The Progressive Response

Volume 8, Number 8
March 18, 2004

Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC)

We Count on Your Support!
Foreign Policy In Focus	www.fpif.org

The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email <feedback@fpif.org> to share your thoughts with us.

John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <john@irc-online.org>.

I. Updates and Out-Takes

THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION
By Phyllis Bennis

RENDERING AN ACCOUNT ON IRAQ
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

IRAQ ONE YEAR LATER
By Stephen Zunes

THE PEACE MOVEMENT ONE YEAR LATER
By Mark Engler

BAIT AND SWITCH? HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
By Julie A. Mertus

PETITION TO CONGRESS ON THE PLIGHT OF HAITI IN LIGHT OF DESTABILIZATION
TransAfrica Forum, Foreign Policy in Focus, Ecumenical Program on Central America & the Caribbean (EPICA), and Global Justice, Inc.

II. Letters and Comments

SYRIA IS NEXT

I. Updates and Out-Takes

THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION
By Phyllis Bennis

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new set of talking points available in full at http://www.fpif.org/cgaa/talkingpoints/0403iraq-const.html .)

The signing of the interim Iraqi “Constitution” by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly “Iraqi” legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th “transfer of power” will be accepted globally as the “restoration of sovereignty to Iraq.” In fact, that “transfer of power” will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The Constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all “laws, regulations, orders, and directives” issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.

The new Iraqi Constitution lacks legitimacy. It was drafted under U.S. supervision by a body hand-chosen by the U.S. military occupation authorities, and subject to final approval by the U.S. proconsul, Paul Bremer.

The Constitution describes only a vague process to select the new transitional government to which the U.S. will “transfer power” on June 30th.

The Iraq Governing Council holds on to power. Since the Constitution says nothing about how the interim government will actually be selected, the unspoken understanding is that the Governing Council--perhaps enlarged by additional U.S.-selected individuals, perhaps in its current form--will remain the center of Iraqi authority.

The Constitution calls for a federal system of government, in which, despite language to the contrary, the sectors are almost certain to be determined by Iraqis' ethnic and religious identity. This causes three major problems: 1) there is no representation for Iraqis who identify first as Iraqi citizens, and only secondarily as Shia'a, Kurds, or whatever. 2) The ethnic/religious quotas assume that all Kurds, Shia'a, Sunni, Assyrians, or others represent monolithic political blocs. 3) A system based on ethnic or religious sectoral interests is inherently unstable, in most cases giving minority and majority populations too little or too much power, and undermining national identity as Iraqis.

The Constitution creates a federal system but leaves vague what powers remain with the national government and what devolves to the regions.

The Constitution asserts a set of individual political rights, as well as economic and social rights significantly advanced, though not absolutely unprecedented, in the Arab world.

The relationship between religious law and individual liberty remains unclear.

Issues missing from the Constitution. The new document does not address crucial questions even for the interim period itself. It does not identify the means of choosing the new interim government beyond “deliberations and consultations.” It leaves undefined the future legality and power of sectarian militias existing in a legal vacuum. The language states that militias and armed factions outside of the to-be-created Transitional Government “are prohibited, except as provided by federal law,” implying that a law drafted in the future granting the Kurdish Pesh Merga forces or a Shia'a militia or anything else would be deemed within the constitutional framework.

(Phyllis Bennis is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).)

RENDERING AN ACCOUNT ON IRAQ
By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0403iraq-ann.html .)

The first anniversary of the beginning of the 2003 war against Iraq is upon us.

Like good and faithful stewards, it is time for the Bush administration to give an accounting to its employer, the U.S. public. Some questions relative to the Iraq war and the period following for those entrusted with the nation’s future--and honest answers from them--might include:

What has been achieved over the past year?

Saddam Hussein’s brutal, self-serving, and surprisingly incompetent regime has been removed from power. Most of the former regime’s key players have been killed or captured, including Saddam himself.

At the provincial and local (town and village) levels, the Iraqi people are choosing councils to discuss and resolve local issues. Baghdad alone has 88 such councils. Civil society is beginning to emerge in many areas, but its development remains susceptible to the security situation.

A “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period” has been adopted by the U.S.-appointed 25 member Iraqi Governing Council. Due to go into effect July 1, 2004, it is to serve as the guide for elections of a National Assembly, the appointment of an interim government, the writing of and referendum on a new Iraqi constitution, and the election of a full-fledged, federal-style government. On the other hand, it may only lead to divisive wrangling and the disintegration of Iraq.

What remains to be done? How long will it take?

Find the weapons of mass destruction that the Bush administration said made Saddam Hussein an imminent threat to the U.S., the original justification for starting this war. The search may be scaled back by the June 30 transition of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the transitional government; it probably will end by December 2005 when the permanent government is to be elected.

Obtain as soon as possible a full and public explanation of the use or abuse of information by the intelligence agencies in forming their judgments, and the use or abuse of intelligence by policymakers in their communications with the U.S. public and with other governments.

