks. For Serbia, it means losing not just U.S. aid, but possibly also funding from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Meanwhile, Croatia is facing a different fate--its refusal to hand over key suspect Ante Gotovina could mean that the European Union blocks its entry to the early stages of membership talks. Both nations have similar problems. Fragile governments are worried that arresting generals who are popular figures will trigger a nationalist backlash. Then there is the problem of finding these men. Right now, Hague officials think that the whereabouts of Gotovina and Mladic are known--the former is rumored to be living on a yacht in Croatian territory, and the Serb general in the town of Valjevo, in central Serbia. But if their respective governments decide to arrest them, both could slip away. Karadzic has remained free in Bosnia for eight years despite being hunted by the world's most powerful military alliance. One thing is certain--America has lost patience, and wants to see the remaining war crimes suspects rounded up. Belgrade and Zagreb have run out of time. (Chris Stephen is the Institute for War Peace Reporting's (www.iwpr.net) project manager in The Hague. This is reprinted with permission by Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)
III. Letters and CommentsRe: In Afghanistan, U.S. Replaces One Terrorist State With Another The setting up of a different terrorist state than what previously existed in Afghanistan by the U.S. comes as no surprise to this old man. I've been watching this country do that for the past 50 years. What the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan is really not any different than what has been done to Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Columbia, Haiti, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Venezuela, Chili, Peru, and the list goes on and on. This country has the very bad habit of supporting those governments that are willing to sell their country off to the highest U.S. corporate bidder. The same thing is now going on in Afghanistan and Iraq. Profits over People is becoming the primary thrust of this country. And to insure this, the U.S. continues to support some of the worst despots, crooks, liars, and thieves in the Western Hemisphere. Columbia is a prime example of this very thing. The U.S. demonizes some (especially if they have resources we want) and glorify others (the ones that go along with U.S. globalization plans). Word limits prevent detailed examples. I'll email them to anyone that asks. Jack Dalton <jack_dalton@ommp.org>
Re: The War in Iraq is Not Over, Nor Are the Lies to Justify It This is one of the best point-by-point analyses I have seen of President Bush's address. Factual, to-the-point, and free of baseless name-calling, it effectively rebuts the dishonest statements with honest facts. This article is extremely well done. - Ken Leonard <kl_tklwgl@hotmail.com>
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