Provide reliable, consistent physical security for the Iraqi population. The old regime had, at most, passing interactions with al Qaeda “adherents.” Now Iraq has become a battleground not only involving disaffected Iraqis but also extremists targeting U.S. forces and Iraqis working with the U.S.-led CPA or foreign military forces. This may not be achieved for as long as five years, and certainly not until a better trained, reliable police force, border police, and regular army are available.

Rebuild Iraq. While a start has been made, the remaining tasks are enormous. Other nations have pledged about $14 billion for this effort; the U.S. contribution so far is more than $20 billion. Estimates of the final cost vary, but most are in the $75 to $100 billion range, with some predicting as much as $200 billion over the next decade.

What was (or should have been) learned?

Preventive (the administration’s “preemptive”) war cannot be “justified.”

In peace operations and nation-building (or rebuilding) endeavors, well-planned, swift responses are required to prevent the development of a security and public safety vacuum. It is less costly if the intervening multinational force is powerful enough to unmistakably be “in charge” vis-à-vis armed groups that might otherwise try to intimidate the population or even seize control of the country in question.

Building coalitions and obtaining the backing of the UN spreads the responsibilities, burdens, and costs of diplomatic and--where necessary--military actions. Strong coalitions, endorsed by the UN, by presenting a solid world front, can induce a retreat from confrontation by a state whose policies and actions are offensive to the majority of nations.

Democracy cannot be imposed by force or by an outside power.

In war as in all life, the law of unintended consequences governs. Reality has an iron law of its own: one never knows what one doesn’t know until those unknowns reveal themselves.

(Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)

IRAQ ONE YEAR LATER
By Stephen Zunes

(Editor’s Note: FPIF’s Middle East editor Stephen Zunes explores the status of the U.S. occupation of Iraq one year after the invasion began. The following excerpt is from a new policy report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004iraq-ann.html .)

A full year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, while the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein is over, the killing continues and the quality of life for most Iraqis has actually deteriorated. Meanwhile, the United States is continuing to sacrifice lives and money in an enterprise for which the original rationales--eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its support for the al Qaeda terrorist network--are now widely acknowledged to be false.

The violence in reaction to the U.S. occupation has consisted of both urban guerrilla warfare against U.S. and other occupation forces, led primarily by Baathist and other nationalist militias, and terrorism against Iraqi and foreign civilians, presumably led by domestic or foreign radical Islamists. There is also small-scale and potentially large-scale nonviolent resistance, particularly in the Shiite community.

The guerrilla attacks, while responsible for fewer deaths overall, have been the primary concern for U.S. officials. Though dismissed simply as supporters of the old regime, their support appears to be much deeper. A CIA report at the end of last year acknowledged that “there are thousands in the resistance--and not just hardcore Baathists” and that “the resistance is broad, strong, and getting stronger.”

Much of the armed resistance appears to be under the control of Baathists, but--with the capture and killing of most senior Baath officials loyal to Saddam Hussein--they appear to be mid-level Baathists who were more independent and not saddled with the baggage of the old regime. For example, Samarra--which is a center of anti-occupation resistance--was also a center for anti-Saddam elements of the Baath Party.

Even if some sort of Iraqi government emerges in July, it may mean little in terms of the military commitment of the United States. President Bush may be able to claim that the United States is no longer an occupying army but there at the invitation of the legitimate government of Iraq. The fact is, however, that whatever government emerges in July will be directly or indirectly appointed by the United States, which illegally invaded and occupied the country. It is less important whether the occupier sees its presence as an occupation than it does the people of the country itself. The Americans may have declared that their presence in Vietnam was at the request of the government of South Vietnam and the Soviets may have declared that their presence in Afghanistan was at the request of the government of Afghanistan, but as long as the people of a given country see them as a foreign occupying army, it matters little whether the government they install “invites” them to stay.

While it would be a mistake to believe that U.S. forces will successfully crush the Iraqi resistance in short order, it would also be a mistake to assume that the resistance will grow significantly or drive the American occupation forces out. The United States has several advantages: U.S. forces have access to sophisticated surveillance technology, which far surpasses earlier counter-insurgency campaigns, that can track down and root out resistance cells. The resistance does not have mountains and jungles in which to hide, nor an outside source of arms and support. The paranoid “snitch culture” from years of totalitarian rule makes it difficult for insurgents to create trustworthy underground networks. The use of terrorism by some resistance forces--which has primarily harmed Iraqi civilians--has alienated huge segments of the population from the resistance as a whole.

On the other hand, U.S. occupation forces have killed far more Iraqi civilians--albeit accidentally in most cases--than have the terrorists, and the occupation itself is extremely unpopular.

(Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of politics and chair of the peace & justice studies program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus project <www.fpif.org> and is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).)

THE PEACE MOVEMENT ONE YEAR LATER
By Mark Engler

(Editor’s Note: The excerpt from this new policy report (available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004peace.html) explores the accomplishments and challenges facing the peace movement one year after the invasion of Iraq.)

One year after the start of war in Iraq, the peace movement in the United States faces an unusual predicament. Critics of the invasion had many of their key arguments vindicated in the past year, as President Bush's case for war has collapsed. Likewise, activists can take substantial credit for emboldening Democratic criticisms of the Bush administration and for keeping war-related scandals in the spotlight. Yet even as we sense that greater space for progressive activism in the country is opening, it has been hard to maintain a sense of unity and purpose within the peace movement itself.

On March 20, the one-year anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, opponents of the war and the ongoing occupation will stage protests and memorials in countries across the globe. The actions will recall the massive demonstrations that took place before the war. However, they will be far smaller than the protests of early 2003.

This set of circumstances raises two key questions: What has the peace movement accomplished? And where do we go from here?

Reflection on these two questions is vital, not because it will magically give the movement a bold new direction or clear up all confusion among supporters about where peace activism now stands. Rather, only by standing back can we crystallize the strains of thinking that are circulating between different activists, and spark further discussion about strategies for going forward. Therefore, this paper will consider each of the questions in turn, with the goals of providing an overview of what has happened so far and of evaluating current ideas about movement strategy.

Since the end of combat operations, peace activists have struggled to present a unified message, structured campaign goals, or a plan for escalating dissent. The call to "Bring the Troops Home Now" is not universally accepted even amongst those who oppose the U.S. occupation, and it often muddies the waters by focusing on technical discussion of if and how the international community should play a greater role in furthering Iraqi sovereignty. The slogan for the March 20 protests, "The World Still Says No to War," is not fashioned to provide a new alternative or to convey a sense of fresh demands.

Some prominent writers have proposed campaigns that might inaugurate a new phase of the peace movement. Tariq Ali has proposed an international movement to close some of the 702 U.S. military bases abroad. Arundhati Roy has suggested a targeted campaign against two selected corporations profiting from Iraq, and the organization Direct Action to Stop the War has continued its focus on corporate profiteers. Naomi Klein has argued for a focus on stopping the privatization of the Iraqi economy.

Each of these proposals merits consideration, especially on the international level. But in the U.S., they must be put in the context of the one dominant strategy to which organizations and activists have actually committed themselves already: The drive to achieve "regime change at home."

(Mark Engler, a writer based in New York City, is a commentator for Foreign Policy in Focus. He can be reached via the web site http://www.DemocracyUprising.com. Research assistance for this article provided by Jason Rowe.)

BAIT AND SWITCH? HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
By Julie A. Mertus

(Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new policy report available in full at http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004rights.html .)

In the aftermath of the failure to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, human rights have become the most prominent justification for the Iraq War in statements by President George W. Bush and other administration officials. This represents the latest of what has become a routine pattern for numerous U.S. administrations: invoking human rights to justify a range of foreign policy decisions and military ventures. But this human rights talk has not been supported by a human rights walk. Policymakers consistently apply a double standard to human rights norms: one that the rest of the world must observe but which the U.S. can safely ignore.

Talk of human rights has become the political equivalent of a “bait and switch tactic.” Like the car salesman promoting an amazing but bogus deal in order to get people into his showroom and to boost his reputation as a preferred dealer, politicians champion human rights in order to induce desired behaviors in others and to nurture a positive self-image. Then, as soon as the desired behavior occurs, they offer a substitute sentiment unreflective of a genuine concern for rights. Instead of promoting just solutions to contemporary foreign policy dilemmas, rights talk is becoming just another way to dupe otherwise-unwilling allies into supporting U.S. interests.

There is nothing wrong with human rights per se, but they are often opportunistically seized upon as the best available choice for framing arguments and making policy choices. Other options, which may not be intrinsically bad, look less appealing when compared to the pretty veneer of human rights. What is wrong is that human rights remains only an option and has not achieved the status of an imperative. Furthermore, in interplay with other policies, human rights are vulnerable to misuse by powerful states plying the cause for their own benefit.

The misuse of human rights gets to the heart of international relations theories about how norms spread and gain influence. For a long time, the most popular theory of norm diffusion has been the socialization and persuasion approach championed by such international relations thinkers as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink. According to this school of thought, dialogue, communication, and argumentation are essential mechanisms for the socialization of norms. Arguing for the inherent goodness of human rights may shame states into action in individual instances, and, as human rights norms are internalized, this process may provoke a shift in identity, interests, and expectations. The best advocates are those that make the most convincing or skillful argument in favor of one norm over another.

One could point to significant evidence that human rights arguments are indeed powerful tools for framing policy issues and can influence behavior. After all, in recent years, regardless of administration, both the White House and Pentagon have repeatedly invoked human rights concerns as justifications for their actions. But in those cases where human rights advocates are successful, have they really persuaded anyone in a broad or transformative sense, or have they only managed to convince someone to apply their approach to a specific, isolated case?

The socialization theory of norm diffusion has serious shortcomings. If we could get into President Bush's head when he speaks about human rights, what would we find? Given the instrumental and selective manner in which the Bush administration employs human rights, can we really point to a shift in the identity, interests, or expectations of anyone in the White House? Can we ever really tell if someone's sentiments have shifted? More importantly, does a sentiment shift matter if behavior does not change? Why is it that U.S. foreign policy, regardless of administration, continues to address in a selective and self-serving manner the violation of human rights by other countries while refusing to apply the same international standards to its own behavior?

(Julie Mertus, a professor of human rights at American University's School of International Service, is the author of Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2004) and Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (University of California Press, 1999).)

PETITION TO CONGRESS ON THE PLIGHT OF HAITI IN LIGHT OF DESTABILIZATION
By Foreign Policy in Focus, Ecumenical Program in Central America and the Caribbean (EPICA), TransAfrica Forum, and Global Justice, Inc.

(Editor’s Note: FPIF, in collaboration with EPICA, TransAfrica Forum, and Global Justice, Inc. has drafted a petition framing a policy agenda for U.S. policy toward Haiti. Organizations and individuals can endorse the statement at http://www.fpif.org/form_haiti-petition.html .)

We, organizations and members of the international community, denounce the flagrant violation of international sovereignty laws by the United States government through its involvement in the overthrow of the democratically elected President of Haiti. The United States has entered Haiti without invitation of the Haitian government or its duly-elected president.

The Bush administration has overstepped its constitutional and moral authority. By no law of the United States is there any sanction given for the overthrow of a duly-elected government. Indeed, there are extensive laws that explicitly forbid it. This reckless usurpation of power further isolates the United States in the global community of nations and more closely resembles the activities of a rogue state.

We condemn the manner in which the Bush administration created the conditions for regime change in Haiti by obstructing the deployment of international assistance that had been specifically requested by President Aristide to halt the military opposition. What happened in Haiti may not be unprecedented, but remains a clear violation of international and federal laws, as well as being unethical and immoral.

The choices made by the Bush administration are causing irreparable harm to the Haitian people and further advance the notion that regime change should be the modus operandi in the relations between the United States and other countries with whom it disagrees.

We, as organizations that work for global justice, are not writing solely out of concern regarding the treatment of the administration of President Aristide of Haiti but also for the precedent it sets in light of the allegations of a direct U.S. role in the removal of an elected leader from office.

The problems caused by recent behavior by this administration, including the allegations here noted of forced removal of a president, sending of troops without specific authorization of Congress, and being actively complicit in the decay of a nation and the degradation of its people, causes us to respectfully urge Congress convoke a Commission with wide-ranging authority to examine U.S. government activities as they relate to Haiti in these five areas:

Removal of the duly-elected president of Haiti
Obstruction of economic aid to Haiti--whether directly or indirectly--during President Aristide’s term of office
Using convicted criminals and thugs to attain the overthrow of the Haitian government
Using disinformation to foment discontent in Haiti
Permitting convicted criminals and terrorists to operate freely in the United States

Therefore, we, the signatories of this letter demand:

A condemnation of the coup and a return of Haiti to constitutional democracy.
That Congress investigates the role of the United States government, including the military and various intelligence agencies, in the destabilization campaign against Haiti’s democracy and their role in the overthrow of President Aristide.
Cessation of any and all U.S. overt and covert support for continuing repression in Haiti. Arrest of the criminals and death squad leaders and no reconstitution of the Haitian army. An immediate disarming of the so-called military opposition and the immediate detaining of known Haitian convicted criminals and terrorists operating on U.S. soil.
Grant refugee status to Haitians fleeing the current situation; suspend Haitian deportations indefinitely; grant temporary protective status to Haitian nationals currently residing in the United States, given the serious political crisis in Haiti.
Immediate resumption of humanitarian and economic assistance and emergency aid to the people of Haiti.

II. Letters and Comments

SYRIA IS NEXT

Re: It's Time to Engage, Not Isolate, Syria

It appears to me that this is the start of the Bush administration's attempt to weaken Syria for the kill just like they did with Iraq. Fox News has jumped on the bandwagon and is bad-mouthing Syria like crazy when they never said anything before. It took the administration a while to soften up Iraq for the kill; they can continue all summer and be ready for another "necessary" war after Bush is re-elected. I've read that the neocons have Syria on their agenda for the next county to be taken over. It looks like they've started.

- Norma Scalise <nscalise@omm.com>

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<table width="600" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tr valign="top"> <td width="539"><h1 align="left">The Progressive Response</h1> Volume 8, Number 4 February 9, 2004 Editor: John Gershman, Interhemispheric Resource Center (<a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">IRC</a>) </td> <td width="61"><a href="javascript:openTafWindow('/?action=etfform&url=http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume8/v8n08_body.html','TellAFriend','scrolling=yes,resizable,width=600,height=400')"><img src="../../images/icon_share.gif" width="38" height="27" border="0"></a> <a href="../../form_feedback.html" target="_parent"><img src="../../images/icon_feedback.gif" width="51" height="22" border="0" alt="Give us your feedback"></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><table width="600" cellpadding="5"> <tr> <td colspan="2"><div align="center"><a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">We Count on Your Support!</a></div></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Foreign Policy In Focus</td> <td> <div align="right"><a href="http://www.fpif.org/" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a></div></td> </tr> </table></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <div align="center"></div> <blockquote> <div align="left"> The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_blank">www.irc-online.org</a>) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/</a>, or email <<a href="mailto:feedback@fpif.org">feedback@fpif.org</a>> to share your thoughts with us. John Gershman, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) (online at <a href="http://www.irc-online.org/" target="_parent">www.irc-online.org</a>) and co-director of FPIF. He can be contacted at <<a href="mailto:john@irc-online.org">john@irc-online.org</a>>.   </div> </blockquote> <h2>Table of Contents</h2> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#nepal">NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR</a> By Conn Hallinan <a href="#iraqiwomen">IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ</a> By Jim Lobe <a href="#wrong">WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG</a> By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <a href="#unbacking">THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ</a> By Phyllis Bennis <a href="#libyan">LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS</a> By Stephen Zunes <a href="#blair">BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES</a> By Ian Williams </blockquote>   <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <blockquote> <a href="#best">THE BEST WE CAN DO</a> <a href="#interesting">VERY INTERESTING</a> </blockquote>   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>I. Updates and Out-Takes</h3> <a name="nepal" id="nepal"></a>NEPAL & THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: INTO THIN AIR By Conn Hallinan <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402nepal.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402nepal.html</a>). </blockquote> Tucked into the upper stories of the Himalayas, Nepal hardly seems ground zero for the Bush administration's next crusade against “terrorism,” but an aggressive American ambassador, a strategic locale, and a flood of U.S. weaponry threatens to turn the tiny country of 25 million into a counter-insurgency bloodbath. More than 8,000 Nepalese have died since a civil war broke out in 1996, and the death rate has sharply increased with the arrival of almost 8,400 American M-16 submachine guns, accompanied by U.S. advisers, high-tech night fighting equipment, and British helicopters. For most Americans, Nepal, birthplace of the Buddha and home to Everest, the world's highest mountain, is a charming tourist haven. For the native Nepalese, 42% of whom, according to the World Bank, live below the poverty line, Nepal is a land enchained by caste, riven with ethnic rivalries, and dominated by a feudal landlord class. The central protagonists in the current war are King Gyanendra, who abolished an elected parliament last year, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPNM), which is leading a rural insurrection, and a group of five political parties that found themselves out in the cold when the monarchy took over. The Bush administration has concluded that the civil war threatens to make Nepal a “failed state” and a haven for international terrorists, leading it to place the CPNM on the State Department's “Watch List,” along with organizations like al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and Lebanon's Hezbollah. U.S. Ambassador to Nepal, Michael E. Malinowski, compares CPNM leader, Baburam Bhattarai, to Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. Malinowski, whose track record includes service in Afghanistan and Pakistan, advocates an all-out military offensive aimed at the insurgency, and recently told the New York Times that the CPNM, “literally have to be bent back to the table.” But it was the Nepalese government's attempt to crush rural unrest that sparked the civil war in the first place, and virtually no one thinks there is a military solution to the insurrection. “The government forces, under the present policies, could win a couple of battles here and there,” writes analyst Romeet Kaul Watt in The Kashmir Tribune, “but will never win the war.” (Conn Hallinan <a href="mailto:connm@cats.ucsc.edu" target="_blank"><connm@cats.ucsc.edu</a>> is a provost at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a political analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="iraqiwomen" id="iraqiwomen"></a>IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PLANS LATEST ASSAULT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAQ By Jim Lobe <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402iraqwomen.html</a>). </blockquote> Iraq's governing council (IGC) has quietly approved a plan to replace some existing legal women's rights with Islamic law or “Shariah,” according to 44 U.S. lawmakers, who warn Washington of a “brewing women's rights crisis” in the U.S.-occupied country. This comes as women are facing broader assaults on women's rights and political power in Iraq. For example, while three women serve on the IGC, only one is in the cabinet and no women serve on the 24-member constitutional committee. One of the three female members of the IGC, a champion of women's rights, was killed this past fall and her replacement is widely viewed as a conservative. According to the Rocky Mountain News, when the adviser on human rights issues for the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, Salwa Ali, tried to be a part of the local elections in Baghdad, she found that the neighborhood was plastered with fliers stating that women were not allowed. In a letter sent to President George W. Bush on February 2, the national political leaders, led by Representatives Carolyn Maloney, Eddie Bernice Johnson, and Darlene Hooley, complain the move will reverse legal guarantees for Iraqi women, who were among the most liberated in the Arab world. “To prevent this order from taking effect, we strongly urge you and your administration to take steps now to protect the rights of Iraqi women,” wrote the lawmakers, who represent both the Republican Party and the Democrats. The White House had no immediate comment. The letter follows earlier reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups critical of the Bush administration's failure to adequately protect women's rights in occupied Iraq. The lawmakers were referring to IGC resolution 137, approved by the 25-member body Dec. 29, which replaces Iraq's 1959 personal-status legislation with religious laws to be administered by clerics from the country's different religious faiths, depending on the sect to which the parties in any dispute belonged. That change could affect everything from the right to education, employment, and freedom of movement, to property inheritance, divorce, and child custody, according to the letter's authors. The resolution must still be approved by the de facto government in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, in order to become legally binding. In a letter to Bremer on Jan. 30 MADRE, a New York-based international rights advocate for women, argued that IGC's action lacked transparency and was taken without any public debate or open consultation, with only a minority of council members present. “In less than 15 minutes of discussions, the IGC--none of whose members were elected by Iraqis--passed Resolution 137, effectively abolishing women's legal rights in 'liberated' Iraq,” said MADRE's associate director, Yifat Susskind. “Under the direct authority of the Bush administration, the IGC has privileged sectarianism over inclusiveness and violated core principles of democratic governance,” she said. Iraqi women are also protesting the resolution, according to recent press reports. “This will send us home and shut the door, just like what happened to women in Afghanistan,” Kurdish lawyer Amira Hassan Abdullah told the Washington Post last month. “The old law wasn't perfect, but this one would make Iraq a jungle. Iraq women will accept it over their dead bodies.” (Jim Lobe is a political analyst with Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>). He also writes regularly for Inter Press Service.) For More Information: MADRE Letter <a href="http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html%20" target="_blank">http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_resolution137.html </a> Paul Wolfowitz, “Women in the New Iraq,” Washington Post, February 1, 2004 <a href="http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html%20" target="_blank">http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Feb/03-11242.html </a> Amnesty International, Iraq's Women: Occupied Territory <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html" target="_blank">http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/iraqi_women.html</a> Woodrow Wilson Center conference on the role of women in Iraq: <a href="http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266" target="_blank">http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1411&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=28266</a> Open Society Institute, Casualties of War: Iraqi Women's Rights and Reality Then and Now (November 17, 2003) <a href="http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117%20" target="_blank">http://www.soros.org/initiatives/women/events/casualties_20031117 </a>   <a name="wrong" id="wrong"></a>WHY SO MANY WERE SO WRONG FOR SO LONG By Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) <blockquote> ( Editor's Note : Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402wrong.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402wrong.html </a>). </blockquote> It may have been fortuitous that David Kay's testimony about U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq came just before the Super Bowl. Watching the game--and the “flash dance” finale of the halftime show--the everyday observer could begin to understand the truth in the caution: “Don't believe everything you think you see.” Or in the case of instant replays, “re-see”--as in, “Did the Patriots really get those few inches and a first down?” David Kay has flatly stated that U.S. and other national intelligence agencies with which the U.S. has close ties essentially got it wrong on Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction. Kay traced the main failure to December 1998. Then the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) looking for weapons, toxic stockpiles, and missile delivery systems since 1991 was forced to withdraw because of the U.S.-UK Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign. Suddenly, the on-the-ground eyes and ears on which the U.S. intelligence community had relied since Operation Desert Storm vanished, leaving only easily spoofed optical and communications “spies in the skies.” Why were so many so wrong for so long? Essentially, because no one could fathom the wheels within wheels that existed within Saddam's inner circle, beginning with Saddam himself. In short, the most basic rule of intelligence--know your opponent--wasn't observed. George Tenet conceded as much in his speech at Georgetown on February 5, 2004 , in which he defended the pre-war performance of U.S. intelligence. And he specifically contradicted David Kay on individual points, leaving the public wondering where the truth lies. The baseline the intelligence agencies seemed to work from rested on two “irrefutable” premises. First, Saddam had produced, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons, had been working on developing a nuclear weapon capability, had produced biological agents, and had surface-to-surface missiles. Second, Saddam knew everything that happened in Iraq and was ruthless when someone crossed him. Flowing from the first premise was the assumption that Iraqis would not adjust to post-1991 realities. These included sanctions and the intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM--and the latter's 2002-2003 successor inspection agency. The second premise carried an implicit assumption that in a rigid, highly centralized society like Iraq , everything would be documented. Thus, the absence of documents detailing destruction of weapons and agents “proved” that large stockpiles still existed somewhere. David Kay said he could find no evidence that the assessments of analysts were influenced by or changed in response to pressure from any official. Given that Vice President Cheney paid multiple visits to CIA headquarters to speak to analysts and that an independent intelligence “unit” created in the Office of the Secretary of Defense fed raw information and its “analysis” directly to the White House, a red flag should have gone up the highest flagpole. Because of these and quite possibly other, unknown, visits and pressures, analysts would be prone to weave into assessments any information supporting their long-held suspicions as a “defense” against the extremist positions (e.g., Saddam is an imminent threat) of Bush administration officials. Similarly, analysts may have omitted the usual caveats to make their case more convincing. But the price of defending a “rational” position resting on old premises was to be so wedded to history that the actual situation, which occasionally was glimpsed, was not even considered to be possible. If Kay is right about the corruption in Iraq and the extent of the deception practiced on Saddam and others in the Baathist and military elites, in effect Iraq was on the verge of becoming a failed state ready to disintegrate at the slightest push. That push came in March 2003, and the resulting and continuing inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, and jihadist carnage attest to the danger Iraq has become to its neighbors as a result of the U.S.-led invasion. (Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org </a>), a retired U.S. army colonel and a senior fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.)   <a name="unbacking" id="unbacking"></a>THE U.S. BEGS FOR UN BACKING IN IRAQ By Phyllis Bennis <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new set of Talking Points available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402un.html" target="_self">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402un.html</a>). </blockquote> The U.S. is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington 's claim of legitimacy, is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help. Kofi Annan's decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the U.S., but also a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan's announcement indicated he was responding to the request of the U.S. occupation authorities and its hand-picked “governing council” to determine whether elections could be held by Washington's June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader definition of “what alternative arrangement would be acceptable” if not. Why Did the Bush Administration Change Their Line on the UN? 1) The utter and all-too-public failure of the U.S. occupation (especially the continuing deaths and mounting injuries of U.S. soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal power shift within the Bush administration, with the Pentagon ideologues tactically (and almost certainly temporarily) giving way to electorally focused considerations. In the battle between Rumsfeld/Cheney and Karl Rove, the Rumsfeld/Cheney team seems to have blinked first. 2) There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments continue to dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is Dick Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly refusing to even hint at an apology for launching Washington's war in the face of UN and broad international opposition, the fact that he left his undisclosed location at all to travel to European capitals urging greater international support for the U.S. in Iraq, even calling on (though only once) the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis, indicates a significant level of pressure on Cheney's longstanding antagonism to multilateralism and the UN. What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Refuses to Return to Iraq Under U.S. Terms? What is the Danger to the United Nations if it Agrees to U.S. Terms? 1) If the UN completely rejects the U.S. proposal that it return to Iraq under the auspices of the U.S. occupation, it faces the possibility of escalating marginalization by the Bush administration, further threats to its independence, and the likelihood of being deemed “irrelevant” by the world's sole super-power. Washington might make additional cuts in dues to the world organization and the humanitarian agencies, reduce its already insufficient political support, and increase its threats and punishments of UN member states who stand defiant. 2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq under terms set by the U.S. occupation, the dangers are even higher. The global organization risks a serious loss of international credibility, and the danger of being deemed an agent for or facilitator of occupation. Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in Iraq would again face the likely possibility of physical attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN was acting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed under extreme U.S. pressure, Security Council resolution 1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the U.S. occupation of Iraq; it does not provide any legitimacy. So, What Should Be Done 1) There should be an immediate end to U.S. occupation, and withdrawal of American troops. Because the U.S. invasion destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and undermined security for civilians throughout much of the country, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces should be followed by a temporary combined mandate for the United Nations, Arab League, and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to provide direct support for Iraq's reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid (including control over all international funds, including those coming from the U.S. Congress, designated for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security deployment. 2) The UN investigation team should reject the artificial U.S.-imposed June 30th deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what conditions would have to change before an election could be organized, assess what time frame would be required to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any election conducted under foreign military occupation could be free and fair. (Phyllis Bennis <<a href="mailto:pbennis@compuserve.com">pbennis@compuserve.com</a>> is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>).)   <a name="libyan"></a>LIBYAN DISARMAMENT A POSITIVE STEP, BUT THREAT OF PROLIFERATION REMAINS By Stephen Zunes <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../2004/0401libya.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0401libya.html</a>). </blockquote> In a world seemingly gone mad, it is ironic that one of the most sane and reasonable actions to come out of the Middle East recently has emanated from the government of Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator long recognized as an international outlaw. Libya's stunning announcement that it is giving up its nascent biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs and accepting international assistance and verification of its disarmament efforts is a small but important positive step in the struggle to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It would be a big mistake, however, to accept claims by the Bush administration and its supporters that it was the invasion of Iraq and other threatened uses of force against so-called "rogue states" which pursue WMD programs that led to Libya's decision to end its WMD programs. While Saddam Hussein was less than cooperative with United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) efforts in the 1990s, it appears that they were successful in ridding the country of its chemical and biological weapons and related facilities. The Iraqi regime was more cooperative during that period with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the IAEA announcing in 1998 that Iraq's nuclear program had been completely dismantled. When IAEA inspectors returned in the fall of 2002 as part of UN Security Council resolution 1441, they reported that no signs that the program had been revived. Iraq also allowed the return of a revived and strengthened inspections regime for chemical and biological weapons systems (known as UNMOVIC) at that time, which also found no evidence of any proscribed weapons or weapons programs. Despite this, the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew the government. As a result, Libya presumably knows that unilateral disarmament and allowing UN inspectors does not necessarily make you less safe from a possible U.S. invasion. More likely, Libya simply recognized that they would not get anything worthwhile as a result of continuing with an expensive, dangerous, and complex process of weapons development and would instead continue to face international isolation and difficulty obtaining certain dual-use technologies which could enhance the country's economic development. (Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He serves as Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_blank">www.fpif.org</a>) and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (online at <a href="http://www.commoncouragepress.com" target="_blank">www.commoncouragepress.com</a>).)   <a name="blair"></a>BLAIR'S PYRRHIC VICTORIES By Ian Williams <blockquote> (Editor’s Note: Excerpted from a new global affairs commentary available in full at <a href="../../commentary/2004/0402blair.html" target="_parent">http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0402blair.html</a>). </blockquote> On the face of it, Tony Blair had an almost Clintonesque week as he walked away from two separate train wrecks seemingly unhurt. However, beneath the surface, there are deep internal injuries that have left him seriously weakened. His escape on the University fees issue by the tiniest handful of defections among Labor rebels was only contrived by Gordon Brown exercising his influence on some of the more prominent of them. Brown is preparing the ground for a “more in sorrow than in anger” replacement of an unelectable Blair before the next elections. He has pre-emptively cleared himself of disloyalty by acting as the, strictly temporary, king-saver. The leadership conflict in the Labor Party has been brought forward all the more sharply by the other “victory,” the Hutton Report. The Law Lord may have done British Prime Minister Tony Blair no favors at all, since public opinion overwhelmingly sees the report as a whitewash, and thus that the government has something to hide. Even the Report's attack on the integrity of the BBC has backfired. Three times as many British people polled trusted the BBC as compared to trusting the government. Indeed almost the only supporters the government and the Report had were the Murdoch press, the Sun and Times. And even their readers may wonder whether a media empire that has never allowed the truth to interfere with the smooth flow of proprietary prejudices really has the proper standing to attack the BBC's journalistic standards. There was a germ of truth in some of the Report's criticisms of the BBC's journalism. Ironically, under Thatcherite and New Labor pressures, it has relaxed its previous standards. The news is no longer scripted and read, based on “balance,” airing both sides. The good aspect is that, even though nominally a state-owned body, it has proved far more skeptical of the government than its privately owned counterparts in the USA. But if Andrew Gilligan had but just a shade more balance and qualifications in his initial report, as in fact he did in later versions, then he would not have left the Achilles Heel that Blair's media minders and Hutton got a noose into. Without some admission on his part, the public has to decide whether the Prime Minister was sincere, but either misled or stupid. Or he could have been so desperate to please George W. Bush that he persuaded himself that more evidence actually existed than there really was. Or he was so mendacious, that to conceal his real agenda of regime change, he marshaled a set of excuses that later failed. None of these positions actually strengthen his position, so he may follow the example of the BBC's bosses and do the honorable thing. Resign before the election. But like them, he will need a shove. Brown is waiting. (Ian Williams <<a href="mailto:uswarreport@igc.org">uswarreport@igc.org</a>> contributes frequently to Foreign Policy in Focus (online at <a href="../../index.html" target="_parent">www.fpif.org</a>) on UN and international affairs.)   <hr size="1" noshade> <h3>II. Letters and Comments</h3> <a name="best" id="best"></a>THE BEST WE CAN DO Re: <a href="../..papers/03petropol/development.html">The Global Record on Oil</a> The best we European and American would do to end the waste of oil is to build smaller cars, go by bike, walk or take public transport electrically driven. And instead of spending money for exploring the Mars, we better invent electrically driven cars and use Earth Energy. And airplanes are, sorry to say, vehicles of the last century. Consumer must change their habits, above all. - Edwin Wagner, <a href="mailto:aewagth72@bluewin.ch"><aewagth72@bluewin.ch></a> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- <a name="interesting"></a>VERY INTERESTING Re: <a href="../../commentary/2003/0305roh.html" target="_parent">Eyes on Different Prizes </a> I found this article to be very interesting. Although I am young, I do have an interest in what happens in our world and how we would go about dealing with those issues. What I thought was the most interesting about this article was that how the U.S. and N. Korea have different goals set in my mind, I am pleased to hear that N. Korea abd S. Korea are working on their peace issues, and how we are building a better relationship then the one that we have with S. Korea already. Things obviously get rough but through our efforts and our patience we can get it all worked out. And with this article I think that's what we are doing with our best abilities. - Tina Dickerson, <a href="mailto:Wolfsreign@Wapda.com"><Wolfsreign@Wapda.com</a>>   <hr size="1" noshade> Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank&#151one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our bare-bones budget. Click on <a href="https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm" target="_parent">https://secure.iexposure.com/fpif.org/donate.cfm</a> to support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or through the mail. We Count on Your Support. 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